2 Vistula-Oder operation. The liberation of Poland - the Vistula-Oder offensive operation. Vistula-Oder offensive operation

The myth of the Vistula-Oder operation

One of the main myths of the Vistula-Oder operation is that, at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill, the start time of this operation was postponed from the originally scheduled January 20 to January 12, 1945, in order to help the Anglo-American troops who were in a difficult situation due to the offensive Wehrmacht in the Ardennes.

But, as evidenced by the documents and, in particular, the plan for the concentration of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front approved by Zhukov on December 29, 1944, the offensive was originally scheduled for January 8, 1945, but due to bad weather, which limited aviation operations and adjustment of artillery fire, it had to be rescheduled. In the same way, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to launch an offensive on January 10, but it started on the 13th.

The 1st Ukrainian Front went forward on January 12 instead of the 9th, and the 2nd Belorussian Front on the 14th instead of January 10th. Churchill's message, which reported that "very heavy fighting is going on in the West", and spoke of the "alarming situation when you have to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative", was sent only on January 6. It contained a request for information about Soviet military plans, but nothing more. Stalin, on the other hand, decided to pretend that the Red Army was ready to accelerate its upcoming offensive for the sake of the Allies, and on January 7 answered Churchill: “We are preparing for the offensive, but the weather is now not favorable for our offensive. However, given the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire Central Front no later than the second half of January. In fact, the Soviet command was in a hurry to advance because it was too risky to keep large forces, including tank armies, inactive for several days on the bridgeheads across the Vistula. They were pulled up to the bridgeheads with a focus on the initial timing of the offensive - January 8-10. The enemy could detect the concentration of troops and inflict losses on them with the fire of his artillery, which was shooting through the bridgeheads. Therefore, the attack began when the forecasters gave a favorable weather forecast. Clear weather was promised on January 14, but they were mistaken. The good weather was established only on the 16th and lasted only a few days.

In fact, the plans for a general offensive by the Soviet fronts began to be developed as early as the end of November, and were finally approved by the Headquarters on December 22, that is, even before the messages to Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill. And even then, the offensive in Poland and East Prussia was supposed to begin on January 8-10. Therefore, Stalin, knowing full well that the offensive should begin in the region of January 10-12, but not on the 20th, openly bluffed when he wrote to Churchill. But already on January 5, that is, before Stalin's answer to Churchill, shock groups of fronts, including tank armies, concentrated on the bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. To keep such a grouping for 15 days on relatively small bridgeheads, shot through by enemy artillery, was not only risky, but, most importantly, absolutely pointless.

And the messages of Roosevelt and Churchill, sent to Stalin on December 24, were by no means panicky. The leaders of England and the United States only wanted to know the plans of the Soviet command. Roosevelt said: "The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period when we need to talk about the next phase." Churchill also wrote about the same: "I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are."

The Vistula-Oder operation was carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev. Both fronts numbered 2,203.7 thousand people, 33.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 5 thousand combat aircraft. The German troops of Army Group "A" of General Josef Harpe who opposed them numbered no more than 400 thousand people with 6 thousand guns, 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, and about 600 aircraft. They could not resist the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet troops.

Guderian stated in his memoirs: “We expected that the offensive would begin on January 12, 1945. The superiority of the Russians was expressed by the ratio: in infantry 11:1, in tanks 7:1, in artillery pieces 20:1. If we evaluate the enemy as a whole, then we could talk without any exaggeration about his 15-fold superiority on land and at least 20-fold superiority in the air.

Guderian on December 25, 1944, during a meeting with Hitler, tried to convince him to stop offensive operations on the Western Front in order to transfer divisions from there to the Eastern Front and create reserves to repel the expected Soviet offensive in Poland. However, Hitler not only did not return the divisions from the Western Front at that moment, but even transferred the 4th SS Panzer Corps, located north of Warsaw, to Hungary to try to unblock Budapest, which, of course, weakened the defense on the Vistula. By that time, the Fuhrer had already decided, in the event of the failure of the Ardennes offensive, to try to hold first of all the "Alpine fortress", where the last oil fields and refineries in Hungary and Austria remained. For the entire Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht had only 12.5 divisions in reserve.

During the Vistula-Oder operation, it was planned to deliver two main strikes: from the Magnushevsky bridgehead by troops in the direction of Poznan and from the Sandomierz bridgehead by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front - to Breslau (Wroclaw). In addition, Zhukov's troops from the Pulawy bridgehead delivered an auxiliary strike in the general direction to Radom, Lodz.

In itself, the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes contributed a lot to the success of the Soviet offensive on the Vistula, since the most combat-ready German divisions, including tank divisions, were transferred to participate in the Ardennes offensive, and the Eastern Front was weakened.

Already on the first day of the offensive, the German defenses on the Vistula were broken through. On January 17, Harpe was removed from his post and replaced by General Scherner. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 100 km in four days.

On the 1st Belorussian Front, on January 16, the 69th Army and the 11th Tank Corps captured Radom by storm. Parts of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies and the 1st Army of the Polish Army liberated Warsaw on January 17, the garrison of which preferred to retreat so as not to be surrounded.

On January 19, units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies approached Breslau, and the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Krakow. Under the threat of encirclement by the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the German troops left Silesia, and Breslau was surrounded. In the period from January 23 to early February, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder on a wide front. Having forced the river in the areas of Olau (Olav) and northwest of Oppeln (Opole), they captured and expanded the bridgehead on its western bank in the area of Steinau and Breslau.

On January 19, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front liberated Lodz. On January 22, Zhukov's troops were already near Poznan, and after another 4 days they overcame the Mezeritsky fortified area on the move, which the enemy did not have time to occupy with sufficient forces. By February 3, the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder and captured a bridgehead on its western bank in the Kustrin area, clearing the right bank of the river from the enemy. Occupied by a strong German garrison, the Polish fortress of Poznan held out until February 13, 1945, when it was taken by the forces of the 8th Guards Army.

In the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops, according to official figures, lost 43.5 thousand killed and missing and 150.7 thousand wounded and sick. Data on irretrievable losses, most likely, are underestimated by at least three times. There is no reliable data on the losses of German troops. It is only known that in the period from January 1 to January 20, 1945, the Red Army took 67,776 prisoners, most of whom were on the front of the Vistula-Oder operation, and a smaller part - on East Prussia.

This text is an introductory piece. From the book 1945. Year of Victory author Beshanov Vladimir Vasilievich

VISLA-ODERSK OPERATION In accordance with the general plan of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (47th, 61st, 3rd, 5th shock, 8th and 1st Guards Tank, 16th Air Army, 1st Army of the Polish Army, 11th and 9th Tank, 2nd and 7th Guards

From the book All myths about World War II. "Unknown War" author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The myth of the Vistula-Oder operation One of the main myths of the Vistula-Oder operation is that, at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill, the start time of this operation was postponed from the originally scheduled January 20 to January 12, 1945, in order to help the Anglo-American

From the book Daily Life of the Army of Alexander the Great the author Fort Paul

Operations from 334 to 332 The consequences of such neglect were not long in coming, and quite seriously. During the winter of 334/33, Memnon of Rhodes, appointed by Darius as supreme commander of all Asian forces in the Mediterranean, gathered a large number of mercenaries and

From the book of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies author Pykhalov Igor Vasilievich

The FBI's "Red Horror" operations and the fight against dissentAs you know, after the outbreak of the First World War, the United States formally adhered to neutrality. However, in fact, their sympathies were clearly on the side of the Entente. In turn, the Germans, knowing about this and using the fact that

From the book Slavs. Historical and archaeological research [Illustrated] author Sedov Valentin Vasilievich

Slavs in the Vistula-Oder region The Przeworsk culture, which developed under the conditions of Slavic-Celtic interaction, developed over more than six centuries, undergoing significant transformations. This was due not only to evolutionary development,

From the book Death of the Fronts author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

Germany ahead! Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation January 12 - February 3, 1945 The 1st Belorussian Front The Vistula-Oder operation was one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Great Patriotic and World War II. Started on

author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

The course of the operation at 11 o'clock. 30 minutes. On September 17, 1944, 1,400 aircraft attacked the enemy in the areas of the upcoming airborne assault. From 12 o'clock. 30 minutes. until 14 o'clock. 5 minutes. with 1544 transport aircraft and 491 gliders under the cover of 1500 fighters were dropped and landed

From the book Weapon of Retribution author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

The course of the operation At 5 o'clock. 25 min. On December 16, 1944, powerful artillery preparation began in the breakthrough areas of the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 7th Field Army, which lasted 10 minutes. The 5th Panzer Army carried out a breakthrough without artillery preparation. Aviation training is not

From the book The Work of a Lifetime author Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich

IN THE SPRING OF THE 45TH IN EAST PRUSSIA Development of a plan. - Two stages of operation. - In memory of Ivan Chernyakhovsky. - Extensive preparation. - Before Koenigsberg. - Our decision. - Storm. - Historic ending. - Names of heroes. - A few words about the Berlin operation Eastern

From the book The Nuremberg Trials, a collection of documents (Appendices) author Borisov Alexey

Telegram from SS Hauptsturmführer Wilke to the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Minsk on the results of Operation Fritz to rob the population of the Vileika district of the Molodechno region for the period from September 24 to October 10, 1943 and a report on the meeting following this

From the book "Included in the operation." Mass terror in the Kama region in 1937–1938 author Leibovich Oleg Leonidovich

The course of the operation Table 1. Dates of arrests and sentencing Date Arrest Arrested by whom Sentences by whom

From the book "Flying Tank". 100 sorties on IL-2 author Lazarev Oleg Vasilievich

Vistula-Oder operation This was one of the final operations of the Patriotic War. It was carried out from January 12 to February 3, 1945. Before the start of hostilities, the command of the corps, together with the leading groups, conducted a reconnaissance of the area, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich

From the book Baltic divisions of Stalin author Petrenko Andrey Ivanovich

6. Participation in the Vitebsk-Polotsk operation June 22 - July 1944 as part of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation (June 22 - July 1944) By December 29, 1943, the division was concentrated in the area of the villages of Barsuchina - Dyatly. The division headquarters moved to the village of Orleya.

From the book Komdiv. From the Sinyavino Heights to the Elbe author Vladimirov Boris Alexandrovich

Vistula-Oder operation December 1944 - January 1945 The Great Patriotic War gave many remarkable examples of military operations. Some of them have survived to this day, while others, due to various circumstances, remained unknown. In these pages of my memories

From the book Chronicle of the Environment: Demyansk and Kharkov author Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

The course of the operation The offensive of the troops of the North-Western Front began on January 7, 1942. On this day, the 11th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov, broke through the enemy defenses south of Lake. Ilmen and with a swift maneuver moved forward up to 20 km, bypassing

From the book Marshal Konev author Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Chapter 9. VISLA-ODERSK OPERATION After the Red Army troops reached the Vistula, captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the river and repelled enemy counterattacks, the front line from the Baltic to the Carpathians stabilized for four months. Both sides were preparing for the decisive

Vistula-Oder operation of 1945

The Vistula-Oder operation is an offensive operation of the 1st Belorussian (Marshal G.K. Zhukov) and the 1st Ukrainian fronts (Marshal I.S. Konev) in the area between the Vistula and the Oder on January 12 - February 3, 1945 (World War II war, 1939-1945). The number of advancing troops amounted to 2.2 million people (about 40% of the troops operating on the Soviet-German front). They had 34 thousand guns, 6.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 4.8 thousand aircraft. They were opposed by the German army group "A" under the command of General I. Harpe (400 thousand people), which had 5 thousand guns, 1220 tanks and 630 aircraft. Thus, the superiority of the Soviet troops was overwhelming, which allowed them, after careful preparation, to strike with unprecedented force.

On January 12, 1945, the Red Army went on the offensive, which was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. In the breakthrough areas, fire was fired at 250-300 gun barrels per 1 km. Receiving a sufficient amount of ammunition, the Soviet guns could carry out a hurricane shelling in the form of a fire shaft, which, alternating, was transferred from the front edge of the German defense into its depths.

The effect of the blow exceeded all expectations. This was partly because the Germans had moved their reserves closer to the front line, and they were in the zone of devastating artillery fire. Therefore, already at the first powerful blow of the attackers, not only the divisions of the first echelon, but also quite strong reserves were defeated. This led to the rapid collapse of the entire German defense system. The presence of large mobile reserves provided the Red Army with a rapid advance (25-30 km per day). “The Russian offensive beyond the Vistula developed with unprecedented strength and swiftness,” wrote German General Mellenthin, “it is impossible to describe everything that happened between the Vistula and the Oder in the first months of 1945. Europe has not known anything like it since the fall of the Roman Empire.”

On the fifth day of the offensive, the Red Army captured Warsaw, and in just 23 days of this operation, carried out in difficult winter conditions, the army of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev moved forward 500 km, occupied Krakow, surrounded a large German group in Poznan. By the end of January - beginning of February, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank, finding themselves 60-70 km from Berlin. Here the offensive of the Red Army ended.

Although the prospects were tempting, it turned out to be impossible to create at that moment a powerful grouping to strike at Berlin. The attackers were far away from the supply bases. Due to the destruction of railways, fuel and ammunition had to be transported hundreds of kilometers by road. In front of the troops that had reached the Oder, there was a powerful fortified area, which seemed unrealistic to take on the move. In addition, an open right flank formed at the 1st Belorussian Front, over which the German grouping in Eastern Pomerania hung. In February, the 1st Belorussian Front had to repel counterattacks from there (see the East Pomeranian operation), as well as hold back the onslaught of German troops deployed to the Oder region.

As a result of a three-week rush from the Vistula to the Oder, Soviet troops almost completely cleared Poland of Germans and entered German territory. The Vistula-Oder operation provided assistance to the Anglo-American troops subjected to German onslaught in the Ardennes. During the Vistula-Oder operation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts captured about 150 thousand people, about 14 thousand guns and mortars, over 1300 tanks and assault guns. The losses of the Red Army during the operation amounted to over 193 thousand people, 1267 tanks and self-propelled guns, 374 guns and mortars, 343 aircraft. In honor of the liberation of the Polish capital from German troops, the medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw" was established.

Used materials of the book: Nikolai Shefov. Russian battles. Military History Library. M., 2002.

The Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, an offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on January 12 - February 3 with the assistance of the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian and the right wing of the 4th Ukrainian fronts. Attaching great importance to the completion of the liberation of Poland, Sov. Top. High command for the defeat of fascists. troops operating in Poland, concentrated a powerful group. By the beginning of the operation, only as part of the 1st Belorus (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and the 1st Ukr. (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev) there were 16 combined arms fronts, 4 tanks, and 2 air. army, as well as several departments. tank., mechanized., cav. corps and a large number of parts of the front, subordination, which included 2.2 million people, 33.5 thousand op. and mortars, 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and 5 thousand aircraft. It was the largest strategist, a grouping of owls. troops, ever previously created for a single offensive operation. The fronts operated in a 500 km zone, holding three bridgeheads per lion. bank of the Vistula - in the districts of Magnusheva, Pulawy and Sandomierz. Chapters were defending in front of them. forces German-Fash. Army Group "A" (since January 26 - "Center". Command, Colonel General I. Harpe), which had up to 560 thousand soldiers and officers, approx. 5 thousand or. and mortars, St. 1200 tanks and assault guns and over 600 aircraft. During the battle, to restore the defense, the enemy transferred to Poland approx. 40 divisions from the West, from the depths of Germany and partly from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. Preparing to repel the onset of owls. troops, German-Fash. the command created in advance on the territory. Poland, between the Vistula and the Oder, a developed defense system, which included 7 defenses, lines, an echelon. to a depth of 500 km. To increase its stability, especially in anti-tank terms, pp. Vistula, Warta, Oder (Odra), etc. The system of defenses, lines included cities and fortresses prepared for a long defense [Modlin, Warsaw, Radom, Lodz, Kielce, Krakow, Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), Poznan, Breslau (Wroclaw), Oppeln (Opole), Schneidemuhl (Saw), Kyustrin (Kostshin), Glogau (Glogow), etc.]. The most strongly fortified were the Vistula line, which consisted of 4 lanes with a total depth of 30-70 km, and the line of Kreuz (Kshnzh), Unrustadt (Kargov), which consisted of the Pomeranian (see Pomeranian Wall), Meaeritz and Glogau Breslav fortifications. districts. German-Fash. the command counted on the stubborn defense of the prepared lines to weaken the offensive. the capabilities of the Soviet troops and thereby drag out the war. Political the purpose of V.-O. about. was the completion of the liberation of Poland from Hitler's tyranny. Strategist, the goal was to defeat the troops of the opposing Army Group A, which covered the vital centers of Germany, and reach the river. Oder to create the most favorable conditions for delivering a decisive blow to Berlin. The idea of the operation was to break through the enemy defenses with simultaneous strong cutting blows from the bridgeheads, rapidly develop the offensive at a high pace, capture intermediate defenses, lines before the retreating troops or reserves of the pr-ka were fixed on them. The total depth of the operation was set: 300-350 km for the 1st Belorus Front and 280-300 km for the 1st Ukr. front.

In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the 1st Belorus, the front was supposed to inflict 3 blows: the main one - from the Magnushevsky bridgehead with four combined arms, two tanks, armies and one cavalry. corps (61st, 5th shock, 8th guards, 3rd shock armies, 2nd guards and 1st guards tank armies, 2nd guards cavalry corps) in the direction of Poznan ; the second - from the Pulawy bridgehead with two combined arms armies (69th and 33rd), reinforced by two detachments. tank, hulls (11th and 9th) and one cavalry. corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps), in the direction of Lodz; the third - from the area sowing. Warsaw by the 47th Army. At the request of the Provisional Government of Poland, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, which was part of the 1st Byelorussian Front, took part in the liberation of Warsaw; she had to, using the success of the owls. armies, go on the offensive north and south of Warsaw on the 4th day of the operation. 1st Ukrainian the front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow with the forces of eight combined arms and two tanks, armies, three divisions. tank, corps (6th Army and 3rd Guards Army with 25th Tank Corps, 5th Guards Army with 31st and 4th Guards Tank Corps, 13th, 52nd, 60th, 21st and 59th army, 3rd guards and 4th tank armies) from the Sandomierz bridgehead in the direction of Radomsko and after completing the immediate task (depth 120-150 km) to develop an offensive on Breslau. To create a blow, groupings in the fronts, large-scale regroupings were secretly carried out. 13,792 op. and mortar, 768 tanks and self-propelled guns. At the Saidomir bridgehead in the 1st Ukr. front was concentrated 11 934 op. and mortar, 1434 tanks and self-propelled guns.

It took a lot of effort to complete the tasks successfully. the work of commanders, com-ditch, headquarters, rear bodies. The troops held special training sessions and exercises with the commanders of units and subunits. Of great importance was the purposeful party-political. Job. Military councils of fronts and armies, com-ry and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, taking into account the peculiarities of the actions of troops on the territory. fraternal Poland, brought up soldiers in the spirit of the proletarian. internationalism, explained to them political. meaning will free, the missions of the Sov. Army. Much attention was paid to the creation of a high offensive in the troops. impulse, mastering military equipment, increasing discipline and vigilance. To develop extensive work among the local population to explain the goals of the arrival of the Sov. Army in Poland in some armies created groups of the Society of Sov.-Polish. friendship. During the preparation of the operation, much attention was paid to the issues of logistical support for the troops. In November - December 1944, only on the 1st Belorus, front, intra-front and intra-army transportation amounted to 923.3 thousand tons. 14 refuelings of aviation fuel, 20-30 days of food rations.

The actions of the troops of the fronts in V.-O. about. can be divided into two stages.

At the first stage (January 12-17), Sov. troops broke through the defenses of the pr-ka, defeated the main. forces of the opposing grouping and created the conditions for the development of the offensive in depth.

At the second stage (January 18-February 3), the 1st Belorus, and the 1st Ukr. fronts with the assistance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian, and the 4th Ukr. fronts promptly pursued the pr-ka, defeated his operatives. reserves, seized the Silesian prom. area and captured bridgeheads to the west. bank of the river Oder.

According to the plan of the Headquarters, the transition of the fronts to the offensive was determined for January 20. However, later, given the position of the allies on the Western Front (see Ardenp operation 1944-45), Sov. Top. The High Command, at their request, instructed the front commanders to expedite the preparation of the operation and on January 12-15. go on the offensive. The operation began on 12 Jan. offensive from the Sandomierz bridgehead of the shock group of the 1st Ukr. front (see Saidomirsko-Silesian operation of 1945). and two days later the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front also went on the offensive from the Magnushevsky and Pulawy bridgeheads (see the Warsaw-Poznan operation of 1945). By the end of the 2nd day of the offensive, the shock groups of the fronts advanced 25-40 km and defeated the operat. reserves pr-ka introduced into the battle. From 14-15 Jan. the defeated formations of the 9th, 17th field and 4th tanks, the armies began to withdraw. By the end of 17 Jan. ch. the forces of Army Group A were defeated. The defense of the pr-ka turned out to be broken through on the 500-km front to a depth of 100-150 km. Jan 17 Poland's capital, Warsaw, was liberated. The immediate task set before the fronts by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - to reach the line of Zhykhlin, Lodz, Radomsko, Czestochowa, Mechow (depth 120-180 km) on the 10-12th day of the operation - was completed by the troops in 5-6 days. The decisive role in this was played by the tank, the armies, the tank, and the moss. corps, to-rye advanced at a rate of up to 30-45 km per day, acting in isolation from the combined arms. armies at 45-100 km (1st Belorussian Front) and 30-35 km (1st Ukrainian Front). German-Fash. the command began to hastily transfer from its reserve, from the Zap. front, as well as from other sections of the Soviet-German. front will complement the forces, trying at any cost to stop the offensive of the Sov. Army in the Berlin direction. However, the attempts of the pr-ka to restore the broken front were not successful.

Jan 25 army of the 1st Belorussian, the front crossed the river. Warta, broke through the Poznań defenses, line, surrounded in Poznan 60 thousand. garrison pr-ka and 26 Jan. reached the Kreutz-Unrustadt line. Jan 22-23 troops of the 1st Ukrainian. front, advancing in the Breslav direction, went to the river. The Oder from the city of Köben to the city of Oppeln and in a number of sectors crossed it on the move. Army lion. wing of the front, freeing 19 Jan. Krakow, started fighting for the Silesian prom. area. In order to quickly break the resistance of the pr-ka, owls. the command undertook an enveloping maneuver with the forces of the 3rd Guards. tank, army and 1st Guards. kav. corps. Having created a threat to the environment, owls. troops forced the Nazis to retreat hastily. With the release of the troops of the 1st Belorussian, and the 1st Ukr. fronts to the aforementioned line, the tasks set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had already been completed, but the offensive continued. In the period from 26 Yayav. to 3 Feb. troops of the 1st Belorus, the front broke through the fortifications of the pr-ka, went to the river. Oder and captured bridgeheads on its west. shore in the district of Kustrin. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian. front, having completed by this time the liberation of the Silesian prom. district, fixed bridgeheads, invader. on the app. bank of the river Oder - in the region of the city of Breslau and south of the city of Oppeln. Exit to the river Oder and the capture of bridgeheads on her lion. on the shores of the troops of the 1st Belorussian, and the 1st Ukr. fronts 3 fsvr. completed V.-O. about. In the meantime, the pr-k was fixed at the borders of the river. Oder. At the same time, in Pomerania, they were preparing to launch a counterattack on the troops of the rights, the wing of the 1st Belorus, the front of the German-phage, the Vistula Army Group. In order to frustrate these plans, pr-ka, owls. the command carried out the East Pomeranian operation of 1945.

IN. about. in scope and achieved military-political. results was one of the major strategists, operations of the Great Fatherland, war. Owls. The army defeated the German-fascist. troops in Poland, crossed the river. Oder and captured the bridgeheads on her Zan. shore. Military actions were moved to the center, districts of the phage. Germany, owls. troops reached the line 60 km from its capital - Berlin. During the operation, 25 were defeated and 35 German-Fash were destroyed. divisions. Fulfilling your pnternats. debt, owl. The army liberated a part of Poland, including its capital - Warsaw. Together with the owls troops in the liberation of their homeland participated in the 1st Army of the Polish Army. IN. about. was an important link in solving such a military-political. tasks like rendering military. help Anglo-Amer. allies. IN. about. showed the increased claim of the command and headquarters of the Sov. Armies during the conduct of large offensives. operations. Created by owls. command superiority in forces and means in the directions of Ch. strikes made it possible to inflict simultaneously a series of powerful blows in order to crack the defense of the pr-ka for several. areas, quickly introduce large mobile forces into the breakthrough, continuously pursue the retreating pr-ka, forbid it from creating defenses at intermediate lines, and use their operators in an organized manner. reserves. Starting a breakthrough for several in areas significantly distant from each other, making up a total of 73 km, the troops of the 1st Belorus, and the 1st Ukr. fronts on the 3rd - 4th day of the operation expanded the offensive front to 500 km, and by the end of the operation to 1000 km. The depth of the operation reached 500 km. The average daily rate of advance was 25 km; in the department days the pace reached for the shooters. connections 45 km, and for tank and mechanized 70 km. Such a rate of advance in the Great Fatherland, the war was achieved for the first time. One of the characteristic features of V.-O. o. - a high degree of massing of forces and means in the directions of Ch. front blows. They focused on St. 75% combined arms, up to 90% tank, and mech. associations and formations and from 75% (1st Belorussian Front) to 90% (1st Ukrainian Front) artillery.

The operation showed a high claim for the implementation of maneuver by large associations with the aim of bypassing, enveloping and defeating disparate groupings of the pr-ka. He will teach, an example of such a maneuver was the exit of the 3rd Guards. tank, army in the rear of the Silesian group pr-ka. Maneuvering actions of owls. troops during V.-O. about. allowed to surround large enemy groups in the years. Poznan, Schneidemuhl and others, to defeat the outgoing formations of the pr-ka and its reserves. All this deprived the enemy of the opportunity to restore a continuous front of defense and favored the advancement of the owls. troops. The leading force of the offensive in the fronts after the breakthrough of tact, the defenses of the pr-ka were large formations and operators. armored associations. and fur. troops, numbering St. 4500 tanks and self-propelled guns. The conditions for bringing mobile troops into battle were different. Separate tank corps were introduced on the 1st day of the offensive, participated in the breakthrough of Ch. defense lines, which ensured a high rate of breakthrough tact, defense zones (on the 1st Belorus, front 8-20 km, on the 1st Ukrainian front 10-15 km per day). Tank, army of the 1st Ukrainian. front (3rd Guards and 4th) were introduced into battle on the 1st day of the operation in front of the 3rd position of Ch. defense lines, and the tank, army of the 1st Belorussian, front (1st and 2nd) - on the 2nd-3rd day of the operation, after the beat, the defense zone of the pr-ka was completely broken through. Great help to the advancing land. the troops were provided with the 16th air. army of the 1st Belarusian, front and 2nd air. army of the 1st Ukrainian. front. In difficult weather conditions, they made approx. 54 thousand sorties and conducted 214 air battles, in which more than 200 aircraft were shot down. The 5th and 10th Corps of the Air Defense Forces of the country carried out the tasks of air defense of communications and important objects of the fronts. When breaking through and pursuing the avenue, the controls were echeloned in depth. Continuous party-political. work during the offensive ensured the offensive. impulse, manifestation of creativity and initiative, high moral and combat qualities of owls. warriors. This found expression in the mass heroism of the lich. composition of compounds and parts. For courage and military skill 481 formations and units of the 1st Belorus, and 1st Ukr. fronts were given honorary titles, approx. 1200 formations and units were awarded orders.

H.A. Svetlishin.

Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.

Literature:

History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941 - 1945. T. 5. M., 1963, p. 47 - 91;

Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II. Ed. 2nd. M., 1974;

Konev I.S. Forty-fifth. Ed. 2nd. M., 1970;

Lomov H.A. Vistula-Oder operation. - "New World", 1975, N "a 5;

Seoev V. From the Vistula to the Oder. - “Communist Voorushch. Seal, 1975, No. 2;

Vistula-Oder operation in numbers. - “Military-ist. journal”, 1965, No. 1.

Read further:

World War II 1939-1945.(chronological table).

Our perception of the final stages of the Great Patriotic War as a whole comes down to listing dates and events. On June 22, 1944, Operation Bagration began. In August of the same year, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was successfully completed with access to the Polish border and Silesia. In August-October 1944, the Warsaw Uprising took place. And so on - the names of the fronts, the names of the commanders, the directions of attacks, the number of groups are mentioned.

But it is worth digging a little deeper, and a grandiose picture of literally biblical proportions will open before us. Suffice it to recall that 2.4 million people participated in the Belarusian offensive operation alone on the Soviet side. Each of them had to be fed three times a day. Provide uniforms and equipment. Arm. To ensure the uninterrupted supply of ammunition, fuel for aviation and armored vehicles, and to create well-established evacuation lines to the rear of the wounded and sick. To provide for thousands more of all kinds of trifles, which in the conditions of war are not trifles at all.

This whole armada falls on the German Army Group Center, rips open the defenses and makes a breakthrough to the depth. The result is the actual collapse of the Eastern Front in the central direction, the existence of Army Group North is threatened, Belarus and part of the Baltic states are liberated, the Red Army enters the Curzon line and crosses the pre-war border of Poland, creating bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. Operation Bagration ends with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and is generally recognized as the largest offensive of the Red Army during the Second World War.

However, the political leadership of the Soviet Union immediately faced the so-called "Polish problem" - we all remember that the Second World War, which was originally "German-Polish", broke out precisely because of Poland: fulfilling treaty obligations, Great Britain and France declare war on Germany in September 1939, involving in the conflict not only the inhabitants of the metropolises, but also dominions with colonies in the space from Canada and Algeria to Australia and India ...

Let's remember at what cost the Soviet people got the solution to the "Polish question", the next aggravation of which took place exactly 70 years ago, in the autumn of 1944.

The events that followed the defeat of Poland are well known: on the night of September 17-18, President Ignatius Mostitsky and his government were evacuated to Romania, where they were interned. The presidency was transferred to the former Minister of the Interior Vladislav Rachkevich, who managed to escape to Paris. Rachkevich appointed Armor General Vladislav Sikorsky as prime minister of the government-in-exile. The "Parisian government" of Poland in the summer of 1940 became the "London" one - after the defeat of France, the Poles had to flee once again, now to Great Britain.

The attitude of the Sikorsky government towards the USSR was unequivocal. If Germany was proclaimed "the main enemy of Poland", then the Soviet Union was a "belligerent" with which Poland was at war de facto, although there was no de iure declaration of war on both sides: from the point of view of Moscow, the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus took place when the Polish state was liquidated, and its leadership lost its sovereignty and any influence on the course of events.

Everything changed after June 22, 1941. Great Britain becomes an ally of the USSR in a general war against Germany, and the government in exile is forced to agree to the demands of its patrons. Anthony Eden's words addressed to General Sikorsky are known: "Whether you like it or not, gentlemen, the treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union must be signed." What happened on July 30, 1941 in London, in the presence of Eden and Churchill - the so-called "Sikorsky-Maisky Agreement".

In addition to the points on the restoration of diplomatic relations, mutual actions against Germany and mean mutual curtsy, this agreement provided for the creation of a Polish army on the territory of the USSR, which "will operate operationally under the leadership of the USSR High Command." The Additional Protocol provided for an amnesty for all Polish citizens imprisoned on the territory of the Soviet Union as prisoners of war or on other grounds.

Here are some dry numbers. During the initial stage of the war, the USSR provides for the formation of the Polish army on its territory:

Interest-free loan in the amount of 365 million rubles.

An interest-free loan in the amount of 100 million rubles to help Polish refugees and civilians.

Free assistance to Polish officers in the amount of 15 million rubles.

About six hundred civil infrastructure institutions (schools, hospitals, canteens, cinemas) are being created for the Polish population in the USSR. 20 consulates are opened representing the Sikorsky government. Permission is given to publish the newspaper "Poland" in the national language.

And this is not counting weapons and uniforms worth tens of millions of rubles (in fairness, it should be noted that the uniforms were also supplied by the British and through the organization "Joint" from the USA).

We repeat: we are talking about the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942, when the situation of the Soviet Union was extremely difficult. The Polish units, first formed near Orenburg (then the city of Chkalov) and Saratov, and then in the deep rear (Uzbekistan), were supplied much better than the Soviet rear units.

It should also be mentioned here that the total number of Polish prisoners of war, internees, persons under investigation and convicts, as well as special settlers in August 1941, was about 380 thousand people. Fulfilling the Sikorsky-Maisky agreement, by October 1, the NKVD authorities liberate 50,000 Poles (prisons and camps), 26,000 prisoners of war and 265,000 special settlers. By March 1, 1942, the strength of the “Army of General Anders” in Soviet Central Asia was already 60 thousand bayonets, an increase to 96 thousand was envisaged.

All citizens of the former Poland had to be fed, armed and trained.

Assessing the presence of Anders' army in the USSR from today's standpoint, one can directly say that the Soviet Union, at its own expense, created and armed the "second Czechoslovak corps", known from the events of the Civil War. The mood among the officers was sharply anti-Soviet. The behavior of the Poles in Uzbekistan left much to be desired - drunkenness, lack of discipline were recorded, it even came to duels with a fatal outcome. The command, headed by General Vladislav Anders, was mired in intrigues and mutual intrigues.

The question of sending already trained and equipped formations to the front (in fulfillment of the London agreements) was quickly removed. In February and March 1942, the Soviet government turned to Anders and Sikorsky with a request to send one of the divisions to the front, but received a categorical refusal. At first, this was justified by the impossibility of sending a single division into battle (and even under Soviet, not Polish command!), Then Anders bluntly stated: until the entire army is formed, there can be no question of any participation in hostilities. This position was supported by the exile government.

Stalin took the demonstrative unwillingness to fight “together with the Bolsheviks” very harshly. A common legend says that during a meeting in Moscow with Sikorsky in December 1941, in response to a proposal to withdraw Polish units to Iran, Stalin said: “We can do without you. We can give all. We'll handle it ourselves. We will recapture Poland and then we will give it back to you. But what will people say to that? Moreover, the Poles made it clear that they agreed to fight exclusively on the territory of the Commonwealth itself - when the war approaches its borders, they will begin to liberate their land.

Stalin, probably not without relief, allowed the withdrawal of Anders' army to Iran - to endure the gentry freemen in the USSR and then there was no possibility for many reasons, from the sharply anti-Bolshevik attitude of the officer corps to the high cost of maintaining this, in essence, completely useless, connection. In the summer of 1942, at the height of the Battle of Stalingrad, the "allies" went to a quiet and prosperous Persia, under British responsibility. The “Second Czechoslovak Corps” did not take place, although the NKVD agents reported that if “Stalin did not let them go”, the Poles were going to fight their way into Iran from Central Asia - a very indicative allied relationship ...

Nevertheless, enough Polish patriots remained in the USSR, of which the 1st Warsaw Polish Infantry Division named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko was formed under the command of Colonel Zygmund Berling, which later became the basis for the creation of the Polish Army, which fought as part of the 1st Belorussian Front. In passing, we note that the Polish "Field Court" in London in 1943 tried Colonel Berling in absentia for "desertion" and sentenced him to death.

One can only guess what kind of residue General Anders' brave zholnezhki left in the Soviet leadership and how their actions (or rather, complete and demonstrative inaction) influenced the further solution of the "Polish problem" already in 1944-1945.

Between the summer of 1942 and the summer of 1944, relations between the Polish government in exile and the USSR degraded from extreme coldness and “worse than nowhere” to a complete break, which happened after a large-scale propaganda campaign by the Germans associated with the Katyn burial. General Sikorsky demanded an investigation (however, it was completely unclear how to conduct it on the territory occupied by Germany and under German control), made sharp accusations against Moscow and began to persuade Winston Churchill to break off relations with the Soviet Union. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov replied with a note dated April 23, 1943:

“... The Soviet Government is aware that this hostile campaign against the Soviet Union was undertaken by the Polish Government in order to use the Hitlerite slanderous fake to put pressure on the Soviet Government in order to wrest territorial concessions from it at the expense of the interests of Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belarus and Soviet Lithuania.<…>Based on all this, the Soviet Government decided to break off relations with the Polish Government.

Prime Minister Churchill was a pronounced pragmatist and realist, and therefore the plane of General Sikorsky, who did not want to make any concessions, crashed near Gibraltar in July 1943. However, this (certainly completely unexpected and accidental, according to the English version) plane crash on the position of the government in exile didn't affect.

The "Katyn case" and the facts listed in the note served only as a formal reason for the break. The refusal of the “Anders army” to fight on the Soviet-German front, contrary to all previous agreements and the enormous costs of its creation and formation, also played a significant role. Stalin, finally convinced of the disloyalty of the London emigrants, accepts his plan for resolving the "Polish question" - the creation after the war of a government of Poland that would be friendly to the Soviet Union.

In April 1943, the "Union of Polish Patriots" was formed, on whose initiative a new Polish army was formed in the USSR. Then, in July 1944, under the auspices of the Polish communists, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKNO) was formed as a temporary executive body, which included the Union of Polish Patriots. Subsequently, the PKNO is transformed into the provisional government of Poland.

Opposition from the government in exile was not long in coming. The entry of the Red Army into the territory of pre-war Poland was assessed as an “unauthorized violation of sovereignty”, a categorical disagreement was declared to establish a post-war border along the Curzon line, and the Home Army operating on Polish territory subordinate to London was ordered to “go over to self-defense”. Finally, in a note dated July 24, 1944, sent by the Poles to Churchill, the key words sounded - "Soviet occupation". However, the British Prime Minister ignored the note.

The government in exile and General Bur-Komarovsky decide on an adventure known as the Warsaw Uprising. It was assumed that the struggle against the exhausted and retreating German troops would be short-lived and, in case of victory, the triumphant return of the London exiles to the liberated Warsaw would follow, which would legitimize the government of Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and automatically place him among the winners who would lay the post-war borders. Of course, this should happen before the approach of the Red Army units "solely for the purpose of showing the whole world the unwillingness of the population to accept the Soviet regime."

The defeat of the Warsaw Uprising and the capitulation of General Bur-Komarovsky on October 2, 1944 was the final political suicide for the government-in-exile. And here, too, petty meanness was not avoided: the signed act of surrender provided for the status of prisoners of war only for representatives of the Home Army who surrendered to the Germans. Participants in the uprising from the pro-Soviet Ludova Army were not considered combatants, which automatically meant their destruction by the Nazis.

The Soviet military authorities in the autumn-winter of 1944 on the territory of Poland inherited a difficult legacy - primarily in relation to a lot of extreme right-wing nationalist armed groups, collectively known as the NSZ, "National Armed Forces". The NSZ recognized the jurisdiction of the London government, as did the Home Army, and in the summer of 1944, the NSZ and the AK actually united to oppose the "Soviet occupiers" and the left-wing Poles supporting the USSR.

Separately, we note that the civil confrontation in Poland began long before the arrival of the Red Army - back in 1943, the Craiova Army received an order "On ensuring tranquility on the ground", which contained a clause "On the fight against banditry", in accordance with which it was ordered to destroy the territory of Poland "armed gangs", "eliminate leaders and agitators". What became the basis for the actions of the AK against the detachments of the People's Army and Soviet partisans in the territory of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. It was only by the beginning of the 1950s that the underground nationalist groups were finally liquidated.

The émigré government, after failing to comply with military-political treaties and as a result of a deliberately hostile attitude towards the USSR, was completely discredited in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. The obsessive desire of Sikorsky-Mikolajczyk and others like him to enter the chosen circle of winners and at the same time a phenomenal lack of flexibility, political instinct and a penchant for insane adventures convinced even their most loyal allies of the incapacity of the London inmates - after the failure of the Warsaw Uprising, Churchill finally "wrote off" the Poles, and the future fate of Poland was determined by the leaders of the Big Three without much regard for the opinion of the government in exile.

You can dream up, imagining the post-war structure of Europe, find yourself in 1945 at the head of Poland, the former leaders of the "sanation" regime, for whom any concessions and agreements with the "Bolsheviks" were fundamentally impossible. No Soviet troops on Polish territory (American or British, on the contrary, were welcome). Incessant territorial disputes - return Vilna and the "Eastern kresy"! There would be no talk of any peaceful coexistence, and after the formation of NATO, the enemy forces would again stand at a distance of two or three days' march to Minsk. A repeat of June 1941 would be a very feasible reality.

The Stalinist solution of the "Polish question", that is, the "Sovietization" of Poland after 1943, became not only inevitable, but the only possible one. Moreover, the aforementioned question cost too much to the whole world.

70 years ago, on January 12, 1945, the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation began. During this operation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev broke through the enemy defenses, liberated the territory of Poland west of the Vistula and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the Oder, creating the preconditions for carrying out the Berlin operation.

The German troops suffered a crushing defeat: 35 divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from half to two-thirds of their manpower and equipment, having lost their combat effectiveness. Significant German forces were surrounded in Posen and Breslau. It became obvious that the collapse of the German war machine was near.

Residents of the Polish city of Lodz greet the Soviet soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Army

The day before the attack. Position of Germany

By the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945. the military-political situation in the world finally developed in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The grandiose victories of the USSR in 1944 finally undermined the power of Nazi Germany and its allies. The former allies of the German Empire - Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Finland, not only left the Nazi bloc, but entered the war against the Third Reich. On the side of the Germans, only the Hungarians actively continued to fight.

The strategic initiative was firmly in the hands of the Allies. In the summer of 1944 a second front was opened. The troops of the USA, England, France and their allies began to advance from the west. By the end of 1944, in the West, the Allied forces cleared the territory of France, Luxembourg, Belgium and part of Holland from the Nazis. The line of the Western Front ran from the mouth of the Meuse River in Holland and further along the French border to Switzerland. The allied armies had here 87 full divisions, 6.5 thousand and more than 10 thousand aircraft. Allied raids wiped entire German cities off the face of the earth. Germany had to conduct active hostilities on two fronts. In addition, the Allies were advancing on the Apennine Peninsula - 21 divisions and 9 brigades.

After the forced halt of the offensive, the Anglo-American command planned to resume it from the line of the western border of Germany and end the war with a quick strike deep into Germany. The United States and Britain hoped to preempt Soviet troops in advancing into a number of regions of Central Europe. This was facilitated by the fact that only a third of the Wehrmacht opposed the Allied forces in the West: 74 understaffed divisions and 3 brigades, about 1,600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,750 aircraft on the Western Front, and 31 divisions and 1 brigade in Northern Italy. The German military-political leadership kept the main and most combat-ready forces on the Eastern Front, which was still the decisive front of the Second World War. In addition, there was the possibility of an apex coup in Germany, when part of the German leadership was interested in a separate peace with England and the USA. Part of the Anglo-Saxon leadership, especially the British, also planned to conclude a separate peace with Berlin and start the Third World War - against the Soviet Union. True, the most sane people, like American President Franklin Roosevelt, were more constructive.

For the Third Reich, both the strategic, foreign policy and internal situation deteriorated catastrophically. In the titanic battles near Leningrad, Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge, on the Dnieper, in the Crimea, in Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine, as well as in the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary and Romania, Germany suffered defeats from which it could no longer recover. In the summer and autumn of 1944, the Wehrmacht lost 1.6 million men, 6,700 tanks and more than 12,000 aircraft. The main strategic groupings of the German armed forces on the Eastern Front were defeated, the reserves were depleted. Germany's resources were no longer able to regularly and in the required quantities to replenish the divisions with manpower and equipment.

The military and economic potential of the Third Reich was seriously reduced. The territory was lost, and the resources of most of the satellites. Germany itself was exhausted. And although the German industry in 1944 showed a good result, releasing 17.3 thousand heavy and medium tanks, 41 thousand guns of 75 mm caliber and above, 27.6 thousand aircraft, but by the end of the year there was a drop in production, and in the first In the quarter of 1945, the fall in military production intensified even more.

The internal political situation also worsened. Although after an unsuccessful assassination attempt and a rebellion on July 20, 1944, Hitler managed to maintain power. Any resistance in the military environment was suppressed by severe terror and mass repressions. Intensified propaganda made it possible to maintain the obedience of the people, who maintained the illusion of the possibility of an "honorable peace" with the Western powers, for which it was necessary to keep the Eastern Front. Part of the military-political elite of the Reich was looking for an opportunity to conclude a separate peace with the United States and England.

However, despite all the problems and the decline in the overall military, economic and moral power of Germany, she was still a dangerous adversary. By the beginning of 1945, there were 7.5 million people in the German armed forces. The Wehrmacht consisted of 299 divisions, including 33 tank and 16 motorized divisions, and 31 brigades. The most combat-ready German formations were located on the Eastern Front: 10 field and 4 tank armies (169 divisions, including 22 tank and 9 motorized, and 20 brigades), 3 air armies. Also, the 1st and 3rd Hungarian armies fought against the Soviet troops - 16 divisions and other units. These troops numbered 3.1 million soldiers and officers, and were armed with 28.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 2 thousand combat aircraft. In the rear there were various reserve formations, numbering approximately 2 million people. They were armed with 2,700 guns, over 1,000 tanks and 930 aircraft. In addition, during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the length of the Eastern Front was seriously reduced (from 4450 to 2250 km). This allowed the German high command to condense the defensive orders along the front and in depth.

It is also worth noting that the technical equipment of the Reich was still high. German industry, despite all the problems, until the very last moment produced modernized aircraft, the latest tanks, guns and submarines. The all-out bombing of German cities by the Allied aviation claimed the lives of many thousands of civilians, but could not undermine the power of German industry. The most important defense enterprises went underground and into the mountains. The German gloomy genius continued to develop advanced types of jets and ballistic missiles at a rapid pace. The German infantry began to receive faustpatrons - the first single-shot anti-tank grenade launchers. If the war dragged on for a few more years, Germany could get nuclear weapons.

The German leadership was not going to give up. The Fuhrer and his entourage kept faith in the "miracle weapon", and in the "surprise factor", in the split of the anti-Hitler coalition. To do this, it was necessary to drag out the war, to turn Germany into a "besieged fortress". In order to maintain the morale of the Wehrmacht and the population, rumors spread about the development of an extraordinary "wonder weapon" that would save the country and destroy enemies. At the same time, total mobilization continued, and battalions of the Volkssturm (people's militia) were formed.

Members of the Volkssturm in November 1944

Volkssturm in the defense of the Oder

The plans of the German command

The German leadership understood that in terms of grand strategy, the war was lost. Plans to create a world German empire collapsed. Now the main plan was the task of preserving the Nazi regime in Germany itself, to save their own skins. The main task was to hold the Eastern Front. Here the front line in East Prussia was already passing through German soil. In the Baltics (in Courland) there were still divisions of the Army Group "North", blocked by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts. The defensive lines in Poland, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia were a huge strategic base for the "German fortress". It was supposed to keep the Soviet troops away from the vital centers of the Third Reich. In addition, the countries occupied by the Germans still had extensive strategic resources needed by the Reich to continue the war.

Given all this, the German command decided to keep the Eastern Front, not reducing its length by withdrawing troops from the occupied territories. In addition, an offensive operation was planned in Hungary. In order to create a solid defense, reinforced construction of defensive structures was carried out. Particular attention was paid to the Berlin direction, seven defensive lines up to 50 km deep were built on it (between the Vistula and the Oder). At the same time, a powerful defense was created in East Prussia, as well as on the former German-Polish and southern borders of Germany.

The German command decided to use the temporary pause in hostilities to strike in the West, in the Ardennes. The Germans hoped to quickly break through the enemy defenses, cross the Meuse, bypass Brussels and reach Antwerp. Success in the operation made it possible to destroy 25-30 Anglo-American divisions and force the allies to abandon active offensive operations for 2-3 months. Adolf Hitler even hoped to start separate negotiations with the Anglo-Saxons.

On December 16, 1944, the Ardennes operation began. For the allied command, the German offensive came as a complete surprise. The defense of the allies was broken through, the situation was dangerous. However, the lack of sufficient reserves did not allow the German troops to develop success. The allies pulled up reserves, organized a counterattack and somewhat stabilized the situation. In addition, the situation on the Eastern Front did not allow the Germans to concentrate all their efforts to fight the Anglo-American troops. In December 1944, 180,000 troops were surrounded in Hungary in the Budapest region. German-Hungarian group. This forced the German command to immediately transfer part of the forces from the Western Front to the Eastern. At the same time, Hitler's headquarters learned that in the near future the Red Army would launch an offensive in East Prussia and on the Vistula. The German High Command began to hastily prepare the 6th SS Panzer Army and other large formations for the transfer to the Eastern Front.

I must say that the German command, as before, underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces. Hitler's headquarters expected that in the winter of 1945 the Soviet troops would resume their offensive. But they did not think that the Soviet troops would advance along the entire length of the front. The Germans believed that after the grandiose battles of 1944, which led to heavy losses on both sides and stretched the communications of the Red Army, the Soviet troops would not be able to resume the offensive in all strategic directions. In addition, the German high command made a mistake with the direction of the main attack in the winter campaign of 1945. The Germans believed that the main attack would be delivered in the southern strategic direction, so they kept almost half of the armored forces there. In Hungary, there were stubborn and bloody battles, the Germans tried to go on the counteroffensive, threw large masses of armored vehicles into battle ().

The position of the USSR

On the Soviet-German front, the Soviet army at the end of 1944 was preparing to deliver the last powerful blows to the Third Reich. The Red Army was tasked with the final defeat of the German armed forces and the completion of the liberation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe occupied by the Germans. As a result, Germany had to sign an unconditional surrender.

Contrary to the assumptions of the German command, the Soviet Union was not exhausted by the operations of 1944 and had everything necessary for the victorious end of the war. The morale of the army and the population was extremely high, the soldiers and commanders sought to finish off the fascist beast and take Berlin. The Soviet economy provided the armed forces with everything they needed. The most difficult times were in the past and the war economy showed rapid growth. In all basic indicators, the USSR showed growth: in metal smelting, coal mining, and electricity generation. Military production and military thought developed rapidly. War-torn areas were being rebuilt at an amazing pace.

The growth in the production of weapons and equipment continued. So, if in 1943 the industry produced 24 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, then in 1944 - 29 thousand, in 1943 34900 aircraft were produced, in 1944 - 40300. The Soviet military-industrial complex increased the production of weapons with high combat qualities , military equipment was actively improved. The T-34 tanks were re-equipped with 85 mm cannons, which pierced the armor of heavy German tanks at long distances. Heavy tanks IS-2, self-propelled guns ISU-122, ISU-152, Yak-3, Yak-9, La-7, Tu-2, Il-10, etc. were produced. The growth of the combat power of the Red Army was accompanied by a sharp increase in its motorization, equipping with engineering facilities and improving radio communications. The saturation of military equipment has increased. In comparison with 1944, the saturation of weapons has increased: for tanks - more than 2 times, for aircraft - 1.7 times. In this way, the Soviet socialist system showed complete superiority over the German system.

Many former allies of Germany went over to the side of the Soviet Union. Together with the Soviet troops, Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops fought against the Germans. They consisted of 29 divisions and 5 brigades.

In 1944-1945, the Soviet military art - strategy, operational art and tactics - reached its peak. The strategy was distinguished by activity and decisiveness, operational art showed classic examples of the destruction of an enemy defense well prepared in engineering terms and protected by first-class troops, rapid encirclement and destruction of powerful strategic groupings. The troops showed mature tactical skill and the former mass heroism of the troops. The Headquarters and the General Staff achieved a high degree of perfection in the planning and organization of military operations.

Thus, Soviet military prowess in this period finally surpassed the German one. Now the Soviet fronts and armies smashed the enemy, broke his defense lines, occupied one region after another and rushed to the enemy's capital.

Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 on the streets of liberated Poznan

The plans of the Soviet command

In the autumn of 1944, the Soviet command began planning an operation to finally defeat Germany. At the beginning of November 1944, the Headquarters decided on a temporary transition to the defense of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. These fronts operated in decisive directions - in Warsaw-Berlin and Silesia. Careful preparation was required for a decisive offensive. At the same time, active hostilities continued on the southern strategic flank, in the zone of the 3rd, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts. This forced the German command to transfer additional forces and reserves to the south from the Berlin direction.

The strategic plan of the Soviet command was to crush Germany during one winter-spring campaign, with the support of the Western allies. The campaign was to take place in two stages. At the first stage, it was decided to maximally intensify operations not only in the southern direction, in Hungary, and then in Austria, but also in the northwestern direction, in East Prussia. This was supposed to divert German forces from the central direction, to weaken the forces of the Warsaw-Berlin grouping. This calculation is fully justified. The offensive of the Soviet troops in November - December 1944 on the flanks of the front forced the German command to throw reserves into the threatened areas, which weakened the defense in the Warsaw-Poznan direction.

At the second stage, the Soviet troops were to go on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front and defeat the enemy groupings in East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops were supposed to take Berlin and force the German leadership to surrender.

In the first half of November 1944, a detailed discussion of the concept of the operation took place at Headquarters. Seven fronts were to take part in the final campaign. On the southern flank, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front were to carry out the West Carpathian operation. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were to complete the Budapest operation. The forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were preparing for the Vistula-Oder operation. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussians (with the participation of units of the 1st Baltic Front and the Baltic Fleet) were to occupy East Prussia and liberate the northern part of Poland.

The start of the operation was scheduled for January 20, 1945, but was postponed to an earlier date - to January 12, due to the difficult situation of the allied forces on the Western Front, and the readiness of the Soviet army formations to attack. As a result, the Soviet Headquarters decided to launch the offensive ahead of schedule.

The 1st Belorussian Front received the task of delivering the main blow in the general direction of Poznan. The 1st Ukrainian Front was to reach the Oder in a sector northwest of Glogau, Breslau and Ratibor. At the first stage of the offensive, Zhukov's troops were to break through the enemy's defenses in two directions and, having defeated the Warsaw-Radom group, reach the Lodz line. At the second stage, the troops were to advance in the general direction to Poznan, to the Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) - Poznan line and to the south, in order to get in touch with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to be ready to turn part of its formations to the north in order to support the 2nd Belorussian Front. On the 10-11th day of the operation, Konev's troops were to reach the line of Czestochowa and further develop the offensive on Breslavl.

The main blow in the Magnushevsky direction (there was a bridgehead here) was delivered by the 5th shock, 61st and 8th guards armies, 1st and 2nd guards tank armies. In addition, on the right flank of the 61st Army of Belov, they planned to bring into battle the main forces of the 1st Army of the Polish Army under the command of General Poplavsky. The Poles have earned the honor of liberating their capital Warsaw. The 61st Army was to advance around Warsaw to Sokhachev. The 5th shock army of General Berzarin, after breaking through the enemy defenses, advanced in the general direction to Ozorkow and further to Gniezno. Chuikov's 8th Guards Army advanced on the Lodz direction and further on to Poznan.

The tank armies were in the second echelon, they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the enemy defenses to develop the offensive. The 2nd Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov was introduced into the gap in the sector of the 5th Shock Army and was given the task of advancing into the Sokhachev area, cutting off the escape routes of the enemy's Warsaw grouping and further advancing on Kutno and Gniezno. In addition, Kryukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps advanced behind Bogdanov's army; he received the task of advancing along the Vistula in the general direction of Bydgoszcz. The 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov was introduced into the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army and was supposed to develop a breakthrough to Lodz and further to Poznan. The actions of the ground troops were supported by the forces of Rudenko's 16th Air Army. The 3rd shock army of General Kuznetsov was located in the second echelon of the 1st Belorussian Front.

In the Pulawy direction, the forces of the 69th and 33rd armies delivered an auxiliary blow. The offensive of these armies was strengthened by the 11th and 9th tank corps. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev advanced in the general direction towards Radom and further to Lodz. After breaking through the enemy's defenses, the left flank of Tsvetaev's 33rd army with tank units was to advance on Skarzysko-Kamenna in order to encircle and destroy the enemy's Kielce-Radom grouping. Lelyushenko's 4th Panzer Army (1st Ukrainian Front) was to interact with units of the 33rd Army. In the second echelon there was a reserve of the front - the 7th cavalry corps of General Konstantinov.

The 47th army of General Perkhorovich launched an offensive a day later than the main forces of the front and struck northwest of Warsaw. The 2nd division of the Polish army operated in its own offensive zone. To misinform the enemy, the Soviet command tried to create the impression that the main blow of the front forces would be directed at Warsaw.

A feature of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian fronts Ivan Konev was the need for the maximum possible preservation of the powerful industrial potential of the Dombrowo-Silesian industrial region. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, when discussing the plan of operation, designated this area very briefly and succinctly - “Gold!”. On the other hand, the Silesian industrial region, with its huge concentration of enterprises, mines, industrial infrastructure, presented a serious obstacle to a maneuverable and fast offensive. As Konev recalled, this left a certain imprint on the actions of the Soviet troops. It was necessary to preserve the industrial area, as it was to become part of the new Polish state. Therefore, according to the plan of the front command, the troops went around the area, north and south of it.

The main blow was delivered by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Sandomierz bridgehead. It was the most powerful bridgehead of the Soviet troops on the Vistula, it reached about 75-80 km along the front and up to 50-60 km in depth. This made it possible to place large forces on the Sandomierz bridgehead. It is clear that the Germans also understood the importance of the bridgehead and constantly tried to push the Soviet troops off it, and also created a serious defense here and pulled up reserves. So, on the eve of the operation, the German command pulled up large reserves to the bridgehead. Moreover, some of them - the 16th and 17th tank, 10th and 20th motorized divisions, were in close proximity to the Sandomierz bridgehead.

The front command planned to create a gap up to 40 km wide and advance in the direction of Radomsko, Czestochowa and further to Breslau. Part of the forces of the front was to advance on the left flank in the Krakow direction. On the right flank, Konev's troops, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, were to defeat the Kielce-Radom group of the Wehrmacht. At the second stage of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front must cross the former German-Polish border, cross the Oder River with the main forces, and take control of the Silesian industrial region with the left wing.

To solve the assigned tasks, it was decided to break through the enemy defenses with one powerful blow. The bridgehead was, according to Konev, literally "packed with troops." The 5th Guards Zhadov, the 52nd Army of Koroteev, the 13th Army of Pukhov, the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov, the 6th Army of Gluzdovsky and two tank armies - the 3rd Guards Rybalko and the 4th Lelyushenko were located here. Kurochkin's 60th Army was advancing on the left flank of the front. Korovnikov's 59th Army and Gusev's 21st Army were in front reserve.
From the air, the ground forces were supported by the 2nd Air Army of Colonel General S. A. Krasovsky. In addition, the front included several separate tank corps, a cavalry corps, breakthrough artillery corps, and other formations.

To misinform the enemy, the front command conducted a demonstrative concentration of large mechanized forces on the left flank, in the offensive zone of the 60th Army. In the Krakow direction, work was carried out to concentrate models of tanks, self-propelled guns and guns. This imitation of the direction of the main attack played a certain role in disorienting the enemy. So, the Germans stepped up aerial reconnaissance in this direction, and on the last day before the offensive, more than 200 artillery raids were carried out at the locations of the mock-ups. The German command also regrouped the forces of the 17th Army and moved part of the forces to the southern, Krakow direction. Already during the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Germans did not dare to transfer part of the forces of the 17th Army from south to north, still waiting for a second strike from the positions of the 60th Army.

Side forces

By January 1945, 3 German armies held the defense in front of the two Soviet fronts: the 9th and 17th field, 4th tank armies, (30 divisions and 2 brigades, as well as dozens of separate battalions that made up the garrisons of cities and towns) groups armies "A" (since January 26, army group "Center"). In total, about 400 thousand soldiers and officers, 4.1 thousand guns and mortars, 1136 tanks and assault guns, 270 aircraft (part of the forces of the 6th Air Fleet). The German defense between the Vistula and the Oder was based on seven defensive lines. The most powerful defensive line was the Vistula.

In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank armies (1st, 2nd and 3rd guards tank and 4th tank armies), and 2 air armies. In total, about 2.2 million people, over 37 thousand guns and mortars, more than 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 5 thousand aircraft.

The commander of the 384th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Malyutin (with a map) sets the task for subordinate officers - battery commanders. 1st Ukrainian Front. Photo source: http://waralbum.ru/

To be continued…

ctrl Enter

Noticed osh s bku Highlight text and click Ctrl+Enter

By the beginning of 1945, the Soviet Armed Forces in the east and the allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition in the west came close to Germany and took up an advantageous position for delivering final blows to the enemy. As before, it was the Red Army that was opposed by the main forces of the Wehrmacht - 185 divisions, including 33 tank and motorized and 21 brigades. At the same time, the German command did not allow the possibility of a simultaneous transition of Soviet troops to the offensive in the entire strip from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians and proceeded from the assumption that it would first be deployed in Courland and East Prussia, as well as on the southern wing of the Eastern Front.

On the other hand, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to begin active operations in all directions with the subsequent development of the offensive in depth and the capture of Berlin. It was this that predetermined the choice of the direction of the main attack in the campaign on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, in the zones of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. These formations, having reached the Vistula during the previous hostilities, held three operational bridgeheads on its western bank - Magnushevsky, Pulawy and Sandomierz - and, if successful, could break through the shortest distance to the capital of Germany. In total, the two fronts included 16 armies (134 divisions), four tank and two air armies, five separate tank and one mechanized corps, three cavalry corps, four breakthrough artillery corps, other formations and units of various types of troops. They numbered more than 2.2 million people, 36,436 guns and mortars, 7,049 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 4,772 aircraft.

The Soviet troops in Poland were opposed by the German Army Group A (from January 26 - Center), which united the 9th and 4th tank armies, as well as the main forces of the 17th army. They had 30 divisions, 2 brigades and 50 separate battalions - in total up to 560 thousand soldiers and officers, about 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1220 tanks and assault guns. Their actions were supported by 630 combat aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.

The enemy prepared seven defensive lines between the Vistula and the Oder, echeloned for 300-500 km. The first - the Vistula defensive line consisted of four lanes with a total depth of 30 to 70 km. The first (main) strip was most heavily fortified, especially its sections located on the line of contact between the parties in the areas of the Magnushevsky, Pulawy and Sandomierz bridgeheads. The main strip included three to four positions, each of which was equipped with one to three lines of full-profile continuous trenches. The approaches to them were covered with barbed wire in several rows and continuous minefields 50-100 m deep. In the tank-prone areas between the first and second positions, there were anti-tank ditches 5-8 m wide and 2-3 m deep. Subsequent defensive lines consisted of one or two trench lines and individual strongholds. A serious obstacle for the attackers was the sixth defensive line, which ran along the German-Polish border in 1939 and included the Pomeranian, Mezeritz and Glogau-Breslav fortified areas.

The idea of the Vistula-Oder operation was to strike from the bridgeheads on the Vistula by the 1st Belorussian Front on Poznan and the 1st Ukrainian Front on Breslau to cut and destroy in parts the main forces of Army Group A, complete the liberation of Poland and create the most favorable conditions for the subsequent offensive in the Berlin direction. The planned advance depth was 300-350 km for the 1st Belorussian Front, and 280-300 km for the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union, decided to deliver the main blow from the Magnushevsky bridgehead with the forces of eight armies, two tank armies and two cavalry corps. Other strikes were planned from the Pulawy bridgehead (two armies and two tank corps) and from the area north of Warsaw (two armies).

In accordance with the decision of Marshal of the Soviet Union, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the strike force, which went on the offensive in the center of the Sandomierz bridgehead, included five armies, two tank armies, four tank and mechanized corps. The groupings deployed on the right and left wings of the front were to remain in the occupied defense zones and subsequently be used, depending on the prevailing situation, to expand the breakthrough.

On January 12, the 1st Ukrainian Front was the first to go on the offensive. At 5 o'clock in the morning, after a 15-minute fire raid, the forward battalions of his rifle divisions suddenly attacked the enemy. As a result of a five-hour battle, they destroyed the outposts, which were located in the first trench, approached the second, and in some areas broke into the third trench, where they were stopped by strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire.

At 10 o'clock artillery preparation began. 30 minutes before its end, a false attack was carried out on the entire breakthrough sector by platoons specially allocated for this. To repel it, the German units left shelters and took up positions. At this time, a powerful fire raid was carried out against them, completed by a volley of rocket artillery. As a result, despite the fact that bad weather did not allow for air training, the enemy's firepower was reliably suppressed, control of his units and communications were disrupted. This contributed to the success of the formations of the 13th, 52nd, 5th Guards, 3rd Guards and 60th Armies (Colonel-General, P.N. Kurochkin), which by noon captured two positions of the main line of defense.

To complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, defeat the enemy’s operational reserves and disrupt his attempts to gain a foothold on intermediate lines, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev brought into battle the 4th and 3rd Guards Tank Armies of Colonel Generals and, as well as the 4th Guards, 31st and 25th Tank Corps. By the end of the day, the formations of the shock group of the front advanced up to 15-20 km. Continuing the offensive at night, the advance detachments of the tank armies and the main forces of the 4th Guards (Lieutenant General P.P. Poluboyarov) and the 31st (Major General G.G. Kuznetsov) tank corps wedged into the depth of the enemy’s defense for 35 km, by the morning of January 13, they reached the river. Nida, crossed it on the move and seized a bridgehead.

In order to delay the further advance of the Soviet troops, the German command launched a counterattack, using the 24th Panzer Corps for this, consisting of two tank and one motorized divisions. With blows from the Kielce and Khmilnik regions, it tried to cut off the 4th Panzer Army from the main forces of the front. However, the enemy's 17th Panzer and 20th Motorized Divisions, which were advancing from the Kielce area, were themselves under the influence of the 4th Panzer Army. In a fierce oncoming battle, they were defeated. The same fate befell the 16th Panzer Division. During January 14, she was surrounded and then destroyed by formations of the 3rd Guards Tank and 52nd armies in the forests west of Khmilnik. The next day, the 3rd Guards Army with the 25th Tank Corps (Major General E.I. Fominykh), the 13th Army and part of the forces of the 4th Tank Army, striking in converging directions, liquidated the Kielce-Radom enemy grouping and captured the city of Kielce. Developing the offensive, the troops of the shock group on January 17 crossed the river on the move. Wart and liberated the city of Czestochowa.

The 3rd Guards and 6th (Lieutenant General V.A. Gluzdovsky) armies operating on the right wing of the front, moving north, on January 18 joined in the Shidlovets area with the 33rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and, together with it, defeated up to ten German divisions. The remnants of this grouping, who managed to get out of the attack, were surrounded on January 20 by the forces of the 3rd Guards Army in the Konsk area and destroyed. Here the enemy lost up to 18 thousand people killed and 3,500 soldiers and officers captured.

Successful operations in the center of the strip of the 1st Ukrainian Front also contributed to the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the armies of its left wing. In order to develop the offensive here, in the Krakow direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, on January 14, entered the battle from the turn of the river. Nida second echelon - Major General's 59th Army, subordinating the 4th Guards Tank Corps to it. The next day, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front launched an offensive against Krakow from the south. Fearing the encirclement of the 17th Army, which occupied the defense zone in the Krakow direction, the command of Army Group A decided to withdraw. On January 16, formations of the 59th and 60th armies began pursuing the enemy and by the end of January 17 they started fighting on the outskirts of Krakow.

The combat operations of the ground troops were supported by the 2nd Air Army of the Colonel General of Aviation. Despite the bad weather, its formations and units made 2030 sorties during the first four days of the operation. In the next two days, when the weather conditions improved, 4135 sorties were already made. In general, over the six days of the offensive, from January 12 to 17, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in a 250 km wide zone, defeated the main forces of his 4th Panzer Army and the 24th Panzer Corps, inflicted heavy damage on the 17th armies and advanced 120-140 km west, forcing the Pilica and Warta rivers.

Combat operations on the 1st Belorussian Front began at dawn on January 14 by carrying out reconnaissance in force simultaneously in a strip over 100 km wide. 22 reinforced rifle battalions and 25 reinforced rifle companies were involved in it. Supported by a barrage of fire, they captured the first position within an hour and a half and created the conditions for bringing the main forces of the 5th shock (lieutenant general), 8th guards (colonel general) and 61st (colonel general P. A. Belov) of the armies that struck from the Magnushevsky bridgehead. By the end of the day, the formations of the 5th shock and 8th guards armies defeated the main forces of the German 8th army corps and advanced 6-12 km. The 61st Army was less successful. Rifle divisions of its first echelon crossed the river in a number of places. Pilica, wedged into the depth of the enemy defense for 2-3 km, but were forced to stop under the influence of his weakly suppressed firing points.

At a faster pace, the enemy's defense was broken through in the bands of the 69th and 33rd armies of colonel-generals and, which went over to the offensive from the Puławy bridgehead. By 1300 the infantry divisions of their first echelon had captured the main zone. After that, by decision of the commander of the 69th Army, the 11th Tank Corps under the command of Major General I.I. Yushchuk. Having increased the strength of the blow, the Soviet troops by the end of the day expanded the breakthrough to 40 km wide and up to 15-20 km deep.

The next day, the German command, in an effort to delay the further advance of the shock groups of the front, sent all operational reserves, including the 40th Panzer Corps, to the areas of their wedging. However, this step did not allow him to change the balance of forces and means in his favor, since on the morning of January 15, the commanders of the 5th shock and 8th guards armies used mobile groups to develop success. In addition, in the afternoon, by decision of the Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov began to enter the breakthrough of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Colonel General M.E. Katukov. On the same day, the grouping was reinforced, striking from the Pulawy bridgehead. Lieutenant General's 9th Tank Corps began to operate here. At the same time, the 47th Army of the Major General and the 1st Army of the Polish Army under the command of Lieutenant General S.P. went on the offensive from the area north of Warsaw. Poplavsky.

As a result of the two days of the offensive, the strike groups of the front broke through the enemy's tactical defense zone to the full depth and inflicted serious damage on his 8th Army, 56th and 40th Tank Corps. The depth of the advance of Soviet troops from the Magnushevsky bridgehead reached 30 km, and from the Pulawy - 50 km. The breakthrough sites on the two bridgeheads were merged into one.

Starting from January 16, the 16th Air Army of Colonel General of Aviation S.I. Rudenko. She attacked strongholds, artillery firing positions, airfields, highway and railway junctions. In the current situation, the front commander decided first of all to complete the defeat of the German 9th Army and develop an offensive in the Lodz direction. At the same time, by bringing into battle the 2nd Guards Tank Army, Colonel General and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General V.V. Kryukov), the strike force on the right wing in order to liberate Warsaw.

The enemy units, defeated in previous battles, could not offer serious resistance to the tank formations of this army. They quickly broke away from the rifle divisions, covered 80 km in a day, and by the evening of January 16 they reached the rear of the Warsaw group, cutting off its escape route to the west. On the same day, having resumed the offensive, formations of the 47th Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army crossed the Vistula, captured bridgeheads north and south of Warsaw, and part of the forces started fighting on its outskirts. On January 17, Soviet and Polish troops, having destroyed the Warsaw garrison, liberated the capital of Poland from the invaders.

In four days, formations of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated the main forces of the German 9th Army. Starting the offensive with breaking through the enemy defenses in three sectors, they expanded them to a width of up to 270 km, uniting them into a single zone. The operational reserves introduced into the battle by the command of group "A" suffered up to 50% losses and could not have a significant impact on the course of events. True, the Soviet troops did not manage to surround and completely destroy the 46th and 56th tank corps, the first in the Warsaw region, the second - between the Magnushevsky and Pulawy bridgeheads.

In general, at the first stage of the operation, the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts broke through the enemy defenses in a strip 500 km wide and to a depth of 100-160 km. As a result of a successful offensive, they captured large industrial centers and important strongholds of the enemy, such as Warsaw, Radom, Kielce, Radomsko, Czestochowa and others. Favorable conditions were created for delivering new strikes to great depths.

After the main forces of the 9th and 4th tank armies were defeated, the German command was forced to consistently concentrate its efforts on holding individual lines and strongholds in order to delay the advance of the Soviet troops and gain the time necessary for the arrival of reserves. Only in the period from January 18 to 20, it transferred seven divisions to the offensive zones of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, including one tank and one motorized.

Under such conditions, it was necessary to prevent the enemy from occupying defensive lines in depth, to prohibit the restoration of his violated command and control and interaction between army groupings, and to destroy his approaching reserves. On January 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command clarified the further tasks of the fronts. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to capture the Bydgosz, Poznan border no later than February 2-4, and the 1st Ukrainian Front was to continue the offensive with the main forces in the general direction of Breslau, reach the Oder no later than January 30 and seize bridgeheads on its left bank . The armies of the left wing were ordered to capture Krakow and the Silesian industrial region.

Beginning on January 18, the troops of the two fronts began to pursue the enemy. It was conducted in wide bands, continuously day and night. The main forces moved in columns and deployed for battle only as needed. The high pace of the offensive was maintained by detaching forward detachments from divisions, corps and armies. Using tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts and vehicles, they, acting in separate directions, bypassed resistance centers, preempted German troops in occupying defensive lines, and captured crossings through water barriers.

Already on January 19, the advanced units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Polish-German border. On the same day, the armies operating on its left wing, after intense fighting, liberated Krakow, opening the way to Upper Silesia. However, on the outskirts of the Silesian industrial region, the command of Army Group A managed to deploy up to twelve infantry and tank divisions. They managed to slow down, and in a number of areas stop the advance of Soviet troops.

To increase the force of impact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev brought into battle from the second echelon and reserve the 21st Army, Colonel General D.N. Gusev and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (lieutenant general). But the turning point in the course of hostilities came only after a blow to the rear of the Silesian grouping of the enemy was delivered by the one that had reached the river. Oder 3rd Guards Tank Army. On January 23, her units liberated the city of Oppeln. Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the armies of the strike force of the front reached the Oder almost in a 200-kilometer zone during January 22-25, crossed it on the move and captured bridgeheads in the areas north and south of Breslau.

In the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, formations of the 8th Guards Army, in cooperation with units of the 11th and 9th Tank and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General M.P. Konstantinov), captured a large industrial center of Poland on January 19 - Lodz. On January 22, the 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies approached the fourth (Poznan) defensive line. It was based on the so-called fortress cities - Poznan, Bydgoszcz, Torun, Schneidemuhl, Breslau and others. At this turn, the German command expected to delay the shock grouping of the front, draw it into protracted battles in large settlements, disperse its forces and create conditions for launching counterattacks. Thus, the formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army that came out to Poznan met fierce resistance from its 60,000-strong garrison. By order of Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov Colonel General M.E. Katukov, setting the task of the main forces to continue advancing towards the Oder, allocated motorized rifle units to block the fortress. Soon they were replaced by two rifle corps from the 8th Guards and 69th armies. They completed the destruction of German troops in Poznan only twenty days after the completion of the Vistula-Oder operation, on February 23.

Planning further actions, the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front sought to capture the fortified areas on the German border before they were occupied by enemy reserves. The main role in this was assigned to tank formations. On January 26, they reached the Polish-German border in 1939. Two days later, the 2nd Guards Tank Army broke through the Pomeranian fortified area on the move. On January 29, having broken through the Meseritsky fortified area, formations of the 1st Guards Tank, 8th Guards, 69th and 33rd armies entered the territory of Germany.

On February 3, the troops of the front reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads in the Kustrin area. 60-70 km remained to Berlin, however, a further offensive due to the changed stop was inappropriate. In an effort to eliminate bridgeheads on the western bank of the Oder, the enemy advanced four divisions and a number of separate units to them. Due to difficulties in basing Soviet air armies, he managed to seize air supremacy for a while. Only in two days, on February 2 and 3, German aviation made 5080 sorties, delivering air strikes on the combat formations of troops, command posts, artillery firing positions and rear facilities. The enemy launched numerous counterattacks with forces ranging from a company to two regiments of infantry, supported by tanks and aircraft, against the weakened formations of the 5th shock and 8th guards armies, which were occupying the defenses in the bridgeheads.

In addition, at the end of January, a gap more than 200 km wide formed between the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was developing an offensive to the north, and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. On January 26, the Wehrmacht high command created the Wisla Army Group, which consisted of 28 infantry, tank and motorized divisions and five brigades. Its task was to launch a counterattack from Pomerania to the rear of the Soviet troops that had reached the Oder during the offensive. Having timely revealed these intentions, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov introduced the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 3rd Shock Army of the Lieutenant General into the gap. Later, the 47th and 61st armies, as well as the 2nd and 1st guards tank armies, were turned north. Only four army formations remained in the Berlin direction. All this prompted the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to suspend the attack on Berlin until the enemy was completely defeated in Pomerania.

The Vistula-Oder operation is one of the largest offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. If at its beginning the width of the offensive zone was 500 km, then by the time it was completed it had increased to 1,000 km. For 23 days, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of 500 km, liberated a significant part of Poland and reached the approaches to the capital of Germany. Trying to stop the offensive of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, the German command transferred 29 divisions and 4 brigades to their zones from other directions, including from the groupings deployed against the Anglo-American troops. But these measures did not allow him to avoid defeat: 35 enemy divisions were defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their people, weapons and military equipment. The troops of the two fronts captured 147.4 thousand soldiers and officers, captured about 14 thousand guns and mortars, up to 1.4 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 1 thousand aircraft. At the same time, their losses in the operation amounted to: 193,125 people, of which 43,251 were irretrievable; 1267 tanks and self-propelled guns; 374 guns and mortars; 343 combat aircraft.

Valery Abaturov,
Leading Research Fellow of the Research
Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences