The Great Patriotic War- the war of the USSR with Germany and its allies in 1938 and with Japan in 1945; an integral part of the Second World War.
From the point of view of the leadership of Nazi Germany, war with the USSR was inevitable. The communist regime was seen by him as alien, and at the same time capable of striking at any moment. Only the quick defeat of the USSR gave the Germans the opportunity to secure dominance on the European continent. In addition, he gave them access to the rich industrial and agricultural regions of Eastern Europe.
At the same time, according to some historians, Stalin himself, at the end of 1939, decided on a preemptive attack on Germany in the summer of 1941. On June 15, Soviet troops began a strategic deployment and advance to the western border. According to one version, this was done with the aim of striking Romania and the German-occupied Poland, according to another, in order to frighten Hitler and force him to abandon plans to attack the USSR.
The first period of the war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942)
The first stage of the German offensive (June 22 - July 10, 1941)
On June 22, the USSR mobilized those liable for military service born in 1905-1918; from the first days of the war, a massive enrollment of volunteers began. On June 23, in the USSR, an emergency body of the highest military command, the Headquarters of the High Command, was created to direct military operations, and the maximum centralization of military and political power in the hands of Stalin took place.
On June 22, British Prime Minister W. Churchill spoke on the radio with a statement of support for the USSR in its fight against Hitlerism. On June 23, the US State Department welcomed the efforts of the Soviet people to repel the German invasion, and on June 24, US President Franklin Roosevelt promised to provide the USSR with all kinds of assistance.
On July 18, the Soviet leadership decided to organize a partisan movement in the occupied and reef-front areas, which became widespread in the second half of the year.
In the summer and autumn of 1941, about 10 million people were evacuated to the east. and more than 1350 large enterprises. The militarization of the economy began to be carried out with tough and vigorous measures; all the material resources of the country were mobilized for military needs.
The main reason for the defeats of the Red Army, despite its quantitative and often qualitative (T-34 and KV tanks) technical superiority, was the poor training of privates and officers, the low level of operation of military equipment and the lack of experience of the troops in conducting large military operations in modern war conditions. ... The repressions against the high command in 1937-1940 also played a significant role.
Second stage of the German offensive (July 10 - September 30, 1941)
On July 10, Finnish troops launched an offensive and on September 1, the 23rd Soviet Army on the Karelian Isthmus withdrew to the line of the old state border, which had been occupied before the Finnish war of 1939-1940. By October 10, the front stabilized along the line Kestenga - Ukhta - Rugozero - Medvezhyegorsk - Lake Onega. - river Svir. The enemy was unable to cut the routes of communication between European Russia and the northern ports.
On July 10, Army Group North launched an offensive in the Leningrad and Tallinn directions. Novgorod fell on August 15, and Gatchina fell on August 21. On August 30, the Germans reached the Neva, cutting off the railway connection with the city, and on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad. Only the tough measures of the new commander of the Leningrad Front G.K. Zhukov made it possible to stop the enemy by September 26.
On July 16, the 4th Romanian Army took Chisinau; the defense of Odessa lasted for about two months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October. In early September, Guderian crossed the Desna and on September 7 captured Konotop (“Konotop breakthrough”). Five Soviet armies were surrounded; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand. The left-bank Ukraine was in the hands of the Germans; the way to Donbass was open; Soviet troops in the Crimea were cut off from the main forces.
Defeats at the fronts prompted the General Headquarters to issue Order No. 270 on August 16, qualifying all soldiers and officers who surrendered as traitors and deserters; their families were deprived of state support and were subject to exile.
Third stage of the German offensive (September 30 - December 5, 1941)
On September 30, Army Group Center began an operation to seize Moscow (Typhoon). On October 3, Guderian's tanks broke into Oryol and took the road to Moscow. On October 6–8, all three armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded south of Bryansk, and the main forces of the Reserve (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies) - west of Vyazma; the Germans captured 664 thousand prisoners and more than 1200 tanks. But the advance of the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht to Tula was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the brigade of M.E. Katukov near Mtsensk; The 4th Panzer Group took Yukhnov and rushed to Maloyaroslavets, but was detained near Medyn by Podolsk cadets (October 6-10); the autumn thaw also slowed down the German advance.
On October 10, the Germans attacked the right wing of the Reserve Front (renamed the Western Front); On October 12, the 9th Army captured Staritsa, and on October 14 - Rzhev. On October 19, a state of siege was declared in Moscow. On October 29, Guderian tried to take Tula, but was repulsed with heavy losses for himself. In early November, the new commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, with an incredible exertion of all forces and constant counterattacks, managed, despite huge losses in manpower and equipment, to stop the Germans in other directions.
On September 27, the Germans broke through the defense line of the Southern Front. Most of Donbass ended up in the hands of the Germans. In the course of a successful counteroffensive by the troops of the Southern Front, Rostov was liberated on November 29, and the Germans were driven back to the Mius River.
In the second half of October, the 11th German army broke through to the Crimea and by mid-November captured almost the entire peninsula. Soviet troops managed to hold only Sevastopol.
Red Army counteroffensive near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942)
On December 5-6, the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern Fronts went over to offensive operations in the northwestern and southwestern directions. The successful advance of Soviet troops forced Hitler on December 8 to issue a directive to go over to the defensive along the entire front line. On December 18, the troops of the Western Front launched an offensive in the central direction. As a result, by the beginning of the year the Germans were driven back 100-250 km to the west. There was a threat of coverage of the Army Group "Center" from the north and south. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army.
The success of the operation near Moscow prompted the Stavka to decide on the transition to a general offensive along the entire front from Lake Ladoga to the Crimea. The offensive operations of the Soviet troops in December 1941 - April 1942 led to a significant change in the military-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front: the Germans were driven back from Moscow, Moscow, part of the Kalinin, Oryol and Smolensk regions were liberated. There was also a psychological turning point among the soldiers and civilians: faith in victory was strengthened, the myth of the Wehrmacht's invincibility collapsed. The collapse of the lightning-fast war plan gave rise to doubts about the successful outcome of the war, both among the German military-political leadership and among ordinary Germans.
Luban operation (January 13 - June 25)
The Lyuban operation was aimed at breaking the blockade of Leningrad. On January 13, the forces of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts launched an offensive in several directions, planning to link up at Lyuban and encircle the enemy's Chudov grouping. On March 19, the Germans launched a counterattack, cutting off the 2nd Shock Army from the rest of the forces of the Volkhov Front. Soviet troops have repeatedly tried to unblock it and resume the offensive. On May 21, the Headquarters decided to withdraw it, but on June 6 the Germans completely closed the encirclement ring. On June 20, soldiers and officers were ordered to leave the encirclement on their own, but only a few managed to do this (according to various estimates, from 6 to 16 thousand people); Army commander A.A. Vlasov surrendered.
Military action in May-November 1942
Having defeated the Crimean Front (almost 200 thousand people were captured), the Germans occupied Kerch on May 16, and Sevastopol in early July. On May 12, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the Southern Front launched an offensive on Kharkov. For several days it developed successfully, but the Germans defeated the 9th Army on May 19, dropping it behind the Seversky Donets, went to the rear of the advancing Soviet troops and on May 23 took them in ticks; the number of prisoners reached 240 thousand. On June 28-30, the German offensive began against the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Southwestern Front. On July 8, the Germans captured Voronezh and reached the Middle Don. By July 22, the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies had reached the Southern Don. On July 24, Rostov-on-Don was taken.
Amid a military catastrophe in the south, on July 28, Stalin issued order No. 227 "Not one step back", which provided for severe punishments for retreating without instructions from above, detachments to fight those who left their positions without permission, and penal units for actions in the most dangerous sectors of the front. On the basis of this order, about 1 million servicemen were convicted during the war years, 160 thousand of them were shot, and 400 thousand were sent to penal companies.
On July 25, the Germans crossed the Don and rushed south. In mid-August, the Germans established control over almost all the passes of the central part of the Main Caucasian Range. On the Grozny direction, the Germans occupied Nalchik on October 29, they failed to take Ordzhonikidze and Grozny, and in mid-November their further advance was stopped.
On August 16, German troops launched an offensive against Stalingrad. On September 13, fighting began in Stalingrad itself. In the second half of October - the first half of November, the Germans captured a significant part of the city, but could not break the resistance of the defenders.
By mid-November, the Germans had established control over the Right Bank of the Don and most of the North Caucasus, but did not achieve their strategic goals - to break through to the Volga and Transcaucasia. This was prevented by the counterattacks of the Red Army in other directions ("Rzhevskaya meat grinder", a tank battle between Zubtsov and Karmanovo, etc.), which, although not crowned with success, nevertheless did not allow the Wehrmacht command to transfer reserves to the south.
Second period of the war (November 19, 1942 - December 31, 1943): a radical turning point
Victory at Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943)
On November 19, units of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and on November 21 took in the pincers five Romanian divisions (Operation Saturn). On November 23, subdivisions of the two fronts joined up at the Soviet and surrounded the enemy's Stalingrad grouping.
On December 16, the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts began Operation Little Saturn in the Middle Don, defeated the 8th Italian Army, and on January 26, the 6th Army was split into two parts. On January 31, the southern grouping headed by F. Paulus surrendered, on February 2 - the northern one; 91 thousand people were captured. The Battle of Stalingrad, despite the heavy losses of Soviet troops, marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht suffered a major defeat and lost strategic initiative. Japan and Turkey abandoned the intention to enter the war on the side of Germany.
Economic recovery and the transition to the offensive in the central direction
By this time, a turning point had also taken place in the sphere of the Soviet military economy. Already in the winter of 1941/1942 it was possible to stop the decline in mechanical engineering. In March, the ferrous metallurgy began to rise, in the second half of 1942 - in the energy and fuel industry. By the beginning, there was a clear economic superiority of the USSR over Germany.
In November 1942 - January 1943, the Red Army launched an offensive in the central direction.
Operation Mars (Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya) was carried out with the aim of eliminating the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead. Formations of the Western Front made their way through the Rzhev-Sychevka railway and raided the enemy rear, but significant losses and a lack of tanks, guns and ammunition forced them to stop, but this operation did not allow the Germans to transfer part of their forces from the central direction to Stalingrad.
Liberation of the North Caucasus (January 1 - February 12, 1943)
On January 1-3, an operation began to liberate the North Caucasus and the Don bend. On January 3, Mozdok was liberated, on January 10-11 - Kislovodsk, Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Pyatigorsk, on January 21 - Stavropol. On January 24, the Germans surrendered Armavir, on January 30 - Tikhoretsk. On February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed troops in the Myskhako area south of Novorossiysk. Krasnodar was taken on February 12. However, the lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling the enemy's North Caucasian grouping.
Breaking the blockade of Leningrad (12-30 January 1943)
Fearing the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group "Center" on the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, the German command began on March 1 to systematically withdraw them. On March 2, units of the Kalinin and Western Fronts began pursuing the enemy. Rzhev was released on March 3, Gzhatsk on March 6, and Vyazma on March 12.
The campaign of January-March 1943, despite a number of setbacks, led to the liberation of a huge territory (the North Caucasus, the lower reaches of the Don, Voroshilovgrad, Voronezh, Kursk regions, part of the Belgorod, Smolensk and Kalinin regions). The blockade of Leningrad was broken, the Demyansky and Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledges were liquidated. Control over the Volga and Don was restored. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (about 1.2 million people). The depletion of human resources forced the Nazi leadership to carry out a total mobilization of the older (over 46 years old) and younger (16-17 years old).
Since the winter of 1942/1943, the partisan movement in the German rear has become an important military factor. The partisans inflicted serious damage on the German army, destroying manpower, blowing up warehouses and trains, disrupting the communications system. The largest operations were the raids of the detachment of M.I. Naumov across Kursk, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovograd, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Kiev and Zhitomir (February-March 1943) and the detachment of S.A. Kovpak in Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kiev regions (February-May 1943).
Defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge (5-23 July 1943)
The Wehrmacht command developed Operation Citadel to encircle a strong Red Army grouping on the Kursk salient by counter tank attacks from the north and south; if successful, it was planned to carry out Operation Panther to defeat the Southwestern Front. However, Soviet intelligence guessed the plans of the Germans, and in April-June a powerful defensive system of eight lines was created on the Kursk salient.
On July 5, the 9th German Army launched an offensive against Kursk from the north, and the 4th Panzer Army from the south. On the northern flank, on July 10, the Germans went over to the defensive. On the southern wing, the tank columns of the Wehrmacht reached Prokhorovka on July 12, but were stopped, and by July 23, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Front threw them back to their original lines. Operation Citadel failed.
The general offensive of the Red Army in the second half of 1943 (July 12 - December 24, 1943). Liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine
On July 12, units of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the German defenses at Zhilkovo and Novosil; by August 18, Soviet troops cleared the Oryol salient from the enemy.
By September 22, units of the Southwestern Front had driven the Germans back across the Dnieper and reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk (now the Dnieper) and Zaporozhye; formations of the Southern Front occupied Taganrog, on September 8 Stalino (now Donetsk), on September 10 - Mariupol; the result of the operation was the liberation of Donbass.
On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts broke through the defenses of Army Group South in several places and captured Belgorod on 5 August. On August 23, Kharkov was taken.
On September 25, by means of flank attacks from the south and north, the troops of the Western Front captured Smolensk and by the beginning of October entered the territory of Belarus.
On August 26, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts began to carry out the Chernigov-Poltava operation. The troops of the Central Front broke through the enemy defenses south of Sevsk and occupied the city on August 27; On September 13, they reached the Dnieper on the Loev - Kiev section. Parts of the Voronezh Front reached the Dnieper in the Kiev-Cherkassy sector. The formations of the Steppe Front approached the Dnieper in the Cherkassy - Verkhnedneprovsk sector. As a result, the Germans lost almost all of the Left-Bank Ukraine. At the end of September, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper in several places and captured 23 bridgeheads on its right bank.
On September 1, the troops of the Bryansk Front overcame the Hagen line of defense of the Wehrmacht and occupied Bryansk; by October 3, the Red Army reached the line of the Sozh River in Eastern Belarus.
On September 9, the North Caucasian Front, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla, launched an offensive on the Taman Peninsula. Having broken through the Blue Line, Soviet troops took Novorossiysk on September 16, and by October 9 they had completely cleared the peninsula of the Germans.
On October 10, the Southwestern Front launched an operation to eliminate the Zaporozhye bridgehead and on October 14 captured Zaporozhye.
On October 11, the Voronezh (from October 20 - the 1st Ukrainian) Front began the Kiev operation. After two unsuccessful attempts to take the capital of Ukraine by attack from the south (from the Bukrin bridgehead), it was decided to deliver the main attack from the north (from the Lyutezh bridgehead). On November 1, in order to divert the enemy's attention, the 27th and 40th armies moved to Kiev from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, and on November 3, the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front suddenly attacked it from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead and broke through the German defenses. On November 6, Kiev was liberated.
On November 13, the Germans, pulling up their reserves, launched a counteroffensive against the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhitomir direction in order to recapture Kiev and restore the defense along the Dnieper. But the Red Army kept the vast strategic Kiev bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper.
During the period of hostilities from June 1 to December 31, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (1 million 413 thousand people), which it was no longer able to fully compensate. A significant part of the territory of the USSR occupied in 1941-1942 was liberated. The plans of the German command to gain a foothold on the Dnieper lines failed. Conditions were created for the expulsion of the Germans from the Right-Bank Ukraine.
Third period of the war (December 24, 1943 - May 11, 1945): defeat of Germany
After a series of setbacks throughout 1943, the German command abandoned attempts to seize the strategic initiative and went over to a tough defense. The main task of the Wehrmacht in the north was to prevent the Red Army from breaking through to the Baltic and East Prussia, in the center to the border with Poland, and in the south to the Dniester and the Carpathians. The Soviet military leadership set the goal of the winter-spring campaign to defeat the German troops on the extreme flanks - in the Right-Bank Ukraine and near Leningrad.
Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea
On December 24, 1943, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in the western and southwestern directions (Zhitomir-Berdichev operation). Only at the cost of a great effort and significant losses did the Germans manage to stop the Soviet troops on the Sarny - Polonnaya - Kazatin - Zhashkov line. On January 5-6, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front struck in the Kirovograd direction and captured Kirovograd on January 8, but on January 10 they were forced to stop the offensive. The Germans did not allow the combination of the troops of both fronts and were able to keep the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, which posed a threat to Kiev from the south.
On January 24, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts launched a joint operation to defeat the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping. On January 28, the 6th and 5th Guards Tank Armies united at Zvenigorodka and closed the encirclement ring. On January 30, Kanev was taken, on February 14 - Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. On February 17, the liquidation of the "boiler" was completed; more than 18 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were captured.
On January 27, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck from the Sarn area in the Lutsk-Rovno direction. On January 30, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts began on the Nikopol bridgehead. Having overcome the fierce resistance of the enemy, on February 8 they captured Nikopol, on February 22 - Krivoy Rog, and by February 29 they reached the r. Ingulets.
As a result of the 1943/1944 winter campaign, the Germans were finally driven back from the Dnieper. In an effort to carry out a strategic breakthrough to the borders of Romania and prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining a foothold on the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the Stavka developed a plan to encircle and defeat Army Group South in Right-Bank Ukraine through a coordinated strike of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts ...
The final chord of the spring operation in the south was the expulsion of the Germans from the Crimea. On May 7-9, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, took Sevastopol by storm, and by May 12 they defeated the remnants of the 17th Army that had fled to Chersonesos.
Leningrad-Novgorod operation of the Red Army (January 14 - March 1, 1944)
On January 14, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive south of Leningrad and near Novgorod. After defeating the 18th German army and pushing it back to Luga, they liberated Novgorod on January 20. In early February, units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts reached the approaches to Narva, Gdov and Luga; On February 4, they took Gdov, on February 12 - Luga. The threat of encirclement forced the 18th Army to hastily retreat to the southwest. On February 17, the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a series of attacks against the 16th German army on the Lovat River. In early March, the Red Army reached the Panther defensive line (Narva - Lake Peipsi - Pskov - Ostrov); most of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions were liberated.
Military operations in the central direction in December 1943 - April 1944
As the tasks of the winter offensive of the 1st Baltic, Western and Byelorussian Fronts, the Headquarters set the troops to reach the Polotsk-Lepel-Mogilev-Ptich line and the liberation of Eastern Belarus.
In December 1943 - February 1944, the 1st PribF made three attempts to capture Vitebsk, which did not lead to the capture of the city, but extremely depleted the enemy's forces. The offensive operations of the ZF in the Orsha direction on February 22-25 and March 5-9, 1944 were also unsuccessful.
On the Mozyr direction, the Belorussian Front (BelF) on January 8 dealt a strong blow to the flanks of the 2nd German army, but thanks to a hasty retreat, it managed to avoid encirclement. The lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling and destroying the Bobruisk enemy grouping, and on February 26 the offensive was stopped. Formed on February 17 at the junction of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian (from February 24, 1st Belorussian) fronts, the 2nd Belorussian Front began the Polesie operation on March 15 with the aim of capturing Kovel and breaking through to Brest. Soviet troops surrounded Kovel, but on March 23 the Germans launched a counterattack and on April 4 they unblocked the Kovel grouping.
Thus, in the central direction during the winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Red Army was unable to achieve its goals; On April 15, she went on the defensive.
Offensive in Karelia (June 10 - August 9, 1944). Finland's withdrawal from the war
After the loss of most of the occupied territory of the USSR, the main task of the Wehrmacht was to prevent the Red Army from entering Europe and not to lose its allies. That is why the Soviet military-political leadership, having failed in attempts to reach a peace agreement with Finland in February-April 1944, decided to start the summer campaign of the year with a blow in the north.
On June 10, 1944, LenF troops, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result of which control was restored over the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the strategically important Kirov railway linking Murmansk with European Russia. By early August, Soviet troops had liberated the entire occupied territory east of Ladoga; in the Kuolisma area, they reached the Finnish border. After being defeated, Finland entered into negotiations with the USSR on August 25. On September 4, she broke off relations with Berlin and ceased hostilities, on September 15, she declared war on Germany, and on September 19, she signed a truce with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The length of the Soviet-German front was reduced by a third. This allowed the Red Army to free up significant forces for operations in other directions.
Liberation of Belarus (June 23 - early August 1944)
The successes in Karelia prompted the Stavka to carry out a large-scale operation to defeat the enemy in the central direction with the forces of the three Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts (Operation Bagration), which became the main event of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944.
The general offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23-24. The coordinated strike of the 1st PribF and the right wing of the 3rd BF ended on June 26-27 with the liberation of Vitebsk and the encirclement of five German divisions. On June 26, units of the 1st BF took Zhlobin, on June 27-29 they surrounded and destroyed the enemy's Bobruisk grouping, and on June 29 they liberated Bobruisk. As a result of the swift offensive of the three Belorussian fronts, the attempt of the German command to organize a defense line along the Berezina was thwarted; On July 3, the troops of the 1st and 3rd BF broke into Minsk and took the 4th German army in pincers south of Borisov (eliminated by July 11).
The German front began to crumble. The formations of the 1st PribF occupied Polotsk on 4 July and, moving downstream of the Western Dvina, entered the territory of Latvia and Lithuania, reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga, cutting off the Army Group North stationed in the Baltic region from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. Parts of the right wing of the 3rd BF, taking Lepel on June 28, broke through into the valley of the river in early July. Viliya (Nyaris), on August 17 reached the border of East Prussia.
The troops of the left wing of the 3rd BF, making a swift rush from Minsk, took Lida on July 3, on July 16, together with the 2nd BF - Grodno, and at the end of July approached the northeastern salient of the Polish border. The 2nd BF, advancing to the southwest, captured Bialystok on July 27 and drove the Germans across the Narev River. Parts of the right wing of the 1st BF, liberating Baranovichi on July 8, and Pinsk on July 14, at the end of July they reached the Western Bug and reached the central section of the Soviet-Polish border; Brest was taken on July 28.
As a result of Operation Bagration, Belarus, most of Lithuania and part of Latvia were liberated. The possibility of an offensive in East Prussia and Poland opened up.
Liberation of Western Ukraine and offensive in Eastern Poland (July 13 - August 29, 1944)
Trying to stop the advance of Soviet troops in Belarus, the command of the Wehrmacht was forced to transfer formations there from the rest of the Soviet-German front. This facilitated the operations of the Red Army in other directions. On July 13-14, the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in Western Ukraine. Already on July 17, they crossed the state border of the USSR and entered South-Eastern Poland.
On July 18, the left wing of the 1st BF launched an offensive near Kovel. At the end of July, they approached Prague (the right-bank suburb of Warsaw), which they managed to take only on September 14. In early August, the resistance of the Germans increased sharply, and the advance of the Red Army was stopped. Because of this, the Soviet command was unable to provide the necessary assistance to the uprising that broke out on August 1 in the Polish capital under the leadership of the Home Army, and by the beginning of October it was brutally suppressed by the Wehrmacht.
Offensive in the Eastern Carpathians (September 8 - October 28, 1944)
After the occupation of Estonia in the summer of 1941, the Tallinn Metropolitan. Alexander (Paulus) announced the separation of the Estonian parishes from the ROC (the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was created on the initiative of Alexander (Paulus) in 1923, in 1941 the bishop confessed for the sin of schism). In October 1941, at the insistence of the German General Commissioner of Belarus, the Belarusian Church was created. However, Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky), who headed it in the rank of Metropolitan of Minsk and Belarus, retained canonical communion with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Metropolitan. Sergius (Stragorodsky). After the forcible retirement in June 1942, Metropolitan Panteleimon was succeeded by Archbishop Philotheus (Narco), who also refused to arbitrarily declare a national autocephalous Church.
Considering the patriotic position of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky), the German authorities initially obstructed the activities of those priests and parishes who declared their belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate. Over time, the German authorities became more tolerant of the communities of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to the occupiers, these communities only in words declared their loyalty to the Moscow center, but in reality they were ready to assist the German army in the destruction of the atheistic Soviet state.
Thousands of churches, churches, prayer houses of various Protestant trends (primarily Lutherans and Pentecostals) resumed their activities in the occupied territory. This process was especially active in the Baltic States, in Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev regions of Belarus, in Dnepropetrovsk, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Kiev, Voroshilovgrad, Poltava regions of Ukraine, in Rostov and Smolensk regions of the RSFSR.
The religious factor was taken into account when planning domestic policy in areas where Islam was traditionally spread, primarily in the Crimea and the Caucasus. German propaganda declared respect for the values of Islam, presented the occupation as the liberation of peoples from the "Bolshevik godless yoke", guaranteed the creation of conditions for the revival of Islam. The invaders willingly went to the opening of mosques in almost every settlement of the "Muslim regions", provided the Muslim clergy with the opportunity to address the believers through the radio and the press. Throughout the occupied territory, where Muslims lived, the posts of mullahs and senior mullahs were restored, whose rights and privileges were equated to the heads of the administrations of cities and towns.
When forming special units from among the prisoners of war of the Red Army, much attention was paid to confessional affiliation: if representatives of peoples traditionally professing Christianity were mainly sent to the "army of General Vlasov", then to such formations as the "Turkestan Legion", "Idel-Ural", they sent representatives of "Islamic" peoples.
The "liberalism" of the German authorities did not apply to all religions. Many communities were on the brink of destruction, for example, in Dvinsk alone, almost all of the 35 synagogues that had functioned before the war were destroyed, and up to 14 thousand Jews were shot. Most of the Evangelical Christian Baptist communities that ended up in the occupied territory were also destroyed or dispersed by the authorities.
Forced to leave the occupied territories under the onslaught of Soviet troops, the Nazi invaders took out of the prayer buildings liturgical items, icons, paintings, books, and items made of precious metals.
According to the far from complete data of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the German Fascist Invaders, 1,670 Orthodox churches, 69 chapels, 237 churches, 532 synagogues, 4 mosques and 254 other prayer buildings were completely destroyed, looted or desecrated. Among those destroyed or desecrated by the Nazis were priceless monuments of history, culture and architecture, incl. related to the XI-XVII centuries, in Novgorod, Chernigov, Smolensk, Polotsk, Kiev, Pskov. A lot of prayer buildings were converted by the invaders into prisons, barracks, stables, garages.
The position and patriotic activity of the Russian Orthodox Church during the war
On June 22, 1941, the patriarchal locum tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky) compiled an "Epistle to the Pastors and Flocks of the Orthodox Church of Christ," in which he revealed the anti-Christian essence of fascism and called on believers to defend themselves. In their letters to the Patriarchate, the faithful informed about the voluntary collection of donations that had begun everywhere for the needs of the front and defense of the country.
After the death of Patriarch Sergius, according to his will, Metr. Alexy (Simansky), unanimously elected at the last meeting of the Local Council on January 31-February 2, 1945, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. The Council was attended by the Patriarchs of Alexandria Christopher II, Antioch Alexander III and Georgian Callistratus (Tsintsadze), representatives of the Constantinople, Jerusalem, Serbian and Romanian patriarchs.
1945 the so-called Estonian schism was overcome, and the Orthodox parishes and clergy of Estonia were accepted into communion with the ROC.
Patriotic activities of communities of other confessions and religions
Immediately after the start of the war, the leaders of practically all religious associations of the USSR supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of the country against the German fascist aggressor. Addressing the faithful with patriotic messages, they urged to fulfill their religious and civic duty to defend the Fatherland with dignity, to provide all possible material assistance to the needs of the front and rear. The leaders of the majority of religious associations in the USSR condemned those representatives of the clergy who deliberately went over to the side of the enemy and helped to impose a "new order" in the occupied territory.
The head of the Russian Old Believers of the Belokrinitskaya hierarchy, Archbishop. Irinarkh (Parfyonov) in his Christmas message of 1942 called on the Old Believers, a considerable number of whom fought at the fronts, to serve valiantly in the Red Army and to counter the enemy in the occupied territory in the ranks of the partisans. In May 1942, the leaders of the Baptist and Evangelical Christian Unions addressed the believers with a letter of appeal; the appeal spoke of the danger of fascism "for the cause of the Gospel" and contained an appeal to "brothers and sisters in Christ" to fulfill "their duty to God and to the Motherland", being "the best warriors at the front and the best workers in the rear." Baptist communities were engaged in sewing linen, collecting clothes and other things for soldiers and families of the dead, helped in caring for the wounded and sick in hospitals, and took care of orphans in orphanages. Funds raised in the Baptist communities were used to build a Merciful Samaritan ambulance plane to transport seriously wounded soldiers to the rear. The leader of Renovationism, A.I. Vvedensky, has repeatedly made patriotic appeals.
In relation to a number of other religious associations, the policy of the state during the war years remained invariably tough. First of all, this concerned "anti-state, anti-Soviet and savage sects", which included the Dukhobors
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58. A radical change in the Second World War (November 1942 - December 1943) Fundamentals. The events of the fundamental turning point were:
Difficult situation for Germ. The offensive and the Soviet command developed on eastward.
Offensive: To cover it, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal Timoshenko. In connection with the current critical situation and the violation of order in the troops, an order was issued by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - Stalin issues decree No. 227 "NO STEP BACK". From the side of the enemy, the offensive was led by the 6th Army under the command of Paulus. In August, the Germans broke through to the Volga; in September, Stalingrad was declared martial law and defended itself. ... Massive assaults of Stalingrad began. Zhukov and Vasilevsky developed an offensive operation "Uranus" - according to which it was supposed to destroy the fascist troops taken into the ring. The operation began in November, 3 fronts participated:
Southwest - headed by Vatutin
Donskoy - headed by Rokossovsky
Stalingrad - Eremenko. The plan was implemented.
the troops of the Hitlerites collided in a ring, as a result, the army of Paulus was surrounded. Thousands of Soviet patriots heroically showed themselves in the battles for the city. As a result, in the battles for Stalingrad, enemy troops suffered colossal losses. Every month of the battle it sent about 250 thousand new soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, the bulk of military equipment. By mid-November 1942, the fascist troops were forced to stop the offensive.
In November 1942, the offensive of the Southwestern and Don fronts of the Sov. Army. A day later, the Stalingrad Front set out. there was a connection of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. As a result, the German tank divisions were surrounded. Attempts to break out of the encirclement failed, and at the beginning of February 1943, von Paulus's group surrendered. ... Resistance to German troops was until February 1943.
The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad led to a radical change in the soul: not only in the Second World War, but in World War II as a whole. A broad offensive of the Red Army began on all fronts: in January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken (food, medicine and weapons began to flow to the besieged city along the liberated corridor no more than 11 km wide); in February - the North Caucasus was liberated. As a result of the autumn-winter campaign of 1942/43, the military power of Nazi Germany was significantly undermined. =
Our victory was facilitated by:
miscalculations of the German command
thoughtful policy of German troops
strengthening the anti-fascist coalition
aggravation of contradictions in the bloc of fascist states
Creation of an anti-Hitler coalition.
June 22, 1942 Churchill - Prime Minister of the Eng. He made a declaration of support for the USSR in its struggle against Germany, and a Soviet-British agreement on joint actions against a common enemy was signed. The President of the United States, Roosevelt, also made a statement of support for the Soviet state. In August 1941, the Atlantic Charter was signed, which outlined the principles of the struggle against the fascist coalition, determined the size of the supply of weapons and military materials to the Soviet Union in exchange for raw materials.
In 1942 - 26 states entered the anti-coalition. The main form of cooperation between the allies was Lend-Lease deliveries (supplies of transport and food) Battle of Kursk:
Battle of Kursk - a radical turning point in the war - July-August '43.
After the Battle of Stalingrad, there was a lull on the Soviet-German front for several months. Both sides were pulling up reserves. After Stalingrad, the successes of the Soviet troops were growing. The success of the Soviet troops in advancing along the Don, Belgorod and Kursk were liberated, Kharkov was recaptured.
In the central direction, after successful operations in the spring of 1943, the so-called Kursk salient formed on the front line, deeply wedging into the German positions. The German leadership decided to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge. The German command counted on strikes from the north, from the Orel area, and from the south, from the Belgorod area, to encircle and destroy the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts and, if successful, launch an offensive against Moscow. The operation was named Citadel.
By the time of the Battle of Kursk, we had superiority in strength and armament.
In the Battle of Kursk, outstanding commanders commanded: Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevsky, Generals Vatutin and Rokossovsky.
The Germans were going to re-use the surprise factor of the attack and start the offensive on July 5 at 3 o'clock in the morning. But Soviet intelligence accurately determined the day and hour of the planned offensive, and it was decided to deliver a warning strike with artillery a few minutes before the expected start. As a result, the Germans suffered significant losses and were able to launch an offensive only a few hours later, bringing in all their reserves.
The Battle of Kursk lasted July-August 1943.
Hitler pinned special hopes on new types of tanks. In July, Army Group Center (Kluge) and South (Manstein) inflicted troops on the Central (Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (Vatutin) fronts. But our troops not only stopped the enemy, but also launched a counteroffensive.
On July 12, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. On the same day, the largest oncoming tank battle in world history took place near the village of Prokhorovka, in which more than 1200 tanks took part. On this day, the final turning point came. The counter-offensive of the Red Army began.
The German command had high hopes for a surprise strike, but Soviet intelligence was able to quite accurately establish the date of the start of the operation.
Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive and captured Belgorod, then Orel.
During the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German army was defeated, after which it was unable to recover. If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German army, then the battle on the Kursk Bulge put it in front of disaster.
The Soviet command and government had confidence in victory. The Soviet command knew the enemy's plan, deployment, and direction of troops. Unlike in previous years, Stalin treated the information confidentially.
The numerical superiority of the troops and their quality were of great importance in the victory. This superiority was achieved and won by air superiority. Our pilots had combat experience. The victory of the Soviet troops at Kursk marked the beginning of a powerful offensive by the Red Army.
In August, Kharkov was liberated, in September 1943 Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper, liberated Donbass, Taman Peninsula, Novorossiysk, Bryansk, Smolensk. The liberation of Belarus began. In the fall of 1943, fighting unfolded in the Right-Bank Ukraine. The troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Vatutin liberated Kiev in November.
November 19, 1942 76 years ago The beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad (the beginning of the Stalingrad operation).
The Battle of Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943) is one of the largest strategic operations of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War.
Its code name is Operation Uranus. The battle included two periods.
The first is the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), as a result of which not only the enemy's offensive power was crushed and the main shock group of the German army on the southern front was drained of blood, but conditions were also prepared for the transition of Soviet troops to a decisive counteroffensive.
The second period of the battle - the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation - began on November 19, 1942.
During the operation, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the main forces of the German armies.
In total, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the enemy lost about one and a half million people - a fourth of its forces operating on the Soviet-German front.
The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad was of great political and international importance, it had a significant impact on the development of the Resistance Movement on the territory of European states occupied by fascist invaders.
As a result of the battle, the Soviet armed forces snatched the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end of the war.
In the Battle of Stalingrad, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers displayed unparalleled heroism and high military skill. 55 formations and units were awarded orders, 179 were transformed into guards, 26 received honorary titles. About 100 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Stalingrad has become a symbol of the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the Soviet people in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland.
On May 1, 1945, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Stalingrad was awarded the honorary title of Hero City.
4. Defense in Stalingrad from 28.9 to 21.11.1942The division was excluded from the offensive grouping and took up defensive positions along the Volga along a wide strip. The well-developed system of fortifications of the Soviets was used here. In some areas, it was improved and brought to a state that excludes a surprise attack from across the Volga. In the center of the divisional strip between Tsaritsa and Minin's ravine was the 191st regiment, south of it was the 211st regiment, adjacent to the 371st infantry division, and north of the Tsaritsa - the 194th regiment, adjacent to the 295th infantry division.
The time before the encirclement was used for rest and putting in order, in fulfillment of the plans of the Wehrmacht leadership.
The following entries in the Wehrmacht diary speaks better than any controversy:
August 16, 1942 The Fuehrer is concerned that the Russians can undertake their standard offensive of the 1920 model, striking near Serafimovich in the direction of Rostov, as the Bolsheviks did against General Wrangel's White Army, and thus achieve a major success. He is worried that the Italian 8th Army located in this sector will not be able to withstand and therefore orders the 22nd Panzer Division to be moved to the rear of the Italian 8th Army as soon as possible. "
A similar kind of concern is found in the records of 27.8, 9.9, 16.9, 16.10, 9.10, 14.10, 25.10. The entry from 10/26 reads:
“The Fuehrer is again extremely worried about the Russian general offensive, possible in winter, in the sector of the allied armies across the Don in the direction of Rostov. The active enemy movements in the area and the construction of bridges across the Don in several places give cause for concern. The Fuehrer orders to give all three armies airfield divisions as a "corset". This will free the German divisions from the front and use them as a reserve in the rear of the Allied armies. "
November 7, 1942: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, reporting on the situation, reports that on November 4, a council of commanders took place in Moscow with the intelligence information received, at which a decision was made to conduct a general offensive on the Don or in the center."
On the basis of these facts, it is absurd to believe that Hitler had a full understanding of the Russian preparations for a general offensive, but did not believe in it. The entry from 26.10 talks about the possibility of a winter offensive in the sector of the allied armies.
Diary of the Wehrmacht, kept by General Helmut Greiner. In his book The High Command of the Wehrmacht 1939-1943, he writes: “As the compiler of the diary, I participated in all important meetings of the command. This can be confirmed by General Warlimont and for a while General Jodl. I used my own handwritten notes, which I then dictated into my diary, without intervals from August 12, 1942 to March 17, 1943. I ask the reader to take note of this. "
Mr. Gisevius at this time, as a representative of General Oster, chief of staff of Canaris, was in Switzerland, maintaining contacts with the enemy. In early December, he called back to Berlin, where he was informed of the Stalingrad putsch. According to the information set out in his book Until the Sad End, in Nuremberg he testified under oath the following: all the details back in December was predicted by Colonel-General Beck. We began our preparations, relying on mathematical calculations of the time left for the army of Paulus, in order to organize a military putsch shortly before this moment. While in Switzerland, I took part in all discussions of this preparation. I can say that we have advanced very far and that field marshals in the east and Witzleben in the west should have taken part in this coup. However, it happened differently, and when Paulus capitulated, Kluge, instead of giving us a code signal, left the conspiracy. "
According to Giesevius, it was planned that after a code signal from Paulus, Kluge would take action, but he obediently canceled the events to Hitler.
In connection with the fall of the 6th army, the following testimonies of Gisevius are of great importance: "Paulus encouraged the surrender of the 6th army, who, despite all the possibilities, did not want to give the 6th army back into the crazy hands of Hitler, canceling the unblocking offensive."
We will remember the decision of the commander of our army after we end this chapter with the recollection of an unknown soldier of the 191st regiment:
“Elite divisions were put into action, the assault on the 71st stopped. Not far from the southern station, near the grain elevator, the days passed hard. In the smoke and stench of rotting wheat, there was a struggle for every brick on every floor, throughout the entire section of the Soviet defensive position from the southern pier to the high elevator. On the night of 17 to 18.9, Marshal Chuikov left his army command post near the Tsarina in panic, when in the middle of the day German assault groups suddenly appeared at the exit of Pushkinskaya Street. During his escape through the second exit to the Tsaritsa ravine, he left many important papers and maps with the Volga bank, which were soon taken by the assault groups of the 191st regiment. On October 3, the division finally destroyed the enemy fighting in the ruins of their houses and took up defensive positions in the neighboring sector. "
5. The battle in the Stalingrad cauldron from 22.11.42 to 31.1.43 and the fall of Stalingrad
In early November, nine-tenths of the cities were in German hands. The first snow fell on November 16. In the middle of the day on November 21, a tragedy broke out at Kalach, and the next day the enemy pincers closed around the 6th Army in the Stalingrad region.
In a jumble of orders and counter-orders, the radio station of the army commander received a radiogram from the Fuehrer's headquarters: “The 6th Army is taking up a perimeter defense and awaiting new orders. The commander moves his headquarters to Stalingrad. "
This order appears in most of the literature on Stalingrad, as well as the radio message received on the night of November 21: “The troops of the 6th Army remaining between the Volga and the Don are the Stalingrad fortress” and “The commander is moving his headquarters to Stalingrad. The army is in a perimeter defense and awaits further orders. "
On November 21, at about 14:00, the commander received a report that enemy tanks from Kalch were advancing along the so-called route of the Don Heights to Golubinskaya. Even before the 6th Army was surrounded, its commander received an order not to oppose the enemy, but to submit to fate! The army is not yet surrounded, but it is already called "Fortress Stalingrad"!
As Ferdinand Lenz says in his book Stalingrad, the Lost Victory, the Fuhrer himself could not send such a telegram, because from 19 to 24.11 he was not at headquarters in Vinnitsa, and he was in Munich and Obersalzberg with Keitel and Jodl.
On the evening of November 22nd, the army was surrounded. However, its commander and chief of staff were already linked by an order received yesterday.
This is the key to understanding the telegram that Paulus sent at 18.00 on 22.11. Why neither the Fuehrer nor the commander of the 6th Army understood the seriousness of the whole situation before is inexplicable.
From the very beginning, it was absolutely clear to the army headquarters: there is no way to supply the army by air. In the diary of the commander of the 4th Air Fleet, Colonel-General von Richthofen, there is an entry dated 11.21.42: “The 6th Army hopes that it will be supplied by air. However, even using all means, it is clear that this will not work. The command of the Luftwaffe, the Wehrmacht and the Army Group agree with this.
On the night of 21/11/22, another order comes from the Army Group: “The 6th Army is holding on, despite the threat of encirclement, and takes control of the IV Army and the remnants of the VI Romanian corps. The railway should be preserved if possible. Regarding the air supply, the order will follow. "
In his well-known report at 6 pm on November 22, Paulus describes the situation that had developed by that time: “The army is surrounded. The entire Tsaritsa Valley, the railway from Sovetskoye to Kalach, the Don bridges, the heights on the western bank of the Don about Golubinskaya, Oskinsky and Krainy, despite heroic resistance, are occupied by the Russians. Their new forces arrive through Buzinovka from the south and, especially, from the west. The situation with Surovikino and Chir is unknown. On the northern front, there was a strong activity of reconnaissance groups, attacks from the IV Army Corps and the 76th Infantry Division were repulsed. There are small insertions. The army hopes to hold the western front west of the Don on the Golubaya River. The southern front east of the Don is still open. At the cost of weakening the northern front, a thin line of defense will be organized from Karpovka through Marinovka to Golubinskaya inclusive. Don froze and began to move. Fuel runs out quickly. Tanks and heavy weapons become immobile because of this. Ammunition taut. There will be enough food for 6 days. The army plans to hold the remaining area from Stalingrad to the Don and is doing everything possible for this. It is assumed that the formation of the southern front will be successful, the necessary supplies will be delivered by air. We ask you to give freedom of action if the all-round defense fails. The situation could force to abandon the northern front and Stalingrad and strike with all forces on the enemy between the Volga and Don on the southern front in order to establish a connection with the 4th Panzer Army. An offensive westward due to a strong enemy and difficult terrain will not be successful. Signed: Paulus. "
The regulation, however, dictated not to carry out Hitler's order on a perimeter defense, but to go for a breakthrough ...
We continue the memories of a soldier of the 191st regiment:
“In the second half of November 22. General Paulus and his chief of staff flew into the cauldron. At the Gumrak airfield, bunkers were prepared for his new command post. Paulus ordered to cut food rations for all soldiers by half and sent Giler another radiogram: “Based on the situation, I ask you to give freedom of action again!”
The soldiers in the cauldron, including officers and generals, began to receive daily 200 grams of bread and half a liter of soup twice a day. This soup contained 60 grams of verbosity or bones and some horse meat. With this ration, soldiers from the bloodless divisions had to fight in the steppe, march in the snow and dig in on the icy slopes of the girders, drag cannons, machine guns, cartridges, sledges, and also pull the wounded out from under fire.
Our regiment until November 24 was in independently built bunkers between the ravines of Minin and Tsaritsa, in the immediate vicinity of the Volga and the elevator. I remember that on the day we drank our tinned coffee, several small-caliber bombs fell on us in our bunker. At about 16.00 the order to advance was received. At 17.40 we moved in the direction of Beketovka, where on black Sunday 22.11 the Russians, after double artillery and mortar preparation, broke through the defenses of the 20th Romanian division.
The road along the Volga led away from Stalingrad, through deep beams, heights and steppes, under the raids of enemy attack aircraft. Continuous snow poured and an icy wind blew, closing his mouth and forming lumps of ice on his eyelashes. The next evening, at about 20.00, we went to the front near Kalach and at 22.00, under the command of Lieutenant Wolf, we launched a counterattack. We threw the enemy back 500-700 meters, after which we settled down for the night right in an open field, at a temperature of -30 degrees, in an icy blowing wind. Enemy shells flew over our heads, “Stalin's organs” roared, and in the morning, after heavy artillery and mortar fire, the Russians again launched an attack.
Despite the fact that the frost constrained any movement, we sent round after round of machine guns. Again we are attacked by the Soviet infantry, accompanied by tanks. We do not have any anti-tank weapons and we are forced to hit tanks with melee weapons. This unequal battle lasted all day. In the twilight of the next morning, hell broke loose again as hundreds of shells began to explode. However, we were able to press the attackers to the ground with our fire and by the middle of the day the attack was repelled. We had only one heavy and three light machine guns when the battle group of the Knight's Cross Knight Riedel with two assault guns and seven tanks came to the rescue. While changing positions on December 5, I was wounded and sent to the main dressing station 2/371.
Operation "Winter Thunderstorm", as the unblocking strike was designated, gave us hope for salvation, when on November 27 the 6th Panzer Division, transferred from France, began to arrive in the Kotelnikovo area "...
During the night of November 17, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region, northeast of Tuapse and southeast of Nalchik. On other fronts, nothing has changed.
In the Stalingrad region, our troops repulsed attacks by small enemy groups. In the southern part of the city, the soldiers of the N unit were active. More than 100 enemy rifles and other trophies were picked up on the battlefield. The gun crews of sergeants Ivantsov and Kratar, firing direct fire, destroyed up to a company of German infantry. In another sector, the fire of our artillerymen scattered up to the enemy infantry battalion.
Northwest of Stalingrad, gunners and mortars under the command of Comrade Poluektov destroyed 4 German dugouts, suppressed the fire of two mortar batteries and scattered three platoons of enemy infantry. The N-unit undertook reconnaissance in force. The scouts broke into the enemy's location, blew up 2 bunkers, destroyed up to 50 Nazis and, capturing 2 heavy machine guns and 3 mortars, returned to their unit.
Southeast of Nalchik, our troops were actively fighting. In one sector, a group of our tanks wedged into the enemy's defenses. The tank crew under the command of Senior Lieutenant Parshin crushed 3 anti-tank guns and 4 German vehicles with tracks. The tank of senior lieutenant Tereshchenko destroyed up to an infantry platoon and destroyed several enemy machine-gun points. The Germans tried to eliminate the breakthrough and hastily abandoned 12 tanks. In the ensuing battle, our tankers knocked out 4 enemy tanks.
Northeast of Tuapse, the numerically superior forces of the Germans attacked the height defended by the N unit. Soviet soldiers with machine-gun fire brought disorder to the enemy's ranks, and then went over to a counterattack. The Nazis retreated, leaving 160 corpses on the battlefield.
On the Kalinin Front, the reconnaissance group of the N unit penetrated into the rear of the enemy and defeated the German garrison in one of the settlements. 90 Germans, 6 machine guns and an automatic cannon were destroyed. The prisoners were taken.
Anti-aircraft artillery fire shot down 2 enemy aircraft.
A detachment of Belarusian partisans derailed two enemy railway echelons. 2 steam locomotives and 26 wagons were destroyed. 110 German soldiers and officers were killed in the crashes. Another detachment of Belarusian partisans made several attacks on small enemy garrisons and exterminated 85 Nazis.
The crew of a German submarine reportedly refused to go to sea. The entire crew of the submarine was arrested and imprisoned in the Esterwegen concentration camp in Emsland, in the Papenburg region. In connection with this, the Gestapo is carrying out a purge among the personnel of the fleet.
During November 17, our troops fought with the enemy in the Stalingrad region, northeast of Tuapse and southeast of Nalchik. On other fronts, nothing has changed.
In the Stalingrad region, our troops repulsed numerous attacks of the Nazis. In the factory part of the city, in one sector, after two days of continuous fighting, the enemy pushed our units back. During the day, according to incomplete data, the Germans lost in killed and wounded up to 1,000 soldiers and officers. Destroyed 60 vehicles, 5 guns, 15 mortars, 28 machine guns and destroyed 10 enemy bunkers. Senior Sergeant Comrade Feobanov shot down a German bomber with an anti-tank rifle fire.
Northwest of Stalingrad, our units defended their positions and fought with the enemy. The soldiers of the unit commanded by Comrade Novikov, 75 Nazis who were building barbed wire fences were exterminated with rifle and machine-gun fire. The artillerymen of the unit, where the commander of Comrade. Stolboshinsky, destroyed 7 enemy bunkers and dugouts with their garrisons, destroyed 2 heavy machine guns, a mortar battery and destroyed two platoons of German infantry.
Southeast of Nalchik, Soviet troops were actively fighting. A unit under the command of Comrade Bely attacked and drove the Germans out of fortified positions in an area of the same height. Tankers under the command of Comrade Filippov knocked out and burned 5 enemy tanks and destroyed up to a company of German infantry.
The captured soldiers of the 93 German motorized regiment and 43 motorcycle battalion of the 13 German tank division reported heavy losses that the division suffered in the last battles. In many companies, 10-15 soldiers remained, and all the rest were killed or wounded.
To the north-east of Tuapse, in the sector of the N-compound, the German infantry, supported by aviation, tried to break through our defense line. In this battle, up to 400 Nazis were destroyed.
On one of the sectors of the Volkhov Front, two regiments of enemy infantry, trying to return a settlement occupied by our troops, attacked our positions. Soviet fighters repulsed six enemy attacks and exterminated up to a regiment of the Nazis. Towards evening, having brought up reinforcements, the Germans, with the support of strong artillery and mortar fire, again went on the offensive. The enemy managed to break into the outskirts of the settlement. Our units are fighting stubborn street battles.
Partisan detachments operating in the Soviet regions occupied by the Germans, from November 9 to 12, derailed 34 enemy railway military echelons. 15 steam locomotives, 440 wagons, platforms and tanks were destroyed. During the same time, partisans exterminated 940 German soldiers and officers and blew up 7 railway and highway bridges.
The soldier of the 396th Infantry Regiment of the 216th German Infantry Division, Joseph F., who voluntarily came over to our side, said: “In the city of Vitebsk, at the railway station, I saw a large train, the cars of which were sealed. Heartbreaking screams came from them. The sentries guarding the train told me that there were Russian women in the carriages who were forcibly sent to Germany. When boarding the car, many of them were beaten, and 6 women were shot. "
The food situation in Romania is continuously deteriorating. The Romanian newspaper Currentul writes: “Corn is the country's staple food. Consequently, for the peace of the vast majority of the population, corn is needed. We repeat, the question of internal order comes down to the supply of corn. However, we had a very bad agricultural year. " Wheat and other crops were harvested almost entirely by the Germans. The Romanians, Hitler left corn, but it is not enough. The corrupt ruling clique of Romania already fears a famine riot. This concern of Hitler's lackeys is reflected in the pages of many Romanian newspapers.
