The Constitutional Court allowed Russia not to pay €1.9 billion to ex-YUKOS shareholders. The Hague court decision on Yukos: $50 billion and national sovereignty

What is the essence of the Yukos company's case?

Editor's response

On Monday, July 28, it became known that the claim of former shareholders of the Yukos company to Russia was partially satisfied by the arbitration court in The Hague: the company's shareholders also received compensation for legal costs of 65 million (instead of the requested 114 billion).

AiF.ru explains the essence of the sensational case of the Yukos company, the largest lawsuit in the entire 60-year history of the European Court of Human Rights, and also the reasons for the bankruptcy of the company.

How and when did the Yukos company appear?

The Yukos company was formed in 1993 on the basis of state enterprises, from which its name came - Yuganskneftegaz and KuibyshevOrgSintez. The main co-owners of YUKOS were Mikhail Khodorkovsky And Platon Lebedev.

In 1995-1996, the state privatized YUKOS, after which the company entered the international market.

In 2000, YUKOS formed an international independent board of directors, which included representatives of the global business community. Yukos also developed a corporate governance code, began publishing financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), audited by an external accounting firm, and was open to financial analysis. At that time, Yukos became the largest oil company in Russia.

What happened to Yukos in 2003?

In 2003, Russian authorities accused the company's management of economic crimes. The claims of the tax authorities of the Russian Federation were related to transactions for the sale of oil and petroleum products between YUKOS and 21 organizations registered in regions that provided tax benefits in 2000 (Kalmykia, Mordovia, Closed Administrative Unit Trekhgorny).

As a result, the largest fines and penalties in Russian history were imposed on the company. Their total amount for 2000-2003 amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles or almost 25 billion dollars at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue. After these events, Yukos shares fell sharply in price.

A number of company executives were also convicted (including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Alexey Pichugin), mainly for fraud and tax evasion.

What happened to YUKOS as a result of the tax authorities' claims?

Arbitration courts of all instances recognized the claims of the tax authorities as legitimate, all assets and accounts of YUKOS and its subsidiaries were frozen. Funds were allowed to be withdrawn only to pay taxes and salaries to employees; everything else went to the state to pay off debts.

The company began to gradually reduce staff, and after some time it stopped exporting oil due to a lack of funds for customs payments. As a result, YUKOS began to fall apart.

How did Yukos go bankrupt?

On December 14, 2004, YUKOS filed a claim for voluntary bankruptcy in court in Houston (USA) in order to avoid dismemberment of the company. By a decision of December 16, 2004, this court prohibited companies and banks from taking any action to alienate YUKOS property.

Nevertheless, on December 19, 2004, 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz shares were sold to the FSSP at auction for $9.3 billion. The winner was the little-known company Baikalfinancegroup LLC.

On March 28, 2006, the Moscow Arbitration Court decided to begin bankruptcy proceedings for the company and appoint a temporary manager, who became Eduard Rebgun.

According to the court decision, on August 1, 2006, bankruptcy proceedings were introduced at YUKOS for a period of one year. After the completion of the bankruptcy procedure, based on the decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court dated November 12, an entry on the liquidation of YUKOS was made in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities on November 21, 2007.

Why did the “YUKOS case” end up in the European Court of Human Rights?

On April 23, 2004, the management of the Yukos company filed a complaint against the Russian Federation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), because the company's management "did not believe in the objectivity and fairness of the Russian government and the judiciary."

On January 29, 2009, the court accepted the case for consideration, recognizing some of the arguments as justified. On September 20, 2011, the ECHR partially recognized the actions of the Russian tax authorities against the Yukos oil company as a violation of its right to protection of property.

What was the court's decision in the first and second “YUKOS case”?

According to the first Yukos case, the court in 2005 found the main co-owners of the company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, guilty of fraud, tax evasion and other economic crimes, and sentenced each of them to nine years in prison. Subsequently, the Moscow City Court reduced this period to eight years.

During the consideration of the first YUKOS case, the Khamovnichesky Court also satisfied the demand of the Federal Tax Service to recover from the ex-head of YUKOS in favor of the state budget the property damage caused by him in the amount of 17.4 billion rubles, as well as the demand of Federal Tax Service No. 5 to pay income tax 52 million rubles. In addition, penalties in the amount of 12 million rubles were assessed on the unpaid amount of taxes.

While Khodorkovsky was in prison, he paid off his debt to the budget about 40 thousand rubles. The remaining amount, according to current legislation, must be paid, since debts recognized by the courts do not have a statute of limitations.

Why is the “YUKOS case” being reconsidered?

In December 2013, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation began hearings on the first and second “YUKOS case” in connection with unaccounted innovations in Russian legislation on a more lenient attitude towards those who violate the law in the field of entrepreneurship.

On July 18, the court unanimously decided to satisfy the claim of Group Menatep Limited and ruled that Russia had violated the Energy Charter and expropriated the assets of Yukos. At the same time, the court agreed that YUKOS tried to evade full payment of taxes through structures in Mordovia.

According to the court decision, Russia can pay compensation until January 15, 2015, after which interest will begin to accrue. The court's decision can be appealed to a Dutch court.

The second case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev was opened in January 2005, when the former owners of what was once the country's largest oil company were still awaiting the outcome of the first trial. A new batch of official charges were brought against them in February 2007, and two years later, hearings on this case began in the Khamovnichesky Court of Moscow. According to the investigation, since the start of the proceedings in the first case, new episodes from the life of YUKOS have been revealed, thanks to which Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are now additionally charged with the laundering of criminally obtained funds and the theft of 350 million tons of oil, that is, in general, all the oil that the company mined from 1998 to 2003.

There is, however, an unofficial version of the origin of the new charges. Many commentators on the trial noted that according to the first verdict, Khodorkovsky should be released in October 2011, that is, on the eve of the presidential elections. Still an influential figure who does not hide his oppositional sentiments, he can have a significant influence on the outcome of the vote, thereby interfering in the already scheduled game of the political elites.

What is the essence of the prosecution's position?

The accusation in the second “YUKOS case” is based on two episodes. The first is the theft of shares of the subsidiaries of the Eastern Oil Company (VNK) by exchanging them for Yukos securities in 1998. The state, represented by the Ministry of State Property, owned a stake (36.8%) in one of these subsidiaries - Tomskneft - and, as a shareholder, turned to the prosecutor's office with a request to check the legality of these transactions. The criminal case was opened in 2000 and was revived in the second Yukos trial.

The second episode of the accusation caused a much greater public outcry. Khodorkovsky, who is presented as the head of an “organized group,” is charged with theft of oil from Yukos subsidiaries and legalization of the proceeds received from its sale. According to investigators, the scheme was as follows: enterprises controlled by YUKOS sold oil to the parent company on conditions that were obviously unfavorable for themselves (at cost), and YUKOS, in turn, sold oil at market prices, “laundering” the funds received “under the guise of official dividends.” Initially, the investigation counted 350 million tons of oil stolen in this way, but later this figure was reduced to 218 million tons.

What is the essence of the defense position?

Whether Khodorkovsky and Lebedev will be found guilty on the first episode is not so important. The fact is that the statute of limitations for such charges is 10 years and by now it has already expired, so the court will have to release them from punishment in any case.

As for the second episode, the defendants' lawyers emphasize that YUKOS, according to the Civil Code, had every right to give any orders to its subsidiaries, including the sale of oil at a reduced price, since these actions do not harm economic efficiency holding as a whole. Another argument in favor of the accused is the court decisions in the first YUKOS case, which found the former owners of the company guilty of tax crimes. It turns out that in the first trial the legality of ownership of the extracted oil was not questioned - after all, you cannot be accused of not paying taxes on something you do not own. In addition, as defenders note, the state itself owned 1% of YUKOS shares, which means it also participated in the legalization.

What witnesses were on the prosecution's side?

The prosecution presented the court with a list of 250 witnesses, but only 51 people were called. Among those who testified against, there were no obvious stars, like Khodorkovsky’s defense. The main bet of the Prosecutor General's Office was placed on the former managers of Tomskneft VNK Evgeny Rybin and Guram Avalishvili, but their speeches rather played into the hands of the accused. Thus, Rybin told the court that “in general, it is impossible to steal oil, all or more of it, because the movement of oil is strictly regulated.” Another important witness for the prosecution was former top manager of YUKOS Alexey Golubovich, who had been cooperating with the investigation since 2006, but he also noted that he considered transactions with shares of VNK subsidiaries fair. The former bankruptcy manager of YUKOS, Eduard Rebgun, spoke on the episode about the theft of oil, whose words also rather disappointed the prosecutor: “I had no information that the oil was stolen. Oil was being sold."

What witnesses were on the defense side?

Khodorkovsky's defense had ambitious plans: they tried to call Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his deputy Igor Sechin to testify, but the court found no reason to disturb high-ranking officials. However, several well-known politicians nevertheless spoke on the side of the defense. The first to testify was former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who stated the political nature of the case: “When tension began between President Putin and the Yukos company, [...] I turned to Putin and asked him to explain what was happening. [...] He said something like this: that the Yukos company financed not only the political parties SPS and Yabloko, which he, President Putin, allowed to be financed, but also financed the Communist Party, which he, President Putin, did not allow to be financed.” .

Another witness for the defense was the former head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, who called the accusations against Khodorkovsky “unfounded.” In June 2010, the head of Sberbank, German Gref, spoke in court. Answering Khodorkovsky’s question, Gref, who served as Minister of Economic Development and Trade from 2000 to 2007, said: “The check was not part of my duties, but if this had been discovered, they would have reported to me.” The Minister of Industry and Trade, Viktor Khristenko, also knew nothing about the thefts of YUKOS.

How long will the verdict be read?

The time it takes to read the verdict directly depends on whether it is guilty or acquittal. If Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are found guilty, one day may be enough for the procedure. If the court sides with the former owners of YUKOS, the announcement of the verdict will likely be delayed, because an acquittal must include evidence of the innocence of the defendants on each count of the charges brought. However, since the YUKOS case is special for many reasons, it is not possible to make an accurate forecast.

How much can they give?

The prosecution is asking for 14 years for the defendants (the minimum sentence under Article 173 Part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is 7 years), while Khodorkovsky and Lebedev do not admit guilt. If they are acquitted in the second case, they will be released next year (Lebedev in June, Khodorkovsky in October). In the event of a guilty verdict, an important factor will be from what point the court decides to count the new term. If this is the moment of the first arrest (2003), then Khodorkovsky and Lebedev will be released no later than 2017 and will even be able to watch the football world championship in Russia live. The court may also begin counting the period from the announcement of charges in the second case (2007), and then the defendants will leave prison in 2021. In this case, it is possible to be released on parole after half of the new term has expired. And, of course, we should not forget about the presidential pardon - the head of state has the right to release Khodorkovsky and Lebedev even today.

Could there be a third Yukos case?

Since the YUKOS company has not existed for more than 3 years, and the accused have not been involved in its activities for even longer, the likelihood of a new case emerging should be considered low. However, it still cannot be ruled out that new facts undesirable for Khodorkovsky will emerge from somewhere - especially if we consider the criminal prosecution of the former owners of YUKOS as a political matter. The Criminal Code provides for a statute of limitations for serious crimes of 10 years, for especially serious ones - 15, and statutes of limitations do not apply at all to crimes against human life and safety.

Who else appeared as a defendant in the YUKOS criminal cases?

In addition to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, more than 30 former employees of the company were accused in criminal cases of YUKOS; each case was subsequently separated into separate proceedings. Among the most high-profile is the accusation of one of the former leaders of YUKOS, Leonid Nevzlin, of organizing several murders and attempts, as well as theft and tax evasion. In 2008, the Moscow City Court sentenced Nevzlin in absentia to life imprisonment. The entrepreneur currently lives in Israel.

The former head of the Yukos internal economic security department, Alexei Pichugin, was also accused of contract killings and assassinations. The former counterintelligence officer received a 20-year sentence for six episodes incriminated against him in 2005, and two years later, in the second case, Pichugin was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Vasily Aleksanyan, who became vice-president of YUKOS in 2006, and before that headed the legal department of the company, was accused of legalization, misappropriation and embezzlement. Aleksanyan, who was under arrest, was diagnosed with AIDS and lymphoma. In 2008, he was able to be released on bail of 50 million rubles, and in 2010, the prosecutor’s office refused to continue the criminal case against him due to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Former Yukos lawyer Svetlana Bakhmina was sentenced to 7 years in prison on charges of embezzlement, embezzlement, and tax evasion in 2006. Three years later, Bakhmina was released on parole, having given birth to a daughter in custody.

Which international and foreign courts hear cases related to YUKOS?

The situation with YUKOS has long outgrown the boundaries of the competence of Russian justice and has brought work to foreign courts of various levels. Thus, in 2007, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce began to consider the claim of the British RosinvestCo against the Russian Federation related to the loss of investments in the amount of $75 million as a result of the nationalization of YUKOS. The British won the case, and in December 2010, the Supreme Court of Sweden refused the Russian side to review it. Prior to this, in 2005, a number of former minority shareholders of Yukos from the United States also tried to sue Russia on similar grounds, but the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia decided that the defendant was outside its jurisdiction.

In January 2010, former shareholders of the oil company filed a claim with the European Court of Human Rights alleging illegal seizure of property by the Russian state in the equivalent of $98 billion, which became the largest amount of claims in the history of the Strasbourg court. The former holders of Yukos shares had the opportunity to bring this claim to court after a year earlier, the Hague Arbitration Court confirmed Russia’s obligation under the Energy Charter, despite the fact that the State Duma denounced this agreement. The case is being considered by the ECHR.

Another international success was achieved in 2006 by Yukos Capital, a former subsidiary of YUKOS registered in Luxembourg. She appealed to the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation with a demand that Rosneft repay a loan of $400 million issued in 2004 to Yuganskneftegaz (it went to the state company after the sale of Yukos). In 2007, the Moscow Arbitration Court overturned this decision, but the Amsterdam Court of Appeal refused to recognize the decision to annul the payments. In June of this year, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands confirmed the right of Yukos Capital to demand repayment of the debt, rejecting Rosneft's appeal.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a Russian entrepreneur and ex-owner of the largest Russian oil company, Yukos. According to his net worth, in 2003 he was considered one of the richest and financially most powerful citizens of the Russian Federation; his capital was estimated at $15 billion.

In 2005, he became a key figure in a high-profile criminal case involving Yukos and was accused of fraud and tax evasion. As a result, the oil company was declared bankrupt, and its leader went to prison for 10 years and 10 months. Khodorkovsky's sentence had a resonant assessment in society - some consider him to be justly convicted, while others call him a “prisoner of conscience”, criminally persecuted for political reasons. At the time of his release from prison, the amount in his account did not exceed $100 million.

Childhood and youth

Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky was born on June 20, 1963 in a working-class family in the capital. His parents Marina Filippovna and Boris Moiseevich were chemical engineers at the Kalibr plant, which produces precision measuring equipment.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky - from a working-class family

According to Mikhail, his paternal relatives were Jews, but he himself felt Russian by nationality.

The family of the future oil magnate lived poorly in a communal apartment until 1971, after which the parents received their own housing. Since childhood, young Khodorkovsky was interested in experiments and chemistry, showing curiosity in this direction.

At the university, Khodorkovsky was considered the best student of the faculty, despite the fact that urgent financial need forced him to work as a carpenter in a housing cooperative in his free time. In 1986, he graduated with honors from the university and received a diploma in industrial engineering.

In his youth, Mikhail, together with like-minded people, created the Center for Scientific and Technical Creativity of Youth, which became his initial business project, with the help of which he earned his first big money. In parallel with his activities at NTTM, the future oil magnate studied at the Institute of National Economy named after. Plekhanov, where he met a relative of officials at the State Bank of the USSR, Alexei Golubovich, which determined the future fate of Khodorkovsky.

Bank "Menatep"

Thanks to his first “brainchild” and his acquaintance with Golubovich, Mikhail Khodorkovsky took a strong position in the world of big business and in 1989 created the commercial bank for scientific and technological progress Menatep, becoming the chairman of its board. Khodorkovsky's Bank was one of the first to receive a license from the State Bank of the USSR, which allowed it to carry out financial transactions with the tax authorities, the Ministry of Finance and Rosvooruzhenie.

In 1992, Khodorkovsky’s professional biography took a different direction and began to lean towards the oil business. First, he is appointed to the post of chairman of the Investment Fund for Industry and Fuel and Energy Complex. The new position gave Mikhail Borisovich all the rights and powers of the Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy. After a few months of activity, he becomes a full-fledged deputy minister. To work in the civil service, he had to formally vacate his position as head of the Menatep Bank, but all the reins of government remained in his hands.

During this period, the oligarch decided to change the strategy of Menatep Bank. As a result, the financial organization began to focus exclusively on large clients who, with its help, carried out financial transactions and received services that required resolving issues with government authorities.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Bank Menatep

Over time, the activities of Menatep began to move more into the investment industry. The priority areas were industry and metallurgy, petrochemistry and building materials, as well as the food and chemical industries.

"YUKOS"

In 1995, Khodorkovsky turned to the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Oleg Soskovets with a proposal to exchange 10% of the shares of Menatep for 45% of the shares of the state-owned oil refining company Yukos, which was in a crisis state and was in crisis.

After the auction, Menatep became the owner of 45% of the shares of YUKOS, and then Khodorkovsky’s bank acquired another 33% of the shares of the oil company, for which, together with 5 partners, it paid $300 million.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky in the Yukos company

Later, at a cash auction, Menatep again received an impressive number of shares in the most delicious piece of the Russian oil business and control over 90% of the shares of YUKOS.

Having become the owner of YUKOS, Khodorkovsky set about bringing the bankrupt oil company out of the crisis, but Menatep’s assets were not enough for this. It took the oligarch 6 years and investments from third-party banks to bring Yukos out of an acute crisis, as a result of which the oil refining company became the leader of the global energy market with a capital of more than $40 million.

Difficulties in running a business did not prevent Mikhail Borisovich from becoming a co-founder of the OpenRussia Foundation charity organization in 2001, the board of founders of which also included Mikhail Piotrovsky, Jacob Rothschild, and former US Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman.

Later, on its basis, the all-Russian network socio-political movement “Open Russia” was created, which was persecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation. After Khodorkovsky was released from captivity, the organization continued its work under his leadership.

The Yukos case

In October 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who at that time became one of the richest people in Russia and the world, was arrested at the Novosibirsk airport and charged with theft of government funds and tax evasion. After this, a search was carried out at the Yukos office, and all shares and accounts of the company were seized by the Russian Prosecutor's Office.

According to the investigation, which was later recognized by the court, the oil tycoon in 1994 created a criminal group whose activities were aimed at illegally acquiring shares of various companies at a reduced price with the aim of reselling them at market prices.

As a result, Russia's largest oil company, Yukos, began to fall apart, as oil exports were stopped, and all the money from the company's assets was used to pay off the debt to the state. As a result of the first criminal case in May 2005, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to 8 years in prison to be served in a general regime colony. And the Yukos case against other company managers was investigated further.

In 2006, a second criminal case was opened against Khodorkovsky and his business partner, the head of the board of directors of Menatep, for oil theft, the indictment of which consisted of 14 volumes.

Khodorkovsky called the crime he was charged with absurd, because if he stole all of Yukos’s oil, which is 350 million tons, then why were wages paid to employees, taxes were paid to the state in the amount of $ 40 million and wells were drilled and new fields were developed .

In December 2010, the court found Khodorkosky and Lebedev guilty, sentencing them to 14 years in prison on a cumulative basis; the term of imprisonment was later reduced.

The convicts were transported to a correctional colony in the Karelian city of Segezha, and in Russia there was a loud discussion of the criminal trial of Khodorkovsky, which was publicly condemned by public figure, opposition politician, former mayor of Moscow, member of the Human Rights Commission under the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Lyudmila Alekseeva and others, who believe that in the YUKOS case the law was violated in a “malicious and brazen manner.” The West also condemned Khodorkovsky's sentence - the United States criticized Russian laws, the independence of the courts, tax policy in Russia and the inviolability of property.

As a sign of protest and non-recognition of the charges, Khodorkovsky went on hunger strike 4 times while serving his sentence. In addition, his stay in the colony was filled with various “adventures”. After the first sentence in the Chita colony, he ended up in a punishment cell, because during the inspection, orders from the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation on the rights of prisoners were confiscated from him, which, according to the administration, is prohibited by law.

There, in Chita, prisoner Khodorkovsky also became a “victim” of cellmate Alexander Kuchma, who cut the oligarch’s face with a shoe knife. According to Kuchma, he was pushed to commit a crime by unknown people who literally “beat” him out of actions against Mikhail. The prisoner said that he was also required to testify in front of the camera that he cut up Khodorkovsky’s face against the backdrop of the latter’s sexual harassment.

In December 2013, the Russian President signed the release of Khodorkovsky. The ex-head of YUKOS was hastily released from the colony, even forgetting to issue a release certificate, and transported to the St. Petersburg Pulkovo airport, from where Mikhail flew to Berlin on a private plane provided by the former head of the German Foreign Ministry.

Upon arrival in Berlin, Khodorkovsky spoke at a press conference and stated that after his release he no longer intended to participate in politics, sponsor the Russian opposition or engage in business. His key plan for the future was social activities aimed at the release of political prisoners in Russia.

Over the course of several years, the opinion of the former oil tycoon changed radically - before the presidential elections, he intensified his activities, which experts assessed as a desire to make his way to the pinnacle of power. Khodorkovsky himself states that he is ready to become president of the Russian Federation in order to carry out constitutional reform in Russia and redistribute presidential power in favor of society, parliament and the court.

Also on the Ukrainian Maidan in 2014, after the coup d’etat, Mikhail Khodorkovsky said that he was ready to become a peacemaker in the Ukrainian situation. Then, speaking on stage in front of the Ukrainian people, he openly criticized the Russian authorities, and called Ukrainian nationalists brave people who honestly defended their freedom.

While still in prison, Mikhail Borisovich began literary activity. His works were analytical in nature. In the mid-2000s, the books “The Crisis of Liberalism”, “Left Turn”, “Introduction to the Future. The world in 2020."

Later “Articles” were published. Dialogues. Interview: Author's collection" and "Prison and freedom". But the most popular was the entrepreneur’s book “Prison People,” which the author dedicated to his cellmates. Khodorkovsky called human life the only currency that exists in prison. In the dungeons, it is customary to go to the end in every situation, regardless of cowardice, even if you have to give up your life.

What Mikhail himself lacked was communication with friends, family, children and the opportunity to look beyond the horizon. The first thing after his release was that the businessman went to the sea, jumped with a parachute and crawled along a rock. According to Mikhail Borisovich, the feeling of adrenaline in his blood brought him back to life.

Repeatedly in his interviews, Khodorkovsky touched upon the topic of attitude towards the President of Russia. In one of his last conversations with journalists, Mikhail Borisovich spoke about Vladimir Putin as a politician who does not have a strategy for leaving the post of head of state. According to the businessman, the long term of the president's rule suggests that society has a stereotype of treating Russians as a people who cannot live without a strong hand. Khodorkovsky called this form of attitude towards the people “a form of racism.”

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Yukos case
- a frequently used name for the events that began in 2003 related to the criminal prosecution of the main co-owners of the Russian oil company YUKOS M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev, a number of company employees and affiliated organizations, as well as the bankruptcy proceedings of the YUKOS company as a result additional assessment of a significant amount of taxes for past periods. These events have had a significant impact on Russia's political life and business climate and are the subject of fierce debate.

• 1 Possible prerequisites
• 2 Claims from tax authorities
• 3 Arbitration process for tax claims
• 4 Bankruptcy of NK Yukos
• 5 The case of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov
• 6 Pichugin case
• 7 Criminal prosecution of other workers
• 8 The second case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• 9 Consideration of the case in the European Court of Human Rights
  • 9.1 Khodorkovsky's first complaint
  • 9.2 Lebedev's first complaint
  • 9.3 Complaint from Yukos shareholders
  • 9.4 Second complaints from Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• 10 GML claim in international arbitration
• 11 Consequences of the “YUKOS Affair”
• 12 Opinions on the Yukos case
  • 12.1 Opinions and assessments of the “second case” of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• 13 Interesting facts
• 14 Notes
• 15 Footnotes
• 16 Literature
• 17 Links

Possible preconditions

As of 1999-2000, the media reported that YUKOS was actively resorting to so-called tax optimization, taking advantage of numerous legal loopholes to reduce the volume of tax deductions - understating the tax base, selling oil through "fly-by-night" trading firms registered in regions with preferential tax rates. taxation, the use of transfer pricing, the use of a “reverse offset” scheme, etc. Unique to the company was the optimization method by resale at a reduced price of oil-containing fluid extracted from wells under the guise of “well fluid” between divisions. This maneuver made it possible to reduce raw material taxes. Many similar schemes in one combination or another were used by all Russian oil companies, but the “well fluid” option was used only by YUKOS. According to Yulia Latynina, the idea of ​​selling so-called “fluid at the wellhead,” which was the main way to minimize local taxes, was “YUKOS’s best invention.” in fact, this method of minimizing taxes was “borrowed” from the United States.

Thus, in 1999, per ton of oil produced, Yukos paid 10 times less taxes than Surgutneftegaz and 5 times less than Lukoil.

• In the first half of 2002, a series of articles appeared in the Western European press incriminating Yukos executives of money laundering. The series was triggered by the discovery by French tax authorities of Elena Collong-Popova's Swiss bank accounts, through which hundreds of millions of dollars passed. According to her statements, she opened these accounts at the request of one of the owners of YUKOS, Alexei Golubovich.

• On February 19, 2003, at a meeting of representatives of big business with Russian President V. Putin, M. Khodorkovsky accused the state company Rosneft of corruption, citing as an example the purchase of a small oil company Severnaya Neft for a fabulous sum of $600 million at that time. Reply Putin reminded Khodorkovsky that Yukos had problems with taxes (although he did not specify what they were) and asked how the oil company obtained “super reserves.”

• In April 2003, Yukos announced a merger with Sibneft, which at that time was controlled by Roman Abramovich. Negotiations were held on the sale of a blocking stake in the merged company with the American ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil. According to Leonid Nevzlin (one of the leaders and co-owners of YUKOS), Khodorkovsky was confident that the country's leadership would approve this record deal, but “Putin was convinced that Khodorkovsky was deceiving him.”

• One of the reasons for the beginning of the defeat of the company, a number of analysts called Putin’s dissatisfaction with the financing of opposition parties by Khodorkovsky and other YUKOS shareholders - Yabloko, SPS, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

• From the book “Prisoner of Silence” by Valery Panyushkin, published in 2006:

“The efforts of Yukos shareholders at the beginning of 2003 can be put into some general picture: they attack corruption, they take the largest oil company out of state control, they finance the opposition, they educate a new generation of free citizens, they develop the humanities (see “Open Russia“) - they seem to have some kind of business plan for Russia. A little more, and Russia will leave the personal control of President Putin and will become a completely Western country. in a sense, this is truly a conspiracy aimed at changing the social system. And it’s stupid to think that the Kremlin didn’t notice such a conspiracy.”

• In May 2008, in an interview with the British newspaper The Sunday Times, M. Khodorkovsky directly accused “former KGB officer” Igor Sechin of organizing both the first and second criminal cases against himself: the first “out of greed,” the second “out of cowardice.” Earlier, Khodorkovsky denied the assertion of his business partner, head of Menatep Group Leonid Nevzlin, that part of the blame for the collapse of YUKOS lies with Roman Abramovich.

• Former British oil company CEO John Brown claimed in his autobiographical book More Than Business that shortly before Khodorkovsky's arrest, Vladimir Putin privately told him (Brown): “I have tolerated this man for too long.” In July 2009, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov submitted written testimony to the European Court of Human Rights, according to which during an informal meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he said that Khodorkovsky had “crossed the line” by funding the Communist Party without the Kremlin’s permission.

• Representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation have repeatedly asserted that neither the party nor its members have ever received funding from YUKOS. However, Mikhail Khodorkovsky claimed that assistance to this party was provided by one of the company’s shareholders from his own funds. In 2003, according to the list of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, former member of the board of directors of YUKOS Sergei Muravlenko and former head of the analytical department of YUKOS Alexey Kondaurov were elected deputies of the State Duma.

• As a number of experts have suggested, one of the factors in the Khodorkovsky case in 2003 and the nationalization of the Yukos company was Khodorkovsky's lobbying for a reduction in the tax burden on oil companies (in 2002, Khodorkovsky opposed government initiatives in this area).

• The British weekly Financial Times expresses an opinion about the political nature of the “YUKOS Affair”:

In a series of cynical moves, President Putin destroyed political opponent Mikhail Khodorkovsky and seized his company. The action, ostensibly aimed at pacifying the greedy oligarch, was in fact done to sharply strengthen the power of the Kremlin.

BBC: "British press: Putin is a 'thug and a liar'"

Claims from tax authorities

In 2003, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Taxes and Duties (after administrative reform - the Federal Tax Service of Russia) conducted a re-inspection of the Yukos Oil Company on issues of tax payment in 2000-2003. As a result of this audit, the largest fines and penalties in Russian history were imposed on the company.

The claims of the tax authorities are related to transactions for the sale of oil and petroleum products between YUKOS and 21 organizations registered in regions that provided tax benefits in 2000 (Kalmykia, Mordovia, Closed Administrative Okrug "Trekhgorny"). Organizations used these benefits and completely or partially did not pay a number of taxes. The tax authorities argued that these organizations were created solely for the purpose of applying tax benefits and all economic benefits from their transactions belonged to OJSC NK YUKOS. This conclusion was based on the following facts established by the tax authorities:

• OJSC NK YUKOS controlled the sales of oil and petroleum products by the above organizations;
• oil and petroleum products were sold to these organizations at reduced prices;
• there was no other point in selling oil and petroleum products through intermediaries other than to minimize taxes;
• the amount of benefits used by organizations was not comparable with the amount of investments made in the corresponding regions (for example, only 0.006% of the amount of benefits used was invested in the Closed Administrative Unit "Trekhgorny");
• all organizations had accounts in banks controlled by OJSC NK YUKOS;
• the founders of organizations were often the same individuals;
• organizations settled with OJSC NK YUKOS and with each other primarily through offsets and promissory notes of OJSC NK YUKOS;
• accounting for all organizations was carried out by LLC YUKOS-Invest and LLC YUKOS-FBC.

OJSC NK YUKOS was found responsible for paying taxes on transactions made by other legal entities, and the tax authorities assessed additional taxes on OJSC NK YUKOS:

• income tax calculated based on the profits of the above-mentioned interdependent organizations;
• road user tax,
• tax on the maintenance of social and cultural facilities;
• property tax;
• VAT refunded from the budget upon export;
• tax on the sale of fuels and lubricants.

The tax authorities did not refer to any legal provisions to substantiate that all economic benefits from transactions of interdependent organizations were received by OJSC NK YUKOS. Neither a reference to Article 40 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation (transfer pricing rules) nor evidence was used that interdependent organizations actually carried out their activities (had separate structural divisions) outside the regions in which they were registered.

The Arbitration Court of Moscow and the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District refused to apply a three-year statute of limitations in relation to bringing OJSC NK YUKOS to tax liability for non-payment of taxes in 2000. At the same time, they indicated that “the norms of tax legislation that provide rights or guarantees to bona fide taxpayers, cannot be extended to those unscrupulous.” The Supreme Arbitration Court also refused to apply the three-year statute of limitations, citing the fact that the on-site tax audit report was drawn up on December 29, 2003.

It should be noted that during the corresponding period, not only YUKOS, but also other Russian oil companies carried out their activities through a network of legal entities registered in preferential tax zones (inaccessible link). in particular, the companies Lukoil and Sibneft acted this way. In December 2003, the Information and Public Relations Department of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, based on the results of an audit of the financial and economic activities of OJSC Sibneft for 2001 and the first half of 2002, reported that such a scheme allowed the company “to pay income tax at a reduced rate within the framework of current legislation. We are, therefore, talking about the legal activities of Sibneft OJSC, aimed at minimizing the expenditure side of the company’s budget.” (unavailable link)

Thus, what was recognized as legal in relation to Sibneft was recognized as illegal in relation to YUKOS.

In 2001, YUKOS had to pay $14.5 in various taxes for each barrel of oil produced, while all oil companies paid an average of only $5.2. In 2000, for each barrel of oil produced by YUKOS taxes were assessed at $10.50, while the other six oil majors paid an average of $6.00. For 2001 and 2002, the company was assessed taxes that amounted to 49.5% of revenue for 2001 and 58.15% for 2002, and the total amount of claims from tax authorities, including fines, exceeded the company's revenue for these years.

The total amount of tax claims, taking into account fines and penalties for 2000-2003, amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles. or almost $25 billion at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue.

After this, Yukos shares fell sharply in price. Then, in one of his interviews, Vladimir Putin said that the state does not intend to bankrupt YUKOS. As a result, the shares increased by 36% in one day, as a result of which the MICEX was forced to stop trading on this security.

Arbitration process for tax claims

All assets and accounts of Yukos and its subsidiaries were frozen. Funds were allowed to be withdrawn only to pay taxes and salaries to employees; the rest went to the state to pay off debts. The company began to gradually reduce staff, and after some time stopped exporting oil due to a lack of funds for customs payments. Russia's largest oil company began to fall apart.

Arbitration courts of all instances recognized the claims of the tax authorities as legitimate. The Federal Bailiff Service of Russia (FSSP) ordered the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to repay the debts of the Yukos Oil Company to the federal budget.

The company's management, together with shareholders, considered the possibility of declaring NK Yukos insolvent (bankrupt) in order to avoid dismemberment of the company. On December 14, 2004, YUKOS filed a claim for voluntary bankruptcy in court in Houston (USA). By a decision of December 16, 2004, this court prohibited companies and banks from taking any actions to alienate YUKOS property. Nevertheless, on December 19, 2004, 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz shares were sold to the FSSP at auction for $9.3 billion. The winner was the little-known company Baikalfinancegroup LLC, whose shareholders, according to V. Putin, are “individuals who have been doing business for many years.” A few days later, this company was purchased by the state-owned Rosneft OJSC.

In December 2004, Deutsche Bank, which headed a group of banks planning to finance the purchase of Yuganskneftegaz, filed an application with the American court asking to dismiss the case regarding the reorganization of Yukos, justifying this by the fact that the company had insignificant assets in the United States and only one employee - Bruce Misamore . However, Yukos indicated that many of its shareholders are American citizens. As a result, in February 2005, a Houston court judge dismissed the case, ruling that it should be tried in court, where the participation of the Russian government would be ensured. She did not take into account the arguments of Yukos representatives that the Russian government imposed tax penalties on the company for political reasons and therefore Yukos could not count on a fair hearing of its case in Russia.

Bankruptcy of NK Yukos

Yukos oil production enterprises produced 24.5 million tons of oil in 2005. YUKOS's revenue according to RAS for the nine months of 2005 amounted to 2.03 billion rubles, net loss - 2.92 billion rubles. The state's tax claims against YUKOS at the beginning of 2006 amounted to $9.8 billion, and the company owed about $1.2 billion to commercial banks and Group Menatep.

On March 28, 2006, the Moscow Arbitration Court decided to begin bankruptcy proceedings for the company and appoint a temporary manager, who became Eduard Rebgun.

As of mid-July 2006, according to information from the temporary manager of YUKOS, Eduard Rebgun, the company's confirmed debt to the budget, Yuganskneftegaz and Rosneft amounts to 491.575 billion rubles. (about $18 billion).

By decision of the court, on August 1, 2006, bankruptcy proceedings were introduced at YUKOS for a period of one year. The size of the claims presented by creditors to YUKOS is about $29.5 billion, including tax claims for $11.5 billion, $14 billion - claims of companies affiliated with YUKOS, $700 million - debt to friendly GML Moravel, $485 million - bank claims , which were bought by Rosneft, another $2.4 billion in debt to Yuganskneftegaz and $90 million in other commercial claims.

During the monitoring period introduced in YUKOS on March 28, 43 creditors went to court with claims amounting to about 630 billion rubles, but the court recognized the claims of 30 creditors for 491.6 billion rubles. The largest are the Federal Tax Service (353.8 billion rubles), Rosneft and Yuganskneftegaz (122 billion rubles).

After the completion of the bankruptcy procedure, based on the decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court dated November 12, an entry on the liquidation of NK Yukos was made in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities on November 21, 2007.

The case of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov

Main article: The case of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov

The formal reason for launching an investigation by the Prosecutor General's Office against YUKOS and its owners was a request from State Duma deputy Vladimir Yudin about the legality of the privatization in 1994 of the Apatit mining and processing plant (Murmansk region) by commercial entities controlled by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business partners.

A few days later, a criminal case was opened on embezzlement and tax evasion by structures controlled by the oil company YUKOS, from which dozens of criminal cases against individual employees of the company were subsequently spun off.

For the first month, the investigation was conducted in conditions of heightened secrecy, and the investigation became known only on July 2, 2003, when the chairman of the board of directors of the Menatep International Financial Association, Platon Lebedev, was arrested.

After the arrest of Platon Lebedev, events developed rapidly, and reports of new charges and searches were received weekly. The investigation into Lebedev’s own case was completed in just two months. At first he was accused of stealing 20% ​​of the shares of Apatit OJSC, then a number of more charges were added.

After some time, the Yukos company itself was accused of tax evasion through various tax optimization schemes. Intensified tax audits followed for several years. According to senior managers of YUKOS, the calculated amount of arrears and fines exceeded the company's revenue over the years. According to the Ministry of Taxes and Duties, YUKOS's real revenue was much more than declared.

At first, the Prosecutor General's Office did not bother Mikhail Khodorkovsky himself very much - he was only interrogated several times as a witness shortly after the arrest of Platon Lebedev, and then left alone for a long time. But already in the fall of 2003, unambiguous hints began to come from the prosecutor’s office about the existence of serious claims against Khodorkovsky.

On the morning of October 25, 2003, Khodorkovsky’s plane, heading to Irkutsk, landed for refueling at Novosibirsk airport. As soon as the plane stopped, it was blocked by FSB officers. On the same day, Khodorkovsky was taken to the Basmanny Court in Moscow and was then placed in the Matrosskaya Tishina pre-trial detention center. On November 3 of the same year, Khodorkovsky resigned from his post as chairman of the company's board.

The investigation into the Khodorkovsky case was also completed in a record two months. The claims against him completely repeated what Platon Lebedev had previously been accused of - theft of someone else's property, malicious failure to comply with a court decision that had entered into legal force, causing property damage to owners through deception, evasion of taxes from organizations and individuals, forgery of documents, embezzlement or embezzlement of someone else's property by an organized group on a large scale.

According to the investigation, which the court later agreed with, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev in 1994 created an organized criminal group in order to fraudulently take over shares of various enterprises (fraud) and then sell the products of the Apatit plant at reduced prices to controlled intermediary companies, who, in turn, sold them at market prices (causing property damage through deception or breach of trust). In addition, they were accused of tax crimes.

In addition to committing economic crimes, a number of Yukos employees were accused of organizing several murders. For example, Yukos security officer Alexey Pichugin, according to the prosecutor's office, organized the murder of Nefteyugansk mayor Vladimir Petukhov in 1998 - on the direct orders of Yukos board chairman Leonid Nevzlin.

Shortly after the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office launched a “general offensive” against Yukos, bringing charges against various employees of the group’s organizations. By May 2005, the list of defendants in the YUKOS cases already exceeded 30 people, most of whom, however, are abroad and inaccessible to the investigation.

The trials of Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky began in April 2004, then they were merged, and the trial of the case began in July 2004.

Court verdict in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev Court verdict in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev (end)

On May 31, 2005, the Meshchansky Court of Moscow sentenced Khodorkovsky to nine years of imprisonment in a general regime colony under articles

• Part 3 of Article 147 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR - “fraud”, “on a large scale, or by an organized group, or by a particularly dangerous recidivist”;
• Part 3 of Article 33, Article 315 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (edition No. 162-FZ December 8, 2003) - “organizer”, “failure to comply with a court sentence, court decision or other judicial act”;
• paragraphs “a”, “b”, part 3 of article 160 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “misappropriation or embezzlement”, “by an organized group”, “on a large scale”;
• paragraphs “a”, “b”, part 3 of article 165 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “causing property damage by deception or abuse of trust”, “committed by an organized group”, “causing major damage” ;
• Part 2 of Article 198 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (as amended by No. 162-FZ on December 8, 2003) - “evasion of taxes and (or) fees from an individual”, “on an especially large scale”;
• Part 3, Article 33, paragraphs. “a”, “b” part 2 of article 199 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (edition No. 162-FZ December 8, 2003) - “organizer”, “evasion of taxes and (or) fees from an organization”, “a group of persons by preliminary conspiracy”, “on an especially large scale”;
• pp. “a”, “b” part 3 of article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (N 63-FZ June 13, 1996) - “fraud”, “by an organized group”, “on a large scale”.

According to the decision of the Moscow City Court dated September 22, 2005, the conviction against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Andrei Krainov, passed by the Meshchansky Court of Moscow, came into force. The Moscow City Court excluded only one episode and reduced the punishment for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev by one year to eight years in prison.

Khodorkovsky was sent to a correctional colony in the Chita region, and Lebedev was sent to the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Meanwhile, according to Article 73 of the Criminal Executive Code of the Russian Federation, those sentenced to imprisonment serve their sentences in correctional institutions within the territory of the subject of the Russian Federation in which they lived or were convicted. The head of the Federal Penitentiary Service, Yuri Kalinin, explained the direction of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to remote colonies by the lack of places in the colonies located near Moscow and the need to ensure the safety of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. Lebedev's lawyers first sent complaints about the illegality of transferring their client to a colony in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation and the Federal Penitentiary Service, and then appealed this transfer in court. But the court refused to satisfy this complaint. A similar complaint by Khodorkovsky was also rejected by the court.

Pichugin case

Main article: Pichugin case

In 1998-2002, the following crimes were committed, which were later incriminated against the former head of the internal economic security department at the Yukos oil company, Alexei Pichugin:

• On January 21, 1998, the director of the Moscow company Phoenix Trading Company LLP, Valentina Korneeva, was shot in the head at the door of her apartment. Previously, Korneeva refused to sell the premises she owned to structures controlled by MENATEP.
• In the summer of 1998, Sergei Kolesov, the business manager of Rosprom CJSC, was beaten.
• On June 26, 1998, on the way to work, the mayor of Nefteyugansk, V. A. Petukhov, was shot with a submachine gun. The murder was committed on Mikhail Khodorkovsky's birthday. Petukhov’s widow stated that the reason for the murder could be “an attempt to check the activities of the Yukos oil company, caused by tax non-payments.” A month before the murder, Petukhov publicly warned the Yukos management that if taxes did not go to the budget, he would achieve the cancellation of the loan allocated to Yuganskneftegaz and Yukos. On June 15, 1998, Petukhov went on a hunger strike demanding the initiation of a criminal case into tax concealment by YUKOS.
• In November 1998, a bomb was detonated at the door of the apartment of former adviser to Mikhail Khodorkovsky O.N. Kostina. According to Kostina, back in 1999, investigators had suspicions about the connections of her case with MENATEP.
• On November 24, 1998, an attempt was made on the life of the head of the Austrian oil company East Petroleum Handelsgas GmbH, Evgeniy Rybin, in Moscow. The criminal shot Rybin with a submachine gun when he left the house of YUKOS-EP top manager Leonid Filimonov. Rybin and Filimonov discussed the previously unsuccessful negotiations between Yukos and Rybin about the return of several tens of millions of dollars, which in the early 1990s were invested by East Petroleum in the development of two oil fields privatized by Yukos. On March 5, 1999, another attempt was made on Rybin’s life: in the Moscow region, criminals shot at his car with a machine gun and a grenade launcher, as a result of which driver Nikolai Fedotov died, and two police officers guarding Rybin were wounded. Rybin accused the Yukos leadership of organizing the assassination attempts.
• In November 2002, Tambov businessman Sergei Gorin and his wife were kidnapped; their bodies were never found.

On August 6, 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced Pichugin to life imprisonment to be served in a special regime colony.

On April 21, 2008, prosecution witnesses Gennady Tsigelnik and Evgeny Reshetnikov stated that they had incriminated Leonid Nevzlin and the head of the Yukos security department, Alexei Pichugin, under pressure from the investigation in exchange for concessions in their prison sentences.

Criminal prosecution of other workers

The investigation into individual episodes of the activities of other YUKOS managers continued; some of them (managers) were convicted (some of them suspended or with a probationary period), some received political asylum abroad, or the states in which they were located refused Russia in extradition.

The second case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

In December 2006, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his former business partner Platon Lebedev were transferred to the Chita pre-trial detention center to face new charges - in the case of money laundering (“Legalization of funds obtained by criminal means”, Article 174 part 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).

On February 4, 2007, lawyers for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, Yu. Shmidt, E. Baru, K. Rivkin, L. Saikin, K. Moskalenko, who arrived at Moscow Domodedovo airport to fly to Chita to see the accused, were detained at the check-in counter; they had tickets and passports were taken away, and they were taken to the basement of the line police station, where they were held for some time by armed law enforcement officers; During the inspection, all papers from the lawyer's files, all documents and letters were inspected and filmed.

On February 24, 2009, M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev arrived in Moscow on a stage. On March 3, 2009, the Khamovnichesky Interdistrict Court of Moscow began preliminary hearings on a new criminal case. The prosecution was headed by Dmitry Shokhin, who represented the state prosecution at the first trial in the case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were charged with the fact that, as part of an organized group with the main shareholders of OJSC NK YUKOS and other persons, in the period before June 12, 1998, they stole shares of subsidiaries of OJSC Eastern Oil Company in the amount of 3.6 billion rubles, in 1998-2000, shares of subsidiaries of the Eastern Oil Company OJSC stolen for the same amount were legalized, and also in 1998-2003 they committed theft by appropriating oil from Samaraneftegaz OJSC, Yuganskneftegaz OJSC and Tomskneft OJSC in the amount of more than 892 .4 billion rubles and the legalization of part of these funds in 1998-2004 in the amount of 487.4 billion rubles and 7.5 billion dollars.

On March 4, 2009, the Khamovnichesky Court refused to satisfy the request of the defense of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to challenge the judge Viktor Danilkin, who was considering the criminal case against them.

On March 6, 2009, lawyers for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev asked the court to dismiss the criminal case against their clients for lack of corpus delicti.

On May 17, 2010, Khodorkovsky went on a hunger strike due to the fact that the court hearing the second case extended his detention. Khodorkovsky considered the extension of the arrest to be contrary to the new law, which prohibits the detention of those accused of economic crimes without sufficient grounds. After that, the press secretary of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reported that the president was familiar with the contents of Khodorkovsky’s letter to the chairman of the Supreme Court of Russia, and on May 19, Khodorkovsky stopped his hunger strike.

In May 2010, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov appeared as a defense witness at the trial. He said that the methods of work at Yukos were no different from those of other leading oil companies and all companies were characterized by vertical integration, the use of transfer pricing and the use of preferential tax zones. Kasyanov said that he considers the case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to be initiated for political reasons and that Putin personally told him that “the Yukos company financed the political parties Yabloko and SPS, which he allowed to finance, and the Communist Party, which he did not allow.”

In May 2010, the defense asked to subpoena a whole group of former and current government officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. However, the court agreed to hear only German Gref, who in 1998 served as first deputy of the Ministry of State Property, and the former head of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Viktor Khristenko.

On June 21 and 22, 2010, they appeared as witnesses at the trial. Gref said that he is not aware of the theft of 350 million tons of oil, for which ex-head of YUKOS Mikhail Khodorkovsky and former head of MFO MENATEP Platon Lebedev are accused. Khristenko told the court that he knew nothing about the theft of Yukos oil, which the defendants are accused of, and also stated that the use of transfer prices and foreign traders was normal practice.

On December 30, 2010, judge of the Khamovnichesky Court Viktor Danilkin found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty under Articles 160 and 174 Part 1 regarding oil transactions and sentenced each of them to 14 years in prison with credit for previously served time. At the same time, regarding the episode with shares owned by OJSC Eastern Oil Company, the case was dismissed due to the expiration of the 10-year statute of limitations.

“I absolutely know for sure that the verdict was brought from the Moscow City Court. And the fact that this verdict was written by judges of the cassation instance in criminal cases, that is, the Moscow City Court. It is obvious".

Natalya Vasilyeva in an interview with Gazeta.ru

According to her, “I know a lot from a person close to the judge,” whom she declined to name. She also drew such conclusions from the fact that “they could have told her: don’t interfere, Viktor Nikolaevich is talking to the Moscow City Court. Or he himself told her: “I’m talking to the ‘city’.” According to N. Vasilyeva, “this means Moscow City Court in slang “Accordingly, N. Vasilyeva concludes, “some orders were given,” Danilkin called this statement slander, and the Moscow City Court declared provocation.

In February 2011, Judge Danilkin said in an interview that the verdict against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev was written by him alone in compliance with all norms of the law. But the threats and pressure were, rather, from those who sympathized with Khodorkovsky: “Some strange people called on the phone, found out my home phone number, went to my son’s website, posted some nasty things there. Correspondence came to my address at the Khamovnichesky Court.” When the verdict was announced, it was announced for four days; there were already direct threats.

By a cassation ruling of the judicial panel for criminal cases of the Moscow City Court dated May 24, 2011, the verdict of the Khamovnichesky District Court in relation to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev was changed and their punishment was reduced to 13 years in prison for each.

On May 27, 2011, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev filed petitions for parole with the Preobrazhensky District Court of Moscow, since the articles imputed to them provide for such an opportunity after serving half of the sentence of imprisonment, and out of the assigned 13 years, they served more than seven and a half.

In June 2011, Khodorkovsky was transferred to correctional colony No. 7 in the city of Segezha in Karelia, and Lebedev was transferred to correctional colony No. 14 near the city of Velsk in the Arkhangelsk region.

On December 20, 2012, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court, having considered the case in a supervisory manner, reduced the sentences of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev from 13 to 11 years. This was motivated by the reclassification of the charges in connection with the liberalization of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In addition, the Presidium of the Moscow City Court excluded from the charges the indication of money laundering in the amount of more than 2 billion rubles, considering it too imputed. Also, due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the court terminated criminal prosecution for one of the episodes of tax evasion. As a result, Lebedev should be released on July 2, 2014, Khodorkovsky on October 25, 2014.

On December 20, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree pardoning Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

On January 23, 2014, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reduced Lebedev’s sentence to time served and decided to immediately release him with the right to partial rehabilitation. On January 24, 2014, he was released from prison.

Consideration of the case in the European Court of Human Rights

Khodorkovsky's first complaint

Even before the verdict was pronounced in the first criminal case against Khodorkovsky, he filed a lawsuit with the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ECHR). At the end of May 2011, the ECHR, considering this claim, recognized that certain rights of Khodorkovsky were violated, but refused to recognize the case itself as politically motivated.

Lebedev's first complaint

In October 2007, the ECHR published a decision on Lebedev’s first complaint against the actions of the Russian authorities. According to the decision, the ECHR ordered Russia to pay Lebedev 3,000 euros in moral compensation and 7,000 euros to cover legal costs. In particular, the ECHR considered a violation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the fact that from March 30 to April 6, 2004, Lebedev was in custody without court authorization. Also, according to the ECHR, in two cases the time frame for considering complaints about arrest was excessively long.

Complaint from Yukos shareholders

YUKOS shareholders filed a complaint against the actions of the Russian authorities with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was accepted for consideration on January 30, 2009. In their complaint, YUKOS shareholders asked to recognize the actions of the Russian authorities as illegal, stating that their property was illegally taken away, citing a violation of the provisions Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Relating to the Right to a Fair Trial and Protection of Property. The applicants demanded compensation for their damages from these actions in the amount of $98 billion.

The Russian authorities brought in 20 lawyers to consider the case, including the famous British royal lawyer Michael Swainston. YUKOS shareholders were represented by British lawyer Piers Gardner, who, according to lawyer Dmitry Gololobov, has less legal experience than Swainston. According to Gololobov, the class of explanations given by Swainston during his speeches during the hearings contributed to a shift in emphasis in the case in favor of the Russian side.

• Article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial);
• Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention (“Every natural or legal person has the right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property. No one shall be deprived of his property except in the public interest and under conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law. The previous provisions shall in no way shall not, in so far as they impair the right of the State to enforce such laws as it may deem necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to enforce the payment of taxes or other charges or penalties.");
• Article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination);
• Article 18 of the Convention (“The restrictions permitted under this Convention in relation to these rights and freedoms shall not be applied for purposes other than those for which they were provided.”);
• Article 7 of the Convention (“No one shall be convicted of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or international law at the time when it was committed”);
• Article 13 of the Convention (“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have the right to an effective remedy before a public authority even if the violation was committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”).

On September 20, 2011, the ECHR adopted a ruling on the claim of Yukos shareholders, the claim was partially satisfied:

• The ECHR found that the Russian state violated the company’s right to protect property. in particular, the amount of tax claims against the company for 2000-2001 was calculated with violations (however, the court considered similar calculations for the tax period for 2001-2003 to be legal and correct). Also, according to the court, a violation of the right to protect property was that the company was not given enough time to pay off the additional tax assessments. The court explained that this was “partly explained by the requirements” of Russian laws.
• According to the decision, the authorities allowed a restriction of the rights of Yukos in relation to a fair trial in the framework of the trial regarding tax payments for 2000: Yukos lawyers were not given enough time to familiarize themselves with the case materials in the first instance (to study 43,000 pages from the party there was only 4 days of protection). In the remaining trials in the Yukos case, the ECHR did not find any procedural violations.
• The ECHR did not find any discriminatory or political components in the Yukos case. According to the ECHR, the tax optimization schemes used by Yukos have never been legal in Russia. Also, the ECHR found no evidence that such techniques were generally accepted in Russian business.
• The amount of material compensation was not determined in the decision; it was stated that this issue would be specifically discussed.

The plaintiffs and defendants assessed the ECHR decision differently: both of them actually declared their victory. The press service of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation stated that the ECHR rejected most of Yukos’ claims against Russia, recognizing only some procedural violations. A spokesman for the Ministry of Justice said: “The court completely rejected the accusations against the Russian Federation of the “political motivation” and “repressive nature” of the persecution of the Yukos company, as well as the alleged discrimination against it by the Russian authorities.” The plenipotentiary representative of the Russian government in the highest courts, Mikhail Barshchevsky, assessed the ECHR decision as a “colossal victory.” On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyer Piers Gardner said that “the court's decision contains three major victories for Yukos: it was recognized that the company could not prepare for the trial; that property rights have been violated; that the fines were imposed illegally.”

Outside commentators also assessed the outcome of the case differently. The former chief lawyer of YUKOS, Dmitry Gololobov, said that in its decision the ECHR actually recognized that YUKOS optimized taxes illegally, and the Russian state, while fighting YUKOS, although it “went too far” in some places, generally acted reasonably and with for legitimate purposes. According to Gololobov, the recognition by the ECHR of the fairness of the assessment of taxes on YUKOS actually means the recognition that Mikhail Khodorkovsky was “absolutely legally convicted in the tax episode, in the so-called first case.” Representatives of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, noting that the entrepreneur was not among The plaintiffs, and played no role in the court case, nevertheless said that they “welcome the ECtHR’s findings of serious violations of the right to a fair trial and property rights committed by the Government of the Russian Federation in its handling of Yukos.”

According to Elena Panfilova, a member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, the ECHR did the right thing by making a decision not on the political aspect, but on the dispute between economic entities in the YUKOS case. The fact that the ECHR decision was made precisely on the substantive part and was not recognized as political is “extremely important for modern Russia,” Panfilova believes. The head of the Memorial human rights center, Oleg Orlov, said: “I and my other fellow human rights activists hoped and expected such a decision... The European Court did not support the oligarch, but the right of Russian citizens to an independent and fair trial of any cases in the courts... Such a decision is for the benefit of Russian citizens , since citizens of the Russian Federation are interested in our judicial system being independent.” The head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alekseeva, said that she had no doubt about the outcome of the process in the ECHR, but she still called the trial in the YUKOS case “ordered political.” “I have no doubt that when it comes to considering the second Yukos case, the decision will be similar.”

On July 31, 2014, the ECHR decided to pay compensation in the amount of 1.86 billion euros to the former shareholders of the company. On October 29, 2014, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation sent a request to refer the issue of compensation to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR. However, on December 15, 2014, this petition was rejected.

Second complaints from Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev filed complaints with the ECHR in 2005-2006 concerning the first case in which they were defendants. In 2010-2011, applications were declared admissible for a number of alleged violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).

In July 2013, the ECtHR issued a ruling on these complaints. The ECHR found a number of violations (in particular, Articles 8 and 34 of the ECHR and Article 1 of its first protocol - on humiliating treatment and the right to a fair trial), but did not find any violations under a number of articles (including Articles 7 and 18). Violations were found under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention, but not in relation to all the events complained of by Khodorkovsky and Lebedev.

The ECtHR found that Article 18 of the ECHR had not been violated, which states that restrictions permitted on rights and freedoms should not be applied for purposes other than those for which they were provided. A press release issued by the ECtHR stated: “The Court is prepared to accept that some officials had their own reasons for facilitating the criminal prosecution of the applicants. However, this fact alone is not sufficient to conclude that without it the applicants would not have been convicted. None of the charges against the applicants related to their political activities. The charges brought against them were serious and had some substance to them. Thus, even if there were improper motives in the case, this did not give the applicants immunity from prosecution and did not render the entire criminal prosecution, from beginning to end, illegitimate, as the applicants alleged.”

The ECHR also concluded that during the trial there was no violation of Article 7 of the ECHR, according to which punishment must be based on the law. The ECtHR stated that “the law was applied reasonably and in accordance with the common sense understanding of tax evasion.”

At the same time, the ECHR found a number of violations of the applicants’ rights. Thus, according to the ECHR, the right of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev to a fair trial was violated, since the defense was not allowed to question experts brought in by the prosecution, expert opinions presented by the defense were unreasonably rejected by the court, and the authorities did not respect the confidentiality of contacts between the defendants and their defense attorneys.

The decision of the Russian court to collect taxes from Khodorkovsky that were not paid to Yukos was also found to be unfounded. The ECHR considered a violation of the applicants’ rights both that they were sent to serve their sentences in remote Siberian colonies and that they were kept in a metal cage in the courtroom. In addition, the ECHR recognized that the Russian authorities prevented Khodorkovsky and Lebedev from filing a complaint to the ECHR by putting pressure on their lawyers (they tried to debar Russian lawyers, denied visas to foreign lawyers and canceled already issued visas).

As a result, the ECHR ruled to recover compensation in the amount of 10 thousand euros in favor of Khodorkovsky. Lebedev was denied compensation.

GML claim in international arbitration

On February 3, 2005, three companies associated with the former major shareholder of Yukos Group MENATEP Ltd (GML) - Yukos Universal Ltd, registered in the Isle of Man, Cypriot Hulley Enterprises Ltd and the Cyprus Veteran Petroleum Trust filed claims with the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The plaintiffs sought about $100 billion from Russia, citing the investment protection provisions of the Energy Charter, which Russia signed but did not ratify.

On November 30, 2009, the Hague Arbitration decided to consider the case on the merits on the basis of a special provision of the Energy Charter that allows it to be immediately applied to a signatory state.

On July 28, 2014, the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that the state had launched an all-out attack on Yukos and its beneficiaries to bankrupt the company and appropriate its assets for the benefit of state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom, thereby expropriating property and violating the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty. The arbitration decided that Baikalfinancegroup was a fictitious company, the auction for the sale of Yuganskneftegaz was rigged and was not related to the desire to return taxes, but was due to the state’s intention to acquire the most desirable asset of Yukos, and then bankrupt the entire company. If the decision comes into force, the Russian authorities must compensate legal costs and pay the plaintiffs an amount of $50 billion by January 15, 2015. . The decision was made unanimously by three judges, one of whom was appointed by Russia.

The arbitration concluded that Baikalfinancegroup was a fictitious company, the auction for the sale of Yuganskneftegaz was rigged and was not related to the desire to return taxes, but was due to the state’s intention to acquire the most desirable asset of Yukos, and then bankrupt the entire company. The court decision, in particular, states:

The (Russian) state apparatus ... unleashed all its might on Yukos and its beneficiaries in order to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its assets and at the same time remove Mikhail Khodorkovsky from the political arena.

After a lengthy examination of how the Russian tax authorities, bailiffs and courts dealt with Yukos, and after weighing all the evidence, particularly relating to the payment of value added tax, the court concluded that the main purpose of the Russian Federation was not the collection of taxes, but bringing YUKOS into bankruptcy and taking over its valuable assets.

The harsh treatment of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, imprisoned in remote locations and kept in cages during court hearings, the harsh treatment of Yukos lawyers, and the difficulties the lawyers encountered in reviewing the case file and in consulting with Khodorkovsky and Lebedev himself the pace of the trial is not consistent with due process. Russian legal proceedings, especially the second verdict against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, in terms of how inventive the legal theory was about their theft of oil produced by Yukos, indicate that the courts followed the lead of the Russian executive power in order to bankrupt Yukos, transfer the assets to the state company and deprive a person of his freedom who could become a political competitor.

If the decision comes into force, the Russian authorities must compensate the legal costs and pay the plaintiffs an amount of $50 billion by January 15, 2015, otherwise interest will be charged on the amount owed

Russia appealed the decision of the Hague Tribunal to the District Court of The Hague. However, despite this, starting from January 15, 2015, interest also began to accrue on the principal amount to be recovered - about 1.9% per annum, or $2.6 million in day. Thus, the amount of debt will increase annually by almost $1 billion. In the 2015 budget, according to the Russian authorities, these funds are not included.

Consequences of the Yukos Affair

According to the Federal Tax Service, after the YUKOS case, almost all oil companies clarified their tax payment figures and began to contribute significantly larger amounts to the budget. In 2004, tax collection was 250% of the 2003 level.

The case caused a powerful resonance, including US President George W. Bush expressing concern about Khodorkovsky's fate. As foreign policy expert Alexander Rahr argued in 2005, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder fully supports the process against Khodorkovsky - he is convinced that it is necessary to punish those people who “have not paid taxes for years, who were bribing the Duma, who participated in corrupt deals, of which there were many in Russia at one time.”

The international resonance was to a certain extent caused by the presence of numerous foreign shareholders. Trying to counteract their pressure, the authorities decided to involve a German bank in financing the transaction, but it was actually ostracized abroad.

In November 2003, Paul Klebnikov, senior editor of the Russian edition of Forbes magazine, wrote: “What conclusions will you draw from the Khodorkovsky case? What will you do to avoid ending up in jail with him? Obviously, you would prefer to always take the side of the president, or even better, to stay away from politics altogether. But you will also make every effort to stay within the law by avoiding get-rich-quick schemes. Then the prosecutor and the organizers of political campaigns will not have a clear reason to find fault with you. It is from such considerations that a law-abiding society is built. Khodorkovsky's arrest does not mark the triumph of the rule of law. Tough actions during detention indicate that the establishment of a civilized law enforcement system in Russia is still far away. It remains to be seen how Putin's people will take this matter further (I suspect things will get worse before they get better). But looking back on these events in the future, we can probably say that they led to a strengthening of both the fundamentals of property rights and the Russian market.”

Khodorkovsky's supporters held various seminars, organized rallies and distributed stickers, in which they mainly resorted to the following arguments:

• court bias;
• political motivation of the case;
• Khodorkovsky's efforts to ensure transparency of Yukos business.

The YUKOS case marked the beginning of the process of nationalization of the Russian oil and gas complex:

• in 2005, Gazprom acquired a controlling stake in Sibneft,
• in 2006, Gazprom became the main shareholder of the Sakhalin-2 project (previous project participants were presented with environmental claims, which were dropped after Gazprom acquired the asset). in the same year, Gazprom became a major shareholder of Novatek
• in 2007, in addition to the final inclusion of YUKOS assets into Rosneft, by decision of the judiciary, shares of enterprises in the oil and gas complex of Bashkiria were returned to state ownership, Gazprom received control over the Kovyktinskoye gas condensate field. The RussNeft company was persecuted, whose owner Mikhail Gutseriev was forced to sell the business and then left the country
• in 2008, information appeared about the likely acquisition by Gazprom of a controlling stake in TNK-BP, which was presented with tax claims in the amount of 6 billion rubles

See also: Sale of Yukos assets

Opinions on the Yukos case

Some observers spoke out in support of the trial and the verdict, some considered the trial in the YUKOS case to be political, demonstrative and ordered.

In November 2003, Forbes magazine senior editor Paul Klebnikov wrote: “The arrest of Khodorkovsky is not at all the beginning of a campaign against the rich. Nor is it an example of repression based on trumped-up charges, similar to Stalin's show trials. By contrast, too many other Russian business leaders could be accused of crimes attributed to Khodorkovsky. We are watching how the kleptocratic system of Yeltsin's Russia is in its death throes. A blatant example of the depravity of the privatization era is the notorious loans-for-shares auctions of 1995-1997. who provided Khodorkovsky with his fortune.<…>By purchasing assets from the state in such a backroom deal and at such a reduced price, you risk that your rights to the new property will never be reliably protected. Your fellow citizens will view you as a fraud, and the state as a custodian of assets rather than their true owner.”

Garry Kasparov criticized the persecution of Khodorkovsky:

The arrest and trial of Khodorkovsky caused discontent in the United States. The US State Department said Khodorkovsky's arrest "raises suspicions of arbitrary use of the judicial system" and would cause serious harm to Western investment. Influential American politician Richard Perle, in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper, called the campaign against Khodorkovsky and Yukos “arbitrary, vindictive and capricious” and demanded that Russia be expelled from the G8. Congressman Tom Lantos, along with Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain, drafted a congressional resolution to expel Russia from the G8 for arresting Khodorkovsky - which was ultimately not adopted. Instead, in December 2003, the US Senate passed a resolution calling on Russian authorities to ensure a fair and open judicial investigation into the case. The House of Representatives resolution to suspend Russia's membership in the G8 was adopted only by the International Affairs Committee at the end of March 2004.

According to the candidate of legal sciences, former judge of the Moscow City Court Olga Kudeshkina (deprived of the status of a judge “for deliberately belittling the authority of the judiciary”), the Moscow city court, chaired by the wife of the FSB general Olga Egorova, works in collusion with the prosecutor’s office and puts pressure on judges to make the necessary decisions solutions. There is an opinion that Egorova herself was appointed to the position of chairman in circumvention of the law.

International lawyer Robert Amsterdam published a white paper in 2007 on abuses of state power in the Russian Federation, arguing that there were violations of the law in the prosecution of Khodorkovsky and his colleagues.

April 4, 2005 Alfred Koch, former Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, former head of the State Property Committee of Russia, for example, spoke about the vertical of power about the YUKOS case:

On June 28, 2005, the Izvestia newspaper published a “letter of fifty” - “An appeal from cultural figures, scientists, and members of the public in connection with the sentence imposed on the former leaders of the Yukos oil company”, expressing protest against attempts to politicize the tax evasion case.

The creators of the anonymous blog “YUKOS. White Book" called for the protection of the rights of victims, in their opinion, from YUKOS: "Unlike Khodorkovsky, human rights activists from Amnesty International did not come to these people, politicians of the Council of Europe did not fight for their rehabilitation, their names are not replete with the Internet and printed publications, although they, and not the company’s management, are the injured party.” According to Sergei Nikanorov from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, “Public Movement named after. V. Petukhova" created the "Internet project" "YUKOS. White paper". According to official certificates, the “Nefteyugansk city public movement named after Vladimir Arkadyevich Petukhov” was headed by Viktor Petrovich Pushkarenko and Galina Nikolaevna Glukhova.

According to a survey of the Russian population conducted in October 2004 by the Public Opinion Foundation, in the proceedings around YUKOS, 47% of respondents were on the side of the state, 7% were on the side of YUKOS, the rest said that they did not know about the YUKOS case or found it difficult to answer.

Opinions and assessments of the “second case” of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev

On March 4, 2009, political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin expressed the opinion that it is difficult to judge the underlying motives for initiating a new case; in his opinion, the new YUKOS trial is a manifestation of the confrontation between the security forces and liberals in the power group: “The matter is symbolic, and if he can be accused and, accordingly, sent to jail for some more years, then this is a sign that the security forces control situation. You can't mess with them, they're in great shape and if anyone goes against them, look what happens. If the decision is in favor of Khodorkovsky or not in favor of the security forces, that is, a draw, for example - sending the case for further investigation, then all the elite groups understand that the security forces cannot control everything. That they have weakened and can be torn to pieces.” The day before, the Wall Street Journal cited similar opinions from other analysts.

On March 6, 2009, Leonid Radzikhovsky said about the possible consequences of the second conviction of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev for the President of the Russian Federation: “This immeasurable sentence that the prosecutor’s office is asking for, this stain naturally falls on Medvedev. Firstly, it contradicts, in a sense, the declared role of this very liberal, intelligent person, and so on, and most importantly, it’s not even whether it contradicts the role or not - such things - this is how people’s consciousness works - are remembered. Some, perhaps much larger, general political events are erased, new events come, and so on. And this is a criminal case, a specific person is in prison, the case is clearly egregious - this will remain with him. And the further game of a liberal, super-liberal, super-Leningrad-Petersburg-professor-liberal on Western stages - this game will be significantly more difficult. And, of course, Medvedev understands this very well.”

On March 7, 2009, on the air of the “News with Sergei Brilev” program on the Rossiya TV channel, the President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Alexander Shokhin, expressed the opinion that there is a logical inconsistency in the case: “In the Khodorkovsky case, bewilderment arises: either people were convicted because they did not pay taxes, then how can they be tried for stealing something for which they did not pay taxes.<…>either the first case must fall apart, or the second has no basis.”

Political scientist Andrei Piontkovsky on the same day: “<…>Medvedev did not actively participate in such persecution of Khodorkovsky, he did not speak out in his defense like Kasyanov, but he also did not zealous in persecuting him. I still think that this process, seemingly absolutely meaningless for the prestige and image of the authorities, was conceived precisely by that same radical anti-Khodorkova group of security officials in order to finally tie up Medvedev in this matter, make him an accomplice in the massacre and demonstratively show him the place which he occupies, using their vocabulary, from the Kremlin bucket.”

In December 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “the bankruptcy procedure of the Yukos company was initiated by Western creditors, Western banks. And this bankruptcy was carried out in full compliance with Russian legislation.” According to him, the funds realized from the sale of the company’s assets went to the Housing and Communal Services Fund: “10 million people have already benefited from the results of the work of this fund; their houses and apartments have been renovated; 150 thousand will be resettled in new houses from slums.” Putin noted that “this money was once stolen from the people,” and also recalled: “there are only five proven murders there.” Putin emphasized: “the problem is that crimes of this kind should not be repeated in our country.”

On October 17, 2010, director Stanislav Govorukhin said in the Pozner program on Channel One that he did not regret signing “Letter 50”, supporting the criminal prosecution of Khodorkovsky, explaining:

No, I'm not sorry. Of course, I don’t really understand all this background, that is, I understand it, but I probably won’t be able to express it. But something else confuses me. Khodorkovsky’s right hand, a certain Nevzlin, a character familiar to you, was sentenced for life, in absentia, it’s true.<…>Khodorkovsky's right hand too - he had two right hands - Alexey Pichugin was sentenced to life for proven contract killings. At one time, when the mayor of Nefteyugansk, Vladimir Petukhov, was killed, the whole of Nefteyugansk - Khodorkovsky had not yet been imprisoned - came out with posters to the demonstration, on which it was written: “Khodorkovsky is a murderer.” It is very difficult to assume that Khodorkovsky did not know any of this and was not involved in it, you will agree. That's why I signed this letter. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin admitted this not so long ago - that, in many respects, everything happens because this person is involved in these incidents.

On December 30, 2010, after the announcement of the guilty verdict, Khodorkovsky’s lawyer Vadim Klyuvgant called the incident “a criminal massacre and a falsified case.” The lawyer announced his intentions to initiate criminal prosecution of all those involved in this case:

“We will raise the issue in accordance with our position that this is a criminal massacre and a falsified case, we will raise the issue of criminal prosecution of the perpetrators... On the criminal prosecution of all identified and unidentified persons of this entire organized criminal group that is involved in the massacre of them ( Khodorkovsky and Lebedev)” “The court did not evaluate anything, this is a fake that has the outward appearance of a verdict... To talk about some kind of evaluation, where one sentence contradicts another, and this indicates that this, if I may say so, has much more “document” , than one author - I don’t think it’s possible to talk about some kind of assessment, about some kind of analysis” “We will strive for this... A criminal is taken, put in prison, under arrest, and his criminal activities are investigated. If there are a lot of criminals, then they are all caught, put in prison and their criminal activities are investigated. How this is done is written in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation"

Vadim Klyuvgant

On May 18, 2011, at a press conference, one of the journalists asked Russian President Dmitry Medvedev whether Khodorkovsky’s release was dangerous. Medvedev’s answer was: “The question is short and the answer is also short: absolutely not dangerous.”

Curious facts

• Beginning in January 2015, compensation payments to Yukos shareholders accrue interest based on the yield on US Treasury securities, which was 1.9% in January 2015. According to rough estimates by the Russian Ministry of Finance, about $2.6 million in interest is added every day to the total debt of $50 billion. Thus, in 2015 the amount of debt will increase by almost 1 billion US dollars.

Notes

1. YUKOS, according to the annual report: The Company's net profit for 1999, according to Russian and international standards, differs by 4.6 times. According to Russian reports, per ton of oil produced, Yukos paid 10 times less taxes than Surgutneftegaz and 5 times less than Lukoil.
2. At the time of the court's decision, Russia's gold and foreign exchange reserves amounted to approximately $470 billion (Central Bank of the Russian Federation: Gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Russian Federation as of July 4, 2014 - $474.3 billion)

Footnotes

1. Creativity of oil barons // Novaya Gazeta, August 7, 2000
2. 1 2 3 Mikhail Khodorkovsky: chemistry and life // Yulia Latynina, “Top Secret”, No.8/124, August 10, 1999
3. “The YUKOS case” - a show trial or payment for mistakes? // Expert, December 5, 2005
4. 1 2 Well fluid
5. S. Besson Switzerland - a refuge for exported Yukos funds (translation from “Le Temps”, Switzerland) // inosmi.ru, 4.03.2002
6. S. Besson How the new Russian oil kings built a secret financial empire in Geneva (translation from Le Temps, Switzerland)
7. 1 2 Irina Reznik. Prosecutor's discount // Vedomosti, No. 180 (1954), September 25, 2007
8. Why Mikhail Khodorkovsky is imprisoned (part 3) // Izvestia
9. RBC - RosBusinessConsulting
10. Jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky ‘framed’ by key Putin aid The Sunday Times, May 18, 2008
11. Sechin started the war against YUKOS out of greed, Khodorkovsky said NEWSru.com, May 18, 2008
12. I ask you to blame... Mikhail Khodorkovsky named the initiator of the “YUKOS case” and the conditions for his possible release. Vremya Novostey, May 19, 2008
13. Mikhail Ocherchenko. “I went to Russia with my eyes closed for the first time,” John Brown, managing director and partner in Europe at Riverstone Holdings, former CEO of BP. // Vedomosti, 05/11/2011, No. 83 (2849). Retrieved May 11, 2011. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
14. Catherine Belton. Europe - Kasyanov reveals Putin’s pursuit of tycoon // Financial Times, July 20 2009 (Retrieved July 22, 2009)
15. 1 2 Anastasia Kornya, Vera Kholmogorova. Pointed to Putin // Vedomosti, No. 134 (2404), July 22, 2009
16. Kommersant-Online - Temporary export duties forever
17. Resolution of the appeal court of the Moscow Arbitration Court in case No. A40-17669/04-109-241 dated June 29, 2004
18. Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation No. 8665/04 dated October 4, 2005.
19. Transfer pricing and Art. 40 Tax Code of the Russian Federation
20. According to the Yukos scenario, oil companies may be required to pay $6 billion
21. Problems of taxation of the Russian oil industry
22. Tax claims against Yukos exceed the company's revenue, 2004
23. YUKOS, NGFR, 10/12/08
24. - Visa President of Yukos, Galina Antonova. Tax legislation of the Russian Federation, tax benefits for large and medium-sized companies (interview on the Ekho Moskvy website, MARCH 26, 2004
25. The Federal Tax Service presented new major claims to YUKOS., 2006
26. Putin: the government must preserve YUKOS, 2004
27. 1 2 3 A court in Houston confirmed that the Yukos case cannot be tried in the United States.
28. V. Putin said that state-owned companies are not behind Baikalfinance Group
29. VEDOMOSTI - An entry on the liquidation of YUKOS was entered into the Unified State Register of Legal Entities
30. Lenta.ru: Russia: Khodorkovsky detained in Novosibirsk
31. Lenta.ru: Russia: Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky sent to “Matrosskaya Tishina”
32. Lenta.ru: Russia: Khodorkovsky leaves YUKOS to save the company
33. Lenta.ru: Russia: Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were sentenced to nine years in prison
34. Lawyers demanded to transfer Lebedev closer to Moscow
35. New Year in the Arctic Circle
36. The court again declared legal the transfer of Khodorkovsky to the Chita region
37. Why Mikhail Khodorkovsky is imprisoned (part 2) // Izvestia. RU
38. 1 2 3 4 5 History of the issue // Kommersant-Gazeta
39. 1 2 3 4 5 How Alexey Pichugin was tried // Kommersant-Gazeta
40. 1 2 3 Kommersant-Gazeta - Alexey Pichugin’s imprisonment will be reclassified
41. 1 2 3 4 Kommersant-Online - The court found Alexey Pichugin guilty of murder
42. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Kommersant-Gazeta - Two murders added to Alexey Pichugin
43. Kommersant-Gazeta - The mayor of Nefteyugansk was killed as a gift
44. They renounced perjury, Vera Vasilyeva, Human Rights in Russia, April 21, 2008
45. List of repressed
46. Fly to Khodorkovsky. Novaya Gazeta (February 12, 2009). - Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s lawyer was promised that they would “take” her to the police station if she did not go there herself. Retrieved March 7, 2009. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
47. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev transported to Moscow rosbalt.ru
48. 1 2 A new trial in the Khodorkovsky case has begun. The prosecution was headed by order bearer Shokhin NEWSru March 3, 2009.
49. The court at the trial in the case of M. Khodorkovsky rejected the defense's motion to disqualify the judge rbc.ru
50. The lawyers of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were unable to change the judge at the new trial NEWSru March 4, 2009.
51. The defense of the ex-owners of YUKOS asks to dismiss the second case for lack of evidence NEWSru March 6, 2009.
52. Khodorkovsky's third hunger strike ends: he reached Medvedev in record time
53. Khodorkovsky stopped his hunger strike
54. Kasyanov spoke about Yukos oil production methods
55. Gref to the rescue - Gazeta.ru, 06.21.10
56. “They are completely destroying what is written in the indictment” - Gazeta.ru, 06.22.10
57. PRAVO.RU - Verdict to Khodorkovsky and Lebedev in case No. 1-23/10, December 27, 2010 (pdf)
58. The court found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty of oil theft (inaccessible link - history). ITAR-TASS. Retrieved December 27, 2010.
59. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were given 13.5 years each // Sergei Smirnov, Maxim Glikin, Vedomosti, 12/30/2010.
60. Full text of the verdict against M. B. Khodorkovsky and P. L. Lebedev
61. 1 2 “The verdict was brought from the Moscow City Court, I know for sure.” // Gazeta.ru, February 14, 2011 (Retrieved March 1, 2011)
62. The head of the Russian Armed Forces refused to comment on the statement about pressure on Danilkin
63. Danilkin: Strange people threatened me during the trial of Khodorkovsky:: Articles:: RBC daily
64. PRESS SERVICE REPORT
65. Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev filed applications for parole
66. Khodorkovsky was taken to the colony in Segezha
67. Platon Lebedev was transferred to a colony near Velsk, Arkhangelsk region
68. The Moscow City Court reduced the prison terms of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky to 11 years
69. Mikhail Khodorkovsky: “I will return to Russia”
70. The Supreme Court decided to release P. Lebedev:: Society:: Top.rbc.ru.
71. ITAR-TASS: Politics - Federal Penitentiary Service: Platon Lebedev left the colony.
72. The ECHR decided to recover 10 thousand euros from the Russian Federation in favor of Khodorkovsky. - RIA Novosti, May 31, 2011
73. Russia owes Platon Lebedev // Gazeta.Ru
74. // News Time No. 197, October 26, 2007
75. Strasbourg accepted the claim of Yukos shareholders against Russia // BBC
76. 1 2 BBC Russian - Russia - Ex-YUKOS lawyer: ECHR made YUKOS a guilty party
77. 1 2 Decision of the ECHR of September 20, 2011 in the case “YUKOS v. Russia”
78. 1 2 Text of the ECHR press release. // pravo.ru. Retrieved September 20, 2011. Archived from the original on February 3, 2012.
79. 1 2 Ministry of Justice:: News Feed:: On the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of OJSC NK YUKOS v. Russia
80. 1 2 PRAVO.RU - The ECHR found no signs of discrimination in the first Yukos case; its tax schemes were illegal
81. 1 2 Dmitry Kazmin, Polina Khimshiashvili. The court took both sides. // Vedomosti, 09/21/2011, No. 177 (2943). Retrieved September 21, 2011. Archived from the original on February 3, 2012.
82. A representative of the Russian government called the ECHR decision in the YUKOS case a “colossal victory” - Gazeta. Ru | daily News
83. RosBusinessConsulting - News of the day - Ministry of Justice: Strasbourg court rejected most of YUKOS's claims against the Russian Federation
84. YUKOS case - the ECHR did not recognize the destruction of the YUKOS company as politically motivated: evidence of the use of similar tax evasion schemes by other companies was provided ...
85. “Now many things will fall apart in Europe” | Front page | Moscow news
86. Khodorkovsky's defense team comments on the ECHR ruling on YUKOS // Press center of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev
87. The Strasbourg court made a decision in the YUKOS case: rights were violated, but compensation will not be paid yet
88. [The ECHR rejected the complaint of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation for compensation to Yukos shareholders
89. The ECHR found the recovery of damages from Khodorkovsky a violation of his rights | News
90. Lawyers for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev commented on the ECHR decision | News | Russian Agency for Legal and Judicial Information - RAPSI. Archived from the original on August 13, 2013.
91. 1 2 3 Lenta.ru: Russia: Politics: The ECHR refused to recognize the Khodorkovsky case as political. Archived from the original on August 13, 2013.
92. The charges against the two Russian businessmen were lawful, but their trial was unfair and their transfer to remote penal colonies unjustified. Press Release ECHR 236 (2013). Unofficial shortened translation
93. 1 2 Point of view - Interfax-Russia.
94. HUDOC Search Page. Archived from the original on August 19, 2013.
95. 1 2 VEDOMOSTI - The YUKOS case: the trial was dishonest, but there is no policy. Archived from the original on August 19, 2013.
96. "fulltext":,"itemid":) CASE OF KHODORKOVSKIY AND LEBEDEV v. RUSSIA
97. Olga Pleshanova, Alena Miklashevskaya. Investments in YUKOS grew to $100 billion
98. 1 2 International arbitration in The Hague has published a verdict in the YUKOS case:: Politics:: Top.rbc.ru
99. 1 2 Answer from The Hague: what new did international arbitration establish in the YUKOS case:: Society:: Top.rbc.ru
100. The verdict of the Hague court
101. Arbitration award
102. “The Yukos ruling: an expensive lesson”, The Economist, Jul 29th 2014
103. “The court in The Hague ordered Russia to pay $50 billion for Yukos”
104. Russia appealed the decision of the Hague court in the Yukos case - Gazeta.Ru | Business
105. Russia appealed the decisions of the Hague court on claims of ex-YUKOS shareholders
106. Reluctance to pay the Yukos lawsuit will cost Russia $2.6 million per day:: Business:: RosBusinessConsulting
107. Russia will not pay Yukos owners - Politonline.ru
108. Tax officials also took advantage of the “YUKOS effect” // Novye Izvestia, August 8, 2005
109. Radio Liberty, May 31, 2005
110. 1 2 Khlebnikov P. The YUKOS case: A milestone on the path to legality // Vedomosti, No. 45 (234) dated November 18, 2003
111. First reactions of diplomats and Western experts to the verdict against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev // Radio Liberty, May 31, 2005
112. Garry Kasparov: “In Russia there is not democracy, but a dictatorship” based on oil. NEWSru (April 17, 2006). Retrieved August 13, 2010. Archived from the original on August 22, 2011.
113. Judge Kudeshkina was left without a job - Incidents - GZT.RU
114. Who is the judge? Olga Egorova. NEWSru (March 11, 2005). Retrieved August 13, 2010. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
115. Robert Amsterdam, "White Paper"
116. "Alfred Koch: "They'll all chew each other up there" interview with the analytical weekly newspaper "Delo"
117. SEMYON NOVOPRUDSKY: “PEOPLE SEEM THAT IF THEY DON’T SUPPORT THE AUTHORITY, THEY WOULD LOSE EVERYTHING,” BelGazeta No. 26 dated 07/04/05
118. Cultural figures against “unhealthy trends” in connection with the YUKOS case // Grani.ru
119. The Internet compiles the YUKOS White Paper // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 25, 2008
120. Nikanorov S. Remembering Khodorkovsky, we forget about the victims // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 4, 2009.
121. List of public organizations in Nefteyugansk, official website of the administration of Nefteyugansk, as of June 14, 2011
122. FOM > The YUKOS case, the fate of M. Khodorkovsky
123. Dmitry Oreshkin: there is a lot of intrigue in Khodorkovsky’s new case. Deutsche Welle (4 March 2009). - According to Russian expert Dmitry Oreshkin, a new conviction against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev will move Russia away from Europe. Retrieved March 7, 2009. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
124. Special opinion "Echo of Moscow", March 6, 2009
125. The head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs criticized the indictment in the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev case NEWSru March 8, 2009.
126. Conversation with experts about the first year of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential year Program “Results of the Week” Radio Liberty March 7, 2009.
127. Full text of the program “Conversation with Vladimir Putin. Continuation” // vesti.ru, December 3, 2009.
128. Vadim Klyuvgant after the verdict was announced on YouTube
129. Medvedev does not consider Khodorkovsky dangerous to society
130. BBC: “YUKOS vs. Russia: a new round of the legal saga”
131. “YUKOS: based on the annual report” // “Oil and Gas Vertical”, No. 7-8, 2000; Copy of the article on Peeep.us

Literature

• Pumpyansky A. B. Khodorkovsky Case - “Zebra E”, 2011, 30,000 copies, 256 pp. ISBN 978-5-94663-312-3
• Vladimir Pereverzin. Hostage: The Story of a Yukos Manager. - M.: Howard Roark, 2013. - (312). - ISBN 978-5-906067-03-6.

Links

Wikinews has events on this topic:

• Press center of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• Defense website for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• “Pravda MBKh” - people’s opinions about the trial
• The Yukos case in Russian public opinion
• Indictment, verdict and cassation ruling in the first case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• Indictment in the second case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
• “The Secret of Judge Danilkin” on YouTube - an interview with the press secretary of the Khamovnichesky Court, Natalya Vasilyeva, to the “Top Secret” TV channel. March 3, 2011
• List of those repressed. Novaya Gazeta (February 12, 2007). Retrieved June 22, 2011. Archived from the original on March 3, 2012.
• Draft verdict presented by N. Vasilyeva

Affairs	The case of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Krainov The Pichugin case
Persons involved	M. B. Khodorkovsky (10/25/2003-12/20/2013, pardoned) P. L. Lebedev (07/02/2003-01/24/2014) L. B. Nevzlin (not detained, sentenced to life, hiding in Israel) V. G. Aleksanyan (04/06/2006-12/12/2008, criminal case terminated 07/06/2010, died of AIDS 10/03/2011) S. P. Bakhmina (07.12.2004-27.04.2009, parole) V. I. Pereverzin (12/16/2004-02/15/2012) A. V. Pichugin (detained 06/09/2003, sentenced to life in prison) V. S. Shakhnovsky (was not detained, compensated for the damage, was released from criminal liability)
Crime victims	V. A. Petukhov (killed on June 26, 1998) O. N. Kostina (attempted on November 28, 1998, not injured)
Literary works	Hostage: The Story of a Yukos Manager
Other	YUKOS Appeal of 50 Appeal of 55 V. N. Danilkin “Basmannaya justice”

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Yukos case

Yukos Case Information About

Brief description of the company

History of the oil company "YUKOS" closely associated with Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky. The company was created in 1993, when M. Khodorkovsky served as Deputy Minister of Fuel and Energy of Russia. In 1995, YUKOS was privatized through loans-for-shares auctions by Menatep Bank, founded by M. Khodorkovsky. After YUKOS came under the control of Menatep, M. Khodorkovsky headed the oil company.
Under the management of M. Khodorkovsky, YUKOS showed very high rates of development. The company effectively managed cash flows and skillfully optimized taxation. The availability of free funds made it possible to acquire new assets, thanks to which in 2003 YUKOS took first place in Russia in oil production, displacing LUKOIL. Twice YUKOS tried to merge with Sibneft (in 1998 and 2003), but both times the deals fell through.
In 2003, M. Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges of theft of other people's property, tax evasion and a number of other crimes. Management of the company was transferred to the company's first vice president, Stephen Theede.
After the arrest of M. Khodorkovsky, the Ministry of Taxes and Duties opened an investigation into the evasion of taxes by the Yukos Oil Company. The company was presented with huge claims, which it was unable to pay. In 2004-2007, the sale of Yukos assets was carried out. The main buyers were Rosneft and Gazprom.
After the sale of all assets, the company was liquidated. The funds collected were enough to pay off approximately 2/3 of the debt. Since the debts were not repaid in full, the company's shareholders received nothing.

Company structure (former)

Production
Tomskneft
Samaraneftegaz
Arcticgas
Vostsibneftegaz
Sakhaneftegaz
Urengoil INK

Recycling
Angarsk Petrochemical Plant
Angarsk Polymer Plant
Angarsk catalyst and organic synthesis plant
Achinsk Refinery
Kuibyshev Oil Refinery
Neftegorsky Gas Processing Plant
Novokuybyshevsky Refinery
Novokuybyshevsk Catalyst Plant
Novokuibyshevsk Oils and Additives Plant
Otradnensky Gas Processing Plant
Samaraneftekhimproekt
Srednevolzhsky NIINP
Strezhevoy Oil Refinery
Syzran Oil Refinery

Sales
Belgorodnefteprodukt
Bryansknefteprodukt
Buryatnefteprodukt
Voronezhnefteprodukt
Lipetsknefteprodukt
Orelnefteprodukt
Penzanefteprodukt
Samaranefteproduct
Stavropolnefteprodukt
Tambovnefteprodukt
Tomsknefteprodukt
Ulyanovsknefteprodukt
Khakasnefteprodukt
Yu-Kuban
South-Minioil
Irkutsknefteprodukt
Interneft
Hermes-Moscow

Company history and projects

Company creation
JSC Oil Company YUKOS was registered on April 15, 1993. According to Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1403 of November 17, 1992 and Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 354 of April 15, 1993, the company included: the Yuganskneftegaz production association, Kubyshevsky, Syzran and Novokuibyshevsky oil refineries, sales networks "Bryansknefteprodukt", "Voronezhnefteprodukt", "Samaranefteprodukt", "Orelnefteprodukt", "Tambovnefteprodukt", "Lipetsknefteprodukt", "Penzanefteprodukt", "Ulyanovsknefteprodukt", as well as a number of construction and service enterprises.
The abbreviation "YUKOS" was formed from the names of the main enterprises that became part of the company - "Yuganskneftegaz" and the production association "KuibyshevOrgSintez".
On September 1, 1995, within the framework of Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 864, the Samaraneftegaz mining enterprise, the Belgorodnefteproduct sales network and several research and production organizations were added to the assets of YUKOS.

Transition to a single share
On April 27, 1995, a meeting of shareholders of NK Yukos was held, at which the issue of the company's transition to a single share was discussed. The following exchange ratios were established: for 1 share of Yuganskneftegaz - 8 shares of the Yukos Oil Company, for a share of the Novokuibyshevsky Oil Refinery - 1 share of the Yukos Oil Company, for a share of Kuibyshevnefteorgsintez - 40 shares of the Yukos Oil Company, for a share of the Kuibyshev Oil Refinery - 10 shares of NK "YUKOS", for a share of the Syzran Oil Refinery - 40 shares of NK "YUKOS".

Privatization of the company
In 1993-1995, the company was influenced by the general economic downturn in Russia, which was typical for the entire oil industry of the country. By the end of 1995, Yukos' debt to the budget exceeded $1 billion, and the Russian government decided to sell the state stake.
The sale was carried out in several stages: 45% of the shares, formally assigned to state ownership, were put up for a loans-for-shares auction, 33% of the shares - for an investment competition and 7.96% - for cash auctions. Another 7.04% of the shares were placed among the Yukos workforce and 7% were transferred to the balance sheet of the company itself for subsequent sale on the secondary market.
The winner of the loans-for-shares auction and investment competition was the Laguna company, which belonged to the Menatep bank. The shares sold at cash auctions were also mainly acquired by structures close to Menatep.
In December 1996, Menatep bought out the state-owned stake in Yukos, which was pledged to it, and became the owner of 85% of the company's shares.

On June 10, 2003, the Russian Federal Property Fund summed up the results of a specialized auction for the sale of a stake in Yukos Oil Company in the amount of 0.07% of the authorized capital. The shares were sold at 369 rubles per share, with a starting price of 280 rubles. For the entire block of shares put up for auction, the Russian budget received 606.4 million rubles.
After the auction, not a single share of Yukos Oil Company remained in state ownership.

Purchase of the Eastern Oil Company
In 1997, YUKOS won an auction for the sale of 44% of VNK shares, paying $810 million for them. Before the auction, YUKOS bought about 9% of VNK shares on the open market, which ensured that it received a controlling stake in the company.
To finance the deal, Yukos and Menatep Bank were forced to borrow heavily from European banks. YUKOS attracted a syndicated loan of $800 million secured by export proceeds from oil sales. The loan was provided by a pool of banks consisting of Goldman Sachs International Bank, Credit Lyonnais S.A. and Merrill Lynch International. Menatep borrowed $200 million for a period of 6 months from Goldman Sachs and West Merchant Bank. Russian banks, Most-Bank and SBS-Agro, also acted as creditors to the transaction.
In 1999, NK Yukos announced the completion of integration with the Eastern Oil Company. YUKOS and VNK have fully coordinated their pricing and export policies. At the same time, a reorganization of the management of subsidiaries of both companies was carried out. According to YUKOS management, the change in management structure led to a reduction in administrative costs by 20%. As a result of the cost reduction program, it was possible to reduce the average cost of oil production from $9.6 per barrel in January 1998 to $3.5 per barrel in December 1998.

On May 24, 2002, an auction was held to sell 36.8% of the shares of OJSC Eastern Oil Company. The winner of the auction was the YUKOS company, which offered $225.4 million. The starting price for the block of shares was $225 million; 3 companies took part in the auction.
Taking into account previously acquired securities, YUKOS consolidated about 90% of VNK shares.

In 2003, the process of merging the Eastern Oil Company and Yukos Oil Company entered its final phase. On January 27, 2003, the extraordinary general meeting of shareholders of VNK approved the agreement on merger with NK YUKOS, and on February 3, the agreement on merger was approved at the meeting of shareholders of YUKOS. On January 15, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Antimonopoly Policy and Entrepreneurship Support issued permission to reorganize the companies.
After the joint meeting of shareholders, VNK OJSC was excluded from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities. The remaining outstanding shares of VNK were converted into shares of NK YUKOS at the rate of 120 shares of VNK for 1 share of YUKOS.

Reconstruction of oil refineries
In the late 90s, YUKOS developed and implemented a comprehensive program to modernize its refining facilities. As part of the program, technological processes at enterprises were separated. The Novokuybyshevsk Refinery has become focused on the maximum possible depth of processing of raw materials, while at the other two plants mainly only primary processes are implemented. At the same time, heavy distillates from the Samara and Syzran refineries are supplied to the Novokuybyshevsk refinery for further processing.
The possibility of implementing such a scheme is due to the peculiarities of the location of the Yukos refinery - the distance between the plants does not exceed 100 km. The proximity of enterprises to each other facilitates their interaction and reduces transportation costs.

Merger with Sibneft, creation of YUKSI
On January 19, 1998, in Moscow, the heads of the Yukos and Sibneft companies signed a memorandum on combining their production facilities and management structures. The merged company was named "UKSI".
The new holding actually united 4 Russian oil companies - YUKOS, Eastern Oil Company, whose controlling stake is owned by YUKOS, Sibneft and East Siberian Oil and Gas Company, controlled by Sibneft. At the time of its creation, YUKSI occupied third or fourth place among the oil giants of the world and first among Russian companies.
It was planned that at the first stage the companies would operate as four independent structures within the holding. At the second stage, their complete fusion will occur. The merger was planned to be completed during 1998.
In the new oil holding, 60% of the combined equity participation was to belong to the shareholders of YUKOS and 40% to the shareholders of Sibneft.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, chairman of the board of YUKOS, was appointed president of YUKSI. Evgeniy Shvidler, who held a similar position at Sibneft, became the first vice-president of YUKSI for finance.
On March 23, NK "UKSI" signed a protocol on strategic partnership with Elf Aqitaine. The document provided that the French company would acquire a 5% stake in YUKSI for $528 million and receive one seat on the holding’s Board of Directors.
On March 24, NK YUKSI signed a memorandum of cooperation with the service company Schlumberger. The memorandum assumes the broad involvement of the service company in servicing the YUKSI oil fields - geophysical and seismic surveys of fields, drilling and construction of conventional and horizontal wells. Schlumberger did not pretend to acquire a stake in the share capital of the Russian company; the main goal of cooperation with YUKSI was to ensure entry into the Russian market with the possibility of receiving large orders.

In May 1998, Yukos and Sibneft published official messages about the suspension of the process of merging the company's assets. The parties did not disclose the reason for abandoning the planned plan, stating only that YUKOS and Sibneft would remain independent companies. At the same time, all agreements signed by YUKSI with foreign partners remain in force, but further negotiations will be conducted separately with each of the participants of YUKSI.
As it turned out later, statements about the deep integration of YUKOS and Sibneft were made in advance; in reality, they continued to operate as separate companies. This fact predetermined the ease of returning to the previous state and the absence of conflicts during the division of "YUKSI".
Commenting on the prospects for further cooperation between YUKOS and Sibneft, Mikhail Khodorkovsky said that the companies could return to the possibility of a merger, but “this will be a different deal.”

Reorganization of the management system
In September 1998, YUKOS announced a reform of the company's management system. Leading Western consulting firms Arthur D. Little and McKinsey took part in the development of the plan. As part of the management reform, the functions of executive bodies were assigned to two specialized management companies - YUKOS EP (Exploration & Production) and YUKOS RM (Refining & Marketing), and the functions of the central office were assigned to the corporate center YUKOS-Moscow.
YUKOS EP received control over all divisions of the company whose activities are related to the exploration and production of hydrocarbons. "YUKOS RM" - all enterprises engaged in refining, marketing and transportation of oil and petroleum products. Strategic planning for the company's development has been transferred to the competence of YUKOS-Moscow. Non-core production facilities were separated into independent structures or transferred to third-party contractors.
Also, as part of the reorganization, a transition to external field service was carried out. Based on the service enterprises that were part of YUKOS, the Siberian Service Company was created. In addition, YUKOS entered into a strategic alliance with Schlumberger.
In the summer of 1998, the company made structural changes in the processing sector. An oils and additives plant was separated from the Novokuybyshevsk Refinery, and separate enterprises were formed to provide repairs and maintenance of fixed production assets, and the provision of transport and other related services.

Suspension of shares circulation
In June 1999, the quotation committee of the Russian Trading System (RTS) decided to stop trading in shares of YUKOS and its subsidiaries. This event was preceded by the transfer of Yukos shares from category “A” to category “B”.
The exclusion of Yukos shares from the RTS quotation list was made on the basis of a statement from the National Association of Stock Market Participants (NAUFOR). YUKOS and its subsidiaries were accused of systematic violation of the rights of minority shareholders. Despite repeated appeals to the company's management with a demand to eliminate the identified violations, the company did not take measures to normalize the situation.
Trading in shares of Yukos and its subsidiaries on the RTS was resumed on May 16, 2000. By this time, the company managed to resolve the conflict with its shareholders.

Launch of the Strezhevsky Oil Refinery
On September 16, an oil refinery was put into operation in the city of Strezhevoy, 100% of the shares of which belong to Tomskneft. The plant's capacity allows it to process about 200 thousand tons of oil per year. The plant produces all main types of petroleum products: gasoline grades A-76 and AI-93, kerosene, diesel fuel, vacuum gas oil and fuel oil.

Transition to a single share
In 2000, the Board of Directors of NK Yukos summed up the results of the first stage of the company's transition to a single share. During the exchange of shares of subsidiaries for securities of the holding company, the company consolidated more than 90% of the shares of Yuganskneftegaz and Samaraneftegaz, as well as about 50% of the shares of Tomskneft. On February 21, 2000, the second stage of the reorganization began, during which shares were exchanged in four oil refineries - Kuibyshevsky, Novokuybyshevsky, Syzran and Achinsky. Shares were exchanged taking into account the following ratios (for ordinary shares): 1 share of NK "YUKOS" for 1 share of OJSC "Achinsky Oil Refinery", 13 shares of "YUKOS" for 1 share of OJSC "Kuibyshev Oil Refinery", 0.6 shares of "YUKOS" for 1 share of OJSC Novokuybyshevsky Oil Refinery, 30 shares of YUKOS for 1 share of OJSC Syzran Oil Refinery. The exchange ratios for preferred shares of subsidiaries were set two times lower than for ordinary shares. In all listed enterprises, the parent company owned at least a controlling stake.

In 2001, NK YUKOS announced the completion of the process of exchanging shares of subsidiaries for securities of the holding. As a result of the process of transition to a single share, the share of the parent company in the authorized capitals of OJSC Yuganskneftegaz, OJSC Samaraneftegaz, OJSC Tomskneft, JSC Kuibyshevsky Oil Refinery, OJSC Novokuybyshevsky Oil Refinery and OJSC Syzran Oil Refinery approached 100%. The company's participation in the capital of the Achinsk Refinery and sales divisions is somewhat lower - from 75 to 98%, however, this figure has also changed upward. According to the published report, over 65 thousand shareholders of subsidiaries took part in the share exchange procedure.

Acquisition of shares of the East Siberian Oil and Gas Company
In 2000, the Yukos Oil Company announced the acquisition of a 19.9% ​​stake in the East Siberian Oil and Gas Company.
In 2001, YUKOS increased its share in the authorized capital of VSNK from 19.9 to 68%. By acquiring a controlling stake, YUKOS was able to implement the planned investment program, which involved the creation of the necessary infrastructure for the development of the Yurubchensky site, which is part of the Yurubcheno-Tokhomsky zone. The license to operate this site belongs to VSNK. YUKOS's interest in acquiring production assets in Eastern Siberia is due to large-scale plans to supply crude oil to the markets of East and Southeast Asia.

Acquisition of Angarsk Petrochemical Company
In 2000, NK YUKOS and the RINKO group of companies signed an agreement defining the procedure and conditions for the creation of the RINKO-YUKOS management company. This company was given powers to manage the production process at the Angarsk Petrochemical Company and sales enterprises located in the Irkutsk region and the Republic of Buryatia. The founders received equal shares of participation in the authorized capital of RINKO-YUKOS. The current management of the company was carried out by managers of the Yukos oil company, and the Board of Directors was headed by the president of the RINKO group, Vitaly Mashitsky. Angarsk Petrochemical Company and a number of other assets that previously belonged to Sidanco Oil Company were acquired by RINCO in 1999.

For several years, YUKOS carried out the purchase of shares in the Angarsk Petrochemical Company and by 2003 increased its participation in the authorized capital of the Angarsk Petrochemical Company to 100%. The shares of the Angarsk Petrochemical Company include an oil refinery with a capacity of 21 million tons of oil per year, a catalyst and organic synthesis plant, a polymer plant and a number of other auxiliary production facilities.

Sale of shares of Volgotanker
In 2000, NK Yukos announced a change in strategic plans regarding the Volgotanker shipping company. Over the course of several years, the oil company strengthened its position in the Volga Shipping Company, buying up its shares. As of August 2000, Yukos directly owned about 20% of the shares of Volgotanker, and a few more percent were owned by friendly structures. At the same time, YUKOS became the main client of the shipping company, providing about 2/3 of the total volume of orders for the transportation of goods. However, at the end of August 2000, YUKOS announced its intention to sell the entire stake in Volgotanker. Despite this, YUKOS remained the shipping company's largest client.

Acquisition of Transpetrol
In 2001, a subsidiary of Yukos Oil Company Yukos Finance B.V. was recognized as the winner of the tender for the sale of 49% of the shares of the Slovak pipeline company Transpetrol. The price offered by YUKOS for the stake in Transpetrol was $74 million. In accordance with the terms of the agreement concluded as a result of the tender, a subsidiary of YUKOS will have the preemptive right to purchase shares of Transpetrol in the event of its further privatization.
Transpetrol is the only operator of main oil pipelines in Slovakia. One of the Transpetrol branches connects with the pipeline systems of Hungary and Croatia, the other goes to the Czech Republic and further to Germany. The maximum throughput of the transport system is 21 million tons of oil per year, the total length of pipelines is 515 km. At the end of 2000, Transpetrol transported 9.3 million tons of oil.

Development of the West Malobalykskoye field
In 2002, Yukos and the Hungarian oil and gas company MOL signed an agreement to create a joint venture to develop the West Malobalykskoye field. The authorized capital of the joint venture is divided equally between the participants. MOL paid Yukos $100 million in compensation for expenses incurred in the early stages of developing the license area.
The West Malobalykskoye field is located in Western Siberia on the territory of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug. Proven recoverable oil reserves amount to 20 million tons. In 2002, the field produced about 1.5 thousand tons of oil per day.

Acquisition of Arctic Gas
In 2002, Yukos acquired a 68% stake in Arctic Gas Company, previously owned by Benton Oil & Gas. The transaction amount was $190 million. Under the terms of the agreement with Benton Oil & Gas, YUKOS assumed investment obligations to finance the current activities of the Arctic Gas Company in the amount of $100 million and pledged to repay the company's debts. Along with the acquisition of a block of shares from Benton Oil & Gas, YUKOS purchased securities from minority shareholders, as a result of which it gained control over 88% of Arctic Gas Company.
Arctic Gas Company holds licenses for the exploration and development of the Samburgskoye, Neponyatnoye, Severo-Esetinskoye, Urengoyskoye, East Urengoyskoye and Evo-Yakhinskoye fields located in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

Exchange of assets with OJSC Gazprom
In 2003, Yukos and Gazprom agreed to exchange production assets. Gazprom transferred to YUKOS a 12% stake in Arctic Gas, and in return, YUKOS gave Gazprom a 25.58% stake in Zapsibgazprom OJSC and $3 million in cash.
By the time of the transaction, YUKOS had purchased 20% of Arctic Gas shares from small shareholders. Thus, after the exchange of assets, Yukos consolidated 100% of the shares of Arctic Gas.

Acquisition of Mazeikiu Nafta
In June 2002, YUKOS acquired 26.85% of the shares of Mazeikiu Nafta (Lithuania) from Williams International for $75 million. As a result of the transaction, Williams International and YUKOS each received 26.85% of the shares of Mazeikiu Nafta, leaving 40 in the ownership of the Lithuanian government .66% shares.
Under the terms of the deal, YUKOS provided the Lithuanian concern with $75 million as an investment and guaranteed a stable supply of raw materials in the amount of 100 thousand barrels per day (4.8 million tons per year) over the next five years.
In August 2002, Williams International decided to withdraw from the shareholders of Mazeikiu Nafta and sold its stake to YUKOS for $85 million. Mazeikiu Nafta's assets include the Mazeikiai Oil Refinery, a terminal in the port of Butinge and the Biržai pipeline system.

In September 2003, the next stage of reconstruction at the Mazeikiai Refinery was completed, as a result of which it became possible to improve the quality of the products produced. In October, the Mazeikiu Nafta Trading House began selling a new grade of gasoline with an octane rating of 95 that meets the requirements of the European Union. The sulfur content in the new grade of motor gasoline has been reduced three times - to 50 ppm, and the benzene content has been reduced five times - to 1%.

Test oil supply to the USA
In May 2002, YUKOS conducted a trial supply of Russian oil to the American market. The difficulty for Russian companies in developing the American market is that delivering oil over such long distances can only be economically justified when using tankers with a carrying capacity of about 300 thousand tons. Russia does not have ports to service large-capacity vessels; moreover, there are no such ports in the territories of neighboring countries.
To overcome this problem, YUKOS used a lighter scheme for loading a large-capacity tanker. In the Black Sea ports, Yukos oil was transferred to three tankers with a carrying capacity of 80 thousand tons. The tankers simultaneously left Novorossiysk, Tuapse and Feodosia, crossed the Bosphorus and met in the Mediterranean Sea near the coast of Greece. At a given point, a tanker chartered by YUKOS with a carrying capacity of 2 million barrels was waiting for them. It was loaded with 240 thousand tons of Russian oil, after which the supertanker headed for the United States, and small-tonnage vessels returned to the Black Sea ports.

Entering the international financial market
In 2002, the Menatep group placed 1% of the oil company's shares in the form of Level 1 American Depositary Receipts. Revenue from the sale of ADR amounted to $147 million. Shortly before entering the international market, YUKOS published a balance sheet for the three quarters of last year, prepared in accordance with the GAAP standard.
The company's performance indicators, reflected in the balance sheet, were assessed by investors as positive, as a result of which the demand for Yukos securities doubled the supply.

Purchase of Geoilbent LLC
In 2003, Yukos signed an agreement with Harvest Natural Resources to acquire a 34% stake in Geoilbent LLC. As part of the agreement, YUKOS paid the American company $75 million. YUKOS also assumed the obligations of Geoilbent LLC under a loan provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the amount of $30 million.
Geoilbent LLC holds licenses for the right to develop the North Gubkinskoye, Urabor-Yakhinskoye, Vansko-Namysskoye, Yuzhno-Tarasovskoye and Prisklonovskoye oil and gas condensate fields.

Merger of YUKOS and Sibneft, formation of NK YukosSibneft
In April 2003, NK Yukos and the main shareholders of NK Sibneft reached an agreement in principle on the merger of companies. The merged company was named YukosSibneft. It was assumed that it would be headed by the chairman of the board of the Yukos oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the president of Sibneft, Evgeny Shvidler, would take the post of chairman of the board of directors.
On May 14, 2003, Yukos and Sibneft announced the signing of a final agreement between the main shareholders of the companies on the merger. As stated in the joint press release, Yukos will acquire a stake representing 20% ​​of Sibneft's share capital minus one share at a price of $3 billion and will receive 72% of Sibneft's share capital plus one share in exchange for up to 26 shares .01% of the share capital of YukosSibneft, taking into account all additional issues.
The purchase and exchange of shares was planned to be completed by December 31, 2003. To finance the costs associated with the merger process, at the end of August 2003, YUKOS signed an agreement to attract a syndicated loan in the amount of $1 billion. The syndicate that provided the loan to the Russian company included Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, ING and SG CIB.

Termination of the merger deal with Sibneft
On November 28, 2003, at a meeting of Yukos shareholders, the termination of the merger process was announced. The initiative to terminate the deal came from Sibneft shareholders. In their opinion, in the time that has passed since the conclusion of the deal, the situation of YUKOS has worsened significantly. In this regard, Sibneft shareholders intend to abandon the merger with YUKOS in order to minimize the negative impact on the assets they own.
The companies agreed to return to their original state: YUKOS would return the shares they owned to Sibneft shareholders, and they, in turn, would give YUKOS 26.01% of its shares and $3 billion.
The parties agreed that Sibneft would not pay compensation in the amount of $1 billion provided for refusal to fulfill the terms of the deal. According to Yu. Beilin, this compensation was provided for by the terms of the deal, which was completed in October 2003. “There are no claims against Sibneft within the framework of that transaction,” he added.

On October 7, 2004, YUKOS returned 57.5% of Sibneft shares to the previous owner, the management company Millhouse Capital, receiving back 17.2% of its own shares.

In July 2005, Yukos and Sibneft carried out another transaction aimed at returning Sibneft shares to the previous owners. YUKOS returned 14.5% of Sibneft shares to Millhouse Capital in exchange for 8.8% of its shares.

Arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky
On October 25, 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who then held the post of chairman of the board of NK Yukos, was arrested at the Novosibirsk Tolmachevo airport. On the same day, M. Khodorkovsky was taken to Moscow, where the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation charged him under 6 articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In particular, M. Khodorkovsky was accused of stealing someone else's property by deception as part of an organized group, malicious failure to comply with a court decision that had entered into legal force, causing property damage to owners by deception, tax evasion on an especially large scale, falsifying official documents and embezzlement of someone else's property. property. On October 27, coordination of the operational activities of NK Yukos was entrusted to the company's first vice president, Stephen Theede.
On October 30, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation seized the shares of the Yukos Oil Company, owned by Yukos Universal Limited and Hully Enterpirses and amounting to about 53% of the authorized capital of the oil company. The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation announced that the seizure of shares belonging to M. Khodorkovsky was carried out as security for compensation for property damage caused by him, preliminary estimated at $1 billion. On October 31, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation lifted the seizure of 4.5% of the shares of Yukos, arrested the day before, because Studying additional materials, it was found that these shares belong to individuals who are not related to the criminal case under investigation.
On November 4, M. Khodorkovsky resigned from the post of chairman of the board of NK YUKOS. Semyon Kukes was appointed the new chairman of the board of NK Yukos, and he also became chairman of the board of directors of the company.
In June 2004, Semyon Kukes left the company. Stephen Michael Theede was appointed chairman of the board instead of him, and former head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Viktor Gerashchenko was appointed chairman of the board of directors.

Tax claims
On November 19, 2004, YUKOS received a tax audit report for 2003 with a claim amount of 169.9 billion rubles. The total amount of YUKOS' tax debt for 2000-2003 exceeded 582 billion rubles, and taking into account the claims against subsidiaries and the enforcement fee, it amounted to 703.1 billion rubles.
Such a high level of claims is due to the unprecedented level of fines. The requirements for Yukos include a fine of 80% of the principal amount of the debt, whereas in normal practice the fine does not exceed 20% of the debt. The motivation of the Ministry of Taxes is as follows: for deliberate non-payment of taxes, the amount of the fine has been increased from 20% to 40%, and for the fact that the company has already been held accountable for a similar offense, the fine has been doubled - to 80%.
The tax burden of NK Yukos for 2000 amounted to, taking into account the tax claims brought against the company recently, $6.1 billion with revenue of $9.0 billion and net profit of $3.7 billion. In 2001, the total tax burden reached $9.5 billion with revenue of $9.5 billion and net profit of $3.2 billion. In 2002, the tax burden of NK Yukos amounted to $11.9 billion with revenue of $11.4 billion and net profit of $3.1 billion.

Default
In July 2004, a consortium of banks organizing a $1 billion syndicated loan, which includes Societe Generale, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank, HSBC and ING, presented NK Yukos with a default notice. Banks began to write off funds from YUKOS accounts as part of repaying obligations to them.

A month later, Yukos received a second notice of default. The agent bank for pre-export lending announced a requirement to begin immediate repayment of a loan of $1.6 billion due to the deterioration of the financial situation of YUKOS.

In December 2004, Standard & Poor's agency downgraded the long-term corporate credit rating of NK Yukos, as well as the rating of obligations to banks from CC to D.

Sale of "Rospan"
In mid-2004, YUKOS sold its 56% stake in the gas company Rospan to TNK-BP. The transaction cost was $357 million. The funds received were used to pay off YUKOS' tax debts for 2000.

Sale of Yuganskneftegaz
On December 19, 2004, an auction was held to sell 76.79% of the shares of OAO Yuganskneftegaz. The proceeds from the sale of shares are used to pay off YUKOS' tax debts.
The starting price of the stake was 246.8 billion rubles. Four companies showed interest in purchasing Yuganskneftegaz, but the auction commission allowed only Gazpromneft LLC and Baikalfinancegroup LLC to participate in the auction. Baikalfinancegroup LLC was recognized as the winner, offering 260.8 billion rubles for Yuganskneftegaz shares. Subsequently, 100% of Baikalfinancegroup LLC was acquired by NK Rosneft.
On December 31, 211.4 billion rubles were transferred to the RFBR account, after which the stake in the main mining enterprise Yukos passed to the new owner. On the same day, a meeting of Yuganskneftegaz shareholders was held, at which a decision was made to early terminate the contract with the management company ZAO YUKOS EP. In addition, Vladimir Bulba, who previously headed Rosneft-Purneftegaz OJSC, was appointed the new general director of Yuganskneftegaz.

Trying to keep Yuganskneftegaz within the company, YUKOS management appealed to the American court with a request to hold urgent hearings to impose a temporary ban on the auction. Despite the fact that the Houston court ordered a 10-day moratorium on the sale of shares, this did not affect the plans of the RFFI. Commenting on the decision of the American court, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov said that holding an auction for Yuganskneftegaz is an internal matter of Russia. “We say that this is our internal matter, determined by previously made decisions and economic feasibility,” he emphasized.

Change of owners of "MENATEP"
At the beginning of 2005, Mikhail Khodorkovsky announced the transfer of all his shares of Group Menatep to Leonid Nevzlin. M. Khodorkovsky owned 59.5% of the shares of Group Menatep, L. Nevzlin owned 8% of the shares of Group Menatep. The Gibraltar offshore Group Menatep controls 61.01% of YUKOS shares and manages another 10% of the company through the Veteran Petroleum fund.
L. Nevzlin met M. Khodorkovsky in 1987 and since then the careers of businessmen have been connected. Since 1991, L. Nevzlin has held senior positions in YUKOS, MENATEP Bank and the Rosprom Group. After criminal cases were initiated against a number of shareholders of Group Menatep, L. Nevzlin left Russia, receiving Israeli citizenship.
The ownership scheme of Group Menatep initially provided that control over the group could pass to another shareholder in the event of the death of M. Khodorkovsky, his conviction, kidnapping, or the loss of a significant asset by YUKOS.

Change of management structure
At the end of 2004, the company's management system was close to complete collapse. The work of the business administration, legal department, treasury and government relations service is completely paralyzed. More or less normal activity continued only in the company's production structures - YUKOS-EP and YUKOS-RM.
Only four of the main Yukos shareholders remained in Russia at this time and were not prosecuted. These are Sergei Muravlenko, Viktor Ivanenko, Viktor Kazakov and Yuri Golubev. The remaining major shareholders of the company were either in prison (Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev), or abroad (Leonid Nevzlin, Vladimir Dubov, Mikhail Brudno, Alexey Golubovich), or had already been convicted (Vasily Shakhnovsky).
The owners of the company have lost the ability to manage and are forced to only monitor developments from afar.

In February 2005, the YUKOS board of directors approved a change in the company's management structure. The contracts with the management companies LLC YUKOS-Moscow, LLC YUKOS-RM and LLC YUKOS-EP were terminated, and the functions of the company's president were transferred to Stephen Theede. In addition, YUKOS has formed a board of five people. YUKOS subsidiaries also now have executive management bodies and boards of directors.

Share circulation
On January 11, 2005, the MICEX decided to transfer shares of the Yukos Oil Company from the A1 quotation list to the “non-listed shares” section. On January 14, RTS moved Yukos shares from the A1 quotation list to the section “securities admitted for circulation, but not included in the quotation lists.”

Sentence to M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev
On June 1, 2005, the Meshchansky Court of Moscow announced the verdict of the former president of YUKOS, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the head of the MFO MENATEP, Platon Lebedev. The court found them guilty of committing a number of crimes and sentenced them to 9 years in prison to be served in a general regime colony.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev did not admit guilt to any of the charges brought against them.