The longer you defend your rights, the more unpleasant the aftertaste.
Participation of Soviet marines in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict
In February 1978 (according to other sources - in the summer of 1978), Soviet marines assisted the Ethiopian army in containing the Eritrean advance on Massawa. A reinforced company of the 55th Marine Division of the Pacific Fleet with a tank platoon under the command of Major Vyacheslav Ushakov landed in the port of Massawa. The landing force came into fire contact with the separatists. By assisting Ethiopian government forces, the Marines made a significant contribution to the defense without losing a single man killed or wounded.
(Landing of the Soviet marines with the large landing craft "Alexander Tortsev" on the island of Nokra. 1987)
True, the proximity of the front line of hostilities did not allow the landing ship to approach the shore to receive the landing equipment, and by decision of the General Staff it was transferred to representatives of the Ethiopian army directly at the firing positions. The landing commander, Major V.K. Ushakov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, deputy. according to the technical part of Art. Lieutenant Boyko - Order of the Red Star; a number of officers, sergeants and sailors - medals “For Military Merit” and Ushakov medals.
Participant in the combat campaign on the large landing ship “50 years of Komsomol patronage”, tail number 386 (Captain 3rd Rank A. Markin) in the Indian Ocean zone as part of the Pacific Fleet Marine Corps battalion from June 1977 to May 1978, Sergeant Sergei Mikhailovich Yudin recalled that after After the BDK participated in the evacuation of our citizens from Somalia, they transferred weapons from Yemen: “... We went between Ethiopia and Yemen: in Mogadishu (the author’s mistake here should be read - Massawa) they unloaded a T-55 company and a platoon of amphibious tanks, regimental mortars, and armored personnel carriers. Ethiopians were trained to work with this technique right in the sand (we lived in the desert, in tents). There, in Ethiopia, all our tank crews were presented with combat medals: they brought the Minister of Defense out of encirclement; Our scouts and sappers also worked, and we parachuted mainly for combat cover. I’m actually a BM-21 gunner (Grad system), but I can handle the regimental 122-mm mortar quite well. True, I didn’t have to shoot, except with the Ethiopian students.”.
In addition to the Pacific Marines, Baltic Marines also performed international duty in Ethiopia. Mikhail Palatkin, who went to BS in Angola in November 1977 on the Nikolai Filchenkov large landing ship, recalls: “The guys from the Baltic had to fight. We left Sevastopol with their ship together. And on the way to Egypt they left through Suez to Ethiopia. There, the Ethiopian-Somali war just broke out. Soviet military personnel also helped defend friendly Ethiopia from Somalia’s aggression.”
In Ethiopia, the combat mission of providing assistance to the armed forces of Ethiopia was carried out by ships of different fleets: SKR "Voron" pr.50 Black Sea Fleet, "SKR-23" pr.159. Pacific Fleet (06.12.1977-07.07.1978), "SDK-109" (01.12.1977-30.06.1978), BDK "Krymsky Komsomolets" (01.04.-30.09.1978), "SDK-82" (01.05.-31.08 .1978) from the Black Sea Fleet. Oleg Kharitonov, who served on the TFR pr.50 “Raven” of the Black Sea Fleet, recalled: “...there was a real war there. They took a “landing force” (a barge with a bunch of niggas) and dragged them wherever they wanted. Близко к берегу шли, обстреливают с миномётов и со всего, что стреляет, отошли в море, баржу раскачивает, ниггеры выпадают!! Then we landed on Dahlak Island to clear the separatists, take depth measurements and subsequently organize our base. There was once a prison there, the nature is wild! When we left Africa, we were replaced by one of our people (the Potiskys), I don’t remember. They took back to the Union one of ours (a self-mutilator - solarium in the knee) and one Marine, they were also exchanged and they found a Colt revolver on him. The special officer kept them in the same cabin, which was a shame. The Marine told a lot about coastal affairs...”
At the end of the 80s, there were many publications in Soviet newspapers about the combat service of our ships, which ensured the safety of navigation in the waters of the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Thanks to the presence of our ships, not a single one of the Soviet ships sailing in convoys was attacked and our warships never had to use weapons to protect them.
And at the same time, the country did not suspect that near the Persian Gulf, in the Red Sea, our sailors were fighting with the “mosquito” fleet of Eritrean separatists, who were trying to disrupt the supply of Ethiopia from the USSR and their allies. For the first time, Soviet people learned about the existence of the Soviet Logistics Support Point (PMTO) on the Dahlak Islands after its closure in May 1991 from the publication of the Izvestia newspaper, and that in that area Soviet ships fought real battles there - and that later.
On February 27, 1974, unrest broke out in military units in Asmara. Ethiopian Navy personnel based at the port of Massawa joined them and the Marines took control of the port. On September 12, 1974, as a result of a military coup, Emperor Haile Selassie I was overthrown and taken into custody. Power passed to the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), which initially consisted of 120 military personnel ranging in rank from private to major. General Aman Michael Andom, chairman of the Air Force, became the de facto head of state.
A power struggle between the leaders of the Military Council ruling Ethiopia led to the resignation of General Aman on November 22, 1974, and on the night of November 23-24, General Aman was killed in an armed clash near his home. This was followed by the execution of 60 former officials, including 32 officers, cabinet ministers, members of noble families and one prince.
On December 20, 1974, the AFAC appeal to the people (the program of the military leadership of Ethiopia) was published, which emphasized the importance of carrying out agrarian reform. At the same time, the EAC announced that Ethiopia would develop along a socialist path.
In 1975, the government nationalized 72 industrial enterprises and acquired majority shares in 29 enterprises. Banks, financial institutions and insurance companies were also nationalized. There were border conflicts on the border with French Somalia (Djibouti), caused by the invasion of Ethiopia by Afar separatists and IS tribes (1975-1977), and large-scale hostilities began again in Eritrea.
In 1976, the Maoist Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was created and began the fight against the military regime. In mid-1976, several more high-ranking members of the Air Force were shot. In April 1976, the Program of the National Democratic Revolution was promulgated, providing for the construction of a people's democratic republic as a transitional stage on the path to socialism.
But the situation in the country was complicated by the ongoing war with Eritrean separatists for many years. At the end of the 19th century, Eritrea became an Italian colony. Ethiopia, one of the oldest countries in the world, was occupied by Italy in 1935. During World War II, Ethiopia not only achieved independence, but also, together with British troops, liberated Eritrea. It, however, remained under British rule until 1952, when, by decision of the UN, it was annexed to Ethiopia on a federal basis. But in 1962, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I abolished the federation, and Eritrea received provincial status. The Eritreans formed the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which launched military operations against government troops. Ideological and ethnic differences split the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and in 1970 this led to the formation of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which used Marxist ideology and received assistance from socialist and developing countries. From 1972 to 1974 There was a bitter civil war between these two groups. Ultimately the EPLF won. In January 1974, the EPLF inflicted a serious defeat on the Imperial Army, thereby hastening the fall of the regime, which was overthrown in February of that year. But even after Ethiopia was declared a republic, the war did not stop.
On January 31, 1977, Eritrean separatist forces (EPLF) captured the town of Om Hajar on the border with Sudan and launched an offensive on Tesenay, which they took on April 12. Over the next months, the separatists continued their offensive: on July 3, they captured the city of Keren, and in August they captured the cities of Akordat and Barentu. Almost 90% of the territory of Eritrea was under their control, and there the rebels began to form structures of state power. EPLF units were active along the entire Red Sea coast, but were clearly unable to launch a large attack on the port of Assab. However, in the fall they blocked the port of Massawa, completely paralyzing its work.
The situation was complicated by the fact that in January 1977, in the Ogaden province, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) began military operations against the Ethiopian authorities. Ethiopian forces in the province were forced to retreat and fortified themselves at the bases of Jijiga, Harar and Dire Dawa. All this was aggravated by the unstable situation in Ethiopia. On February 3, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam becomes the sole leader of Ethiopia after eight members of the ruling Military Council, led by Brigadier General Tafari Banti, were killed in a bloody battle on the streets of the capital. The role of Somalia in the outbreak of the uprising in the Ogaden became increasingly clear. The Soviet leadership made efforts to prevent conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. In February 1977, the Kremlin proposed that Somalia and Ethiopia create a federation; in March, Cuban leader Fidel Castro, during a visit to the Horn of Arab countries, agreed on a meeting between the Ethiopian leader Mengistu and Somali President Siad Barre in Aden. There, Castro advocated the creation of a Marxist federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as a confederation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and North and South Yemen. But Siad Barre found Castro's calls for a settlement with Mengistu on the basis of socialist brotherhood unconvincing, and rejected the proposal. However, the Somalis promised Castro that “they will never invade Ethiopia, and they will never use their armed forces to attack Ethiopia’s ancestral territory.”.
However, the Somalis never considered the Ogaden as part of the legitimate territory of Ethiopia and did not want to give up the historical opportunity to include the Ogaden in Somalia. Having received assurances from the Soviet leadership that Somalia would refrain from being drawn into the conflict, Addis Ababa calmed down somewhat. and in April, the Ethiopian army moved artillery and an armored battalion from Gode to the country's northwest to fight Eritrean separatists. But in May, troops of 3,000 to 6,000 Somali-trained Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) fighters crossed the border and joined the forces of local resistance leaders. This invasion was a well-planned strategic campaign. Their immediate goal was to cripple what was left of the Ethiopian economy. In June, partisans attacked a train and soon after blew up five bridges, stopping all traffic. Garrisons were also attacked, especially the air base at Gode, as well as the nearby barracks of the 5th Brigade of the 4th Army.
Ethiopia found itself in a difficult situation, fighting on several fronts, and could not do without foreign help. Before the revolution, weapons and equipment were supplied by the Americans, Ethiopia was the main recipient of American military assistance, but after the overthrow of the emperor, the United States began to suspend supplies to Ethiopia and the new leadership began to look for new sources of supply. In December 1976, a long-term agreement between the USSR and Ethiopia on military assistance worth $100 million was signed in Moscow, under which T-34 tanks were to be supplied. In February 1977, the United States curtailed all contacts with Ethiopia under the pretext of its human rights violations.
On April 23, 1977, Ethiopia closed the consulates of the United States and other Western countries in Asmara. There was only one hope left: the USSR. In May 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam arrived on an official visit to Moscow. During the visit, a Declaration on the Foundations of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia was signed. The new arms supply agreement was concluded in the amount of $400 million, and implied the supply of more modern weapons than after the signing of the first agreement.
At the same time, in exchange for military assistance, the Ethiopian leader promised to provide the USSR with the Ethiopian port of Massawa as a naval base. And already in May-June 1977, the Soviet Union began supplying military equipment to Ethiopia. In May, 20-40 T-34 tanks, the same number of armored vehicles and guns were transferred, and in June another 80 T-54 tanks. Along with weapons to restore the collapsed Ethiopian army, specialists and military advisers arrived in the country, sent to Ethiopia on the basis of the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1823 of August 13, 1977. Deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Pyotr Vasilyevich Chaplygin (1977- 1981).
On July 13, 1977, the first regular formations of the Somali army began to take part in battles on the territory of Ethiopia. On July 21, Somalia MiG-21MF aircraft - some reportedly with Iraqi and Syrian pilots - began attacks on various targets in Ethiopia. On July 23, a full-scale invasion began, the Siad Barre regime threw in a 42,000-strong army - 12 mechanized infantry brigades, 250 tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces, more than 30 modern aircraft, trying to seize part of Ethiopian territory. The Ethiopians had only the 3rd Infantry Division and a number of separate units in the province - a total of 10,200 people, 45 M41/M47 tanks, 48 artillery and 10 anti-aircraft guns. In addition, these already small forces were dispersed among individual garrisons and posts.
Ethiopian authorities did not publicly condemn the Somali invasion until July 24, and until September they maintained diplomatic relations with Somalia, relying on promises that the Soviet Union would be able to persuade the Somalis to leave the Ogaden.
Just a few days after the start of hostilities, the Somalis took the cities of Dagabur and Kebri Dehar. The loss of the Gode air base was especially painful for Ethiopia. After the first successes, the Somalis, without slowing down, regrouped their forces and launched an offensive in the direction of Jijiga and Harar. Less than a week later, by the end of July, the Somalis had captured approximately 60% of the Ogaden territory. The Ethiopian army was weak, and it also had to fight Eritrean separatists.
In June 1977, the Mengistu regime reportedly invited Israeli pilots to rebuild the Ethiopian Air Force. And already on the morning of July 26, two F-5As, led by the Israelis, discovered four Somali MiG-21MFs near Harar and shot down two of them in an air battle, while the other two collided while trying to evade a missile launched from the F-5s " Despite this fiasco, the Somali Air Force continued its air offensive, regularly targeting Ethiopian airfields and force concentrations on the ground. The guerrillas - now supported by armored vehicles from the Somali Army - continued their advance. And already on August 9, 1977, the regime in Addis Ababa was forced to admit that it had lost control of the Ogaden province. The Somalis concentrated their main efforts on capturing the three most important and largest cities of Jijigi province - Dire Dawa and Harare. It was around them that the most fierce fighting broke out in August. In mid-August, in Dire Dawa, Somali tanks were able to break through to the airfield on the outskirts of the city, but were driven back by Ethiopian units. 150 Ethiopian soldiers and 500 Somalis died in the battles for the city. The Somalis, with the help of several mechanized brigades, besieged Jijiga. On September 4-14, Somali troops and guerrillas (WSLF) defeated Ethiopian forces in the Battle of Jijiga, where Ethiopian units retreating from the Ogaden were pulled together, destroying or capturing 50 tanks. The Somalis also suffered serious losses - they lost 45 tanks near Jijiga, about half of the three tank battalions located on this section of the front. On September 29, the Somalis captured the important mountain pass of Marda, and one of the columns headed towards Harar. The city and the Ethiopian 3rd Army were under siege.
On September 7, 1977, Ethiopia broke off diplomatic relations with Somalia. Cuba came to the aid of Ethiopia. According to the US State Department, the number of Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia increased from May to October 1977 from 50 to 400 troops. The transfer of large units began in November-December, some of them were transferred by air, and some by sea. The USSR provided its ships, including the Admiral Nakhimov liner, to transport these units and weapons. Cuban troops were transferred not only from Cuba, but also from Angola. A total of six personnel brigades were deployed - 18,000 people under the command of Divisional General Arnaldo Ochoa. The first Cuban tank battalion arrived at the front on December 28, 1977. Aviation units were also deployed with the ground forces. In addition to military personnel from the Soviet Union and Cuba, a contingent of “volunteers” from South Yemen (2,000 people) fought on the side of Ethiopia.
After a series of defeats in the fall of 1977 from the Somali army, the head of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam, went to the USSR in October 1977 for help. He was greeted as the best ally; not only extensive military supplies worth $385 million were promised, but also assistance in obtaining F. Castro’s consent to send Cuban volunteers to Ethiopia. Thereafter, during the three months of November 1977 - January 1978, approximately fifty Soviet ships passed through the Suez Canal on their way to the port of Assab, delivering numerous military supplies, including fighter aircraft, tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, multiple launch rocket systems fire and anti-aircraft missile systems and ammunition - approximately 60,000 tons of supplies - for delivery to the Ogaden front. In addition, Moscow sent additional equipment from the territory of the PDRY (South Yemen). In addition to the navy, from November 25, 1977, the Soviet Air Force organized an air bridge to Ethiopia, using at least 225 Il-18, An-12B, An-22, and Il-76 transport aircraft to deliver BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, T-55 and T-62 tanks, BMP-1, 130 mm, 155 mm and 185 mm artillery, ammunition and other supplies. In just these few months, according to Western data, 80 airplanes and helicopters were delivered to Ethiopia by sea and air (including 48 MiG-21 fighters of various modifications, 10 Mi-6 helicopters, several Mi-8 transport "and 6 combat "Mi-24A", later their number was increased to 16), 600 tanks and 300 anti-aircraft missile systems. According to Western countries, all aid was valued at approximately one billion dollars, while a quarter of the supplied was donated. The GDR (diesel IFA trucks), Czechoslovakia (small arms), South Yemen (T-34 tanks, BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems with crews), North Korea (uniforms) also began to supply weapons and equipment for the Ethiopian army. , Libya provided assistance and support to Ethiopia, paying for part of the arms supplies.
In the fall of 1977, a delegation from various departments of the General Staff and branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, led by the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Army General V. Petrov, arrived in Ethiopia to clarify the situation. Their task was to familiarize themselves on the spot with the situation after the invasion of Somali armed forces into Ethiopia and assist the Ethiopian army in expelling the aggressor. The troops were poorly trained tactically; commanders of the highest ranks did not master the art of operations. The Ethiopian army took up defensive positions in a line, scattering forces and resources. In addition to purely military mistakes, the factor of surprise in the actions of the Ethiopian army was completely excluded. The enemy's awareness of all our plans was simply amazing. Therefore, Soviet advisers had to plan all operations independently and announce the decision only the day before. When Soviet specialists began organizing resistance to the Somali army, specialists who had been expelled from Somalia literally a week before were called in for consultation. They talked about the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy, about approximately in which directions which troops were operating. They knew this well, because for almost fifteen years we supplied weapons there and many officers, including senior ones, graduated from our schools and academies, and therefore the Somalis fought according to all the rules, according to Soviet combat regulations. On November 18, 1977, our delegation met with the leaders of Ethiopia. Then the work of the members of the Soviet delegation began at headquarters and in the troops. At the same time, close cooperation was established with the leadership of the Cuban group of troops deployed to Ethiopia. On November 24, 1977, the first Soviet soldier, Major V. Sokolov, a specialist under the head of intelligence of the Ethiopian special forces brigade, died.
Somalia quickly realized that they had no more time, and on November 28 they launched their final offensive towards the cities of Dire Dawa, Harar and Babile. Somali troops tried to capture the city of Harar, taking advantage of the fact that bad weather forced the Ethiopian air force to remain on the ground. However, in December the first Cuban units were already in the area of operation, and thanks to their support, the offensive failed.
As stated above, only the port of Assab could be used to supply Ethiopia. Our transports from the Suez Canal to the port of Assab were guarded by warships, among them was the TFR Project 50 “Raven” of the Black Sea Fleet. There was a need for this. In the winter of 1977-1978, North Yemeni patrol vessels in the area of Zugar Island intercepted several foreign ships (American, French and Russian) entering the waters of the disputed islands and demanded that they leave these waters. Subsequently, the Soviet fleet participated in the transfer of Cuban units to the port of Assab, for which civilian ships were involved, including the Admiral Nakhimov liner. It was the Cuban units, under the leadership of Soviet advisers, that carried out the defeat of the invading units of the Somali army.
The situation in Eritrea was also not reassuring. On December 23, 1977, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) launched an attack on the port of Massawa, one of three cities in the province that remained under Ethiopian control. Due to the threatening situation in Eritrea, the Ethiopian leadership transferred part of the air force to this area, without waiting for the end of hostilities with Somalia. These forces, using napalm, attacked five towns between Asmara and Tesenay, allowing the Ethiopian army to thwart the rebel advance while the main forces of the Ethiopian army were concentrated on fighting the Somali invasion in the Ogaden.
South Yemeni troops and the Soviet fleet assisted the Ethiopian army in containing the Eritrean advance on Massawa. In 1977, South Yemen (YEM) supported Ethiopia in its actions against Somalia, but they provided real assistance in the fight against Eritrean rebels who besieged the port of Massawa. The PDRY Navy sent there the KFOR Project 770 Sira (tail number 137) with its own landing party. Soviet sailors did not lag behind.
For many weeks in late 1977 and early 1978, approximately 25 Soviet naval vessels were in the Red Sea off the coast of Eritrea, where the Ethiopian army was fighting a civil war on three fronts. In December 1977 - January 1978, carrying out a combat mission to assist the armed forces of Ethiopia, the destroyer "Vesky" (captain 2nd rank N.I. Malinka, from 12/06/1977 to 07/21/1978) provided artillery support for government troops in battles with Eritrean separatists near the port of Massawa.
Other ships also provided combat missions to assist the Ethiopian armed forces: SKR “Voron” pr.50 Black Sea Fleet, “SKR-23” pr.159. Pacific Fleet (06.12.1977-07.07.1978), "SDK-109" (01.12.1977-30.06.1978), BDK "Krymsky Komsomolets" (01.04.-30.09.1978), "SDK-82" (01.05.-31.08 .1978) from the Black Sea Fleet.
Technical support for the actions of our vessels was provided by the floating dock “PD-66” and the floating workshop “PM-156” (Captain 3rd Rank Yatsenko), which were withdrawn after the break with Somalia from the Berbera PMTO to Aden (NDRY). Thus, the crew of the floating workshop repaired the destroyer “Vesky” (they replaced the boiler cooling tubes). During the repair, the repairmen heard from the sailors of the destroyer about artillery support in the area of the port of Massawa, about the Cuban landing in Ethiopia.
But Ethiopia's main pain point continued to be the conflict in the Ogaden. By the beginning of 1978, the Ethiopian army, together with Cuban units in the Ogaden, consisted of 26 brigades, about 230 tanks, 180 guns and mortars, and 42 multiple launch rocket systems. They were supported from the air by more than 40 combat aircraft. They were opposed by 30 Somali brigades, about 130 tanks, and up to 450 guns and mortars.
On January 8, 1978, the Ethiopian Air Force began massive air strikes with F-5As, MiG-21, and MiG-23BN on Somali positions and on the air base in Hargeisa with the aim of defeating the Somalis in the Ogaden - north of Dire Dawa and north of Harare (later, in due to the fact that the enemy became aware of the preparation of our offensive north of Dire Dawa, the first blow was delivered south of Harar). At the same time, plans were made for the troops of the Southern Front to go on the offensive.
On the morning of January 24, 1978, after intensive air and artillery preparation, Ethiopian and Cuban units and units went on the offensive. The Ethiopian counteroffensive made it possible to push the enemy back several tens of kilometers and liberate many populated areas. The Somalis lost 3 thousand people, 15 tanks, and a significant amount of other military equipment and weapons. This success was hailed in Ethiopia as the "turning point" of the entire war.
By early February, the position of Somalia and the WSLF guerrillas in the Ogaden had become critical: the Ethiopian Air Force had destroyed almost all of their heavy weapons, and a series of rapid offensives had routed most WSLF units. At the end of November 1977, the Somalis turned to Saudi Arabia for military assistance, in particular, they asked to send Saudi warships to the port of Berbera. Saudi Arabia has put its Armed Forces on alert. In December 1977 - January 1978, Siad Barre visited Iran, Pakistan and Egypt, seeking political support and weapons; the visits turned out to be fruitful. In January, the Somali President received a guarantee from the Shah that Iran would help them if the Ethiopian army violated Somalia's borders. He received promises of help from Pakistan in the form of Chinese arms supplies, which began to materialize in January. Contracts were signed with 20 Pakistani pilots to support their air force. A promise of support was received from the presidents of Egypt - Saddath and Sudan - Nimeiry in the event of an Ethiopian invasion. Their help for the Somalis was especially important, since Sudan and Egypt had weapons previously supplied from the USSR.
On February 9, 1978, general mobilization was announced in Somalia, accompanied by the declaration of martial law. The troops were moved to the border after the border town of Haigeisa was bombed by Ethiopian MiGs. Continuing the offensive in the direction of Jijiga, Ethiopian troops encountered fierce resistance from the Somalis, who were entrenched in two passes in the mountains leading to the city - Marda and Shebele. In accordance with the operation plan developed by Soviet military advisers, the 10th Infantry Division of the Ethiopian Army crossed the mountain ranges, bypassing the Marda Pass, and reached Jijiga. The city was subjected to artillery shelling and aerial bombardment. On March 1, Somali troops launched a counterattack with infantry, tanks and artillery, but failed. On March 3, their repeated attempt to counterattack also ended in failure. After another 6,000 Cubans arrived in the area, they, together with Ethiopian troops and the Cubans there and supported by 120 T-54 and T-62 tanks, broke the defense and on March 4, the Somalis began a disorderly withdrawal from Jijiga. The next day the city was taken by the attackers. With the fall of Dhijiga and Aisha on the Eastern Front and the withdrawal of troops from the Southern Front to the state border with Somalia in the Dolo region, the liberation of the Ogaden was completed. Immediately after the fall of Jijiga, Siad Barre convened a meeting of the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, at which it was decided to withdraw Somali troops from Ethiopia in order to prevent their complete destruction.
The final disaster for the Somali army occurred on March 2, 1978, when General Petrov launched a major offensive at Dire Dawa. In just a few morning hours, Cuban-piloted Ethiopian MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and Mi-24s flew no less than 140 sorties, inflicting heavier losses on the Somalis than ever before. The deployment of Ethiopian infantry with 90 Cuban T-62 tanks and an artillery-supported frontal attack against five Somali brigades at Dire Dawa was a diversionary blow. Petrov simultaneously sent all available Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters with Ethiopian and Cuban soldiers, along with heavy weapons and military equipment, including PT-76 tanks, to the rear of enemy front lines, where no one was waiting for them. They were supported by a second Cuban armored brigade, which went far into the Somali flank. The Somalis fought bravely, but they had few tanks, no air cover, little ammunition, and on March 5 their defeat was completed. At the same time, Ethiopian units, supported by Cuban tanks, knocked out the Somalis from two strategic mountain passes, Marda and Shedele.
When news of the defeat reached Mogadishu, Siad Bare gathered the country's leadership and during a twenty-hour meeting a decision was made to end the war. But this was announced only three days later in order to be able to prepare the population for this news. On March 15, the Somali government announced the complete withdrawal of its troops from Ethiopia. As a result of the successful actions of the Ethiopian troops, by March 16, the entire Ogaden territory occupied by the Somalis was liberated.
As a result of the war, Ethiopia lost 40,000 people (15,000 military personnel and 25,000 civilians), and over 600,000 residents of the country became refugees. During the hostilities of 1977-1978. 160 Cubans died. The Somali army suffered a crushing defeat, 12 brigades were defeated, 20,000 people were killed, 250 tanks (three quarters of the pre-war fleet), over 200 guns and mortars, and a large number of vehicles. Somalia has actually lost its air force. By the end of the war, only 12 MiG-21 aircraft and several MiG-17 aircraft were in their service.
After the end of the war, Cuban units garrisoned Harare and central Ethiopia near the capital Addis Ababa. The Cubans no longer participated in the fighting in Eritrea or in the border skirmishes with Somalia, which continued until 1984, although publications in the Western appeared in the press about this. The size of the Cuban contingent declined steadily from 18,000 in 1978 to 3,000 in 1984.
At the beginning of May 1978, the military delegation under the command of Army General V. Petrov returned to Moscow in full force, having completed its task. The Somali-Ethiopian conflict ended with the expulsion of the regular armed forces of Somalia from the Ogaden. At the same time, the remaining militant organizations of the Western Somali Liberation Front did not stop resisting and switched to guerrilla methods of struggle. However, neither in their numbers nor in the number and composition of weapons, the opposition forces in Eastern Ethiopia no longer posed a significant threat to Addis Ababa. But sabotage groups of the “Somali front” periodically carried out raids on Ethiopian territory. On June 16, 1978, a group of Soviet military specialists from a separate medical battalion fell into one of their ambushes (near the village of Daketa, Ogaden province): Lieutenant Colonel N. Udalov, captains V. Knyazev, V. Filippov, Sergeant N. Gorelov, privates S. Dulov and N. Kozlov. The servicemen were captured and later, while trying to escape, five of them were killed. Lieutenant Colonel N. Udalov was taken to Somalia and went missing.
The USSR Navy played an important role in restraining the actions of the fleets of Western countries during the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-1978.
As soon as the fighting in the Ogaden was over, in mid-March 1978, the Ethiopian leadership, using Soviet and Ethiopian transport aircraft, began to move troops to Eritrea. During April, the 2nd Ethiopian Army was assembled in Asmara and Assab with approximately 75,000 soldiers and equipped with additional T-55 tanks, BTR-50 and BTR-152 armored vehicles, artillery pieces - Soviet D-30 122 mm and American M 46 130 mm, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and hundreds of trucks. The offensive was launched on May 15, 1978. The Eritrean rebels were ill-prepared and unable to withstand air raids after the Ethiopian Air Force was strengthened by the supply of Soviet aircraft and new pilots trained by the Cubans. Soon everything that the separatists had conquered in 1977 was again under the control of Ethiopian troops.
On November 20, 1978, during the visit to Moscow of the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the USSR and socialist Ethiopia. Article 10 of this treaty directly stated that “in the interests of ensuring the defense capability of the High Contracting Parties, they will continue cooperation in the military field.”
The only area remaining under EPLF control was the Nakfa area of the city, which became a symbol of Eritrean resistance to government control. The retreating EPLF units established a system of fortifications in the city of Nakfa, including a forty-kilometer-long defensive trench extending into the nearby mountains. Despite several attacks, the Ethiopian army was unable to establish control over the area and defeat the separatist units there. The final battle of this first Ethiopian campaign in Eritrea was from December 1 to 15, 1979 in the Nakfa region, and resulted in heavy casualties for Ethiopian forces—more than 15,000 people were killed or wounded, according to Eritrean figures. In addition, the separatists got a dozen tanks and hundreds of vehicles. By mid-January 1980, government forces had retreated to defensive lines near Asmara. In 1979, the USSR continued to provide significant military assistance and support to the Ethiopian army, which during this period was engaged in intense fighting in Eritrea. However, the guerrilla struggle of the separatist “fronts,” which drew almost the entire population of Eritrea into the armed conflict, only led to protracted bloodshed. Given the prevailing conditions, the Soviet Union officially declared that participation in internal conflicts was not within the scope of activity of Soviet military advisers and specialists, and recalled them from Ethiopia, but then returned them again.
Second Italo-Ethiopian War (Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936)) - a war between the Kingdom of Italy and Ethiopia, which resulted in the annexation of Ethiopia and the proclamation from it, along with the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia, colonies of Italian East Africa. This war showed the inability of the League of Nations, of which both Italy and Ethiopia were members, in resolving international conflicts. In this war, Italian troops widely used prohibited chemical weapons: mustard gas and phosgene.
It is considered a harbinger of World War II (along with the Spanish Civil War).
Victory in the war made Mussolini one of the most prominent and significant figures in European politics and showed the strength of the “Italian weapons”; it also prompted him to overestimate his strength and get involved in a war with Greece, which ended disastrously.
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Provisional small fort Werder (Werder) of Italian native troops in Italian Somalia. September 24, 1935.
Built by Said Mohammed Abdille Hassan in 1910, located about 12 km northwest of the Wal-Wal oasis, the Italians built a road to it in 1933-34 to accommodate the movement of vehicles from Italian Somalia.
In Italian Wikipedia it is designated as the Italian Fort Ual-Ual. 
The Italian fort of Kassala near the border with Eritrea, abandoned by Italian troops after the defeat at Adua by the Ethiopian army in 1896. The fort was later occupied by the British following the conquest of Sudan by Lord Horace Herbert Kitchener. September 21, 1935. 
An Ethiopian hunter from the Galla people (modern Oromo) ready to fight for his homeland on the second day after the start of the Italo-Ethiopian War. October 8, 1935.
A photo of a Galla hunter wearing jewelry for killing a giraffe and a rhinoceros around his neck, gold earrings for killing an elephant, a bracelet on his arm for killing a lion, and various rings for other trophies. In both peace and war, he sleeps with his gun at his side. He typifies the type of warrior the Italians will face if the Duce continues his march into the wild lands of Ethiopia. 
American Resident Minister Cornelius Van Hemert Engert took up arms along with other members of the mission for two days to confront the chaos and unrest in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Realizing the direness of his situation, he was forced to send an urgent call for help. He was sent to the British Legation, which had an air-raid shelter and 200 guard soldiers.
A rescue party was dispatched and brought the Americans, among whom was Mrs. Van H. Engert, to safety. This is the last photo of the minister (in Addis Ababa). May 4, 1936. 
Italian fort Ual-Ual. Italian Somalia, October 19, 1935. 
Eritrean warriors, probably of the Tigrinya tribe, in traditional costume, photographed just a few years before the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. These warlike men formed the backbone of the Italian Army's colonial forces in Africa. Their weapons were almost identical to those of the tribes of neighboring northern Ethiopia and included a large number of awards, a shield and a curved saber.
Local residents watch the Italian Fiat-Ansaldo C.V.33 wedge and the Lancia Ansaldo IZ armored car overcome the water barrier.
On the eve of aggression: an Italian soldier says goodbye to his mother before being sent to the East African front. Naples, Italy. September 23, 1935. 
Marshal Badoglio (left).
Italian artillerymen. 
Italian soldiers in Montevarchi before leaving for Ethiopia. 1935 
Italian wedges "Fiat-Ansaldo" CV-33.
Italian cavalry.
Abyssinian warriors in traditional clothes.
Bomber Savoia Marchetti - SM.81 Pipistrello. 
Italian aircraft over Abyssinia. 
Abyssinian Emperor Haile Sellasie prepares to fire a French Hotchkiss M1914 machine gun.
Another caption: Emperor Haile Selassie checking weapons on the Northern Front.
The date of the photograph is currently localized to be from 1931 to 1935.
There is an assumption that the man standing on the left hand of the emperor, in a white robe and hat, is none other than Herui Velde Sellase - “the great shadow of Jah.” French diplomats assessed the importance of this man with similar phrases: “Cherui was placed on the throne by the emperor under the name Haile Selassie,” “Cherui is the Abyssinian Rasputin.”
An Abyssinian soldier tries on a gas mask during a training exercise in Addis Ababa in preparation for a possible chemical attack by the Italians. October 26, 1935. 
Haile Selassie's personal guard - Kebur Zabanga at the parade.
Abyssinian soldiers.
Regular units of the Ethiopian army (Kebur Zabanga - Negus guards) pass through Desse during their great march to the front in the northern front zone. The number of these units was one and a half thousand people. December 23, 1935.
Kebur Zabanga is the Negus Guard, the only part of the Ethiopian army trained in accordance with the European military canons of a modern army.
Her preparation and training were carried out by Belgian specialists invited by Haile Selassie. The choice fell on Belgium, since this country had no interest in enslaving Ethiopia, unlike such militarily developed European countries as Italy, France and England. 
Abyssinian Guard - Mahel Sefari (center army).
Abyssinian machine gunner.
Abyssinian mortarmen.
Two spies, sentenced to death, were hanged on a makeshift gallows on the northern front during the Italo-Abyssinian War. October 10, 1935.
Chief Bakala Ayele takes aim from cover with a rifle, October 1935.
Bakala Ayele, chief (fitaurari) of the Ogaden, is the most important man in the district, whose home is 20 miles from the settlement of Ual-Ual (the dispute over which was the formal reason for the Italian aggression). Preparing to repel the invaders, he armed and trained his entire family to shoot: his wife, his children and even his servants.
Fitaurari - literally "attacker at the head." One of the oldest traditional military titles in Ethiopia, introduced in the 14th century. Fitaurari was either the commander of the vanguard or the commander-in-chief of the troops of the emperor or individual provincial rulers. In this case, this title can be compared to the Russian governor general.
An Abyssinian fighter, armed with a rifle, takes cover in the grass in the Adua-Adigrat front line. 1935 
An Abyssinian machine gunner on the Adua-Addigrat front line with a Browning M1918 machine gun. 1935
In total, the Abyssinian army had 200–300 machine guns of various systems with 10,000 rounds of ammunition per machine gun.
Four Italian soldiers in Ethiopia in 1935
Ras Gugsa, son-in-law of Emperor Haile Selassie, who went over to the side of the invaders with a group of Italian officers during the campaign to Makale. December 12, 1935.
Ras Gugsa (at the center of a group of officers with a scarf around his neck) was appointed governor of Tigre province by the Italians after he defected to the invaders.
Dejazmatch Haile Selassie Guksa - Ethiopian aristocrat, military man. Belonged to the Tigray dynasty. Son-in-law of Emperor Haile Selassie. Traitor to Ethiopia. Haile Selassie Gugsa was the son of Ras Guksa Araya Selassie and the great-great-grandson of Emperor Johannes IV.
In 1934, Haile Selassie Guksa married the second daughter of Emperor Haile Selassie I, Zenebe Work. The marriage between Woizero Zenebe Work and Dejazmatch Haile Selassie Guxa, as well as the marriage between the heir to the throne Asfa Wossen and Woizero Volet Israel Seyoum - the daughter of Ras Seyoum Mangasha, was intended to unite both branches of the Tigrayan dynasty with the imperial dynasty of Shoa. The emperor's calculations did not give the desired results. The marriage turned out to be fragile. Zenebe Work constantly complained to her father about the bad attitude of her husband and his family, and Haile Selassie Guxa himself was indignant that his second cousin and rival Mangasha Seyoum (son of Ras Seyoum Mangasha) already held the title of Ras when he himself held the title dejazmatcha. All this despite the fact that the province of Tigre was already divided between two branches of the Tigrayan dynasty of the heirs of Emperor Johannes IV. Western Tigray was ruled by Ras Seyoum Mangasha and eastern Tigray by Ras Guksa Araya Selassie (father of Haile Selassie Guksa).
After the Italian invasion in 1935, all the ruling circles of Ethiopia were shocked, the dejazmatch Haile Selassie Guksa went over to the side of the Italians. The Italians gave him the title of Ras, and also recognized him as the eldest heir to the Tigrayan dynasty. At the end of the war, Seyoum Mangasha surrendered to Haile Selassie Guxa and was imprisoned by him.
After the liberation of Ethiopia in 1941 and the restoration of Haile Selassie I to the throne, Haile Selassie Guksa was declared a traitor and thrown behind bars. The title rasa assigned to him by the Italians was naturally not recognized and he remained with the title dejazmatch. Haile Selassie Guksa spent more than 30 years behind bars until the 1974 revolution, when he was released, but died shortly after his release. 
Italian soldiers and officers at the unveiling of a stele to those killed in the Battle of Adua in 1896. In the center on horseback is the commander of the Italian troops, General Emilio de Bono.
"Those killed in Adua were avenged on 6.H. 1935." - so reads the inscription on this monument, officially unveiled here on October 13, 1935 by General Emilio De Bono, commander of the Italian colonial forces that captured Adua on October 6, 1935, thereby easing the 39-year pain of a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians in 1896. 
An Italian priest conducts a service with a Blackshirt unit. Makale, December 11, 1935. 
Raising the flag by Italian troops over Makalle. 1935 
Blackshirts in Makale, December 11, 1935. 
An Orthodox priest blesses Abyssinian soldiers leaving for the front from the city of Harar. November 16, 1935.
Collection of humanitarian aid for the front in Addis Ababa.
An Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 medium bomber bombs Ethiopia.
The Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 medium bomber was adopted by the Regia Aeronautica in the spring of 1935. First combat use in December 1935 in Ethiopia. 
Negus Haile Selassie watches the Il Duce's "eagles" from the balcony of his palace. 1935 
Italian soldiers inspect the caves of Mount Amba-Alagi in which Ethiopian soldiers were hiding. 
Abyssinian soldiers on the attack. 1936 
Italian Alpine skirmishers are fighting for Amba Aradam. 1936
Italian soldiers watch the bombardment of Ethiopian troops at the Battle of Amba Aradam. February 15, 1936.
Battle of Amba Aradam (mountain) (aka Battle of Enderta (province)) - battle on the Northern Front against Ras Muluget Yeggazi, commander of the army of the center (Mahel Sefari)
This battle consisted of attacks and counterattacks by Italian troops under Marshal of Italy Pietro Badoglio and Ethiopian troops under Ras Mulugeta Yeggazi. 
Ethiopian fighters killed in their mountaintop position at the Battle of Amba Aradam. February 1936.
Battle of Amba Aradam (mountain) (aka Battle of Enderta (province)) battle on the Northern Front against Ras Mulugeta Yeggazi, commander of the center army (Mahel Sefari)
The number of Italian troops participating in the battle was 70,000.
The number of Ethiopian troops participating in the battle was 80,000.
The Italians lost only 590 killed (modern estimates around 500)
The Ethiopians lost 5,000 killed (modern estimates up to 6,000). 
Major Giuseppe Bottai and Colonel Pelosi in the Amba Aradam area on February 16, 1936, with the Roman standard depicting the Capitoline she-wolf in the background.
Giuseppe Bottai (September 3, 1895 – January 9, 1959)
Italian statesman, lawyer, economist, journalist, governor of Rome, first Italian governor of Addis Ababa, minister of corporations and minister of national education. At the end of 1942, he openly declared his disappointment in B. Mussolini and his rejection of the war. Member of the Great Fascist Council. On February 5, 1943, among other opponents of rapprochement with Germany, Mussolini was replaced, but remained a member of the Great Fascist Council. In 1943, together with D. Grandi, he became one of the main organizers of a conspiracy within the fascist party, which ended at a meeting on July 25, 1943 with the overthrow of Mussolini. On January 10, 1944, he was sentenced to death in absentia by a fascist tribunal in Verona. After the end of the war, he was sentenced to prison in 1945 by an Italian court. In 1947 he was granted amnesty and returned to Italy. Until the end of his life he remained committed to nationalism.
A column of Italian troops passes the Maria Teresa cannons near Dire Dawa. 1936
The city of Dire Dawa was founded in 1902 when the construction of the French Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway reached the site. Occupied without a fight by Italian troops on May 6, 1936. 
Italian soldiers during work in Ethiopia. 
Stopping artillery tractors. General Starace's column moves from the west around the lake. Tana, the southern tip of which he reached on April 29, 1936. 
An Italian Caproni Ca.101 bomber flies over Italian troops in the Gondar area. 
The commander of the Italian troops, Marshal Badoglio (Pietro Badoglio) in positions in Abyssinia. 1936
On November 30, 1935, Badoglio was sent to Massawa as commander of the expeditionary force in Ethiopia in connection with the failures of General de Bono in the Italo-Ethiopian War, whom the Duce removed from his post, and Pietro Badoglio appointed commander-in-chief of the Italian forces in Ethiopia.
Badoglio's failure for a long time to carry out a successful finishing offensive enraged Mussolini. He threatened to replace Badoglio with General Rodolfo Graziani. But nevertheless, it was under the command of Badoglio that Italian troops managed to occupy the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, on May 5, 1936 and win the war. Marshal Badoglio was appointed viceroy of the new colony and received the title Duke of Addis Ababa.
In 1937, Badoglio returned to Rome, where he continued to work on the General Staff. His new task was to coordinate the actions of the Italian corps in Spain, sent by Mussolini to help General Franco.
Houses of residents of Desse (Akhmara region) after bombing by Italian planes. 1936
Desse is one of the largest cities in Ethiopia. 
The Italians demolish the monument to Menelik II in Addis Ababa. 1936
Photo from the archive of Italian Brigadier General of the Italian Air Force Enrico Pezzi.
General Enrico Pezzi was liquidated by Soviet troops during Operation Little Saturn on December 29, 1942, during the general’s attempt to provide assistance (on a Savoia Marchetti SM81 plane) to fascist troops surrounded in the area of the village. Chertkovo
Arrival of Negus Haile Selassie and his family in Haifa after the defeat in the war on the British light cruiser Enterprise on May 8, 1936. 
Stolen by Italian fascists from Addis Ababa, the “Lion of Judah” is a symbol of the ruling dynasty of the Negus of Ethiopia. It was brought by the Italians to Rome as a trophy, by ship and train. The photo shows the moment of unpacking the container with the trophy. Rome, Italy, February 22, 1937.
The memorial was erected by Ethiopian ruler Haile Selassie in 1930, shortly before his coronation. In 1935, it was stolen by the Italians and taken to Rome, where it was installed on the obelisk of the Dogale heroes near the monument to Vittorio Emanuele II. The monument returned to Ethiopia after long negotiations in the 60s of the 20th century and was installed in the presence of Emperor Haile Selassie. After the coup in Ethiopia in 1974, the military junta wanted to remove the monument as a symbol of empire. But the resistance of military veterans led to the cancellation of the decision and the lion remained in place. 
Italian obelisk to the Heroes of Dogali in Rome with the Lion of Judah installed. May 10, 1937.
The Dogali Obelisk (or the Baths Obelisk) is one of a composition of two obelisks, the second of which is located in the Boboli Gardens in Florence. It was built from red granite at the direction of Ramses II in Heliopolis. The height of the obelisk is 6.34 meters, width - 77 centimeters. Centuries later, the obelisk was found by archaeologist Rodolfo Lanciani during excavations on June 17, 1883 and was transported to Rome to decorate the Temple of Isis. The obelisk was left in its current state.
Four years later, 548 Italian soldiers died at the hands of the Ethiopian army in January 1887 at the Battle of Dogali during the First Ethiopian War of 1885-1896. It was decided to use this obelisk for the memorial to Italian soldiers. Therefore, it was called the Dogali obelisk and placed in “Piazza Cinquecento” (500 square), opposite the main railway station. The names of Italian soldiers who died during the battle were engraved on the pedestal. The opening ceremony of the obelisk took place on June 5, 1887. When the square was redeveloped in 1925, the obelisk was moved slightly north, to the Baths of Diocletian.
In 1937, after the conquest of Ethiopia, it was decorated with a bronze "Lion of Judah" brought from Addis Ababa, but after the fall of the fascist regime, the bronze lion was returned to Ethiopia by Negus Haile Selassie.
Station square and the Dire Dawa station building during the Italian occupation. 
Somali soldiers at a training camp during the fighting in the Ogaden, November 30, 1977. Photo: AFP/EAST-NEWS
In 1977-1978, a bloody war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia; The USSR was initially an ally of both countries
The history of post-colonial Africa is a history of both civil and international conflicts. However, even among them Ethiopian-Somali War 1977-1978 years or, as it is also called, war for the Ogaden, stands apart.
23-mm Shilka self-propelled gun in a firing position. Nokra Island, Ethiopia
Source – otvaga2004.ru This photo was taken
From a colony to the idea of “Greater Somalia”
Back in 1960, when the state Somalia was only formed by merging the former colonies that gained independence - British Somalia And Italian Somali- its leaders set themselves the task of uniting all territories inhabited by ethnic Somalis into one entity.
The flag of Somalia, both now and 50 years ago, features a five-pointed star. It was in it that the idea of the Somali tribes about uniting and creating a strong national state in the “Horn of Africa” - “Great Somalia” - was reflected.
The two rays are two former colonies that formed the core of the new country.
The other three are Djibouti(sphere of influence France), province Ogaden (Ethiopian Somalia) and Northeast Kenya.
All these territories had in common the fact that they were inhabited predominantly by Muslim Somalis and the leaders of the newly formed state set as their goal to bring closer the day when all the rays of the white Somali star would unite not only on the national flag.
In 1960, almost in the first days of independence, Somalia designated Kenya their claims to the North-Eastern Province. The parties addressed Great Britain with a request to act as an arbitrator in the dispute. England did not support Somali claims, which resulted in a breakdown in relations between the former colony and the metropolis.
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Podgorny and Siad Barre in Kisimayo during Podgorny's visit to Somalia, September 3, 1974. Photo: Yuri Abramochkin / RIA Novosti
Realizing the need for support from one of the world powers to implement their expansionist plans, the Somalis, after the break with Great Britain, decided.
In 1961, Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke visited the Soviet Union on a friendly visit. During this visit, an agreement on friendship and cooperation was signed between the two states, which included, among other things, military assistance for Somalia from the USSR.
The Soviet Union had its own interest in this agreement - neighboring Somalia Ethiopia maintained close ties with USA, and in this situation, by relying on the Somalis, the USSR equalized the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Thanks to the support of the Soviet Union, Somalia was able to acquire an army quite strong by African standards, trained and armed according to the Soviet model. In addition, the Soviet side actively participated in the formation and development of industry in the young country.
The coup d'etat of 1969, as a result of which General Mohammed Siad Barre came to power, not only did not interfere with the ties between the two countries, but, on the contrary, only strengthened them.
As soon as he took the presidency, Siad Barre immediately announced a course in the country towards building socialism with an Islamic slant.
This decision was met with approval in Moscow, and in subsequent years the Soviet military and economic presence in Somalia only increased.
Thus, by the mid-1970s, the number of Soviet military advisers of all ranks and civilian personnel in the country amounted to three thousand. In return, the USSR received at its disposal the strategically important port of Berbera.
New friends and old enemies
The situation began to change rapidly after the Ethiopia Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown.
The 700-year-old monarchy was replaced by a group of socialist-oriented military men.
Mogadishu considered political destabilization in the neighboring country a good reason to begin putting its territorial ambitions into practice.
In particular, Siad Barre began to secretly support the terrorist organization “Western Somali Liberation Front”.
As a result, Ethiopia found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, certain concerns were caused Eritrean separatists, and on the other - in Ogaden and adjacent territories, local Somalis, with the support of Mogadishu, launched a guerrilla war against the authorities.
Under these conditions, the country needed support and support in the person of a powerful ally.
As a result, the struggle for power among the military elite was won by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, who decided set a course for rapprochement with the USSR.
This is how Ethiopia turned from a US ally into a socialist-oriented country.
Mengistu Haile Mariam in Tbilisi, November 1, 1978. Photo: Runov / RIA Novosti
In Moscow, this situation was perceived ambiguously. On the one hand, Brezhnev warmly welcomed Colonel Mengistu as a new comrade and ally, on the other hand, a stalemate developed for the Soviet leadership - two pro-Soviet countries were located next to each other in the Horn of Africa, which were extremely unfriendly towards each other .
The Kremlin’s fears were not in vain: Siad Barre did not want to take into account changes in the political situation in the region, putting Somalia's national interests are undoubtedly higher than the global strategy of the Soviet Union.
In particular, on February 23, 1977, during a conversation with Soviet diplomat Georgy Samsonov, he stated that Mengistu, who declares his orientation towards socialism, should follow the principle of the right of nations to self-determination proclaimed by Lenin and allow the population of the Ogaden to decide for themselves which state they belong to. would like to see your area.
Nevertheless, Moscow until recently believed that the conflict could be avoided, periodically advising Mogadishu to refrain from escalating the situation.
It should be noted that The Ogaden itself did not represent any strategic value- it was a deserted, sparsely populated area.
Nevertheless, as part of the national idea of building a “Greater Somalia”, this area was of great importance for Mogadishu. War was inevitable.
Hot summer 1977
Since the beginning of 1977, the Somalis have undertaken a series of provocations on the border with Ethiopia.
Soldiers of the regular Somali army, dressed in civilian clothes, together with militants from the Western Somali Liberation Front, attack targets on Ethiopian territory, but are defeated and retreat.
After an unsuccessful attack on the Gode garrison in May, during which the Somalis lost more than 300 fighters, Siad Barre decides to move from sabotage and provocations to a full-scale invasion without notifying Moscow.
On July 23, 1977, regular Somali troops invaded the Ethiopian Ogaden province. The Somali group numbered 42 thousand people and included 12 mechanized and infantry brigades, 250 tanks, 600 artillery pieces, and about 40 aircraft.
The Somalis attacked in the Northern and Southern directions - the main attack was carried out by the northern group, while the offensive in the south had auxiliary functions.
The Ethiopian army was inferior to the Somalis both in technical equipment and in numbers. In addition, the Ethiopian units were scattered throughout the province and did not represent a single force, and the troops of Siad Barre, skillfully maneuvering and using the principle of concentrating troops in strategically important directions, crushed the Ethiopians piece by piece, suffering almost no losses.
In Addis Ababa they hoped to the last that the USSR would be able to reason with Siad Barre and force his troops to retreat back to Somalia.
In August, a few days apart, he and Mengistu visited Moscow - it was then that it was decided which side the USSR would take.
The Kremlin decided that Siad Barre, who started the war without the consent of the Soviet leadership, could no longer be considered a reliable ally. Preference was given to Mengistu and Ethiopia.
In September, the Ethiopians broke off diplomatic relations with Somalia.
On November 13, the Somalis denounced the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR and demanded that Soviet military and civilian specialists leave the country as soon as possible.
The Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation - having decided to support Ethiopia, the leadership of the USSR had to declare war on the Somali army they had nurtured and armed.
The Ethiopian troops were poorly trained and armed with outdated weapons and equipment.
The Soviet side was faced with the difficult task of creating a combat-ready new Ethiopian army that could successfully repel Somali aggression in the shortest possible time and in war conditions.
An “air bridge” was hastily organized to Ethiopia to transport equipment, personnel and instructors. So, for example, their direct participant V.V. Boev recalled those events: “In September 1977, with a group of military specialists of 120 people, under the guise of an agricultural specialist, he was sent to Ethiopia. Acted as a driver, operator, electromechanic, and head of communications at the Diredyau airfield. The population treated us well."
At the same time, the Somali blitzkrieg was unfolding at the front - by the end of the year, Siad Barre's troops controlled up to 90% of the Ogaden territory.
The Ethiopian units were defeated and retreated in disarray.. For the countries of the socialist camp, a critical moment has arrived.
Moscow and Havana decided to resort to what was already used in Angola accepted and sent to Ethiopia Cuban armed forces, which would strengthen Mengisti's army.
In December 1977, the transfer of Cuban military personnel from Angola And Congo(Brazzaville). A total of six brigades with a total strength of 18 thousand people were deployed under the command of General Arnaldo Ochoa.
At the same time, the fact of the presence of Cuban soldiers in the Ogaden was officially denied by both Havana and Addis Ababa.
Cubans arriving in Ethiopia were immediately transferred to the front line, which made it possible to partially stabilize the situation at the front by the end of the year.
In addition to the Cubans, about two thousand militants from South Yemen, also a union of the USSR.
The collapse of hopes for “Greater Somalia”
In parallel with the Cubans holding back the Somali offensive, Soviet military specialists were re-creating the Ethiopian army. This is how one Soviet instructor later described the state of affairs in it: “ The Ethiopian army made a depressing impression. The officers were not accustomed to combat operations, and their role was unclear. For them to climb into a trench... No, what are you talking about... The division commander did not appear at the front for ten days. There was not a single battle map. We went to the front line at night. There are no trenches. The tent is standing, the fire is smoking, some brew is gurgling. And what? When they saw Somali tanks, they simply ran. And when the artillery repelled the attack, they returned. 12 thousand people held a front of one and a half kilometers! Before us, their advisers were Americans. But the level of assistance is already indicated by the fact that the division commander's advisor was a sergeant! »
Ethiopian soldiers armed with Soviet AK-47s during a counteroffensive in the Ogaden, February 16, 1978. Photo: Amin/AP
Nevertheless, active assistance from the USSR soon began to bear fruit.
In January 1978, the Ethiopians and Cubans launch a counteroffensive and push the Somalis back from the city of Harar, the capital of the Ogaden.
Presence in the ranks of the Ethiopian army Cubans and Soviet military specialists in addition to practical benefits, it provided colossal moral impact on Ethiopians.
Retired Major General P. A. Golitsyn recalled: “ Approaching the front with Captain Imam, we see how the Ethiopian battalion abandons its position in the trenches and retreats in panic, two tanks retreat along with the battalion. Captain Imam, holding a machine gun above his head, shouts: “The Soviet general is with us, reinforcements are coming from behind, forward to the Somalis!” The battalion began to stop, the tanks moved forward, and the battalion regained the position it had occupied before the withdrawal. During this battle, the Ethiopians captured five Somalis. I asked the Imam: “What were you shouting?” - he reported the above text through an interpreter».
Beginning on February 2, 1978, the Ethiopian armed forces launched a full-scale offensive against Somali units. By that time, Siad Barre's troops were exhausted and had completely lost the strategic initiative. In the first half of February alone, about 70% of Somali tanks and more than 80% of field artillery guns and mortars were destroyed and captured.
The front began to shift in the opposite direction - Ethiopian units systematically liberated cities previously captured by the Somalis.
On March 3, Cuban-Ethiopian troops began fighting for Jijiga- the most important strategic node of the Ogaden and the last line of Somali defense.
By the morning of March 5, the city was taken by the efforts of Ethiopian units and a Cuban tank brigade.. The Somalis no longer have bases or significant fortified positions in the Ogaden. They retreated randomly towards the border, pursued by Ethiopian troops.
By March 9, the Ethiopians reached the borders of Somalia. On March 15, Siad Barre announced the “withdrawal of troops” from the territory of Ethiopia, but in fact there were almost no troops there anymore. By 16 March, the last Somali troops had been expelled from the Ogaden.
Ethiopian soldiers advance against the Somali army in the Ogaden Desert, June 14, 1978. Photo: AFP/EAST-NEWS
Losses on both sides numbered in the tens of thousands. Losses in equipment were especially hard to bear, replenishing them was a long and expensive undertaking.
As for the long-term consequences, they were undoubtedly more serious for Somalia.
Siad Barre's army never recovered from the Ogaden disaster, which led to weakening power and destabilization of the country.
Already in the early 1980s, an anti-government guerrilla movement began in Somalia, which ultimately led to a coup and the removal of Siad Barre from power in 1991, which subsequently plunged the country into the abyss of a civil war that continues to this day.
Ethiopia, although it repelled Somali aggression, also lost significantly in military resources, which led to the escalation of the conflict in Eritrea and the department of the latter in 1993.
The border dispute between these states has not yet been resolved; Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in Africa.
As for the Soviet Union, despite the disappointing consequences for both sides, it was war for the Ogaden became perhaps the only conflict in Africa during the Cold War where The USSR was able to win a clear victory.
11. Politics of war
(Start)
Preparing for war
Mussolini's closest collaborators stubbornly denied the fact of consciously creating a cult of his personality. But sometimes he himself suddenly admitted this, saying in justification that a dictator needs supporters who fanatically believe in his infallibility. If the newspapers called him “our prophet Duce,” and his regime was called nothing less than “the embodiment of the divine will,” if they made him into a miracle worker, whose name alone acted on patients in hospitals like a painkiller before surgery, then all this was done not without him tacit approval.
In 1933, Mussolini decided to publish his works in the so-called "definitive" edition. Everything written and said by him was to be included there, except that relating to the period when he was a socialist and editor of the newspaper Avanti! At least sixty articles of the nineteenth year were also omitted; there were sections whose vulgar tone or anti-clericalism did not suit his new appearance. Much of the real Mussolini had to remain a secret. The "definitive" edition was published under a pseudonym.
By this time, Mussolini had again taken over seven of the fourteen cabinet posts and was often irritated with even the limited power that other ministers had been given. He warned them never to argue with him, “because contradiction only increases my doubts and distracts me from the path that I know is right, since my animal instincts are always correct.” Sometimes he admitted that he was easily influenced by other people and that is why he preferred to make all important decisions without consulting anyone. Even the lowest ranks were ordered not to issue any executive orders without at least making it appear that they came from the Duce himself. Therefore, ministers and officials expressed less and less desire to make any decisions even on the most insignificant issues.
Subsequently, some fascists admitted that this process of idolizing Mussolini was one of the mistakes of the regime, that the attempt to create “Oriental despotism” naturally had to lead to general inaction. But Mussolini himself thought just the opposite. He believed that he had already done as much for Italy as Napoleon had done for France, and from time to time he pointed out in what respects he had even surpassed him. This superiority over Napoleon became a common theme of Fascist propagandists, who argued that the Duce was more original and had a greater vision, better knowledge of people, greater courage and less personal vanity.
Flatterers fueled his pride, suggesting that he was a born commander like Napoleon and was capable of personally leading any military campaign. They knew that these were exactly the words that would please Mussolini most. While to a wider international audience he continued to insist that all his energies were devoted to preserving peace, in his soul Mussolini harbored a dream, which became a literal obsession, of how he would lead his country to a victorious war. He repeated previous assertions that 1935 would be the year of war readiness. Fascism should take the chance to take over another colony as proof that Italy under Mussolini has become a great power.
The first and necessary step was to strengthen the leader's power over the economy. Talking to foreigners in the early thirties, Mussolini noted that he was against tariff barriers and for the least possible government intervention in economic life. But soon he spoke completely differently. Since the logic of fascism increasingly inclined him towards surveillance and patronage, he explained that he was reluctant to do this and only because other countries forced him to act so in self-defense. However, in reality, he was forced to change his policy and resort to helping sick sectors of the economy by the global economic crisis of 1929, coupled with aggressive trends in international politics. It began with government intervention in the affairs of important industries that were temporarily in difficulty; Then the success of this operation showed Mussolini that intervention could be used on a larger scale to create more centralized control over the entire economy. By 1933 he had become accustomed to repeating that the capitalist organization of production was no longer acceptable. The state, Mussolini now said, must intervene in every sector of the economy, which led one senator to accuse him of becoming almost a communist, since three-quarters of Italian industry would soon be controlled, if not entirely owned by the state.
In 1934, Mussolini felt the need to declare the existence of corporations. He convinced himself that England and other countries would follow his example, introducing their own corporate systems. The Duce hoped that these corporations would soon control the entire Italian economy. However, he miscalculated. The expensive and burdensome corporate bureaucracy "has become a powerful body working for its own perpetuation, with its functions completely unclear, except that, by demanding huge amounts of money, it constantly puts a spoke in the wheels of industry."
Of course, Mussolini could not publicly admit that the corporations were a mistake. He simply supplemented them with corresponding agencies, whose functions, often overlapping, created administrative confusion. Soon the buzzword was no longer corporatism, but autarky, or self-sufficiency. In this, the Duce saw the need to prepare Italy for military action when the import of goods from abroad would be difficult. In February 1935, he set the goal of eliminating the country's dependence on external supplies. Mussolini said that ten years of the “battle for bread” had made Italy capable of self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, so that it now had a sufficient supply of food to feed even a nation twice its size. Few of these listeners knew that this was a complete lie. Mussolini regretted that he had not realized ten years ago the need for self-sufficiency in industrial products. He failed to fully appreciate that arms production would invariably increase, rather than decrease, Italy's dependence on imports. Autarky became a magic spell for the dictator, which itself could solve the main problems of the war economy.
Mussolini hoped that the war would contribute to solving Italian economic problems. Conquering Ethiopia would link two already existing colonies, Eritrea and Somalia, and he dreamed of sending millions of Italian settlers to a united East Africa. Mussolini was in no mood to listen to realists, who knew that colonial enterprises usually cost much more than they were worth; he preferred the advice of others who believed that Italian settlers would turn Ethiopia into a rich economic zone within a few years. There was constant extensive talk about huge deposits of gold, diamonds, copper, iron, coal and oil, although for Mussolini the most attractive was the prospect of mobilizing one or two million Ethiopians into the army, who, as soon as industry was properly established in the new colony, would become dominant force throughout the African continent.
At the end of the summer of 1934, significant amounts of military equipment were sent to Eritrea. In October, France received a request to allow Italy free “economic penetration” into the territory. In early December, one of many skirmishes took place in Vol-Val. Eighty miles from the border, in territory which even on Italian maps was designated as part of Ethiopia, an Italian garrison was established. Mussolini took this as a convenient occasion for subsequent military preparations. He refused to bring the Vol-Vol incident to international discussion, but - as in the case of Corfu in 1923 - demanded monetary compensation and punishment for those responsible for "aggressive actions" against the Italians.
At the end of December, the Duce issued a secret order to prepare for the “total” conquest of Ethiopia. Now there was a need to hurry - not only because German rearmament would soon force him to keep most of his army at home, but also because Ethiopia was becoming a Europeanized country. It was necessary to strike before she acquired sufficient modern weapons and carried out the appropriate military training. He had no intention of formally declaring war, but rather to take the world by surprise by declaring that these actions were taken in self-defense. In this way he could avoid accusations of aggression at a meeting of the League of Nations. Mussolini believed that France needed to be processed first, and then the British could be bribed by giving them one of the regions of Ethiopia.
In January 1935, a formal treaty was signed with France. The main intention of the French was to create a common front against Nazi Germany. It was rumored that French Prime Minister Pierre Laval had secretly given Mussolini verbal guarantees that France would treat Italy's invasion of Ethiopia leniently. Laval subsequently always denied this, claiming that he was only told about the economic penetration of Italy. Mussolini later also said that he had not told Laval anything about the possibility of war. But he certainly hinted to the French side that economic penetration implied a certain degree of political control, and both sides were content with this without specifying details.
Throughout February and March, Mussolini continued to reassure other countries that he had no aggressive intentions. By this point, foreign diplomats began to show some suspicion. But no one could believe that Mussolini so underestimated the threat from Germany that he was going to start a big war in Africa. In Italy itself, the Duce ordered military preparations to be kept in absolute secrecy. Arrangements were organized for the distribution of gas masks and the return to their homeland of ten million Italians believed to be living abroad.
Of course, Mussolini knew that the British would not like the war he planned against Ethiopia, but he relied on the fact that they were too concerned about Hitler’s intensification and would prefer to turn a blind eye to his affairs. On January 29, Mussolini sent a message to London that he would like to agree on spheres of influence in East Africa, but did not show any haste. Ambassador Grandi told the British representatives that this was a matter of medium importance, again accompanying his words with the promise that Italy had absolutely no aggressive intentions. Perhaps Mussolini simply wanted another ambiguous agreement like the one made with France. This would make it possible to then tell the government in London that they had no reason to be surprised that war had broken out. In response, the British approved of his commitments to avoid starting a war. They clearly and repeatedly conveyed to Mussolini that he would make an irreparable mistake if he resorted to violence. Unfortunately, Grandi was more concerned about not upsetting the Duce. The truth was distorted for the sake of flattery: the ambassador insisted that the British assured him of their full support.
In order to decide to go to war, Mussolini did not need to consult anyone other than the king, and certainly not his ministers and the Great Council. He had too much contempt for his civilian colleagues and admitted that he feared their objections to what instinct and the “supreme judge” had already told him. Counseling, he explained, is a refuge for people who lack willpower. Mussolini told the Italian police chief that war would begin in a few months, but did not say against whom. It was only in February 1935 that he spoke more clearly, when he deciphered to his ministers that a major military operation was being prepared. He said that the armed forces are already ready, basic food supplies have been created and even the problem of delivering coal and oil has been solved.
The Duce was going to take over the main leadership of the campaign. The commander of the active army, De Bono, received instructions not to enter into any direct contact with the headquarters of the armed forces. By March, aircraft were repaired and designed to transport 300 thousand people, which were supposed to include an equal number of fascist policemen and regular troops. But De Bono discovered that the police had no military training at all and were almost useless. When pressed, Mussolini said that he was ready to send many more people: fascist prestige demanded a quick and decisive victory in the war, no matter the cost.
In the end, half a million soldiers and civilian workers were sent to East Africa - a huge army, the largest ever used in the colonial wars. It was necessary to transport several million tons of cargo over two thousand miles: according to one senior officer, this was ten times the amount actually needed. But Mussolini insisted that sending only one army corps would be too big a mistake, especially considering that “we will need troops later to conquer Egypt and Sudan.” De Bono was horrified to find that his requests were multiplied in such a random and haphazard manner. Since the port at Massawa was only capable of unloading 3,000 tons per day, some ships had to wait weeks or even months for unloading.
Hitler waited until these preparations were far enough advanced, then shocked the world with the official announcement that the Germans would rearm in defiance of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. Mussolini, who had been secretly helping them, suddenly realized that he had acted extremely recklessly by concentrating almost his entire army in Africa. This concern was reflected in an article published in his own monthly magazine. There was an accusation that Germany and Japan were trying to establish world dominance, as well as a statement that the Germans were afraid of Mussolini, knowing that he had enough strength to prevent their expansion into Central Europe. He was so shameless that he warned the British government about Hitler sending weapons to Africa and his possible intention to raise “the Negro race against all Europeans.” English politicians may not be able to understand the German mentality, but they could at least take his good advice and build a powerful air force as quickly as possible.
To respond to a potential challenge from the Nazis, Mussolini held talks with the French and English prime ministers in April. Stresa was chosen as the meeting place, so that the Duce did not have to leave Italy. As the owner, he could preside and draw up the agenda. The Foreign Office offered to take this opportunity to raise the issue of Ethiopia, but since the Duce knew that England was hostile to his African claims, he did not want to risk it.
Mussolini's main interest was concluding an agreement to open the so-called “Stresan Front” against Germany - without protection on the northern border, he could not risk starting a war in Africa. Therefore, Mussolini asked the British delegates not to discuss the Ethiopian issue, except informally, outside the walls of the conference room. They agreed, although some of their officials - as well as his - believed that this was a major mistake. Subsequently, the silence of the British allowed Mussolini to declare that since no official protest had been recorded at Stresa, the British, like the French, should give him the opportunity to follow his own path.
Mussolini already knew that England was resolutely opposed to the war he had started. British dissatisfaction was clearly expressed behind the scenes at the Stresa conference. Ethiopia, they pointed out, was a member of the League of Nations, and any attack on its territorial integrity would entail intervention by the outside world. Undoubtedly, they hoped that the Italians were only trying to intimidate Ethiopia and force it to make concessions. Mussolini did not dissuade them.
The resulting uncertainty was deliberately provoked by Mussolini. He knew that otherwise he would have to pay attention to a second, this time public warning against the outbreak of war made by the British the day after the end of the Stresa conference. As Mussolini's military preparations became more obvious, private instructions again came from London to warn him that as soon as Ethiopia wished to accept international arbitration, Italian intrigues against a much weaker country would alienate potential allies from it, and the resulting hostility would destroy the system of collective security, in which Italy, like other countries, is in great need of.
But Mussolini was not a man who could be moved by such arguments. He made it clear that if his plans were upset, he would leave the League of Nations forever. In any case, he added, the hostility of world public opinion meant nothing to him. Mussolini had already spent enormous sums preparing for his colonial war and "intended to give Italy the opportunity to recoup its investment." In Grandi's opinion, this new prospect of challenging the League of Nations pleased Mussolini even more than the annexation of Ethiopia.
At the end of May 1935, Mussolini continued to maintain an anti-German stance and ranted about how he would “crush” Hitler if necessary. Italy signed a secret military agreement with France on the joint defense of Austrian independence, and consultations were held with the French General Staff regarding the strategy of the war against Germany. But in reality, Mussolini was about to move in the completely opposite direction. Even before concluding a military pact with France, he informed Germany that he was ready for a fundamental reorientation of the political course from the “Stresa Front” to confrontation with Western democracies.
For several years, Mussolini's men eavesdropped on negotiations between the British and French embassies in Rome. The Duce should have had confirmation from this source that there was a firm determination in London and Paris to prevent a war against Italy at almost any cost. When the British proposed an agreement regarding Ethiopia in June, Mussolini did not take it seriously: British rearmament had barely begun, and he knew that London had decided to give priority to the Japanese threat in the Far East.
As the weeks passed and nothing but verbal protests were heard from other members of the League of Nations, Mussolini realized that his plan was well on its way and was becoming feasible. Publicly, he listed ninety-one examples of Ethiopian “aggression” and declared that he was merely exercising the right of self-defense. But in private circles, the Duce said: even if he could take possession of this entire vast empire through peaceful negotiations, he would prefer war - victory in the war would be revenge for Italy’s defeat in Ethiopia in 1896. Mussolini wanted “war for the sake of war, because fascism needs the glory of victory.” The paradox was that just at this time, some people again began to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
For a time, Mussolini toyed with the idea of going personally to East Africa to lead the offensive. In his unpublished speeches, he stated that he wanted to force the whole world to submit to his will and, if the Ethiopians showed the slightest resistance, he would betray their land to “fire and sword.”
By August, Mussolini also began to talk about war with England if it stood in his way. This greatly alarmed his generals and admirals. They tried to convince the Duce that there was no way to start such a war, but he brazenly claimed that he could attack and sink the entire English fleet in Alexandria in a few hours. Perhaps he did not know what the Italian General Staff knew - only about half a dozen aircraft in Italy had sufficient range for this, and they also lacked the armor-piercing bombs to destroy enemy ships.
England's policy towards Italy in September, as Mussolini learned through his interception channels, continued to be a policy of connivance with the aggressor. With limited options and numerous commitments, especially in the Far East, England was unlikely to be able to defend Ethiopia's independence. But since articles began to appear in the Italian press about possible attacks on Suez, Gibraltar and Malta, London considered it wise to strengthen the fleet in the Mediterranean. Mussolini privately told the British that he would do the same if he were in their place, but publicly declared that this was an unacceptable threat, and cleverly used this fact in his homeland to raise patriotic feelings.
The commanders of the troops were amazed at the Duce's self-confidence, because they knew that his fable about the weakness of the British fleet was just a figment of his imagination. The fact that Italy received over three-quarters of its imports by sea and was even forced to send drinking water by sea to its armed forces in East Africa made it extremely vulnerable. The admirals reported that if England entered the war, they would not be able to protect even the Italian coast from bombing. But Mussolini correctly judged that the British would never move against Italy as long as they were sure that the main danger to them was Germany or Japan. When the Duce was right, the leaders of the armed forces, like all of Italy, were filled with admiration.
In these last weeks before the start of the war, there was something amazingly impudent in Mussolini’s whole appearance. He had almost no friends in the League of Nations, the Vatican considered him a little crazy, and the Pope, despite everyone's sympathy for the upcoming "Catholic Crusade," was plotting to introduce public censorship against "a civilized nation intent on conquering another country." . According to the US ambassador, Mussolini was not a madman, but a “cunning, inflexible, stubborn, ruthless and angry” man; The English ambassador considered him “extraordinarily devoid of remorse,” but creating “the constant impression of a man who turned out to be a victim, and not the master of his fate.”
War in East Africa
Mussolini's strategic plans were based on the assumption that the Ethiopians were poorly armed. They may have had several hundred machine guns, perhaps ten unarmed aircraft (although to the public Mussolini pretended that his opponents were very well armed with the most modern weapons). Having an undeniable superiority in air forces, Mussolini intended to use them to carry out a carefully prepared strategy of terrorizing the civilian population until they surrendered to the mercy of the winner. The plan was to destroy the main Ethiopian cities by bombardment if necessary. He also relied on the power of bribery, which he subsequently did in other countries that he planned to attack.
On October 2, the ringing of bells and the wail of sirens gathered the people of Italy in city squares, where the Duce announced the beginning of war through loudspeakers. This entire procedure had been carefully rehearsed by Starace in the preceding months. Twenty-six million people took part in this so-called greatest event in human history.
Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936 (video)
At the same time that a flotilla of planes set out to bomb the city of Adua, Mussolini sent a message to the League of Nations that Italy had become the victim of a barbaric and unprovoked aggression. On these planes were his two eldest sons and son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano. The youngest son, Bruno, was taken from school. At less than seventeen years old, after little training, he also received a pilot's license.
The Italians greeted the start of the war, oddly enough, without much enthusiasm. Mussolini was forced to admit this to himself. His claims that this was a defensive war against a barbarian aggressor clearly lacked credibility. Few responded to the call to volunteer to enlist in the army. What finally created excitement among the people was, as they expected, the unanimous condemnation of Italy by fifty members of the League of Nations. This is exactly what the Duce needed to convince the Italians that their country was in danger, that all true patriots should unite for a common cause.
Under the terms of the treaty establishing the League of Nations, any state that was a member of it and attacked another state was considered to have committed an act of aggression against all other members, who were required to sever trade relations with it. Mussolini agreed that he had violated the treaty, but argued that trying to place Italy on the same level as uncivilized Ethiopia was an act of humiliation of its national dignity. Universal condemnation in Geneva cut him off from Western democracies but provided unexpected support in his own homeland.
The economic blockade under the terms of the League of Nations treaty was not only mandatory, it was definitely political in nature for countries that saw collective security as their only system of protection. However, in reality, sanctions against Italy turned out to be more than useless. In the absence of a precedent for application, it took too much time to create a mechanism for their actual implementation at the same time by so many different countries. In particular, there was no agreement regarding the closure of the Suez Canal to military traffic or the ban on oil supplies, which would be tantamount to the outbreak of military action against Italy.
So much was said about fascist military preparations and so important was it to seize as much territory as possible before international reaction made itself felt that Mussolini, rejecting the advice of his army commanders, ordered to ignore the enemy remaining in the rear and move forward to the central regions of Ethiopia. De Bono complained about the incompetence of the Duce as an organizer and strategist; others believed that it was De Bono who was truly incompetent, who decided to wage a long war and did not count on the lightning victory that the political situation required. The choice of commander was an obvious mistake and, judging by the first hours of the offensive operation, Mussolini immediately began to look for a replacement.
Meanwhile, what happened caused terrible anxiety in London and Paris about the fate of the Stresa Front, formed by three anti-German states. Grandi, who was in London, remained almost completely unaware of the political decisions of Rome, so that he was sometimes forced to ask the English government what was happening. Privately, he tried to convince the British that Mussolini's belligerent public statements were intended for the ears of Italians abroad and should not be taken seriously.
Without informing the ambassador, Mussolini sent emissaries to London, whose appearance caused even greater confusion. One of them brought proposals for resolving the conflict. But when an envoy arrived from Ethiopia to Rome to discuss the terms, Mussolini refused to accept him on the pretext that he might be a hired assassin. Instead, the Duce entered into a strange agreement with a charming rogue named Jakir Bey, who took it upon himself to either kidnap Haile Selassie and take him to Italy, or to secretly conspire with him to stage a fictitious battle, which the Italians would supposedly win, after which the Ethiopians would agree to compromise world. For two months the fascist government continued to play this unheard-of game, but in the end it decided to pay off Cakir Bey, generously paying him for his silence. Some documents relating to this fact were removed from the archives.
In December, the French and British presented further proposals for a compromise, according to which Italy would be given most of what it claimed. Mussolini was ready to accept this Hoare-Laval plan as a basis for discussion, but the outburst of popular indignation in England against such a betrayal of Ethiopia forced Samuel Hoare to resign as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In turn, this gave Mussolini the opportunity to refuse the offer, while at the same time declaring that the refusal was forced on him.
December was a difficult month for the Duce. His colleagues believed that he was adrift without any clear political purpose and wondered how he could survive the almost unanimous condemnation of the Western world. Several Italian ministers and hierarchs were sent to fight in Ethiopia to show that they remained loyal squadristas at heart, and to enable everyone to see that Mussolini could easily rule the state without their help. Balbo noted that their leader had forced the war on them without any prior discussion or consultation, and that he had "rarely seen a spectacle of such magnitude with such lack of skill or with such frivolous naivety. Political, diplomatic, financial, even military preparations were completely inadequate." Mussolini “lived in isolation, within four walls, not seeing or hearing anything from the real world... surrounded only by sycophants who told him only what he wanted to hear. If you tell a person a hundred times a day that he is a genius, then he will eventually believe in his own infallibility.”
The victory was supposed to serve as a justification for Mussolini; he expected it from Marshal Badoglio, who replaced De Bono. Badoglio was ordered to use any terrorist methods, including the destruction of villages and the use of chemical agents on a large scale. Although Mussolini himself signed an international convention banning the use of poison gases, he continued to consider them a conventional weapon of war as long as their use was kept secret. The Duce was ready, if necessary, to use even bacteriological weapons to spread infectious diseases. Since Jakir Bey and other intermediaries had failed in conquering Ethiopia by cunning, the decision was made to use any possible military means. There was no point in spending ten years producing hundreds of tons of poison gas without using it to intimidate and demoralize the enemy.
The very fact of the use of gas is perhaps less noteworthy than the enormous efforts that were made to conceal it. Mussolini needed to make the world believe that a civilized country like Italy was a savage country involved in the war, so all reports from the front were carefully checked. He also did not want people to think that the Italians won only by resorting to illegal methods of struggle. The Duce knew that if such facts came to the surface, it would deal a strong blow to fascist prestige. Mustard gas was Mussolini's secret weapon, and he wanted to keep this secret so that he could use it in the future.
In early 1936, Badoglio's huge army began to advance deep into Ethiopia from the north, while Graziani advanced from Somalia in the south. Mussolini realized that a compromise peace was no longer needed. The danger arose when the British finally decided to propose a ban on oil supplies. In response, Mussolini threatened to withdraw from the League of Nations and possibly attack Sudan. However, he did not forget to encourage the peacekeepers, continuing to hold separate negotiations with them in Rome, Geneva and Djibouti in order to create the impression that an agreement with him could still be reached.
Meanwhile, Grandi tried to regain Mussolini's trust. He reported from London the unlikely information that King Edward allegedly wanted the Italians to know that he was secretly on their side and, in great secrecy, told the Italian ambassador that he considered the English government’s attempt to support the League of Nations “criminal and ridiculous.” Grandi's efforts were aimed at causing panic in London over the threat of war: articles should be placed in English newspapers saying that Italy had an army of eight million and the most powerful air force in Europe and that any resistance to it would not only doomed to failure, but could lead to the establishment of Nazi Germany's hegemony in Europe.
In early May, Badoglio occupied Addis Ababa. Apparently, the war has come to a triumphant conclusion. The fact that most of Ethiopia remained unconquered and that the fighting continued for the next three years was hidden from the Italian public. Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed emperor in place of "Signor Tafari". Mussolini declared that captured Ethiopians would now be executed as “rebels.” His generals received official permission to continue to use poison gas and pursue a “systematic policy of terror,” as well as specific instructions to destroy the small stratum of intellectuals who could lead the resistance movement. A rule was introduced for every Italian who died, even by accident, to execute ten Ethiopians.
By creating the Italian Empire, Mussolini finally achieved the goal he had set for himself many years ago. The Italian people received with joy the news that the Ethiopians unanimously and friendlyly welcomed the conquerors, thanking them for bringing them civilization, justice and technical achievements. European countries strenuously assured that Italy had satisfied all its sovereign demands and would no longer lay claim to any territory. Fascism will now become conservative, inclined to oppose violence and, in relation to the revolution, will move to the “other side of the barricades.” Mussolini convinced the British that rumors about his recruiting a huge army from Ethiopians had no basis.
None of these statements were true, but the Duce hoped that they would be believed.
Those close to the Duce admitted that waging such a war as he waged may be immoral, but the only morality in politics is success. The “greatest colonial war in history” was planned and won personally by Mussolini - everyone should have understood this. He tried in every possible way to ensure that the merits of his military leaders De Bonnet, Badoglio and Graziani did not overshadow the glory that rightfully belonged to him alone. The victory in Ethiopia was described as a "masterpiece" that amazed the world. It was said that European military experts considered Ethiopia a country that did not know defeat. Among the foreigners, scribblers were hired, who could then be generously quoted in Italy.
It is difficult to determine what this war cost. The Ethiopians estimate, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, that they lost half a million people. The Italian side claimed that about 5,000 soldiers died on their side, mostly non-whites. Mussolini, commenting on these figures, cynically stated that he would like more Italians to die so that this war would look more serious. Almost the entire annual national income was spent on the war. The amount of military materials spent would be enough to equip seventy-five divisions. In financial terms, this was equal to the entire military budget of the country for the next three years. However, Mussolini thought he could make people believe that the army had emerged from the war stronger than ever. Also exaggerating, he spoke of the new colony as a “promised land”, with the help of which it was possible to solve all Italian economic problems. In reality, it has caused enormous expenditure on already limited national resources.
Mussolini Sphinx sculpture, built by soldiers after the victory over Ethiopia
Dictatorial propaganda sought to perpetuate many such misconceptions. Still, it was not difficult for outside observers to notice that as a result of the military efforts undertaken, Italy became much weaker than before. The program of long-term supply of troops in the Red Sea basin turned out to be very expensive and extremely vulnerable, especially now that systematic provocations and threats from Mussolini finally prompted England to rearm more quickly. Economic sanctions, although ineffective, still brought losses. By alienating Western democracies, Mussolini pushed himself ever closer to an alliance with Germany and thus began to lose one of Italy's most important advantages - the ability to play powerful European powers against each other. The possibilities for maneuver in foreign policy have narrowed sharply. Now Mussolini had become a truly prominent figure - in the United States, the fascists began to be treated as a gang of unscrupulous gangsters, and some again suggested that if the Duce had not gone completely crazy, he was still capable of pouncing “like a mad dog” on anyone something else.
The negative results of Mussolini's victory in Africa emerged much later. In a short time, he managed to challenge fifteen member countries of the League of Nations. Instantly becoming a central figure in world politics, Mussolini forced the British to accept that he had challenged and won. In Italy itself, he convinced many doubters of his genius and reached the finest hour of his popularity.
Saying that all his ambitions were satisfied, Mussolini increasingly came to the idea that if he could win the greatest colonial war in human history, then he could accomplish something greater. “Every stop is a loss,” he once told an old acquaintance, not even allowing the thought of how dangerous such a slogan was. Mussolini intended to establish a powerful metallurgical industry in Ethiopia, capable of producing the necessary weapons for the army of millions of soldiers whom he planned to recruit there, and he wanted it to be thought that he was busy studying the Amharic language, as befitted the ruler of an empire. Already in March 1936, he began to talk about the inevitability of the next war and the need to direct the entire national economy to this main goal. Most of the industry had to stop producing products for private consumers and concentrate solely on producing weapons. Some of the Duce's ministers finally realized that his self-confidence, which arose as a result of the too easy victory over the poorly armed and disorganized Ethiopian army, was a cruel joke of fate, which lured him onto the path of final defeat.
The months following the war in Ethiopia were marked by a new upsurge in the Duchismo movement, and Mussolini was not such a strong personality to withstand the barrage of praise that fell upon him. Peasants in the fields fell to their knees before him, women held up babies so that he could give them his blessing, and cabinet ministers sometimes stood at attention for hours in his presence. The time came when Starace established a general rule for those who wanted to interview the Duce: they had to run to his desk and then back in the same way, only stopping for a moment at the door to salute him.
Any reasonable person should have understood that this crossed all boundaries and carried a certain danger. But Mussolini himself did not understand this. A flock of well-paid journalists insisted every day that the Duce was almost a deity, at least the deputy of God on earth, who came to make history, the helmsman and leader of a race destined to dominate at all times.
Mussolini's mother also became something of a cult. In memory of her, schoolchildren sang the song “Happy Mother” in recitative. The birthplace of the Duce and the burial place of his parents turned into a shrine, before which visitors had to kneel as a sign of gratitude. The new edition of the biography written by Pini quite officially stated that Mussolini is considered throughout the world to be a superman and the greatest genius of our time. Those who held this opinion included Gandhi, Douglas Fairbanks, Kipling, De Valera, Stravinsky, Lejar, Pierrot Morgan, Franklin Roosevelt and "an infinite number of others."
80 years ago, in May 1936, the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935-1936 ended. (Second Italo-Abyssinian War) - a war between the Kingdom of Italy and Ethiopia. The result of the war was the annexation of Ethiopia and the proclamation of it, together with the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia, as colonies of Italian East Africa. This war showed the inability of the League of Nations, of which both Italy and Ethiopia were members, in resolving international conflicts. The international community was generally indifferent to the occupation of Ethiopia. Although on June 30, 1936, at an emergency session of the League of Nations dedicated to the annexation of Ethiopia, the last emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, called for the return of independence to the country and criticized the world community for inaction. He prophetically warned: “What happens to us today will happen to you tomorrow.”
The world community (the West) not only remained inactive, but contributed to Italian aggression. In fact, the Anglo-Saxons “fed” Ethiopia to Italy. The United States immediately announced that it would not sell equipment to both warring parties. For Italy, this ban did not matter, since it had its own fairly developed military-industrial complex and the support of powerful German industry. As a result, it was a blow to Ethiopia's defense capabilities only. The United States also voted at a meeting of the League of Nations against a proposal to close the Suez Canal to Italy - the main communication of Italian forces, without which it could not effectively fight in East Africa. Britain, which de facto controlled Suez, also did not close the canal to Italian ships. France also found itself in this camp when the French colonial authorities in Djibouti refused to transport them to the Ethiopian border and then detained a shipment of weapons ordered by Addis Ababa. Britain and France proposed a “settlement” plan: Ethiopia was to give up part of its territory and sovereignty in favor of Italy (accept Italian advisers, provide exceptional economic benefits). It is clear that Ethiopia has rejected such a peace plan.
Only the Soviet Union decisively defended Ethiopia's independence, although it did not have diplomatic relations with it. However, the USSR's proposals to blockade the aggressor did not pass in the League of Nations. The League of Nations recognized Italy as an aggressor and imposed partial economic sanctions. But the embargo did not apply to a number of strategic materials; not all states joined the sanctions, and Italy could buy the necessary materials through third countries. Among the countries that refused to sever economic ties with Italy and actively supported it economically, the USA, Germany, Austria and Hungary stood out in terms of supply volumes. Thus, leading Western countries were either indifferent to Italy’s aggression or supported it.
In this war, Italian troops widely used prohibited chemical weapons: mustard gas and phosgene. The Ethiopian War is considered a precursor to World War II (along with the Spanish Civil War and the Japanese invasion of China). Victory in the war made Mussolini one of the most prominent and significant figures in European politics and showed the power of the “Italian weapons.” As a result, Italy overestimated its strength and tried to continue its conquests by getting involved in a war with Greece, but the Greeks crushed the Italians. Greece was only captured in April 1941, when Germany entered the war.
The occupation of Ethiopia lasted only a few years. The partisan movement immediately began, causing big problems for the Italians. Individual units of the Ethiopian army also continued to resist. In response, the Italians unleashed mass terror. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians died. This struggle continued until 1941, which forced Italy to maintain large military contingents (about 110 thousand people) in Italian East Africa. In January 1941, the British launched an offensive: from Kenya through Italian Somalia, from South Yemen through British Somalia and from Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The British began to push back the Italians and on March 25 they took Harar, the second largest city in the country. Subsequently, the British advanced with the support of Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian troops, formed by the Italians, also began to side with Emperor Selassie. In early April, fighting began in the capital area and on April 6, the Ethiopians recaptured Addis Ababa. The Italians began to retreat north into the Aladzhi mountain range. On May 5, 1941, the emperor returned to the capital. By the end of the year, the Italians finally left Ethiopia. True, the British remained in Abyssinia until 1954.
Background
Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was an ancient state that existed in various forms since the early Middle Ages. In the 12th century, the Christian principalities united. In XIII, Abyssinia was led by the Solomon dynasty, which, according to legend, originated from King Solomon, the Queen of Sheba and their son. This dynasty ruled until 1974. At its height, the Ethiopian Empire united the territories of modern Ethiopia, Eritrea, Eastern Sudan, Southern Egypt, part of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Christian Abyssinia withstood the period of Arab and Islamic aggression. Ethiopia was also the only African state to maintain its independence during the colonial expansion of European states. At first, Ethiopia withstood the onslaught of the Portuguese and the Jesuits, who introduced Catholicism. Then Ethiopia successfully held back the onslaught of Egypt and Sudan and survived the British invasion.
Since ancient times, Abyssinia occupied an important place on the route from Europe to Africa and further to India and China. With the construction of the Suez Canal this importance increased. Especially for England - the imperial path to India and other colonies, as well as France - to Indochina. Therefore, the Europeans took over the coastal lands of Ethiopia. England occupied the Suakin region, annexing it to Sudan, and British Somalia. France occupied French Somalia with its capital in Djibouti. Italy captured Eritrea and Italian Somalia. To the north and northeast, Abyssinia bordered Italian Eritrea; in the east - with French and British Somalia; in the south - with Italian Somalia and British East Africa (Kenya), in the west and northwest - with Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Thus, Abyssinia was cut off from the sea and sandwiched between European colonies.
The 1880s saw the first clashes with the Italians. In 1889, the Treaty of Ucchiala was concluded between Italy and Ethiopia, according to which the Abyssinians recognized the transfer of the coastal regions to the Italians. In 1890, Italy united all its possessions on the Red Sea into the colony of Eritrea and announced that, by the 1889 treaty, Ethiopia recognized Italy's protectorate over itself. Almost all of Africa during this period had already been divided between European powers, and Italy, which had recently become a single state and was late to the division of the “African pie,” hoped to seize resource-rich Ethiopia and make it the core of its colonial possessions on the Dark Continent. Ethiopia was at the stage of feudal fragmentation; the emperor's power over the largest feudal lords was conditional. Also behind Italy was Britain, which supported the aggression of the Italians. Therefore, the Italians underestimated the enemy and presented this colonial war as an easy walk. And the Abyssinians were born warriors, tenacious in battle and skilled in hand-to-hand combat. Over its centuries-old history, Abyssinia has more than once emerged victorious from difficult trials without losing its state and military traditions. In addition, before the start of the war, the imperial throne was occupied by Menelik II, who proved himself to be a skilled statesman and commander. He made a great contribution to the unification and economic development of the state, and also expanded the borders of Ethiopia in the south and southwest.
Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II
A new war began in 1894. In this confrontation, Russia provided diplomatic and partially military support to Abyssinia. Ethiopia made a coup by establishing friendly relations with the Russian Empire and breaking the diplomatic blockade. As a result, Russia provided assistance in the modernization of Abyssinia. Thousands of Russian volunteers visited Ethiopia. In particular, Alexander Bulatovich was Menelik's military adviser. Russia, like France, helped Abyssinia with weapons and ammunition, but unlike the French, for free.
Back in 1894, an expedition of Eliseev and Leontyev was organized to Abyssinia with the aim of establishing diplomatic relations and offering assistance in organizing the army. As Leontyev noted in his diary: the idea of the campaign was born “out of the desire to show the whole world that we, Russians, can serve our homeland, and, moreover, without resorting to fire and sword, no worse than the British, French and Germans, who with the help of these two factors forged strong nests in Africa." The sympathies of Russian society were on the side of the African country where Orthodox Christians lived. Also, Russia, which had no colonies, planned to get a reliable ally in Africa. In Ethiopia, the Russians were greeted with joy and a return embassy was sent. Thus, friendly relations between the two Orthodox powers were established. Therefore, when the war began, Nikolai Leontyev was in Abyssinia with a group of volunteer officers. They occupied an exceptional position under the Ethiopian emperor. The Ethiopian Negus (“king of kings”, emperor) received from the Russians all the information on issues of modern European tactics and strategy, and with their help adjusted his policy with foreigners. In 1895, Russia secretly supplied Abyssinia with firearms, bladed weapons, and cartridges. After the war, through the efforts of Leontyev, the formation of a regular Ethiopian army began. Russian volunteers and advisers continued to help Ethiopia until the First World War.
Italian troops captured a number of cities and occupied the Tigre region. Ethiopia mobilized 100 thousand. army and in December 1895, Ethiopian troops defeated the Italians. On March 1, 1896, the Ethiopians inflicted another major defeat on the Italians. The defeat was complete: the Italian army of 17.7 thousand people lost about 15 thousand soldiers killed and captured and all the artillery. Having suffered a serious defeat, the Italians began negotiations. Russia supported the peace negotiations. In October 1896, peace was signed in Addis Ababa. Italy, having paid indemnity, recognized the independence of Ethiopia. Ethiopia's northern border was established. For the first time, a European power paid indemnity to an African country. Therefore, in Europe they joked about “Menelik’s tributaries” for a long time. It should be noted that Ethiopia's successes (largely associated with Russian support) stopped British advances in this region and forced Britain to choose a new target for aggression - the Boer republics.
Negus Menelik formally ruled until 1913 (in 1903, the Ethiopian emperor became seriously ill and actually retired from governing the country) and left Ethiopia as the only independent state in Africa (except for Liberia). Emperor Iyasu maintained the country's neutrality during World War I. But Ethiopia adhered to a pro-German orientation, hoping to gain benefits in the fight against the British, French and Italians.
Map of the Ethiopian Empire in the early 1930s
On the way to the Second Italo-Ethiopian War
After the First World War of 1914-1918, which Rome entered hoping for broad territorial gains, Italy had nothing to boast of. The Italian colonial empire included deserts, without obvious rich resources and sparsely populated - Eritrea, Italian Somalia, Libya taken from Turkey and the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea. The dreams of the Italian leadership and the big bourgeoisie about extensive acquisitions at the expense of the German colonies and Austrian possessions in the Balkans did not come true. As a result, in 1935, France and England owned more than 70% of Africa, and Italy owned just over 5%.
Internal problems and the economic crisis pushed Italy to further implement the colonial program. Italy needed resources, lands for colonization, victories were needed to channel the energy of the dissatisfied masses. Therefore, Benito Mussolini, who came to power in 1922, and the Italian fascists maintained the colonial program and theoretically developed it. Italy was now considered the heir to the Roman Empire and its spirit, and was to achieve dominance in the Mediterranean, North Africa, all the way to Abyssinia in the east and Cameroon in the west of the continent. Thus, not satisfied with the division of African colonies after the war of 1914-1918, Italy embarked on the path of revising the colonial division of Africa. Rome planned to create an Italian colonial empire from Libya to Cameroon, a former German colony.
Ethiopia was to be the first victim. Firstly, Abyssinia was the only independent state in Africa, that is, the war with Addis Ababa did not threaten a direct clash with Paris or London. The British and French were not allies of Ethiopia and did not intend to defend it. Moreover, Western countries blocked the supply of weapons to Abyssinia. Ethiopia itself was considered a weak opponent. A significant part of her army consisted of territorial and tribal militias, whose warriors were armed with spears and bows.
Secondly, the capture of Ethiopia made it possible to unite the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia, which made it possible to create a strong springboard for further expansion in Africa. The Ethiopian bridgehead was of strategic importance, as it influenced the struggle in the Mediterranean theater from the southeast and threatened the main British imperial route through Gibraltar, Suez, the Red Sea and on to Persia, India, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. The Abyssinian bridgehead threatened the British trans-African railways, waterways and air lines London - Cairo - Khartoum - Kapstadt and Cairo - Baghdad - Bahrain - Karachi. Also, Italy, having captured Abyssinia, created a threat to sea communications between France and its colonies in Indochina. Thus, Ethiopia occupied an important strategic position, and its capture strengthened Italy's position as one of the leading world powers and allowed for expansion in Africa.
Thirdly, unlike other Italian colonies, Abyssinia was rich and had serious resource potential. Abyssinia was supposed to become an important raw material base and sales market for Italy, as well as a territory for colonization, where the Italian poor could be resettled (especially from the south of the country). The Italian bourgeoisie needed super-profits, and for this they needed war and colonial conquests. In addition, the Italians wanted to wash away the shame of their previous defeat in the first Italo-Ethiopian War, when they became “tributers of Menelik.”
Crowd in Piazza Venezia in Rome during Mussolini's speech on the mobilization. 1935
Fourthly, the international situation on the eve of the Italo-Abyssinian War was developing favorably for Italy. Italy in 1928 concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Abyssinia, but it was a formality. When it was not possible to annex Ethiopia “peacefully,” Italy headed for war. Since 1932, the Italians began to plan a military invasion of Abyssinia. The examples of Japan, which captured Manchuria from China, and Germany, which in 1935 violated the Versailles agreements with impunity and set a course for creating full-fledged armed forces, were very close to Italy.
The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (reigned from 1930), unlike Menelik, was unable to find reliable external allies. An attempt to establish friendly relations with Japan failed. They were unable to equip the army with modern weapons due to the resistance of the Western powers.
England, which maintained a leading position in the region, was hostile to Ethiopia. On the one hand, it was unprofitable for London to strengthen Italy in the region at the expense of Ethiopia. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon elite set a course for inciting a new world war. To achieve this, even to the detriment of the strategic interests of the British Empire, three global centers of war were created - Italy, Germany and Japan. Damage to Britain's vital interests in the present was bound to pay off many times over in the future. Therefore, British policy was contradictory. Thus, the British Foreign Office made it clear to Rome that if British interests in Lake Tana and the Blue Nile River were not affected, England would not interfere with Italy. A similar idea was expressed by McDonald (former head of the British government) in a conversation with Mussolini. The Duce asked how London would react to the fact of the Italian army’s invasion of Ethiopia. The Labor leader responded cynically: “England is a lady. Women like actively offensive men, but subject to secrecy. Therefore, act tactfully, and we will not object.” The Italians were made to understand that the seizure of Ethiopia was recognized.
At the same time, London began extensive military preparations in the zone of its main communications in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and spread rumors about the possibility of closing the Suez Canal to Italy. In response, the Italian government said sanctions, especially on oil, amounted to a declaration of war. Benito Mussolini began to threaten England by putting forward the slogan of reviving the “Great Roman Empire” on the corpse of a British lion. As a result, the British threat was not realized when the war began. Although, as future events of the Second World War showed, Britain had every opportunity to stop Italy’s aggression.
France also gave the Italian aggressor a free hand by concluding an agreement with Rome on January 7, 1935. According to it, in exchange for supporting France's position in Europe, Italy received several islands in the Red Sea and the right to use the French section of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway to supply the Italian army. Having concluded this agreement, Italy began transporting troops to Africa using the railway. On April 15, 1935, Mussolini and Laval signed a Franco-Italian agreement to correct the French border in Africa: in exchange for concessions to France on questions of the citizenship of Italian settlers in Tunisia, France transferred 22 km of coastline to Italy opposite the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. After the start of the war, this section of the coast was used by Italian troops as a bridgehead. Paris wanted to use the current situation to strengthen ties with Rome in order to tear Italy away from Germany. Also, the French were not averse to weakening Britain’s position in the region, and wanted to direct the efforts of the Italians to Africa, diverting them from South-Eastern Europe, where French capital had serious economic interests. Lawal later boastfully declared that he "gave him (Mussolini) this Ethiopia." At the same time, the French, according to the American Ambassador to Germany Dodd, recommended that the Italians seize Ethiopia in parts, as they did Morocco, so it would be easier to “digest.”
The United States followed a similar policy. Back in 1934, the American government refused to mediate the Ethiopian issue. Washington did its best to make Ethiopia “realize that no one in the world will help it” and finally abandon “exaggerated ideas about independence and agree to the moderate demands of Italy. On August 31, 1935, with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia a foregone conclusion, the American Congress passed the Neutrality Act. This meant that the Italian aggressor had complete advantage over the victim.
Thus, England, the USA and France contributed to the aggression of Italian fascism, pursuing far-reaching goals of destabilizing the world order and starting a world war, as well as solving personal problems that were far from maintaining peace.
Germany supported Italy. Hitler was quite happy with the fact that Italy, which at that time was not inferior to Germany in strength and even superior (the Reich had just begun to create full-fledged armed forces and transfer the economy to a “military footing”), set its sights on the south and was distracted from Central and South-Eastern Europe . In particular, Germany and Italy had different goals in Austria. Hitler planned Anschluss (reunification), and Mussolini wanted to maintain an independent Austria. In addition, world public opinion, Berlin believed, would be attracted by the war between Italy and Ethiopia, which would allow Germany to arm itself more calmly.
Italy had been intensively preparing for war since 1933 and, provoking it, did not want to transfer controversial issues with Abyssinia to an international arbiter. In Eritrea, Somalia and Libya, military infrastructure was being prepared: seaports, airfields, military bases were built and reconstructed, and roads were laid. To transport the expeditionary army, more than 155 sea vessels with a total tonnage of approximately 1,250 thousand tons were prepared, purchased and chartered. To conduct combat operations, Italy created reserves and sharply increased purchases of weapons, aircraft, aircraft engines, spare parts, oil, and various kinds of raw materials and goods from the United States. Other Western countries also actively armed Italy. Thus, French Renault factories supplied tanks. Since February 1935, having carried out a series of private mobilizations, Italy began to transfer troops to Eritrea and Italian Somalia. At the same time, Rome waged an active information war against Abyssinia, accusing the Negus of the slave trade, and demanded that Abyssinia be excluded from the membership of the League of Nations. Italy offered to transfer Abyssinia to it “for correction.” Thus, in Western traditions, preparations for aggression took place in line with the “civilizing mission” and “establishing order in Abyssinia.”
