75 years ago, from 28 to 30 November 1943, a conference of the leaders of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was held
In 2017, Exmo Publishing House published Susan Butler's book Stalin and Roosevelt. Great partnership ”. To date, it is the most complete study of the history of the relationship between the two main figures of the Second World War. Two political giants representing two opposing social worlds, but who realized the need for a trusting partnership not only in the fight against German fascism, but also in the post-war world without wars.
S. Butler's book is valuable not only because it contains previously unknown details of the meetings between Stalin and Roosevelt, but, as it seems to us, first of all, by the author's immersion into the already distant past, which allows us to see what kind of reality the post-war world could become if not for sudden death F. Roosevelt. Let's say the well-known: history does not know the subjunctive mood, but this does not mean that it does not suggest an alternative to what has already happened. Whether the modern course of history will allow a return to the lost possibility of a world without war - this question becomes inevitable when reading Susan Butler's book.
Half a world path
The first meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt took place on November 28, 1943 in Tehran. It became possible after the victory of the Red Army in the grand battle of Kursk. Prior to that, Stalin rejected all proposals of the US President for a personal meeting, which, as the author of the book notes, he, Roosevelt, "tried to organize for two years and for which he made tremendous efforts and covered great distances." For the President of the United States, this required a lot of stoicism and courage, considering that in 1921, at the age of 39, he fell ill with polio - infantile paralysis. Roosevelt became a cripple and was doomed to move in a special wheelchair with the help of people close to him. A meeting with Stalin in Tehran obliged him to cover a distance of 17,442 miles. In other words, to travel more than half the world along the waters of the Atlantic Ocean on the battleship Iowa (she was accompanied by nine destroyers and one aircraft carrier, a group of fighters carried out constant observation), as well as by air by plane.
Before Tehran, Roosevelt proposed to Stalin various options for a possible meeting place: Iceland, southern Algeria, Khartoum, the Bering Strait, Fairbanks in Alaska, Cairo and Basra. Stalin rejected all these proposals due to their great remoteness from Moscow, where he daily performed the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Finally, he told Roosevelt: "For me, as Commander-in-Chief, the possibility of going beyond Tehran is excluded." The US President rejected this meeting place - too far from Washington. But after three days, very reluctantly, he agreed.
Roosevelt, on which S. Butler focuses, sought a personal meeting with Stalin, as they say, face to face, without Churchill's participation. We can say that he sought the location of his mission on the territory of the Soviet embassy in Tehran. In his message to Stalin, he directly put before him a seemingly casual but acute question: "Where do you think we should live?" As S. Butler writes, “he did not want the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the former Minister of Colonial Affairs of the largest colonial empire in the world, to hang around his neck. That is why, even at a conference in Cairo, he informed the British "that he wants to have freedom of action in Tehran."
Stalin was in no hurry to answer, but in the end he made the American president an offer to settle on Soviet territory. This "gave Churchill a great deal of mental pain." “Roosevelt traveled a long and dangerous journey to Tehran to get to know Stalin,” says S. Butler. “And for his plan to be realized, it was necessary to distance ourselves from Churchill,” which he did in Tehran, which will be discussed later. Roosevelt was looking for Stalin's trust, solid and complete trust. Why? It was in the interests of the United States of America, the interests of the imperialist, which Franklin Delano Roosevelt served. He understood well, according to S. Butler: “The war unpredictably changed all countries. After the war, there were only two superpowers left: America and Russia. "
The main reason for the personal meeting of the President of the United States with the Soviet leader
Roosevelt was a far-sighted politician and could not perceive the victories of the Red Army at Stalingrad and the Kursk Bulge other than, first of all, the victories of the industrial Urals over the industrial Ruhr. How powerful the military potential of Hitlerite Germany was after Stalingrad, before and after the Battle of Kursk, can be judged by the production of German aircraft and tanks in 1943-1944. In 1943, 25,527 combat aircraft and 5,995 tanks entered the front, in 1944, respectively, 39,807 aircraft and 8344 tanks. In the production of tanks, the USSR surpassed Germany in 1943, convincing proof of which was the unprecedented tank battle near Prokhorovka: the Soviet T-34 took over the German Tiger. In terms of the number of aircraft, Soviet aviation surpassed the German in 1944.
Before meeting with Stalin in Tehran, Roosevelt, with his practicality and strategic foresight, it was not difficult to guess that the Soviet state had the opportunity to defeat fascist Germany and on their own. Perhaps the first to foresee such a very likely outcome of the war against the USSR was Hitler. This can explain his decision to attack the Soviet country treacherously. It may seem paradoxical given the adventurousness of his mind, but it was Hitler who had priority in a realistic assessment of the growing industrial, and therefore, military power of the USSR. After a treacherous and at first successful invasion of the Soviet country, he confessed to his closest circle: “The more we learn about Soviet Russia, the more we rejoice that we struck the decisive blow in time. Indeed, in the next ten years, the Soviet Union would create many industrial centers of an unattainable level. It is even impossible to imagine what kind of weapons the Soviets would have, while Europe would continue to steadily degrade. Stalin, of course, should be treated with due respect. He's kind of a genius. His plans for economic development are so ambitious that only four-year (German - Yu.B.) plans can surpass them. The strength of the Russian people is not in its numbers or organization, but in the ability to generate personalities of Stalin's scale. "
And as if giving characteristics to the main characters of the Tehran conference, Hitler asserted: “In his political and military qualities, Stalin surpasses both Churchill and Roosevelt. This is the only world politician worthy of respect. " As you can see, the objective and subjective factors were taken into account by our main enemy. As for taking into account the growing industrial and military power of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt did it before Hitler, when he established diplomatic relations with our state.
Roosevelt was well aware of the grandiose industrialization of the USSR: he authorized the largest Soviet orders for industrial equipment of the highest technological level during the years of the depression of the American economy. He knew about the difficult internal political struggle in Soviet Russia: about political repression, difficulties and costs of collectivization ... He knew everything, but this knowledge of him now, before meeting with Stalin in Tehran after the great victory of the Red Army at Kursk, did not matter to him.
Yes, in 1930, adhering to bourgeois political cliches, he compared Stalin to Mussolini, and in 1940 he declared that he, Stalin, was guilty of "the massacres of thousands of innocent people." All this was in a ritual anti-communist spirit. However, before Tehran, he did not want to remember this. Roosevelt was aware of Stalin's historical role in world politics, his indisputable authority in Soviet society and his growing popularity in the world after Stalingrad and Kursk. He also knew that the moral and political unity of the people of the USSR, which has no analogues among other peoples of the world, served as the basis for unparalleled mass heroism at the front and in the rear, without which industrial power would be only a potential force.
Roosevelt, as a realist politician, and he was such, could not but reckon with Stalin in resolving the fateful issues of world politics. As for Churchill, Roosevelt the realist treated him as the ideologist and politician of the outdated largest colonial empire. The US President saw himself as the leader of the post-war world (it was no coincidence that he spoke of a world government in Tehran), the leader of the most powerful imperialist power.
This is how Susan Butler presents him to the readers of her book. She categorically asserts: "Roosevelt needed Stalin, and, as Roosevelt assumed, Stalin also (perhaps even more) needed him." And then even more categorically, without admitting the slightest objection: “For the first time since Lenin, Stalin met a man more influential than himself. Roosevelt was president, elected for a third term (an unprecedented case!), Leading the country that had the most efficient industry in the world at that time, which was now the main help for the Soviet Union. This man, this cripple who did not look or behave like a cripple, whose clothes fit so well that, sitting on the sofa, he seemed not only physically normal, but also elegant, came thousands of miles to meet him ... And now it was located, practically on his own initiative, in the Stalinist office. What, naturally, was Stalin supposed to think? This president was a man of strong temper. "
Under the pen of S. Butler, Roosevelt appears before us as a respectable master of the situation at the Tehran meeting. She admires and enjoys the image of Franklin Delano Roosevelt created by her - FDR, as he was called in the inner circle. He was undoubtedly a great politician and deserves high recognition from history. But his desire to see America's superiority in everything was far from always justified and realistic. So, he had no doubt that the American soldier would be the first to enter Berlin. On November 19, 1943, Roosevelt declared: "There will certainly be a race for Berlin ... But Berlin must be taken by the United States." However, this was not destined to come true.
The failure of Churchill's plans
But let us turn to the main reason for which Roosevelt sought a meeting with Stalin - to the issues, the solution of which determined the achievement of an early victory over Nazi Germany and a secure world order. There were two of them: the landing of the Anglo-American landing in the north of France (the "second front" - Operation Overlord) and the creation of the influential United Nations Organization (UN). There could be no agreement with Churchill on these issues, since he was worried about saving the world's largest colonial empire, Great Britain.
Roosevelt, on the other hand, demonstratively sought to "present America as the main driving force in the world." "He, - notes S. Butler, - did not want to preserve the British Empire, he advocated that it was destroyed." Moreover, he was convinced that "the former colonial possessions should be governed by a collective body such as the United Nations." American imperialism confidently declared its first role in the capitalist world and no longer reckoned with the weakened English lion. He recognized the strength of the new superpower, and therefore only with it he intended to solve the main issues of world politics. This is what must be seen behind the charm and charming smile with which Roosevelt met Stalin during their personal conversations in Tehran.
Following S. Butler, we also note that the US president's sympathy for the leader of the Soviet people, his emphasized respect for him, was based on an extremely high assessment of the intellectual and volitional qualities of Stalin's personality. Here are just some of Roosevelt's statements about him, contained in the book: “Working with him is a pleasure. No roundabouts. He clearly states the issue that he wants to discuss, and does not deviate anywhere ”; “This man combines a huge, unyielding will and a healthy sense of humor. I think the soul and heart of Russia have their true representative in it ”; "This is a man carved out of granite."
And what about Winston Churchill? This large bourgeois politician of the era of colonialism, who had a shrewd mind, the talent of an orator-polemicist, a brilliant writer, a gifted painter, a man of great personal courage (in his youth he often looked death in the face), with enviable energy, despite his advanced age, in short - an outstanding personality (!), found himself in Tehran on the sidelines. It is clear why: colonial England was living out its age. That is why his desire to postpone Operation Overlord as long as possible, replacing it with an offensive in the Mediterranean theater of war (liberate Italy, take Rome), and withdraw Anglo-American troops through the Balkans to Eastern Europe, in order to prevent the Red Army there supported by Roosevelt, not to mention Stalin. His attempt to replace the UN with organizations of regional unions, where England could still play a leading role, was also unsuccessful in Tehran.
England had no opportunity to claim the role of a superpower, and Churchill had no choice but to agree with Stalin and Roosevelt on the implementation of Operation Overlord no later than May 1944. This was the main result of the Tehran conference. As S. Butler writes: the British Prime Minister was in despondency, Marshal Stalin was in an excellent mood.
Stalinist will and determination
It would be a mistake to believe that the agreement of Stalin and Roosevelt on the main issues of the conference predetermined the ease of their solution. First of all, Churchill stubbornly defended his position, hoping for Roosevelt's class solidarity with him. In addition, the latter did not expect from Stalin the ability that he himself did not possess - a military mentality. As the British military expert General Brooke noted in his diary: "Never in any of his calculations did he (Stalin - Yu. B.) make any strategic mistakes."
The President of the United States, having made a fundamental decision on Operation Overlord, did not consider it possible to clarify such "details" as establishing the exact time of its beginning and the appointment of the commander-in-chief of the Anglo-American forces for the period of its conduct. This played into Churchill's hands: the more uncertainty in the "details", the more likely it is to delay the opening of the "second front".
Let's give credit to S. Butler: she presented the decisive and leading role of Stalin in concretizing the decision on Operation Overlord. Let's turn to the text of the book:
“Stalin entered the conversation. - Who will be in charge of Operation Overlord? - he asked.
Roosevelt replied that the decision had not yet been made.
Then Stalin said rather sharply:
- Then nothing will come of this operation.
In the end, after a long altercation with the British Prime Minister, the US President had to give assurances that the decision on the leader of Operation Overlord and the date of its start would be made in the coming days. "
For all her admiration for US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, S. Butler presented the gigantic figure of Stalin at the Tehran Conference. She did this with the help of the then US Secretary of Defense Stimson, citing the following diary entry: “I thank the gentlemen that Stalin was there. In my opinion, he saved the situation. He behaved bluntly and decisively and energetically dismissed all attempts by the Prime Minister to sideline the negotiations, which delighted my heart. By the time he arrived, our side was at a disadvantage. Firstly, because the president had a rather weak command of the situation and influenced it rather haphazardly, and secondly, because Marshall (chief of staff of the US Armed Forces - Yu.B.), who bears full responsibility, persistently tries stay aloof to a greater or lesser extent because he feels he is a stakeholder. Therefore, the first meeting, held before Stalin's arrival, as could be understood from the protocols, turned out to be rather discouraging, without results clearly coordinated by our representatives. But when Stalin appeared with his general Voroshilov, they were able to completely change the situation, since they went on the offensive, defending the need for Operation Overlord. They supported the idea of conducting an auxiliary offensive operation in the south of France and spoke out categorically against diversionary actions in the eastern Mediterranean. Ultimately, Stalin emerged victorious that day, and I was delighted with it. "
Roosevelt admitted: in negotiations with Stalin, he did not expect harsh pedantry from him. It is explainable. If the American president was thinking about the life of American soldiers (after the Stalinist assurance that the USSR would enter the war with Japan after the defeat of the Third Reich, the president said: "Now I am calm: two million Americans will be alive"), then the leader of the Soviet people thought about the life of his compatriots with even more passion, knowing what a terrible grief they had to endure loss.
The idea of the UN and US world domination
On the issue of the United Nations - Roosevelt's main idea at the Tehran conference - he received Stalin's support, which irritated Churchill. The latter was aware that this organization, by the very fact of its existence, would contribute to the acquisition of independence of the colonially dependent countries and thereby strengthen the dominant role of the United States of America in the capitalist world, contribute to the transformation of the USSR into an influential factor in world politics. England will have no choice but to sail in the wake of US international politics.
And so it happened and is happening to this day, with the only difference that after the death of Winston Churchill, England never had such a major politician like him. The same can be said about France, remembering de Gaulle, and about the United States after Roosevelt's death: capitalism at the stage of imperialism became an increasingly reactionary force.
One cannot fail to note the progressive nature of the United Nations Organization conceived by Roosevelt. By creating it, he approved the policy of peaceful coexistence of two opposite social worlds: capitalism and socialism. How long such a policy could in reality be is a question to which we will come back. But the attempt to declare the principle of peaceful coexistence, undoubtedly, was the historical merit of the last outstanding US president, who paved the way for the great partnership of the two superpowers. There was nothing like this after his death. Today, the United States and the Russian Federation have the kind of leaders that their peoples deserve in their current state. Then there was the time of political giants, but now ...
We dare to make one more assumption regarding Roosevelt's idea of creating the UN. As we see it, he conceived an international organization with "four policemen" (USA, USSR, Great Britain and China - the prototype of the UN Security Council) in order to prevent the danger of the revival of the fascist state in Germany. We believe that Roosevelt, who actively welcomed the Munich agreements in 1938, later began to think about many things as a far-sighted politician of American imperialism.
The war provided the United States with the opportunity not only to restore its industry to the level of 1929, but also to surpass it by far due to the dynamic development of the war economy. Roosevelt's "New Deal" was a course of forced reforms that strengthened state-monopoly capitalism, and partly satisfied the interests of workers: in 1935 a law came into force confirming the right to a collective agreement, as well as a social security law that introduced unemployment benefits and increased albeit negligible, tax on the richest and inheritance. According to the "new rate", the limits of the working week were established and the minimum wage for a working day was guaranteed.
But the foundations of the capitalist social system remained unchanged. The "New Deal" protected them, and therefore a crisis of the system was inevitable: in the spring of 1938, the decline industrial production reached alarming proportions. There were 10 million unemployed in the country. By the summer of 1939, the United States ranked 17th among the main capitalist countries in restoring the pre-crisis level of industrial production. The war became the salvation for American imperialism. The rapid growth of the high-tech military industry made the country a leader in the capitalist world.
In this situation, Roosevelt, as a realist politician, a pragmatist, could not help but realize that Germany, Japan and England could become potential competitors of the United States. That is why he sought the complete defeat of Germany and Japan, which was simply impossible without an alliance with the USSR. So the great partnership between Roosevelt and Stalin was of an opportunistic nature, which does not devalue its importance for humanity. As for Great Britain, its demotion in the table of ranks of the world powers became a matter of time.
American imperialism, which had outstripped European imperialism (German, English and French in the first place) and Asian (Japanese) imperialism, was rushing at full steam to establish its hegemony in the bourgeois world. The Tehran conference was a testament to this: Roosevelt's condescension towards Churchill struck in the eyes. The United States began to pass off its imperial hegemonism as its national interests, which it is doing to this day. It was in Tehran that the application for a policy was made, which at the end of the twentieth century will be called the policy of globalism. Roosevelt, as already mentioned, came up with the idea of creating a world government, it is not difficult to guess under whose auspices. Stalin listened to this proposal of the US President with icy indifference - the idea failed. The still latent claims of American imperialism to world domination have fully manifested themselves in the Roosevelt version of the solution of the German question.
German question
In fact, the US President proposed the prospect of eliminating Germany as a country. His plan called for the division of Germany into five autonomous parts: (1) Prussia; (2) Hanover and northwest Germany; (3) Saxony and Leipzig; (4) Hesse-Darmstadt; (5) Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg.
Stalin was for the partition of Germany. We emphasize this, since the thesis was established in Soviet historiography that the Soviet Union, and, accordingly, Stalin, always stood for the unity of the German nation and country. This was so from the point of view of the historical perspective of its far from near future. In the concrete historical situation of 1943, in view of the inevitable defeat of Germany, Stalin thought like Roosevelt: first of all, the idea of the Reich must be erased from the German mind. “It is necessary that,” he said in Tehran, “the very concept of the Reich should become powerless to ever again plunge the world into the abyss of war ... And until the victorious allies secure the strategic positions necessary to prevent a relapse of German militarism, they will not be able to solve this problem ".
Stalin knew the lessons of history very well. He remembered that according to the Versailles Peace Treaty, the defeated Germany was guaranteed the unity of the country and the nation. But, as noted by the outstanding Soviet writer-historian V. Pikul, “for the Germans, imperial concepts stood above national ones” and “Hitler came to power promising to resurrect“ the third Reich - with colonies and slaves ”. The idea of the Reich, nurtured by Prussian militarism, linked the latter with the class interest of German imperialism (a stake on world domination). According to the figurative expression of V. Pikul, it was at the end of the era of Bismarck and Moltke that "the future Hitlerite marshals - Rundstedt, Paulus, Halder, Keitel, Manstein, Guderian and others came out of their cradle."
Stalin did not forget the lessons of history. In Tehran, he advocated the partition of Germany also for the reason that he looked at the future of the Soviet zone of her control through the prism of its possible socialist reconstruction. Like Roosevelt, Stalin saw the hidden position of the British Prime Minister on the German question: "he wanted a strong Germany in order to ensure a balance of power with the Soviet Union in Europe." This is at least, but as a maximum - again to use the well-oiled German military machine against the USSR.
Let's pay tribute to S. Butler: we can say that on the German question (and not only) she was on the side of Stalin. This is evidenced by the following provisions of her book. We read: “Stalin knew firsthand how cruel the attitude of the German soldiers towards all Slavs was. The war that Hitler waged against the Soviet Union and Poland (the Aryans against the Slavic peoples) was strikingly different from the war he waged in Western Europe (the Aryans against the Aryans). Hitler considered the Slavs to be an inferior race. After the successful completion of the war, he planned to turn Russia and Poland into enslaved countries "(suffice it to recall the Ost plan. - Yu.B.); “Stalin did not believe that the Slavs were a race of masters destined to rule the world. He believed that communism was the economic model of the future and that communism would eventually be adopted in the West as it was a more efficient form of government. However, at present, the primary task was to win the war and secure the borders of the Soviet Union, which meant that it was necessary to ensure control over Germany.
Stalin was so worried about the future of Germany that, after returning to Moscow, he carefully edited the Russian part of the conversations held in Tehran to reflect what he said during them and to make the necessary corrections with his own hand. The final version of the Soviet document read: "Comrade Stalin declared that in order to weaken Germany, the Soviet government prefers to divide it."
Brief conclusion
If we try to give the most general assessment of Susan Butler's book, then we can say about her: this is a book by an author for whom the pursuit of objectivity and honesty in researching epoch-making historical events is in the first place. She is imbued with the spirit of admiration for the heroism of the Soviet people and a sense of deep sympathy for them for their sacrifices during the Second World War. Against the background of rabid Russophobia emanating from the "civilized" West today, this is a bold book that challenges those who denigrate the contribution of the Red Army and deny the price the Soviet Union paid for the Great Victory for all mankind.
S. Butler does not directly pose the question: why was it possible for a great partnership of two superpowers belonging to opposite social worlds? But it begs after reading the book. In a condensed form, we think that the following answer can be given to it: it, this partnership, became possible due to the presence of a powerful military and scientific-industrial force on each of the parties, which is in the first place. Secondly, in the conditions of the social and political system of their countries, each of the leaders fulfilled their historical mission, to one degree or another reflecting the interests of the working people: Stalin, as a proletarian politician, in full measure, Roosevelt, as a progressive but bourgeois politician, - partially, but significantly compared to those who ruled America before him. In other words, both of them had authority among the people: Stalin is indisputable, Roosevelt is quite tall and strong (in Tehran, as already noted, he was the President of the United States, elected for a third term, which no one has ever succeeded in, let alone his election for a fourth presidential term after Tehran). Thirdly, both Stalin and Roosevelt were great politicians, people of large-scale state thinking, high erudition in matters of history, politics and culture.
Did the great partnership between the USSR and the United States have a long and stable historical perspective? We are sure that no, it did not. The reason for this is the irrepressible striving of American imperialism for world domination. This opinion is strengthened by reading the book by Susan Butler. Roosevelt, if he had not died so suddenly, could have prolonged the peaceful existence of the two superpowers for a certain period, but he was not able to make it irreversible. American imperialism could not deny itself the opportunity to extract maximum profits without the export of capital, the militarization of the economy, and a reactionary foreign policy.
And yet, could Roosevelt, in his fourth presidential term, have prevented, say, a "cold war" between the United States and the USSR? Most likely, he could and would have tried to do it. But he was unable to stop this war in the future. It is no coincidence that the US political "hawks" have imposed their own representative, Truman, on him as vice-president.
But let us dwell on the main conclusions arising from the content of the book by Susan Butler. Stalin and Roosevelt at the Tehran conference laid, in our opinion, the foundations of a bipolar world, a world without a third world war. It existed until December 1991, before the collapse of the USSR. This is the life of two generations - 50 years. This is, first of all, the historical merit of the two great politicians of the twentieth century.
Yuri Belov
On November 28, 1943, the Tehran Conference began its work. This was the first meeting of the leaders of the countries participating in the Anti-Hitler coalition face to face during the war. It was there that agreements were reached on the opening in Europe of a second front against Germany. This meeting traditionally attracts much attention of researchers, not only because of its historical significance, but also because the Nazis allegedly intended to turn the tide of the war by assassinating three leaders at once. And only the actions of Soviet intelligence prevented this.
Over the past 74 years, history has become a legend and has taken on a life of its own. However, in reality, most likely there was no assassination attempt. This whole story with the averted assassination attempt was originally a cunning disinformation on the part of Stalin, which was supposed to serve Soviet interests. The USSR leader hoped to use this story to put additional pressure on the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition and get an additional trump card in the difficult negotiations on the second front.
Training
After the outbreak of the war, the leaders of the countries that fought Nazi Germany had quite lively diplomatic affairs. Conferences of representatives of the USA, USSR and Britain have been held in various cities several times. But each time these were either meetings at the level of the heads of foreign affairs agencies, or in a truncated composition. For example, in August 1942, the British leader Churchill came to a conference in Moscow, but the Americans were represented by Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's personal representative.
Averell Harriman is Roosevelt's personal representative. Collage © L! FE Photo: © W ikipedia.org
During the first two and a half years of the war, the leaders of the three leading powers never met in full force. Meanwhile, after the Battle of the Kursk Bulge, a final turning point took place in the war. From that moment it became clear that a meeting of the three leaders was inevitable and would take place in the near future. Since it was necessary to discuss not only the issues of the supply of Lend-Lease or the opening of a second front, but also to outline some contours of the post-war world.
However, choosing a venue for the meeting was much more difficult than agreeing to hold one. All countries were far enough from each other, and no matter which option they chose, at least one of the leaders would have been completely uncomfortable to get to. In addition, war was raging in Europe, so the routes had to be drawn up with this in mind.
If the issue of holding the conference was agreed quickly enough, back in early September 1943, then the choice of the venue for it dragged on for several months and was determined literally at the last moment. It would be convenient to hold the conference in London, where the exiled governments of a good half of the European countries were based at that time. However, the way there was unsafe for Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill suggested Cairo, where there were a large number of British soldiers, but it was inconvenient for Stalin to get there.
Roosevelt suggested organizing a meeting in Alaska, which would be the most the best option in terms of security. However, Stalin did not agree to this. Firstly, he was afraid to fly an airplane, and secondly, the way there would have taken a very long time, and in the event of any unforeseen changes on the fronts, the Soviet leader would have been torn off from Headquarters for a long time.
The meeting could have been arranged in Moscow, but it was not the best option from a diplomatic point of view. Then it turned out that Stalin looked down on his allies so condescendingly that he did not even want to leave Moscow in order to meet with them.
As a result, it was decided to hold a meeting on neutral territory so that no one would be offended. The choice fell on Iran. Stalin was not far from getting there, Churchill was not too far from the British overseas possessions. And Roosevelt - that Cairo, that Tehran - about the same, since both there and there in any case would have to travel by sea.
Iran's main advantage was its security. Formally, it was a neutral country. But in fact, back in 1941, Soviet and British troops in the course of a joint operation preventively occupied the country in case the Germans tried to break through to the oil fields.
There were Soviet and British army units in Iran. Their special services were also active. So from a security point of view, Iran was the ideal option among neutral countries. Because the country was an important transit point for the supply of goods under Lend-Lease to the USSR, and in this regard, all German agents in the country were cleaned long ago and thoroughly by both British and Soviet special services.
Conference
On November 8, 1943, 20 days before the opening of the conference, Roosevelt agreed to the proposal to hold it in Tehran. Active preparations for the event began. Each of the leaders of the coalition got to the designated place by his own route. Stalin left for Baku on a special specially guarded armored train. In the capital of the Azerbaijan SSR, he transferred to an airplane piloted by the chief Soviet civil aviation pilot Viktor Grachev, who carried high nomenklatura officials.
The American president traveled to Cairo on the largest American battleship Iowa, accompanied by a combat escort of ships. In Cairo, he met with Churchill, who was waiting for him, and together they flew to Tehran.
For three days, the Allies discussed the opening of a second front, having decided on the timing. The front was planned to be opened in May 1944, later the dates were moved by several weeks. In addition, issues of the post-war world order were discussed. The contours of a new international body - the UN - were discussed. The post-war fate of Germany was also discussed.
Tehran, Iran, December 1943. Front row: Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill at the portico of the Russian Embassy; back row: General of the Army Arnold, Chief of the US Air Force; General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Admiral Cunningham, Lord of the First Sea; Admiral William Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, during the Tehran Conference. Collage © L! FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org
During the conference, unprecedented security measures were taken. In addition to the fact that Soviet and British troops were already in the country, additional NKVD units were introduced to Tehran to protect especially important facilities. In addition, the entire country was enmeshed in a dense Soviet-British intelligence network. Soviet residencies were located in almost every more or less large settlement in the zone of Soviet occupation. A roughly similar situation was observed in the British zone of occupation. The buildings where the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition met, as well as the routes of their movement, were cordoned off with three or four rings of armed guards. In addition, air defense units were deployed in the city. In a word, Tehran could withstand a real assault by an entire army, although it had nowhere to come from in the desert.
Nevertheless, Stalin immediately stunned the arrivals of Churchill and Roosevelt with the news that the Soviet special services had just prevented an attempt on their lives, foiling the insidious plans of the Nazis. As if Soviet intelligence managed to capture several dozen German saboteurs who were planning a terrorist attack, but some may have managed to leave, so he cordially invites his colleagues to be accommodated in the Soviet embassy under reliable protection.
Churchill only smiled slyly, pretending to believe. Iran was literally flooded with British agents, moreover, in the last half century, the country was in the British sphere of influence and the British felt as at ease there as at home. Even the German agents that existed in the country before the war have been cleared out in several stages over the past two years due to the importance of Iran for Lend-Lease routes.
But Roosevelt was much less aware of the situation in Iran. American intelligence in Iran was not on the same scale as British or Soviet, so he listened more closely to Stalin's words. And when the Soviet leader offered, under the pretext of security, to move everyone to the Soviet embassy, Churchill flatly refused, saying that this was not necessary. But Roosevelt agreed and moved to live in the Soviet mission.
However, do not underestimate the gullibility of the American president. This step was influenced by two other significant factors. First, unlike the British embassy, which was located next to the Soviet one, a few meters from it, the American one was located in another part of the city. And Roosevelt would have to drive alone through the city every day, which was inconvenient for the guards.
Secondly, and this is the most important thing, Stalin and Roosevelt had been looking for an opportunity to get closer for a long time, but they never imagined it. Unlike the staunch anti-communist Churchill, Roosevelt was more sympathetic to Stalin. There was even some sympathy between the two leaders. For this reason, Stalin hoped that by eliminating the influence of the British leader on Roosevelt, the American could be made much more accommodating. Having settled the American president in the Soviet embassy, the Soviet leader could be the master of the situation, feeling at home, had additional opportunities to "process" Roosevelt, and in addition, the president's conversations could be tapped by Soviet intelligence. Thus, Stalin killed three birds with one stone.
But the American president could not just take and settle in the Soviet embassy under the pretext that he had to travel far to meetings. Such a move would have been received with hostility in the United States, where the country's leader would have had to make excuses for a long time. That is why the trick with the imaginary assassination attempt was needed. Thus, Stalin gave Roosevelt a legitimate opportunity to move to the Soviet embassy and not be booed for it. This whole story was not designed for Churchill (Stalin knew perfectly well that he would not believe), but for Roosevelt, who used a convenient pretext and later explained to the Americans that he had accepted the Soviet proposal, since the USSR special services had information about a possible assassination attempt and this was necessary with security point of view.
The fact that this whole story was nothing more than a diplomatic ploy is evidenced at least by the fact that the Soviet side did not even bother with more or less plausible legend of the assassination attempt. When the British (possibly on the initiative of the cunning Churchill, who guessed the maneuver) asked if they could see the detained German saboteurs, they were told that this was not possible. Attempts to find out the details of the uncovered conspiracy through Molotov were also unsuccessful. The Soviet People's Commissar said that he did not know any details of this case.
From left to right: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin sit together at a dinner in the Victorian living room of the British Mission in Tehran, Iran, celebrating Winston Churchill's 69th birthday on November 30, 1943. Collage © L! FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org
It is quite possible that on the eve of the meeting, the Soviet special services could indeed have arrested several suspicious local residents, as they say, just in case. But one should not think that these were selected thugs-saboteurs, armed to the teeth, sent personally by Hitler.
Legend of the assassination attempt
The classic legend of the assassination attempt is full of inconsistencies, which is not surprising. It began to be developed many years after the end of the war through the efforts of Soviet publicists.
So, according to the classic version, in the spring and summer (different sources of the season differ) in 1943, the Soviet intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov under the name of Paul Siebert, who served in the German administration in Rovno, got drunk excessively chatty SS Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who told him that he would soon be involved in a crucial mission in Tehran that would even surpass Skorzeny's operation to rescue Mussolini.
Kuznetsov immediately reported this to the right place. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1943, a group of German paratroopers-radio operators landed in Iran, who were supposed to prepare a base for the arrival of Skorzeny's main sabotage group. However, the Soviet intelligence was well aware of this and all the agents were soon captured. Upon learning of this, the Germans were forced to cancel the operation at the last moment. As for the specific method of the assassination attempt, the versions differ depending on the fantasy of the publicists. Everything is just like in the best spy novels: infiltration under the guise of waiters and shooting at dinner, digging through a cemetery, a plane with explosives piloted by a suicide bomber, etc. plots from spy thrillers.
Nikolai Kuznetsov in German uniform, 1942. Photo: © Wikipedia.org
It is quite obvious that even with the slightest attention to detail, the version looks extremely dubious. First, Kuznetsov, with all his desire, could not inform about the operation planned by the Germans in the summer of 1943, because then even the leaders of the countries themselves did not know when this conference would take place. Only at the beginning of September was an agreement reached on the meeting, and only on November 8 was the venue chosen. However, recently this discrepancy was noticed and now they write about the autumn of 1943, although in classical sources the extraction of valuable information is dated in the spring and summer.
Secondly, Ortel could not brag to Kuznetsov that an operation was planned to abruptly rescue Mussolini, since this operation took place only in September 1943, while most sources claim that Kuznetsov transmitted information about this no later than the summer of 1943. Thirdly, it is very doubtful that some supernumerary SS officer Ortel from Rovno could have been privy to the details of such a secret operation. Fourthly, the same Skorzeny, who is considered the leader of this operation, after the war claimed that no SS Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who allegedly was part of his group, never existed (in various Soviet sources he is called either Paul Ortel, or generally by Oster).
In addition, the assertion that the first group of saboteurs was sent to Iran in the summer of 1943 to prepare an assassination attempt looks very doubtful. How could the Germans know where the meeting would take place, when even the participants themselves, who had not yet agreed on it, did not know this.
But even if we imagine that someone simply confused the dates and surnames, and the Germans were actually preparing this operation, how could they get to Iran? The pre-war agents were completely destroyed, which means that people would have to be transferred from Germany. But how to do that? For landing operations, the Germans generally used the DFS 230 and Go 242 gliders, which were towed by Ju 52 or He-111 bombers. However, these bombers had a very limited flight range and for such an operation the Germans needed to have field airfields in the Middle East.
For obvious reason, the Germans did not have such airfields in Iran itself. For the same reason, they did not have them in the USSR bordering on Iran. Only Iraq, Turkey and Saudi Arabia remain. Turkey adhered to neutrality and had no German airfields. Iraq and Arabia were in the British sphere of influence. The only airfields in the Middle East that the Germans had (Syrian airfields were used by agreement with Vichy France) were lost by them back in the summer of 1941, when de Gaulle's "Fighting France", with the active participation of British troops, took control of Syria.
The only aircraft that could do this was the Ju 290 long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft, capable of flying six thousand kilometers. However, the Germans had only a few of these aircraft and almost all of them were used to search for sea convoys off the British coast. And for such an amphibious operation, given the capacity of the aircraft, at least 5-10 such aircraft would be required, which were piece goods (only about 50 of them were built during the entire war). According to Skorzeny's recollections, it was with great difficulty that one such plane was obtained to send six agents to Iran in the summer of 1943. They were supposed to organize sabotage on Lend-Lease routes in coordination with detachments of local rebels. According to Skorzeny, the group was discovered almost immediately and had no success.
Actually, it is this transfer that is very often confused with the imaginary transfer of saboteurs to Iran to assassinate the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. In fact, she has nothing to do with her, after this unsuccessful attempt, the Germans no longer made such landings.
Finally, the Nazis simply did not have time to prepare it. The allies themselves only on November 8 (20 days before its start) agreed to hold a conference in Tehran. It must have taken German intelligence some time to obtain this information. Thus, the Germans would have had no more than 7-15 days to prepare for a complex operation in the most difficult conditions. And this is in the conditions of completely defeated local agents and total domination of the Soviet-British special services and army in Iran and unprecedented security measures. Obviously, in such conditions, the preparation of such a complex operation was simply impossible.
By the way, Skorzeny himself always denied that such an operation was being developed. He did not deny that he met with Hitler and the heads of the German special services after the information about the Tehran meeting became known to the Nazis. However, after Hitler asked if something could be done, he was briefly described the available alignments, and they were so unfavorable that it immediately became clear that this mission was impracticable, and the issue was closed without much discussion. It is for this reason that both Skorzeny himself and his immediate superior Schellenberg bypassed her in his memoirs, and it was also not possible to find any traces of the planning of this operation in the captured German archives.
Yuri Andropov and Nikolay Shchelokov. Collage © L! FE Photo: © RIA Novosti, Wi kipedia.org
In reality, the whole story of the assassination attempt was Stalin's cunning diplomatic ploy, aimed primarily at the American leader. If Roosevelt had believed in her, he would have been very grateful to his Soviet colleague for his concern and felt a sense of duty towards him, becoming more accommodating. But even if he did not believe, this story gave Roosevelt a "legal" opportunity to relocate to the Soviet embassy, which was in the hands of both. Ultimately, the ruse played into the hands of the Soviet side. At the Tehran Conference, Stalin and Roosevelt actually acted as a united front against Churchill. The American president generally agreed with Stalin and supported his initiatives, while Churchill was left alone.
In fact, during the conference, Roosevelt went against Churchill, who insisted on an offensive into the Balkans through Italy, and spoke in favor of opening a second front in northern France. Roosevelt supported Stalin on the question of the division of defeated Germany, as well as on the question of organizing the UN. De facto, at the Tehran conference, an internal mini-coalition of Stalin - Roosevelt arose within the anti-Hitler coalition, since at that time there were no contradictions between the interests of the United States and the USSR, whereas they always existed between Britain and the USSR.
Evgeniy Antonyuk
In January 1943, at a meeting in Casablanca (Morocco), US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill announced that they would fight the war until the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. However, towards the end of the war, some politicians in the West began to cautiously express themselves in the spirit that the demand for unconditional surrender spurred German resistance and dragged out the war. In addition, it would be nice, they continued, not to bring matters to the point of complete defeat of Germany, but to partially retain the military power of this country as a barrier against the growing Soviet Union. Moreover, if we assume that Soviet troops enter Germany, then the USSR will firmly establish itself in Central Europe.
For similar reasons, Stalin also doubted the practicality of demanding unconditional surrender and believed that a weakened but not completely defeated Germany, no longer capable of threatening an aggressive war, was less dangerous for the USSR than the victorious Anglo-Saxon countries that had established themselves in the center of Europe. Indeed, in 1922-1933 and 1939-1941. The USSR and Germany were on friendly terms.
At the Tehran Conference of the Heads of Government of the Three Allied Powers (November 28 - December 1, 1943), Stalin, in a private conversation at a dinner with Roosevelt, proposed to put forward specific demands for surrender to Germany, as was the case at the end of the First World War. It was necessary to announce how much weapons Germany should give out, and what territories it should give up. The slogan of unconditional surrender, according to Stalin, makes the Germans rally and fight to the brutality and helps Hitler to stay in power. Roosevelt remained silent and did not answer. On the part of Stalin, it was obviously a "sighting" in order to find out the reaction of the allies. Later he did not return to this topic. At the Tehran Conference, the USSR officially joined the declaration demanding the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany.
There, at the Tehran conference, the question of the post-war territorial structure of Germany was discussed. Roosevelt proposed to divide Germany into five states. The President of the United States also believed that the Kiel Canal, the Ruhr Basin and the Saar Region should be internationalized, and Hamburg made a "free city". Churchill considered it necessary to separate the southern lands (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden) from Germany and include them, together with Austria, and probably also Hungary, into the "Danube Confederation." The rest of Germany (minus the territories that go to neighboring states) was proposed by the British Prime Minister to be divided into two states. Stalin did not express his attitude to the plans for the partition of Germany, but achieved promises that East Prussia would be torn away from Germany and divided between the USSR and Poland. Poland, in addition, will receive significant gains at the expense of Germany in the west.
Plans for the post-war partition of Germany into several independent states for some time also captured Soviet diplomacy. In January 1944, the former USSR Ambassador to London, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs I.M. Maisky drew up a note in which he substantiated the need for the dismemberment of Germany. At the end of 1944, the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov also formulated a project in which he argued that Germany should be divided into at least three, at most seven states. These plans were studied by Stalin and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov before the Yalta Conference of the Great Powers in February 1945.
Stalin, however, was in no hurry to take advantage of these recommendations, but intended to find out first the position of Britain and the United States. Back in September 1944, at a meeting in Quebec, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed the plan of the American Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. According to it, it was supposed to deprive Germany of heavy industry in general and divide what remains of it (minus the lands that go to Poland and France) into three states: northern, western and southern. This division of Germany into three was first envisaged back in 1942 in the plan of US Undersecretary of State (Foreign Secretary) S. Wells.
However, by that time, the mood of influential circles in the West had changed significantly. As already mentioned, the Soviet Union was perceived in the post-war perspective as a greater threat than a unified Germany, which was defeated. Therefore, Roosevelt and Churchill were in no hurry to discuss at the Yalta Conference the post-war state structure of Germany, except for the zones of its occupation by the great powers. Therefore, Stalin did not make such proposals either. The projects of Maisky and Litvinov were shelved. It is obvious that Stalin did not sympathize with them in advance. For the same reason as his Western partners, he did not want Germany to be unduly weakened and fragmented.
On May 9, 1945, speaking on the radio on the occasion of Victory Day, Stalin, quite unexpectedly for the Western allies, announced that the USSR did not aim to dismember Germany or deprive her of statehood. This was a definite position on the eve of the last meeting of the leaders of the three victorious powers, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945 in Potsdam. When the Allies raised the issue of internationalizing the Ruhr region at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin remarked that his views on this issue "have now changed somewhat." "Germany remains a single state," the Soviet leader firmly emphasized. This topic did not come up again.
Although summits like those of the Big Three never met again, several post-war conferences of the victorious foreign ministers agreed that the future Germany should become a single democratic federal state. The FRG Constitution, proclaimed in the western zones of occupation on May 23, 1949, corresponded to these plans. The problem was that both the West and the USSR wanted to equip Germany in their own way. Ultimately, each side in the Cold War got the Germany it was striving for - united and under its control, but not all, but only part of it.
The Prosveshchenie Publishing House publishes two volumes of Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill during the Great Patriotic War. Documentary research ". They contain unique materials that make it possible to understand how relations developed between the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. And most importantly, one can trace how three people - the heads of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - shared the post-war world. Now that between America, European countries relations with Russia are quite tense, with the help of this book you can look into the origins of the contradictions.
Churchill: "We Admire the Courage of the Russian Army"
Vladimir Olegovich, who was the first to start this correspondence? - I ask one of the authors of the book - Head of the Department of Europe and America of MGIMO, Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Pechatnov.
The correspondence began in July 1941. Winston Churchill was the initiator. For Stalin, this format of communication was new. And in the fall of 1941, correspondence began with Roosevelt. It lasted until the death of Roosevelt, and with Churchill - until the Potsdam Conference. That is, almost five years.
DOCUMENT
First personal message from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Stalin.
“We are all very happy here that the Russian armies are showing such strong, bold and courageous resistance to the completely unprovoked and ruthless Nazi invasion. The bravery and stubbornness of the Soviet soldiers and people evoke universal admiration.
We will do our best to help you, as time, geographic conditions and our growing resources permit. The longer the war goes on, the more help we can provide ...
About 400 planes flew yesterday afternoon raids across the sea. More than 200 heavy bombers raided German cities on Saturday evening. And last night, about 250 heavy bombers took part in the operations. This will continue to be so.
We hope in this way to force Hitler to return part of his air force to the west and gradually ease the burden on your country ...
We just need to continue to make every effort to knock the spirit out of the villains. "
- Churchill is actually a staunch anti-communist, a man who hated the Soviet Union ...
But it was he who, on June 22, 1941, was the first to declare assistance to the USSR. After all, there was a common enemy. Churchill never hid his feelings for communism, but believed that in a new war we are allies.
Leaks were inevitable
In terms of uniqueness, historical significance and intensity, in terms of the size of the figures, this correspondence is an unprecedented phenomenon. In total, about 900 messages were sent in the Stalin-Roosevelt-Churchill triangle. Sometimes they wrote several a day.
- And how?
They used cipher telegrams, which, as a rule, were sent through the embassies. And there they were transmitted either personally by our ambassador, or by messenger.
- Was the signal on the radio?
Yes. With encryption and decryption at the place of receipt.
- Stalin wrote a letter ...
It ended up in the secret department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. And from there it went to the embassy in Washington or London. If it was a very important message, and the ambassador was in front of the first persons, say, like Maisky to Churchill or like Litvinov to Roosevelt, the message was delivered in person. But more often it was transmitted with a courier, either to the White House or to the Chancellery on Downing Street.
- How quickly?
The communication itself took three or four hours. Plus decryption. In general, if the message was sent in the morning, the addressee received it on the same day.
- Was the connection secure?
One of Roosevelt's first messages to Stalin was intercepted by German intelligence. Roosevelt used a State Department code that was not very well protected. Then Roosevelt began to use only communication with his naval attaché in Moscow - more reliable. And there were no more serious systematic hacks of correspondence between the Germans and the Japanese. But there were leaks. For example, the Foreign Office in London, when it received another telegram from Stalin about Polish affairs, informed the Polish migration government in London about its contents. And the Poles could, based on their interests, leak into the press or on the radio.
Lies about the second front
- I understand that in the end the correspondence began to be personal.
From the Soviet side, only Molotov and Stalin led it. Often Stalin wrote everything himself. But even if Molotov wrote, Stalin necessarily ruled the text. It can be seen from the autographs. Moreover, Stalin sometimes changed both the meaning and the tonality of the letter - either towards warming, or towards tightening. Already with the correction of Stalin and his visa "I approve" the letter was sent for encryption.
- How about translation? Diplomatic nuances are also important.
Most often, we sent a text in Russian to our embassy, and there they translated either ours, the ambassadors, or transmitted the version in Russian to the Foreign Office, and there were people who knew Russian well. It was the same in Washington. And in 1944, Gromyko became ambassador to the United States; he himself often translated Stalin's messages into English.
- I read that everyone had their own style. Eloquent, "democratic" - in Churchill. Hard - Stalin ...
The relationship developed in different ways. Stalin and Churchill are more complex, contradictory, and at the same time more intense. They met more often and knew each other better. Stalin, of course, understood Churchill's nature. A more detached, but also more equal relationship was with Roosevelt.
- Roosevelt was just more sympathetic to the USSR.
- If he had not died, it remains to be seen whether there would have been a cold war ...
Roosevelt, as a rule, often added a warm note to messages prepared by the Department of State or the military. “My friend,” he wrote, addressing Stalin. Or conveyed greetings, congratulations ...
He attached great importance to building personal relationships. As, however, and Churchill. They were both obsessed with the idea of establishing personal contact with Stalin. And they were jealous of the competition. At first, Churchill was Stalin's chief correspondent and wanted to act as an intermediary between the head of the USSR and Roosevelt. Roosevelt was tired of this. Stalin himself, taking into account Churchill's nature, was more wary of him, made harsh statements.
- For example?
His message is known in the summer of 1943, when, after the Anglo-American conference, the opening of the second front was once again postponed - already to 1944. First, Roosevelt and Churchill sent Stalin an explanation of the reasons for this decision. And they got a very harsh answer. He listed the previous promises of Churchill and Roosevelt to open a second front. The picture turned out to be unambiguous: the allies deliberately lied ...
DOCUMENT
Personal and secret message of Prime Minister JV Stalin to President Roosevelt.
“Your message, in which you report on some decisions on strategy adopted by you and Mr. Churchill, was received on June 4. Thank you for your message.
As can be seen from your message, these decisions are in contradiction with the decisions that were adopted by you and Mr. Churchill at the beginning of this year on the timing of the opening of the second front in Western Europe.
You, of course, remember that your joint message with Mr. Churchill of January 26 of this year reported on the decision taken at that time to divert significant German ground and air forces from the Russian front and force Germany to kneel in 1943.
After that, Mr. Churchill, on his own and your behalf, announced on February 12 the exact dates of the Anglo-American operation in Tunisia and the Mediterranean Sea, as well as on the western coast of Europe. The message stated that preparations were vigorously carried out by Great Britain and the United States for an operation to force the Canal in August 1943, and that if the weather or other reasons hindered this, this operation would be prepared with the participation of a larger force for September 1943.
Now, in May 1943, you, together with Mr. Churchill, are adopting a decision postponing the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe until the spring of 1944.
This decision of yours creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which for two years has been waging a war with the main forces of Germany and its satellites with extreme exertion of all its forces, and leaves the Soviet army, fighting not only for its country, but also for its allies, to its own forces , almost in single combat with a still very strong and dangerous enemy.
Needless to say, what a heavy and negative impression on the Soviet Union - on the people and in the army - this new postponement of the second front and the abandonment of our army, which has brought so many casualties, will produce without the expected serious support from the Anglo-American armies.
As for the Soviet Government, it does not find it possible to join such a decision, taken, moreover, without its participation and without an attempt to jointly discuss this most important issue and which could have grave consequences for the further course of the war. "
Between the Boar and the Captain
- Stalin's letter provoked a violent reaction from Churchill. He even thought about ending the correspondence.
There were also tough explanations with Roosevelt. The most famous case is March - early April 1945. The famous operation "Crossword" - separate negotiations between the Americans and the British in Switzerland with the emissaries of the German command. Remember, in "Seventeen Moments of Spring" there is a similar plot? When Stalin suspected that behind his back there were separate negotiations on the surrender of the Germans on the Western Front, in Italy, he and Roosevelt allowed himself a very harsh tone.
DOCUMENT
Personally, top secret.
From Marshal JV Stalin to President Roosevelt.
“I have received your message on the question of the negotiations in Bern.
You claim that there have been no negotiations yet. It must be assumed that you were not fully informed. As for my military colleagues, on the basis of the data they have, they have no doubt that the negotiations were and they ended in an agreement with the Germans, by virtue of which the German commander on the western front, Marshal Kesselring, agreed to open the front and let the Anglo American troops, and the Anglo-Americans promised for this to facilitate the terms of the armistice for the Germans.
I think my colleagues are close to the truth. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans refused to admit representatives of the Soviet command to Berne to participate in negotiations with the Germans.
I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or somewhere else, since the Anglo-American troops are able to advance deep into Germany with almost no resistance from the Germans, but why it was necessary to hide This is from the Russians, and why did they not warn their allies, the Russians, about this?
And so it turns out that at this moment the Germans on the western front actually stopped the war against England and America. At the same time, the Germans continue their war with Russia, an ally of Britain and the United States.
It is clear that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of maintaining and strengthening trust between our countries. "
- Roosevelt had a hope after the war to make friends with the Soviet Union, to "tame the beast."
He believed that it was worth influencing Stalin as the master of the country, and then it would be possible to slowly turn the whole system. It was important to change the program in Stalin's head. At one time it seemed to him that this was happening. Indeed, there was a reconciliation with the Church, the dissolution of the Comintern, a return to Russian historical traditions. All this gave hope that Russia would become a normal, from the point of view of the West, a nation state that would forget about the world revolution.
You mention in your book that Roosevelt and Churchill had codenames in the intelligence reports. They show the attitude of Soviet intelligence and the Soviet leadership ...
Boar - Churchill, Captain - Roosevelt ...
How the world was divided
A turning point took place in the second half of the war. It became clear that the USSR was winning. The leaders began to negotiate the post-war reconstruction of the world. That's how? They could not sit in Tehran or Yalta at the table on which the map is laid out: so, Poland is mine, Hungary is mine, but France is yours.
There were cases of such a frank exchange - that is, exchanging influence in one country for influence in another.
- Roosevelt was in favor of leaving the Baltic countries in the sphere of influence of the USSR?
And the Baltics, and Western Ukraine, and Western Belarus. That is, the borders of 1941. The allies understood that they would have to come to terms with this. Churchill and Roosevelt write to each other: well, we will not fight the Soviet Union when it enters these territories again. Nevertheless, neither the British nor the Americans formally recognized the entry of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. And the diplomatic missions of these Baltic countries continued to function in the United States and Great Britain.
More difficult was the issue of Eastern Europe, Iran, Turkey, Of the Far East... Where there is competition for influence. I must say that negotiations on this began in 1941. The first visit to Moscow by British Foreign Secretary Eden, Churchill's right hand, took place in December 1941. Stalin proposes to him: we recognize your predominant influence in Western Europe, your bases that you can create in Holland, Belgium, and we would like you to recognize the 1941 borders, that is, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus. Plus our right to establish military bases in Romania and Bulgaria.
REFERENCE "KP"
Roosevelt Franklin Delano- 32nd President of the United States, led the United States during the global economic crisis and World War II. He died on April 12, 1945.
Winston Leonard Churchill- Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940-1945 and 1951-1955. His speech in 1946 in the American Fulton, in fact, became the declaration of the cold war of the USSR.
Gusev Fedor Tarasovich- In 1943 - 1946 Ambassador to Great Britain.
Gromyko Andrey Andreevich- From 1943 to 1946, the USSR Ambassador to the United States.
Eden Anthony was a member of Churchill's military government from 1940 to 1945. From 1955 to 1957 he was Prime Minister of Great Britain.
