This person's life is divided into three parts. The first - from birth to imprisonment for anarchist activities, the second - four years of continuous battles, campaigns and treatment for numerous wounds, and the third - thirteen years in a foreign land.
Nestor Makhno was born on October 26, 1888 in Gulyai-Pole in the family of a former serf, groom. Eyewitnesses claimed that during the christening, the priest's cassock caught fire, and he exclaimed in his hearts that the baby would grow up "a robber such as the world had never seen." Considering all these components, there is nothing strange in the fact that the boy emerged as an unsurpassed master of cavalry raids and battles.
Studying at the zemstvo school was short-lived, and at the age of 10, Nestor began working - first, as a father, with horses, and then as a laborer. Subsequently, his fate was influenced by the 1905 revolution, which caused a rather tangible wave of enthusiasm for the ideas of anarchism. Young workers, disenchanted with the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, joined the ranks of the anarchist movement, the center of which was Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk).
The guy did not have to be a member of the anarchist "Union of Poor Farmers" in Gulyai-Polye for long. The revolutionary activity needed money, so the opposition to the tsarist regime obtained it through expropriations - armed robbery of enterprises, banks, post offices and the bourgeois in general. After the police and postmen were killed, Nestor was arrested in August 1908 and faced a death sentence. The revolutionary's mother wrote a letter to the mother of Tsar Nicholas II - Maria Fedorovna, with a request to reconsider the case, since Nestor was then considered a minor - he was not yet 21 years old.
The young man served hard labor in the Moscow Central Prison - Butyrka. Among the political prisoners there were many teachers and students, in political disputes with whom he formed his worldview. In the cell, the young prisoner received the nickname "Modest", because his comrades had repeatedly heard from him: "I will become a great man!" He spent seven years in Butyrka prison and was released by the February 1917 revolution.
In March, Nestor returned to his native village - Gulyai-Pole. He headed the local council and the trade union of metalworkers and woodworkers, co-founded the Peasant Union and organized a peasant self-defense detachment. And in 1918, its own rebel army appeared in the "Free Gulyai-Polish Republic". Makhno and his brothers-in-arms fought with everyone who came to conquer the Zaporozhye steppes - the Austro-German army, Hetman Skoropadsky, Denikin and Wrangel, the Bolsheviks, the Entente and the Directory. And not only with them.
Taking Yekaterinoslav, Nestor Ivanovich, along with his staff, drank heavily to celebrate, and then began to play in the city park. Namely: the Makhnovists, sitting on a swing and a merry-go-round, began to shoot at city dwellers who had the misfortune of not being dressed like a proletarian and walking in the park that day. Well, others staged a pogrom in the city. Then the sober Makhno shot several dozen of the most vicious pogromists. Of course, not from their environment.
The first steps of the newly-minted republic were interrupted by the heavy stomp of the Austro-German army, which Skoropadsky invited to fight the Bolshevik detachments advancing from the north. At the end of April, after Makhno was driven out of the Ukraine, he reached Moscow through Rostov, Saratov and Samara. There he met Sverdlov and Lenin, whom he made a great impression on (more than Lenin on Makhno). The fact of the meeting was hushed up by Soviet historians for a long time. Constructive conversation didn't work out. Nestor was interested in Lenin's attitude to anarchism, and Lenin - in how anarchists can be used in the fight against the Germans and Skoropadsky.
Makhno was more impressed by his meeting with the theorist of anarchism Pyotr Kropotkin. He answered all the questions of interest and said goodbye words that Nestor remembered for the rest of his life: "Selflessness, firmness of spirit and will on the way to the intended goal, all win." Having secretly returned to Gulyai-Pole, Makhno began an armed struggle against the hetman's punitive detachments and German troops. Peasants came to him, dissatisfied with the return of the landowners, the liquidation of democratic institutions, and requisition. After one victorious battle on October 10, 1918, the rebels named their thirty-year-old commander "father".
Makhno won thanks to his original tactics and ingenuity. He was the first to guess to put the Maxim machine gun on the spring cart of the German colonists familiar from childhood. This is how the legendary "tachanka" was born. With a pivoting front axle and four horses, she was a formidable force in battle. The military science of that time did not know such oncoming cavalry attacks: cavalry flew towards the enemy, and behind it - hundreds of machine-gun carts. Instantly, on command, the cavalry went to the sides - and the enemy crashed into a wall of machine-gun fire. The machine gun regiments proved to be quite effective in the fight against the Don and Kuban cavalry of Denikin and Wrangel.
Twice in the fight against them, Batka (Batko) Makhno was an ally of the Red Army. And on June 4, 1919, Klim Voroshilov even came to Gulyai-Pole to personally award Nestor with the Order of the Red Banner No. 1. Twice he was outlawed, and his troops tried to destroy. Defending the peasants, he opposed the surplus appropriation system, the willfulness of the "check" and the commissars. The document adopted at the congress of peasant representatives in Gulyai-Pole said: “The Soviet government, by its orders, is trying to take away their freedom from local councils ... We have not elected commissars to monitor the activities of the councils and ruthlessly deal with unwanted ones. The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat in practice means the monopoly of one party. "
In the fall of 1919, the number of Makhno's detachments under black flags reached one hundred thousand people. It was then that he concluded an alliance with Petliura, and his stab in the back of Denikin's army largely decided the fate of the White movement. A year later, he helped the Bolsheviks take the Crimea: the Makhnovists were the first to cross the Sivash, and immediately after that the Red Army began a war against them. Over the next ten months, Makhno carried out military campaigns in the Azov region, the Don and the Volga region, losing most of his troops.
With the defeat of Denikin and Wrangel, the Red Army threw all its might against the Makhnovists. Having experienced defeat, Makhno on August 28, 1921, with the remnants of his army - a detachment of 77 people, crossed the Dniester to Romania. He lived in Bucharest, then in Warsaw and there, in September 1923 he was arrested on charges of preparing an uprising in Western Ukraine, but acquitted by the court. After wandering in Poland and Germany, he lived in Torun, and in April 1925 he moved with his wife and daughter to Paris, where he worked as a turner, a printer, and a shoemaker while they were strong.
Nestor Makhno died in Paris on July 25, 1934. His body was cremated and buried in the Père Lachaise cemetery, in the columbarium wall, at number 6686 - next to the Parisian Communards.
For a long time, Makhno was molded into a cinematic ataman, unrestrained in rage, unpredictable, capable only of meaningless actions, in no way connected with the people. Who was he really? A bandit? Then why did he have such support from the local population?
Everything is still a mystery. If we manage to unravel the mystery of Nestor Makhno, it means that another key to
Biography of Nestor Ivanovich Makhno! (The whole life of Old Man.) There is a legend that on the priest who baptized Nestor Makhno, a vestment was lit from a candle flame. According to popular belief, this means that a robber was born, whom the world had never seen. Nestor Makhno was born on October 26, 1888. Father, Ivan Makhno, the coachman of a wealthy Gulyaypole man, wrote down the date of his son's birth a year later - this was sometimes done in order not to give very young sons to the army (fate: later the year attributed to Nestor saved his life). Ivan Rodionovich died early. "Five of us, brothers-orphans, small and small, remained in the arms of an unhappy mother who did not have a stake or a yard. I vaguely recall my early childhood, deprived of the usual games and fun for a child, darkened by a strong need and family, until the boys got to their feet and began to earn money for themselves ", - recalled Makhno in his memoirs (written, by the way, in Russian - the Ukrainian language dad did not know much).
Eight-year-old Nestor was sent to school. The boy studied well, but at some point he became addicted to skating. He regularly collected books in the morning, but never showed up at school. The teachers haven't seen him for weeks. Once on Shrovetide, Nestor fell under the ice and nearly drowned. Having learned about the incident, the mother "regaled" her son for a long time with a piece of twisted rope. After the execution, Nestor could not sit for several days, but he became a diligent student. "... In the winter I studied, and in the summer I was hired by rich farmers to graze sheep or calves. During the threshing, I drove oxen from landowners in carts, receiving 25 kopecks (in today's money - 60-70 rubles) per day."
At the age of 16, Makhno entered the Gulyaypole iron foundry as a laborer, where he entered the theater group (an amazing detail that does not fit into our ideas about the life of workers at the beginning of the century).
In the fall of 1906, Makhno became a member of the anarchist group. After a while, he was arrested for illegal possession of a pistol (there was a reason for that: Makhno tried to shoot his jealous friend's rival), but was released as a young man.
The group committed four robberies in a year. On August 27, 1907, Makhno entered into a firefight with the guards and wounded a peasant. After some time he was detained and identified, but the anarchists either intimidated or bribed the witnesses, and they refused their initial testimony. The young anarchist was released. The group has committed several murders. Nestor did not participate in these murders, but then they did not understand much. The military-field "Stolypin" court, before which the accomplices appeared, gave the gallows and not for that. Makhno was saved by a year's postscript and his mother's troubles: the death penalty was replaced by hard labor.
For six years he was in Butyrskaya prison (for bad behavior - in shackles). Here he learned to write poetry, met the anarchist-terrorist Peter Arshinov (Marina) and received thorough theoretical training, and not only in the area of \u200b\u200banarchism: in the conclusion, according to Makhno, he read "all Russian writers, starting with Sumarokov and ending with Lev Shestov. ". On March 2, 1917, Makhno and Arshinov were liberated by the revolution.
Nestor returned home and married a peasant woman, Nastya Vasetskaya, with whom he corresponded while in prison. They had a son who soon died. The marriage broke up. Makhno was no longer up to family life: he quickly moved to the Gulyaypole leadership.
In the fall of 1917, Makhno was elected to as many as five public positions. How compatible is anarchy with an elected leadership and where is the line beyond which the self-organization of the masses ends and the "monster bastards, mischievously ... one hundred percent" begins - gosudarstvoN For the answer, Makhno went to the Yekaterinoslav anarchists and immediately realized that he was at the wrong address. "... I asked myself: why did they take away from the bourgeoisie such a luxurious and large building? Why do they need it, when here, among this screaming crowd, there is no order even in the cries with which they solve a number of the most important problems of the revolution, when the hall is not swept, in many places the chairs are overturned, on a large table covered with luxurious velvet, there are pieces of bread, heads of herring, gnawed bonesN "
The landowners' lands were confiscated in favor of the "working peasantry". In the vicinity of Gulyaypole, communes began to emerge (Makhno himself worked twice a week in one of them), and workers' self-government bodies were gaining more and more power at enterprises. In December 1917, Makhno arrived in Yekaterinoslav as a delegate to the provincial congress of Soviets: the people's representatives "were angry with each other and fought among themselves, drawing the workers into a fight."
Meanwhile, in accordance with the terms of the "obscene" Brest Peace, Ukraine was occupied by German and Austro-Hungarian troops. On March 1, 1918, they entered Kiev, at the end of April they occupied Gulyaypole. Makhno and several of his anarchist comrades left for Taganrog. From there, the future father went to the Volga region, and then to Moscow.
What the anarchist Makhno saw in the "red" provinces alarmed him. He regarded the dictatorship of the proletariat declared by the Bolsheviks as an attempt to split the working people. The impressions of the "new Moscow" in the summer of 1918 strengthened him even more in this thought. Neither a conversation with Sverdlov and Lenin in June 1918 in the Kremlin, nor even a visit to the aged Prince Pyotr Kropotkin helped. "There are no parties," the old man lamented three years later, "... but there are handfuls of charlatans who, in the name of personal gain and thrills ... destroy the working people."
According to false documents, Makhno returned to Gulyaypole - to raise the uprising of the working people under the black banner of anarchy. Bad news awaited him: the Austrians shot one of his brothers, tortured the other, burned the hut.
In September 1918, Makhno gave the first battle to the invaders. He raided wealthy German farms and estates, killed Germans and officers of the army of the nominal ruler of Ukraine, Hetman Skoropadsky. A lover of daring undertakings, once, disguised as a hetman's officer's uniform, he appeared at the landowner's name day and, in the midst of the celebration, when the guests were drinking for the capture of the "bandit Makhno", threw a grenade on the table. The surviving "guests" were killed with bayonets. The estate was burnt down.
Those shot, hanged, impaled, with severed heads, raped by thousands, lay down in the land of Ukraine. And everyone was guilty of this: the "civilized" Germans, and the "noble" White Guards, and the Reds, and the rebels, of whom there were a great many besides Makhno at that time. Taking Gulyaypole, the whites raped eight hundred Jewish women, and many of them were killed in the most cruel way - by ripping open their bellies. The Reds shot the monks of the Spaso-Mgarsky Monastery. All ... At the Orekhovo station, Makhno ordered to burn the priest alive - in the locomotive furnace.
Makhno was not an anti-Semite. An anarchist cannot be an anti-Semite at all, because anarchism is international in nature. Under Makhno, individual rebels crushed the Jews, but mass pogroms, such as under the Whites and Reds, did not know the land of Makhnovia. Once at the Verkhniy Tokmak station, Batka saw a poster: "Beat the Jews, save the revolution, long live Batka Makhno." Makhno ordered to shoot the author.
The anarchists enjoyed popular support, because the Makhnovists, unlike the Whites and Reds, did not rob local residents (the idea of \u200b\u200bthe Makhnovist movement as a rampant uncontrollable banditry is a late ideological cliché). The authority of Makhno was recognized by the atamans operating near Gulyaypole, for the punishers he was elusive. The core of the detachment was made up of a small mobile group, and for major operations the old man summoned volunteers who willingly went to him. Having done the job, the peasants dispersed to the huts, and Makhno with two or three dozen fighters disappeared - until the next time.
In the fall of 1918, Skoropadsky's government collapsed. The hetmanate was replaced by the nationalist Directory headed by Petliura. The troops of the Directory entered Yekaterinoslav and dispersed the local council.
When, at the end of December 1918, the insurgent detachment of Makhno and the Bolsheviks who had agreed to an alliance with him took Yekaterinoslav, the Bolsheviks first began to divide power. The robberies began. "In the name of the partisans of all regiments," Makhno addressed the residents of the city, "I declare that any robberies, robberies and violence will not be allowed at this moment of my responsibility to the revolution and will be suppressed by me in the bud." In emigration, Nestor Ivanovich recalled: "In fact, I shot everyone for robbery, as well as for violence in general. Of course, among those shot ..., to the shame of the Bolsheviks, almost all of the Bolsheviks themselves arrested and crossed them with the Makhnovists. "
On a new year, 1919, Petliura's units defeated the Bolsheviks and captured the city, but the Gulyaypole region, where Makhno had retreated, could not be occupied. The social structure of Makhnovia was built in strict accordance with the resolution of one of the Makhnovist congresses, which called on the "comrades of peasants and workers" to "build a new free society without oppressors of the nobles, without subordinates," on the ground without violent decrees and orders, in spite of the inhabitants and oppressors of the whole world slaves, no rich, no poor. "
A quite biased witness, the Bolshevik Antonov-Ovseenko, reported "upward": "Children's communes, schools are being established, Gulyaypole is one of the most cultural centers of Novorossia - there are three secondary schools, etc. Makhno's efforts have opened ten hospitals for the wounded, a workshop has been organized repairing tools, and locks for tools are made. "
The Makhnovists lived at ease. The cultural enlightenment of the insurgent army gave performances, and grandiose drinking parties were regularly arranged with the participation of the father himself.
The Bolsheviks did not like this "enclave of freedom". Reports were sent to the "center": "... that area is a special state within the state. Around this famous headquarters all the forces of the left Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists, notorious bandits and repeat offenders were concentrated." The Reds wanted to subjugate the troops of Makhno and use them in the struggle against the Petliurists and White Guards. Both the Reds and the Makhnovists hoped to destroy each other on occasion. The resolution of the second congress of free soviets of Gulyaypole said: "Under the cover of the slogan" dictatorship of the proletariat, "the Bolshevik communists declared a monopoly on revolution for their party, considering all dissidents to be counter-revolutionaries."
Nevertheless, the Makhnovists entered the operational subordination of the Red Army as the Third Rebel Brigade and launched battles against Denikin. However, the Bolsheviks deliberately kept the Makhnovist army on starvation rations, sometimes depriving them of the bare essentials. Moreover, in April, on Trotsky's initiative, a propaganda campaign began against the Makhnovists.
Having sent an angry telegram to Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev and Voroshilov, in mid-June, the daddy with a small detachment disappeared into the Gulyaypole forests. The Reds shot the chief of staff of the Makhnovists Ozerov and several prominent anarchists. In response, the Moscow anarchists blew up the building of the city party committee in Leontievsky lane (Lenin, who was supposed to come there, miraculously escaped death). A new phase of relations between the old man and the Reds began - open enmity.
On August 5, Makhno issued an order: “Every revolutionary insurgent must remember that both his personal and national enemies are persons of the rich bourgeois class, regardless of whether they are Russians, Jews, Ukrainians, etc. The enemies of the working people are also those who are guarding the unjust bourgeois order, that is, Soviet commissars, members of punitive detachments, extraordinary commissions who travel to cities and villages and torture the working people who do not want to submit to their arbitrary dictatorship. and every insurgent is obliged to detain and send oppression to the army headquarters, and in case of resistance - to shoot on the spot. "
The Red Army troops, sent to catch the old man, went over to his side in droves. Gaining strength, Makhno began active hostilities against the Whites and Reds at the same time. He even made an agreement with Petliura, who also fought with the Volunteer Army. The Makhnovists, disguised as merchants in Yekaterinoslav, seized the city for a whole week (and then again for a month), which, according to eyewitnesses, rested from constant fear and ... robberies. Batka gained particular popularity among the townspeople when he personally shot several looters at the bazaar.
Makhno tried to establish a peaceful life. In the liberated territories, communes, trade unions, a system of assistance to the poor were organized, production and commodity exchange were established. Incidentally, both earlier and then newspapers continued to be published that allowed (an unthinkable, it seemed to be) criticism of the Makhnovist regime. Old Man stood firmly for freedom of speech.
Denikin had to withdraw large forces from the front against the rebels (the corps of General Slashchev - the one that became the prototype of Khludov in Bulgakov's "Run"), giving the Reds a life-giving respite. In December 1919, Slashchev managed to dislodge the Makhnovists from Yekaterinoslav.
Makhno again began negotiations with the Bolsheviks. But he was declared a bandit, deserving arrest and execution. Baron Wrangel several times sent delegates to the dad, but someone was captured by the Reds, and someone was executed by Makhno.
The repressions that the advancing parts of Wrangel rained down on the inhabitants of the province forced Makhno to first end the war with the Bolsheviks, and then unite with them. In early October 1920, rebel representatives signed an agreement with the Bolshevik commanders. The insurgent army came under operational subordination to the commander-in-chief of the Southern Front, Timur Frunze.
In Gulyaypole, anarchists were again drawn, whom the Reds released from their prisons. After Wrangel's retreat to the Crimea, it was time for Makhnovia to take a break. But it was short-lived and ended with the defeat of the White Guards. In the decisive throw across the Sivash, an important role was played by a detachment of four thousand insurgents under the command of the Makhnovist Karetnikov.
On November 26, 1920, Karetnikov was summoned to a meeting with Frunze, captured and shot, and his units were surrounded. However, the Makhnovists managed to shoot down the Red screens and leave the Crimea. Of the fighters who left for Perekop a month ago, no more than half returned to the old man. A fight broke out for life and death. Units of the Red Army were thrown against the remnants of Batka's army. It was easier for them now: the enemy was left alone, and the superiority of forces was astronomical.
Makhno rushed about Ukraine. His days were numbered. Fighting off the advancing punishers almost daily, Makhno, with a handful of surviving fighters and his faithful wife Galina Kuzmenko, broke through to the Dniester and on August 28, 1921, left for Bessarabia.
Nestor Ivanovich Makhno spent the rest of his life in exile - first in Romania, then in Poland (where he served in prison on suspicion of anti-Polish activity) and in France. In Paris, Makhno was actively involved in promoting the ideas of anarchism - he spoke, wrote articles, and published several brochures. At the same time, if his health allowed, he worked physically - as a worker at a film studio, shoemaker.
The body of Nestor Ivanovich was weakened by numerous wounds and chronic tuberculosis from the tsarist penal servitude. It was he who brought dad to the grave: Nestor Ivanovich died in a Paris hospital on July 6, 1934. Either an evil genius, or the liberator of the Ukrainian peasantry, holder of the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, anarchist daddy Makhno rests in the Pere Lachaise cemetery. In World War II, the widow of the father and his daughter were first in a concentration camp, and then in the basements of the GPU. After Stalin's death, both of them settled in Dzhambul. Co-workers daughter Makhno was a little afraid - you never know ...
Assessing the actions of the Makhnovists in the Denikin rear, military historians headed by A. Bubnov wrote in the third volume of the Civil War of 1917-1921: degree shaken their strategic position. By October 25, 1919, Makhno's forces reached 28 thousand bayonets and sabers, with 50 guns and 200 machine guns, representing a fairly strong organizational core, divided into four corps. " Members of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee Konivets and Levko testified about 25 thousand soldiers of Makhno's army, including 14 thousand infantry, 6 thousand cavalry, 5 thousand in separate cavalry units and artillery 89. The main insurgent headquarters of G. Kolos (the most knowledgeable) determined the size of Makhno's army at 35-40 thousand people 90. The historian Volkovinsky believes that the number of Makhnovists by November 1919 had reached 80 thousand people 91. Soviet encyclopedias on the history of the civil war put them at 30-35 thousand 92.
In our opinion, it is rather difficult to accurately determine the size of Makhno's army during this period due to the fluidity and inconstancy of its composition. At the moment of the greatest successes in the fight against Denikin, it undoubtedly increased. The peasants who replenished it sometimes stayed in the ranks of the army for only a few days, before serious skirmishes with the enemy, and then deserted to their native villages. Therefore, we can only talk about the size of the organizational core of Makhno's army. In the summer of 1919, he co-organized his army mainly from the retreating Red Army units, which included his former regiments. It is legitimate to consider this part of the Makhnovist troops to be the most constant; we have determined its number at 45-50 thousand people. Speaking of the total mass of Makhnovist formations controlled by the Makhno Headquarters, the data given by V. Belash can be considered reliable. At the same time, one should take into account the scale of the region captured by the Insurgent Army, information about those who died of typhus at the end of 1919 (35 thousand people) 93 and who joined the ranks of the Red Army, at the beginning of 1920 (35 thousand people) 94.
According to Belash, Makhno's army in the fall of 1919 consisted of four corps. 1st Donetsk had 15,500 bayonets, 3,650 sabers, 16 guns and 144 machine guns; 2nd Azov - 21,000 bayonets, 385 sabers, 16 guns and 176 machine guns; 3rd Ekaterinoslavsky - 29,000 bayonets, 5,100 sabers, 34 guns and 266 machine guns; 4th Crimean - 17,500 bayonets, 7,500 sabers, 18 guns and 154 machine guns. In the reserve of the army headquarters were: a machine-gun regiment (700 machine guns), a cavalry brigade (3000 sabers), transport troops, labor regiments, commandant companies and squadrons with a total number of 20,000 people. In total, the army had 103 thousand bayonets, 20 thousand sabers, 1435 machine guns, 84 guns 95. The Makhnovist formations consisted of infantry and cavalry regiments, most of the units were formed in accordance with the Red Army states and were not reorganized. The new shelves were modeled after them.
The infantry remained the main branch of Makhno's troops. Arshinov wrote that the greatest fame in the Makhnovist army was enjoyed by the infantry regiments - the 13th Infantry Rebel, the 3rd Steel and the 1st Yekaterinoslavsky. The infantry, for the most part, was put on carts, which proved their indispensability in raids on Denikin's rear. Carts and carts drawn by 3-4 horses became means of transportation for infantry, hospitals, supplies, and made the rebels extremely mobile. Lined up in one or two rows, the carts with infantry moved at a fast trot along with the cavalry, making daily transitions 60-70, and sometimes 90-100 96 versts.
Crushing defeats from Shkuro's cavalry in April-May 1919 forced Makhno and his commanders to pay serious attention to the cavalry. September 22 in the village. Current he issued an order on the need for training in cavalry 97. Makhno's cavalry caused a lot of trouble for the White Guards. The chief of staff of the Slashchev division, Colonel Dubego, wrote: "Operations against Makhno were extremely difficult. Makhno's cavalry, which at first was almost elusive at first, acted especially well. She often attacked our carts, appeared in the rear."
The third branch of Makhno's troops was artillery. Under the leadership of the artillery instructor, former captain Morozov, batteries and half-batteries of two and four-gun composition were created, which, by decision of the army headquarters, were attached to corps and units. The Makhnovists used only field and mountain artillery with two types of guns - a 76 mm rapid-fire cannon and a 152 mm mortar 99.
The problems of recruiting the Insurrectionary Army were resolved at the next congress of the "Makhnovsky District", held October 27 - November 3, 1919 in Aleksandrovsk. As a result of a long discussion, the principle of "voluntary-compulsory" mobilization was rejected and the resolution of the Congress on November 2 announced the transition to "voluntary-equalizing" mobilization of men from 19 to 45 years old. The formation of units was carried out on a territorial basis (in villages, volosts and counties), with elective junior command personnel, economic and judicial bodies at 100 units. The commanders of the regimental echelon and above were selected at meetings, conferences and congresses of the command staff of corps and army, and were approved by their headquarters 101. The entire region, occupied by the Makhnovist troops, was divided into "regimental districts", in which district formation departments were formed. They drafted commanders into the Insurgent Army on the basis of the so-called compulsory service, and the rank and file - voluntarily, on the basis of "self-mobilization." It was a "business meeting", the resolution of which was drawn up in a protocol, and the draft age, expressing agreement with mobilization, were included in the army's lists. The Denikinites from the forcibly mobilized peasants were also accepted into the army. Thus, the principles of volunteerism and forced mobilization into the Rebel Army were combined, which ensured its manning. General Slashchev wrote: “Makhno brilliantly managed to take advantage of the disregard for him by the White Headquarters and, having shown high organizational talent, quickly formed new detachments and began to threaten Taganrog and Rostov, forcing them to seriously fear for the integrity of the location of the commander-in-chief of the Whites. only in a partisan way, but also in a regular way and quickly form and unite their units (by the measure of a civil war in general of a militia character) into good, stubbornly fighting regular troops "102. Slashchev's opinion was also shared by his chief of staff, who wrote: "The Makhnovist" troops "differ from the Bolsheviks in their fighting efficiency and steadfastness."
In our opinion, the higher resistance of the Makhnovist formations in comparison with the units of the Red Army is explained by the fact that the Insurrectionary Army was socially more homogeneous and revolutionary, consisted mainly of volunteers of anarcho-communist orientation. V. Volkovinsky ignored the fact of liquidation of the kulaks by the Makhnovists and in his research asserts that the Makhnovist cavalry consisted mainly of wealthy peasants. This contradicts the documents that allowed M. Kubanin to conclude: "The social composition of Makhno's army in 1918-1919 consisted of purebred proletarians and peasants who rebelled against the power of the hetman and Denikin.105 The" kulaks "could not support the Makhnovists with their forced redistribution of land and property, support of the Bolshevik government. ”About the poor, lumpen-proletarian army of Makhno then wrote both“ red ”and“ white. ”R. Eideman wrote in paint:“ Under the black flag of the Gulyaypole anarchist all those dissatisfied with the Denikin way of government, including supporters Soviet power "106. And the whiteguard newspaper" Novaya Rossiya "reported on November 6, 1919:" The main and most persistent core of Makhno is made up of criminals who adhere to him at all points through which he passed. A significant part is made up of the Bolsheviks, who sometimes do not hide at all that they are following Makhno for the time being, until Soviet power reigns in the Ukraine. "
According to Belash, landless laborers accounted for 35% of Makhno's army, workers - 7%, poor and middle peasants - 40%, other categories - 15% 107. Noteworthy is the evidence of the social composition of M. Gutman's Insurrectionary Army: “The entire 40,000-strong army of Makhno was rather motley in composition. There were students, anarchists, and Socialist-Revolutionaries, there were even a few Bolsheviks ... There was every rabble who then adjoined Makhno, then to Denikin solely for the purpose of robbing. There were many criminals released from prison. But the main nucleus were the peasants, among whom Makhno was extremely popular. "108
We consider it necessary to note that the social composition of the Makhnovist commanders in comparison with the "Red Army period" has not changed significantly. All command posts from the regiment and above were occupied mainly by Makhno's comrades-in-arms in the "black guard" and the struggle against the hetmanate. Belash wrote that "the regular commanders of Makhno were, for the most part, brave and cunning fighters who had influence on their comrades, subordinating them to their courage and military cunning, after whom the fighters followed with confidence and love."
Most of the peasant "reserve" was only Makhno's fellow traveler, with whom the command could not always cope. It was mainly among this category that desertion was widespread, which was highlighted by V. Verstyuk on the basis of orders for Makhnovist formations and units for the autumn-winter of 1919 110.
According to Belash, the ethnic-territorial composition of the Insurrectionary Army was as follows: residents of Yekaterinoslav region accounted for 50%, Tavria and Kherson region - 25%, Poltava region - 8%, Don region - 7%, other provinces - 10% 111. Most of Makhno's army, including her "dad", were Ukrainians, the second largest nationality was Russians. In the Revolutionary Military Council of the army and the cultural and educational department, Jews predominated. The "ideological anarchists", most of whom belonged to this nationality, largely determined the ideology of the Makhnovist movement. Therefore, according to V. Ermakov, "although there were cases of manifestation of anti-Semitic sentiments, it is hardly correct to associate this with the activities of Makhno and his inner circle." The Makhnovist terror in all periods of its activity had not a national, but a social orientation. An order on the army of November 18, 1919 said: "Every insurgent must remember that his enemies are persons of the bourgeois class, regardless of whether they are Russians, Jews, Ukrainians or French and British."
Makhno was loyal to the activities in the Insurrectionary Army and on the territory controlled by it of various political parties and their press organs, People's Power (organ of the Right Social Revolutionaries), Zvezda (organ of the Yekaterinoslav Gubernia Committee of the Bolsheviks), etc. 114. All parties were completely free to express their views orally and in the press, sometimes even criticizing anarcho-communism. Taking advantage of this, the Bolshevik "Zvezda" distorted the social composition and essence of the Makhnovist movement, on November 15, 1919 wrote: "The petty-bourgeois anarchist ideology, assimilated by the propertied strata of the peasantry, turned out to be the most complete reflection of their possessive aspirations and aspirations. The idea of \u200b\u200banarchy, which ensures freedom of the propertied strata of the village. from all the pressures from the proletariat and the peasant poor allied to it, the village kulaks and the oppressors liked the taste as much as possible. "
Makhno allowed completely legal activities in the Yekaterinoslav province and in his troops of the Bolshevik gubernia committee, headed by the communist Pavlov (Mirkin). The communist Chetolin in 1925 still had the opportunity to publish truthful memoirs: "Makhno, conducting agitation against us, did not take any decisive measures against the gubernia committee and the organization."
Communist Bolsheviks held a number of command posts in the army of Makhno, among them Lashkevich was the commander of the 13th regiment, Polonsky was the commander of the 3rd regiment, Brodsky was the head of the Nikopol garrison, etc. 116. According to the Yekaterinoslavsky provincial committee of the CP / b / U, at the beginning of December 1919, the 26 Makhnovist regiments were dominated by the desire to unite with the Red Army, sympathy was expressed for the "Soviet" (Bolshevik) government and the RCP / 6 / -KP / 6 / U ... There were also units that were "Soviet", but anti-communist. It was noted that the composition of these units, with a certain propaganda and explanatory work, could side with the Red Army 117.
Belash, obviously, underestimated the degree of influence of the communists in the Makhnovist troops, tried to prove the ideological superiority of the anarcho-communists. He argued that the cells of the RCP / b / were created only in the 13th and 3rd infantry regiments, in the "English battery". 70% of the personnel of the Insurrectionary Army was anarchist-communist, 20% sympathized with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Petliurists, only 10% - with the Bolshevik communists. According to Belash, the corresponding party membership was formed at the congress in Aleksandrovsk in late October - early November 1919. There were 85 anarchists there. (42.5%) - all commanders and chiefs of military departments, 21 people. - Left SRs (10.5%), of which some were commanders, and some were delegates from villages. There were 4 Bolsheviks. (2%) - from the workers of Aleksandrovsk Belik, Yekaterinoslav - Novitsky, Khartsyzsk - Ivanov and from the army - Kolodub. 70 delegates were non-partisan (35%) workers and peasants of Yekaterinoslav and Donbass. The Mensheviks, populists, right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and nationalist parties did not have delegates to the congress, and 118 were not included in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Insurgent Army, although Makhno did not forbid their activities. In the resolution of the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Council of November 6, 1919, it was announced: "All socialist parties and organizations, trends, without exception, are given complete freedom to disseminate their views, ideas, teachings and opinions, both orally and in print." The Makhnovists only did not allow the activity of bourgeois and monarchist parties - "counter-revolutionary".
The central place at the Alexander Congress was given to strengthening the Insurrectionary Army. All other issues were resolved from this perspective. The congress considered and approved the declaration "On Free Soviets" prepared by V. Volin and P. Arshinov. The declaration essentially became a program document of the Makhnovist anarcho-communist movement and Makhno's army. It outlined the main goals and objectives of the revolutionary activities of the anarcho-communist formations, the building of the Makhnovist army. The Declaration considered the "popular insurrectionary movement in Ukraine" as the beginning of the "great third revolution", striving for the final emancipation of the masses "from all oppression of power and capital." According to the declaration, the Insurrectionary Army was "the core of this revolutionary popular movement" and was supposed to "help the insurgent people in their struggle against any encroachments on the part of power and capital." The ideologists of the Makhnovshchina regarded the army as a temporary and forced phenomenon. They wrote that "a genuine peasant and workers' revolution will embrace the entire working Ukraine and free it from rapists and rulers," after which the Makhnovist army and its fighters will dissolve "in millions of ordinary insurgent people and begin the free construction of a truly new life."
During the Alexander and Yekaterinoslav "standing" of the Makhnovists in October-December 1919, there were some changes in the structure and forms of work of the central governing bodies of the Insurrectionary Army. (Appendix No. 6) The cultural education commission formed at the Army RVS in August 1919 has grown into a cultural education department. It was now part of the "civilian" (for the population) and military apparatus of the Revolutionary Military Council, had sections: press, oral propaganda, theater and school. The head of the cultural enlightenment department was V. Volin, a member of the Nabat conference secretariat, later he was replaced by Laschenko. The press was directed by P. Arshinov. The central organ of the army headquarters was the daily newspaper Path to Freedom, published in Russian and Ukrainian. Anarcho-communist newspapers were also published in Russian: "Nabat" (organ of the secretariat of the anarchist conference), "Free Berdyansk", "Free Melitopol", "Free Gulyaypole", "Free Orekhovo", "Free Nikopol". Due to lack of paper and correspondents, these newspapers were published irregularly. Numerous anarcho-communist leaflets and proclamations were also published. During interrogation at the Moscow Cheka, Volin said that in the "sedentary" position, the printing work of the cultural department was more active. In Aleksandrovsk from October 4 to November 4, in addition to the declaration "On Free Soviets," appeals were issued against Denikin and Petliura 121. The Makhnovist movement was initially and to the end not only anti-White, but also anti-Ukrainian political orientation. In the corps of the army, the printing section had its own apparatus - small printing houses ("American women"), which published the daily all-army newspaper "Rebel" and leaflets.
The apparatus of the oral propaganda section consisted of full-time leaders and insurgents with the gift of speech. The conversations were conducted on political and economic topics in the units and among the population. Outstanding speakers were Volin, Makhno, Aly, Arshinov, Udovichenko, Kalashnikov, Gavrilenko.
The theater section in Makhno's army was headed by amateur artists N. Konoplya and Tsyganok. This section was divided into musical, dramatic, opera and satirical groups. At the headquarters of the army and corps, brass bands were playing in some regiments. In the regiments across the state there were accordions (1 at the headquarters and 1 in each platoon), bought with army funds.
The school section was headed by G. Kuzmenko. Its functions were to organize the school business in the region controlled by the rebels, but during the month of its stay in Aleksandrovsk, the section did not manage to organize this work.
One of the most important tasks of the cultural enlightenment department and army headquarters was to maintain the morale and military discipline of the soldiers. Drunkenness, theft, looting and other negative phenomena in the Makhnovist environment were widespread, but a struggle was waged against them. Orders of Makhno and his commanders of all levels are full of warnings and punishments for such misconduct. On November 18, Makhno issued an order for the army, which said: "Drunkenness is considered a crime. It is considered an even greater crime to show a revolutionary army insurgent on the street while drunk." Makhnovsky Shtarm has developed a disciplinary instruction with a list of disciplinary offenses entailing administrative punishment and crimes subject to judicial responsibility. For minor violations, the rebels were reprimanded in orders (orders for service and work were canceled). Looting, rape of women, appropriation of military property, concealment of trophy valuables, lynching executions of prisoners and arrested persons were considered crimes.
The body of "justice" in the Insurrectionary Army was counterintelligence, headed by L. Golik and L. Zadov, - the main instrument of the Makhnovist terror. According to Belash, “anyone who served with Denikin as an officer, gendarme, prison warden, counterintelligence officer was shot with it. Makhno himself directed the punitive functions of counterintelligence.
A. Shubin believes that counterintelligence also fought against robbery and looting in the Makhnovist army. In his opinion, in the autumn-winter of 1919, Makhno "gave sanction not for robberies, but for reprisals against officers. Against the general background of the civil war, Makhno's measures against robberies can be considered satisfactory." Makhno really did not encourage criminal charges, he even shot the most zealous marauders with his own hands. But the anarcho-communist ideology and the poor composition of his army, the hostile attitude towards the "rich" and the haves in general, the principle of "self-supply" of the army did not allow the Makhnovists to avoid robberies even against the poor.
The power of the Makhnovist counterintelligence was omnipresent, both among the Makhnovist troops and among the civilian population. It was delivered no worse than in the Bolshevik Cheka. The troops had secret agents in every ten (department), the civilian counterintelligence department had freelancers in villages and cities who did not receive salaries, but they regularly reported everything, including political conspiracies, hiding White Guards 126. In addition to working in the occupied area, counterintelligence functions included collecting information about the location and military plans of the enemy, communication between individual units of the Rebel Army dispersed in different places 127.
In the fall of 1919, Makhno's army headquarters developed the fundamentals of combat training for personnel and command training. The most experienced commanders conducted training in the units. Belash wrote that young recruits underwent "practice" at the front in combat units, headquarters and commanders "were obliged to train them for the shortest time." In early December, in Yekaterinoslav, in the premises of the former English club, team courses were organized. They were headed by the commander of the 3rd corps, former staff captain of the tsarist army P. Gavrilenko. The main task of the courses was reduced to theoretical training of commanders of the lower and middle echelons (up to the regiment), elected in the units by the rebels 129.
At the headquarters of the army, a drill management was also created for the theoretical training of young soldiers who had not gone through the school of world war. The training program was based on the "specialization" of the insurgent. For training an infantryman, 20 hours of drill, 20 hours of shooting and 10 hours of fortification were allotted; for a cavalryman - 30 hours of horse and foot formation, 20 hours of shooting, 10 hours of fortification and 10 hours of horse grooming; for an artilleryman - 20 hours to study the theoretical part of weapons, 20 hours of shooting and 20 hours of fortification 130.
In comparison with the "Red Army period", the supply system of Makhno's army underwent significant changes. Lacking, as before, sources of centralized supply, the rebels completely switched to self-sufficiency. The communist V. Miroshevsky, who served at that time in the troops of Makhno, described this system as follows: Upon arrival in the village, they were accommodated in peasant huts and ate whatever God would send. Under such a system, the Makhnovists did not feel a particular shortage of food ration. ”131
But the provision of the army that had grown in numbers required a clear organization and improvement. Once in stationary conditions, the RVS of the army brought up the supply issues for discussion at the delegates' congress in Aleksandrovsk at the end of October 1919. According to its resolution, the army was supported by voluntary contributions from peasants, war booty, requisitions and indemnities imposed on the wealthy class 132. The supply of the army was handled by the supply department of its headquarters, which had a field (with the troops) and local (district) procurement and distribution apparatus.
Food and fodder preparations were made with the expectation of a certain number of eaters, determined by the headquarters, the army for a month with the troops and for 5-6 months in the district warehouses. War trophies became the main source of food and fodder stocks. In October-December 1919, up to 2 million poods of food and 1.5 million poods of fodder were exported from the Aleksandrovsky and Melitopol districts to the area where the army was located. These stocks were kept in mobile "shops": at stations, steamers and mills. Requisitions, voluntary procurements in the private market for less wealthy citizens were widely used. Payment was made in money or in the form of material compensation (clothing, cart, horse, etc.). At the same time, the consistency of the owner was determined by the commission of the unit with the involvement of the poor groups of the local population, as the Bolsheviks did. According to the calculations of the supply department, the daily ration of the Makhnovist consisted of 150 g of proteins, 110 g of fats and 510 g of carbohydrates 133.
The clothing allowance of the Makhnovists was provided at the expense of military trophies, including the organization of special "expeditions" to the rear to the Denikinites. The undressing of captured White Guards and the requisition of things from the "bourgeois" were widely used. On November 21, 1919, the army headquarters confiscated the Yekaterinoslav pawnshop, where there was a lot of gold and clothing. Some of the things were returned to the poor according to receipts, good things were received by the Makhnovist doctors and nurses, outerwear and underwear went to the infirmary, and hats were made for cavalrymen from astrakhan coats. Attempts were made to adjust sewing of uniforms and shoes under an agreement with local craftsmen, but it was not always possible to get what was ordered due to the frequent and unexpected retreats of the Makhnovist troops.
The supply of weapons and ammunition provided artillery control at the army headquarters. Repairs of the materiel of artillery and machine guns were carried out at private and joint-stock enterprises in Aleksandrovsk, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Gulyaypol, Yekaterinoslav. War trophies were the main source of replenishment of weapons and ammunition. M. Kubanin wrote that in October 1919 the Makhnovists captured the most important supply bases of Denikin Sinelnikovo, Lozovaya, Berdyansk, Mariupol 135. After this, they did not experience a shortage of weapons and ammunition. “The Makhnovists had a huge amount of weapons, especially machine guns,” testified Miroshevsky, “they carried mountains of rifles on carts, which they distributed to the peasants when they passed through villages. During this period, in addition to the above systems, British rifles and carbines Lee-Metford 1892 and Lee-Enfield 1902 (caliber 7.69 - 7.71 mm), French rifles of the Lebel system 1892/1907 / 1915 (caliber 8 mm). Among the trophies, the American Springfield rifle of 1903 (caliber 7.62 mm) was especially appreciated, since its barrel diameter corresponded to the Russian cartridge 137. According to Belash, on November 1, 1919, the army had 37 million 750 thousand rifle cartridges and 496 thousand shells directly in the arsenal. The combat kit for a rifle was 250 rounds, for a heavy machine gun - 5,000 rounds, for a light machine gun - 2,500 rounds, for a gun - 124 rounds. In addition, 75 million rifle cartridges and 1.5 million shells were stored in army warehouses 138. For comparison, note that the entire Ukrainian Front of the Red Army in January-March 1919 received about 11 million cartridges and 53 thousand shells 139.
Largely at the expense of the enemy, Makhno's army provided itself with horses. They were subdivided into categories (combatant, artillery, transport) and in case of purchase, from 15 to 100 thousand rubles were paid for them. It was allowed to exchange two defective or tired horses for one fresh one. Often, the practice of requisitioning horses from wealthy peasants, if their number exceeded the labor norm (for two eaters - 1 workhorse) 140. I. Dubinsky and G. Shevchuk noted that the Makhnovists achieved great maneuverability precisely due to the constant requisition of horses from the peasants 141, which, of course, pushed the "kulaks" away from themselves.
The purchases of horses and food for the needs of the army were carried out by the purchasing commissions of units and formations, controlled by the financial commission of the RVS and the chief treasurer of the army headquarters. The army cash desk was replenished at the expense of contributions imposed on the "rich" in cities and villages, expropriation of banks 142. Concealment of trophy, expropriated or indemnity money was considered the gravest crime. "The Makhnovists did not receive monetary allowance, since they served the revolution by vocation, they did not enjoy salaries," wrote Belash. Such an order actually pushed the Makhnovists to plunder, looting, theft to satisfy their personal needs. Part of the money taken from the "bourgeoisie" was distributed to the poor. In Yekaterinoslav, 3 million rubles were allocated for distribution to the poor. 144. 550 thousand of them were allocated to orphans. The head of the city shelters M. Gutman wrote: "We must pay tribute to the Makhnovists, after the" volunteers "orphan children were fed for a month" 145.
At the end of 1919, the most difficult problem was the sanitary and medical provision of the Makhnovist army. The medical and sanitary department located at the headquarters acted as a department. On November 19, 1919, the communist Kolodub 146 was appointed head of the department and head of the army hospital. Mobile hospitals were subordinate to him - army (for 5 thousand beds), corps (for 1000 beds), brigade and regimental (for 50 places each). The provision of medical personnel was carried out according to the staff of the regiment, where there were chief and battalion doctors (6 people in total), and in the companies there was 1 paramedic. However, the typhus epidemic, which began in the army in mid-October, was not prevented by the medical and sanitary department - it covered all of Russia and Ukraine. In Yekaterinoslav, the army command took decisive measures to improve medical care for personnel. Captive medical workers were involved, short-term courses for paramedics and nurses were created at the buildings, the city's medical staff were mobilized, vaccinations were organized, baths, laundries and isolation chambers were opened 147. And yet, according to Belash's data, the Makhnovists lost up to 35 thousand people from typhus, that is, about half of their personnel 148. "The insurgent army named after Batka Makhno was melting by leaps and bounds," recalled M. Gutman, "Peasants having stuffed their "carts" with the looted property, a string of people pulled out of the city through their villages, abandoning "father" Makhno to the mercy of fate "149.
By the beginning of December 1919, the Slashchev division completed its reorganization into a corps and, together with General Revishin's group, began active operations against Makhno on both banks of the Dnieper - Revishin diverted the attention of the Makhnovists about the Sinelnikov side, and parts of Slashchev's corps with a deeply echeloned group broke through the front in the Pyatikhatka area, captured Verkhnedneprovsk and went to the station. Sukhachevka, on December 19 they occupied Yekaterinoslav and held him for a week. The 1st Donetsk corps of Makhno surrendered the city without a fight and rolled away from it 35 versts south 150. 25 thousand Makhnovists left Yekaterinoslav, including 14 thousand infantry, 6 thousand cavalry, transport services and artillery. There were 10 thousand sick and wounded people. The army was armed with 42 three-inch guns, 2 six-inch guns, 4 armored vehicles, 4 armored trains, approx. 1000 machine guns. The Whites got an armored train and 2 armored cars 151 as trophies.
During these days, Slashchev's corps was forced to repel the attacks of the red units from the north, commanded by I. Yakir. Under the onslaught of the Red Army, Denikin's troops retreated south and Slashchev did not pursue Makhno. He wrote: "The Whites retreated in two large groups. 1) Led by the Headquarters, as part of the Volunteer Army, Donets, Kuban and Tertsy to the Caucasus and 2) the troops of Schilling and Dragomirov - to Novorossiya, covering Nikolaev-Odessa and based on the latter. In the intervals between them, the 3rd Army Corps, under my command, received an order to withdraw with the task of holding the Crimea. ”152
Having organized his troops, on December 24, Makhno attacked units of Slashchev in the area with. Sursko-Litovsk, Petrenko's detachment occupied st. Igren. Belash with the cavalry went to the village. Mikhailovsky, took st. Zaporozhye and Sukhachevka. In the evening, Makhno's cavalry occupied the village. Afternoon. Slashchev's infantry retreated to Yekaterinoslav, leaving 400 people behind. killed, 4 guns and a train. Petrenko by the night of December 25 occupied Nizhnedneprovsk 153. On December 26, Slashchev's troops left Yekaterinoslav without a fight and retreated to Aleksandrovsk along the right bank of the Dnieper. The next day, at the Kichkassky bridge, they captured 5 guns of the 2nd Makhnovist corps and went south. With the forces of the 4th corps, Makhno tried to organize the pursuit of the whites, but Slashchev covered his retreat with a horse curtain and retreated in marching order to the Crimea 154.
Makhno's war with the Denikin army was over, now he was most worried about the meeting and relations with the Red Army, which had entered the "Makhnovsky district". Considering the enormous contribution of his army to the defeat of Denikin, Makhno hoped for rehabilitation in the eyes of the RCP / b /, the return of the red commanders to the ranks. But the leaders of the RCP / b / had a different opinion. V. Volkovinsky gave documents testifying to the aspiration of the Central Committee of the RCP / b / in the fall of 1919. "replace" Makhno as commander of the Insurrectionary Army 155. In their context, the only case of the execution of communists by order of Makhno in December 1919 becomes explainable.Makhnovskaya counterintelligence shot several communists led by the commander of the 3rd "steel" regiment M. Polonsky for preparing a conspiracy to assassinate Makhno 156. The fact of this conspiracy is considered by many historians to be unproven, but the conclusion of V. Verstyuk about the existence of links between the Front Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP / b / U and the communists of the Makhnovist army confirms the possibility of it 157. The methods of the RCP / b /, Cheka, Lenin, Stalin and Dzerzhinsky did not exclude, but assumed physical isolation and reprisals against a political enemy.
In the battles with Denikin in the summer and autumn of 1919, the Makhnovist formations improved their tactical skills. Freed from the tutelage of the red command, successfully using the accumulated arsenal of means and methods of armed struggle, the Makhnovist command staff developed specific elements of battle tactics, which were improved in the process of conducting combat operations. Makhno felt the effectiveness of deep raiding operations and widely used them. If earlier his formations, relatively small in number, maneuvered only within the Grishin-Gulyaypol region, now he carried out unexpected movements of large masses of troops over a considerable distance, causing panic in the enemy's rear.
The marching order of the Makhnovist formations was now different from the regular armies. Ahead of the detachment was always cavalry lava with rare flanks and a densely knocked down center, which played the role of the vanguard. Behind the lava, at a distance of 200-400 m, a column of the main forces was moving, which consisted of cavalry and infantry on carts. The movement of the column was closed by a small equestrian rearguard, whose task was not so much to protect the rear, but to drive the rest of the cart 158.
In battles, the Makhnovists continued to widely use detours and loops, strikes from the rear, using different types of troops to encircle the enemy. A typical example was the battle near Pologi on October 30, 1919, about which the Yekaterinoslavsky Nabat newspaper reported on November 6 of this year that the Denikinites had lost more than 500 killed, 65 thousand cartridges, 8 machine guns, 4 chariots with shells and "in a mad panic retreated, pursued by the cavalry until late at night. "
In an area with a less developed railway network than in the Donbass, in the fall of 1919 the Makhnovist command abandoned armored trains. It was almost impossible to use armored trains in a guerrilla war; sooner or later, the railway giant became a vulnerable target.
Thus, in the fall-winter of 1919, Makhno's insurgent army was an operational partisan formation of 60-100 thousand people. Its organizational structure practically copied the staff of the Red Army. The methods of combat training and the control system of the Makhnovist troops did not differ significantly from the Red Army. At the same time, the anarcho-communist orientation of the army determined its specific features. This was expressed in the volunteer principles of recruiting the army, political pluralism in the work of its RVS and the cultural enlightenment department, and the self-supply system of the Makhnovist units.
During this period, the principles of guerrilla maneuver warfare finally entered the Makhnovist military art. The swift movement of manpower over considerable distances and the surprise of attacks became Makhno's favorite tactical techniques.
Notes
88. Civil War 1918 - 1921: In 3 volumes / Edited by A. S. Bubnov. - M. -L., 1930 .-- T. 3. - S. 282
89. Keane D. - Decree. op. - P. 79
90. The history of the civil war in the USSR. - T. 4. - P. 314
91. Volkovinsky V. N. - Decree. op. - P. 130
92. Civil war and military intervention in the USSR. Encyclopedia. - S. 344; Veliky Zhovten i homoadyanska viina in Ukraine. Encyclopedic guide. - P. 331
93. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 362
94. A Brief History of the Civil War in the USSR. - M., 1979 .-- S. 361
95. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 341
96. P. Arshinov - Decree. op. - S. 90-91
97. Volkovinsky V.N. - Decree. op. - P. 133
99. Bloodless L. G. Army and Navy of Russia at the beginning of the XX century. Essays on the military-industrial potential. - M., 1986 .-- P. 87
101. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op, - p. 346
102. Slashchev Ya. A. Materials on the history of the civil war in Russia // Military bulletin. - 1921. - No. 12. - P. 41
104. Volkovinsky V. N. - Decree. op. - P. 133
105. Kubanin M. - Decree. op. - P. 160
106. Eideman R. Insurrection and its role in modern war // Army and revolution. - 1919. - No. 3 - 4, - P. 96
107. Belash A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 346
108. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 62
109. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 353, L. 176
110.Verstyuk V.F. - Decree. social - P. 346
111. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 346
112. Ermakov V. - Decree. op. - P. 81
113. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement. - S. 19-20
114. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 354
115. Levko (Chetolin) Communists among the partisans // Chronicle of the revolution. - 1925 - No. 4. - P. 93-94
116. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 360 - 361
117. Keane D. - Decree. op. - S. 80-81
118. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 352, 362
121. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 330, L. 16
122. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 350-351
123. Makhno and the Makhnovist movement. - P. 21
124. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 349, 354
125. Shubin A. Makhnovist movement in 1917-1921. // Friendship of Peoples. - 1993. - No. 3. - P. 186
126 Belash. A.V., Belash V.F. - Decree. op. - P. 349
127. Arshinov P. Anarchism and Makhnovshchina // Anarchist Bulletin. - Berlin, 1923. - No. 2. - S. 27-37
128. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 347
129. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177
130. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. -FROM. 346-347
131. Miroshevsky V. - Decree. op. - P. 200
132. Arshinov P. History of the Makhnovist movement - P. 147
133. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 343
134. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177-178
135. Kubanin M. - Decree. op. - P. 87
136. Miroshevsky V. - Decree. op. - P. 199
137. Beetle A.B. Rifles and machine guns. - M., 1987 .-- S. 40-41, 50, 52
138. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. P. 345
139. Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. - T. 4. - P. 385
140. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 347
141. Dubinsky I., Shevchuk G. - Decree. op. - S. 347
142. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - P. 348
143. Ibid. - P. 345
144. TsGAOOU. - F. 1, Op. 20, D. 315, L. 8
145. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 65
146. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 177
147. Belash A. V., Belash V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 347
148 Ibid - p. 342
149. Gutman M. - Decree. op. - P. 86
150. VF Verstyuk - Decree. cit., - p. 199; TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 196
151. TsGAOOU. - F. 1, Op. 20, D. 315, L. 8 ob.
152. Slashchev Ya.A. White Crimea, 1920. - P. 41
153. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 196-197
154. Ya. A. Slashchev. White Crimea, 1920. - S. 42-43
155. Volkovinsky V. N. - Decree. op. - S. 144-145.
156. TsGAOOU. - F. 5, Op. 1, D. 351, L. 193
157. Verstyuk V. F. - Decree. op. - S. 203
After the fall of the regime of Hetman Skoropatsky, three main social forces, extremely different from each other, began to operate in Ukraine - Petliura, Bolshevism and Makhnovism. Each of them, over time, entered into an implacably hostile relationship with the other two.
In October and November 1918, Makhno's detachments launched a widespread offensive against the hetman's counter-revolution. By this time, the troops of the Austro-Germans, under the influence of the political events that took place in their homeland, were quite decomposed. Makhno took advantage of this. He entered into a contractual, neutral relationship with some of the guests, arming himself at their expense, the rest were forced out of the area with battles. The hetman's troops were not in the area. State Warta at the sight of the extraordinary growth of the rebel army. But the hetman was still in Kiev. Then Makhno moved with his units to the north, took the junction stations Chaplino, Grishino, Sinelnikovo, reached Pavlograd and then turned west towards Yekaterinoslav. In the area, but ran into the Peter and Paul authorities.
The Petliurites, who seized power in a number of cities, considered themselves the true masters of the country. From many peasant detachments, they formed their own army, then announced a widespread mobilization in order to create a regular state army. Petliura hoped to draw the Makhnovist movement into his sphere of influence and leadership. They sent Makhno a number of political questions: how he looks at the Petliurism and its power, how he envisions the political structure of Ukraine, whether he does not find it desirable and useful to work together in the creation of an independent Ukraine. The answer from Makhno and his staff was short. Petliurism, in their opinion, is a movement of the Ukrainian national bourgeoisie, with which they, the peasants, are not on their way. Ukraine should be built on the principle of labor and the independence of peasants and workers from any political power. Not unification, but only struggle, can be the international movement of the Makhnovism and the bourgeois movement of the Petliura movement.
Soon after that, Makhno went to Yekaterinoslav to expel the Petliura government from there. The latter had significant military forces there. In addition, protected by the Dnieper, the Petliurites could turn out to be invulnerable in this city. Makhno's detachments became in Nizhne-Dneprovsk. There was also the city committee of communist-Bolsheviks, which had local armed forces. The personality of Makhno at this time is known throughout the district as the personality of an honored revolutionary and a talented military leader. The Bolshevik Communist Committee invited him to take command of their workers and party detachments. Makhno accepted this offer.
“As often happened to them before and afterwards, he resorted to military cunning. Having loaded the train with his troops, he launched it, a subspecies of a working train, across the Dnipropetrovsk bridge directly into the city. The risk was enormous. If the Petliurites had found out about this trick a few minutes before the train stopped, they could have destroyed it. The train drove straight into the city station, where the revolutionary troops unexpectedly unloaded, occupied the station and the nearest part of the city. In the city itself, a fierce battle took place, which ended in the defeat of the Petliurists. However, a few days later, due to the insufficient vigilance of the Makhnovtsy garrison, the city had to be surrendered again to the Petliurists, who approached the new forces from the direction of Zaporozhye. During the retreat, in Nizhne-Dneprovsk, an attempt was made on Makhno twice. Both times the bombs dropped did not explode. The Makhnovist army retreated to the Sinelnikov area. From that moment on, on the northwestern border of the Makhnovsky region, a front was created between the Makhnovists and the Petliurists. However, the troops of the Petliurists, which consisted mostly of peasants-rebels and forcibly mobilized, began to decompose quickly upon contact with the Makhnovists. And in a litter of time the front was liquidated. Huge spaces were freed from all authorities and troops. " 1
But the region was already advancing from the north - the Bolshevik army, from the south-east - the army of General Denikin.
Denikinites were the first to come. Even during the period of the struggle between the Makhnovists and the hetman, and especially in the first days of his overthrow, separate detachments of General Shkuro infiltrated from the Don and Kuban to the Ukraine, and approached Pologi and Gulyaypole. naturally the army of the Makhnovist insurgents turned in this direction. By this time, it consisted of several regiments of infantry and cavalry, perfectly organized. The infantry in the Makhnovist army was an exceptional and unique phenomenon. She was all like a cavalry, moving on horseback, but not on horseback, but in light spring carriages called "tachanki" in southern Ukraine. This infantry usually moved quickly at a trot along with the cavalry, making an average of 60-70 versts a day.
Denikin, counting on the confused Ukrainian situation, on the struggle of the Petliura directory against the Bolsheviks, hoped to occupy most of the Ukraine without much difficulty. But he suddenly stumbled upon a stubborn, well-organized army of the Makhnovists. After several battles, Denikin's detachments began to retreat back in the direction of the Don and the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov. In a short time, the entire space from Polog to the sea was freed from them. The Makhnovist units occupied a number of important junction stations and the cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol. Beginning in January 1919, the first anti-Denikin front was created here - a front on which the Makhnovist army held back the Denikinites for six months. It then stretched for more than a hundred versts, from Mariupol to the east and northeast.
The struggle on this front took on a stubborn and fierce character. The Denikinites, imitating the Makhnovists, began to resort to the partisan method of action. In separate cavalry detachments, they burst into the deep rear of the region, inflicted a series of blows, disappeared and suddenly reappeared in another place. Only the working population suffered from these raids. They took revenge on him for supporting the Makhnovist army, for not sympathizing with the Denikinites. The Jewish population also suffered from these raids. Jews, Denikin's detachments crushed at each of their raids, trying to artificially provoke an anti-Semitic movement that would create fertile ground for their invasion of Ukraine. General Shkuro especially showed himself in these raids. However, for more than four months the Denikinites, despite the elite composition of the troops and the fierceness of the attacks, were unable to overpower the Makhnovists. Very often General Shkuro had to come under such blows of the insurgent regiments that only a retreat of 80-120 versts to Taganrog and Rostov saved him from complete disaster. At that time, the Makhnovists were at the walls of Taganrog no more than five times. The bitterness and hatred of Denikin's officers towards the Makhnovists took incredible forms. "They subjected the captured Makhnovists to various tortures, tore them up with shells, and there were cases when they burned them on sheets of red-hot iron." 2
The Bolsheviks came to the Makhnovshchina region much later than the Denikinites. By that time, the Makhnovists had already ousted the Denikinites from their area and drew a front line east of Mariupol. Only after that did the first division of the Bolsheviks, led by Dybenko, come to Sinelnikovo. Makhno himself and the Makhnovshchina were unknown to the Bolsheviks. Prior to that, the communist press wrote about Makhno as a brave revolutionary with a promising future. His struggle, first with Hetman Skoropadsky, then with Petliura and Denikin, pre-arranged the prominent leaders of Bolshevism in his favor. In the spirit of these praises, the first meeting of the Bolshevik military command with Makhno took place in March 1919. He was immediately asked to enter the Red Army with his detachments in order to defeat Denikin with joint forces.
Makhno and the headquarters of the insurgent army saw perfectly well that the coming of communist power to them would bring with it a new threat to the free region; that it is a messenger of civil war from the other end. But neither Makhno nor the army headquarters wanted this war. It was mainly taken into account that a frank counter-revolution was organized from the Don and Kuban, with which there could be only one conversation - a conversation with weapons. The insurgents had the hope that the fight against the Bolsheviks would be limited to ideological power. In this case, they were absolutely calm about their region, since the strength of revolutionary ideas, revolutionary flair and distrust of the peasants towards outsiders would have been the best defenders of the region. The general opinion of the leaders of the Makhnovshchina was that all their forces should be directed against the monarchist counter-revolution, and after its liquidation they should turn to ideological differences with the Bolsheviks. In this sense, the unification of the Makhnovist army with the Red Army took place.
Since February 1919, the Makhnovist detachments have joined the Zadneprovsk Soviet division, later in the 2 Ukrainian Red Army, as a separate brigade with an elective command and internal independence. The insurgent army became part of the Red Army on the following grounds:
- a) her internal routine remains the same;
- b) it receives political commissars appointed by the communist government;
- c) it is subordinate to the high command of the Red Army only in operational terms;
- d) the army is not being withdrawn from the anti-Denikin front;
- e) the army receives military equipment and upkeep on a par with the units of the Red Army;
- f) the army continues to be called the Revolutionary Insurrectionary, keeping the black banners with it. 3
Soviet construction in the Ukrainian village went on in conditions of devastation and famine in the cities. In the countryside, the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine and the leadership of the CP (b) U made a number of mistakes that determined agrarian policy for a long time and undermined the foundations of the union of the working people of the city and the countryside. "The head of the SNKh of the Ukrainian SSR E.I. Queering and the People's Commissar of Agriculture V.N. Meshcheryakov avoided fulfilling the guidelines on the land issue set forth in the Manifesto of the Soviet Government of Ukraine on the confiscation and equalizing distribution of landlord lands out of 14.5 million dessiatins. confiscated land only 5 million dess. was transferred to the middle peasants and the poor, the rest passed to collective farms and state farms. In southern Ukraine, large commodity-grain landlord farms, which form the basis of grain production, were transformed into collective and state farms. These measures revived part of the peasantry, who did not receive the expected land, against Soviet power. Despite the fact that V. I. Lenin repeatedly pointed out the inadmissibility of the compulsory alienation of land and the violation of the voluntariness of the creation of collective farms and demanded correction of mistakes, this was not done in Ukraine until February 1920. In addition, the People's Commissariat for Food of Ukraine established for its entire territory the same indicator for determining the kulak farms, and these measures against the kulaks hurt the interests of the middle peasants, since in the south of Ukraine there were 7-10 acres of land per farm of the middle peasants, while in the north Ukraine - 4 tithes ”. 4
On April 1, 1919, food appropriation was introduced in Ukraine. It was conducted without taking into account the class structure of the village, the poor strata were not interested in providing assistance to food detachments. Serious mistakes were made in organizing food policy. Often the surplus appropriation was carried out uncontrollably, the withdrawal of grain exceeded the permissible limits. VI Mezhlauk in a telegram to VI Lenin categorically objected to the attempts of some food workers to consider "Ukraine as a promised country, from where you can draw a lot without taking into account."
In addition, having declared at the III Congress of the CP (b) U about the inadmissibility of any political agreements with democratic and socialist parties and groups, the Bolsheviks doomed themselves to loneliness in the struggle against reaction. In January 1919, LD Trotsky wrote that in Ukraine "... the heavy hand of revolutionary repressions immediately fell on the head of anarchists, leftist Socialist-Revolutionaries and just criminal adventurers." He called on the leadership of the blows of the "iron broom" "to drive them into such cracks, from which it is better for them never to leave." 45
Under these conditions, in February 1919, at the Second Congress of the Makhnovists and delegates of the peasants of the area controlled by them, the Makhnovists demanded the autonomy of the region and their detachments in dealing with internal issues, the independence of local "free Soviets", created on non-party, classless principles. At the congress, the Revolutionary Military Council was organized, "combining the functions of parliament and an advisory body," determining the policy and ideology of the movement. The congress demanded that the Chekist organizations and leaders - "appointees" from the central government be prevented from entering the region, put forward the conditions for the election of the leadership of the local population. A delegation was sent to Kharkiv on behalf of the congress in order to seek independence from the government of the region. At the same time, the congress approved a resolution on the need for the unity of all revolutionary forces and reprimanded the supporters of a break with Soviet power.
In April 1919, the Third Congress of the Makhnovists and representatives of the peasantry from 72 volosts in the south of Ukraine took place. At the congress, the land and food policy of the Soviet government in Ukraine was sharply criticized. Resolutions were adopted against the Bolshevization of the Soviets, the "commissar-power", against the Extraordinary Commissions. Despite the extremist, anarchist slogans, this congress also spoke in favor of a "united front" policy with the Bolsheviks and indicated that the overthrow of Soviet power or a rebellion against it would lead to the triumph of reaction.
The mistakes of the Bolsheviks in agrarian and food policy, confrontation with the petty-bourgeois democracy helped elements hostile to Soviet power to provoke peasant revolts. In April 1919, in Ukraine, as a result of aggravated class contradictions, economic turmoil and leadership mistakes, they broke out in the countryside and among the soldiers of the Ukrainian Red Army, which mainly consisted of former partisan and insurgent units. The revolts of the Atamans Zeleny, Katsyura, Struk, Sokolovsky, Angel continued until August 1919, when Ukraine was captured by the White Guards and Petliurites. The general demand of the rebels of various political overtones was a change in agricultural and food policy.
At the congresses of the Makhnovists, resolutions were adopted calling for the building of an anarchist society on the basis of supra-class anarchist organizations - free Soviets, "workers' unions of peasant communities." The political struggle for central power was declared a deception of the people and an action incompatible with anarchism. Criticism of the mistakes of the Soviet regime in the spring of 1919 was not aimed at preparing a rebellion, but was only a manifestation of the discontent of the peasant masses with the policy of "war communism" and the establishment of a command-administrative centralized system of government. The old anarchist slogan "Walk apart, beat together" is also characteristic of the attitude of the Makhnovists towards the proletarian party in the spring of 1919.
Nestor Makhno had to contain the discontent and open hostility towards the communists, which was observed among individual rebels in his peasant army. He spoke out against hostility to the communists, held back the most zealous anarchists from the Confederation of Anarchist Organizations of Ukraine "Nabat". Makhno categorically refused to give money to the well-known anarchist Marusa Nikiforova for the fight against the Bolsheviks.
At the same time, the policy of the "united front" advocated by the Makhnovists did not mean that they were ready to sacrifice their interests. The Makhnovist movement, in search of “its own” path in the revolution, slipped into the position of the “third force,” declaring a temporary alliance with the “statists” - the Bolsheviks “for tactical reasons,” that discord in the revolutionary camp or not help reaction.
The dual social nature of the petty bourgeoisie was expressed in the vacillation of the middle peasants, whose interests did not correspond to the policy of "war communism". Under the conditions of confrontation between reaction and revolution, the middle peasant, aware of the danger of restoring landlord ownership, resisted attacks against Soviet power, but under the weight of surplus appropriation and various duties, "... this petty bourgeois force was transformed into an anarchist element that expresses its demands in excitement."
Some extremists from anarchist groups called to prepare for a "third" revolution (the revolution of 1905-1907 was not taken into account), which, in their opinion, would destroy the socialist state and lead to anarchy.
The Makhnovists in the period 1918 - the first half of 1919, recognizing with reservations the Soviet power as the only force capable of crushing the reaction, expressed middle peasant sentiments and, depending on the strengthening or weakening of the pressure of the authorities, supported the proletariat, trying, without entering a military conflict, to seek concessions from the authorities with with the help of the demands of congresses, gatherings, sending delegations with a demand to the center. This position distinguished the Makhnovists from the petty-bourgeois counter-revolution, which, in the person of the ataman Grigoriev, called for the destruction of the communists and embodied its slogans in practice.
And although, as V.A. Antonov-Ovsienko, the Makhnovist movement was "serious and sharply sharpened against the Petliura and Denikinites and at first sought to limit the kulak influence in the countryside, it suffered from an underdeveloped ideology and from the lack of awareness of its place in the events that brought it to a tragic outcome." 6
Since April 1919, in relations between Nestor Makhno and his headquarters, on the one hand, and with the command of the Red Army and the Republican Strategic Military Council, on the other, an atmosphere of mutual mistrust has been established, growing into enmity. This was caused not only by the resistance of the Makhnovists to the policy of "war communism", but also by the further development and establishment of anarchist ideology in the Makhnovist movement. Makhnovist newspapers; V. Volin (V. Eikhenbaum) in the second half of 1919 headed the Makhnovist Military Revolutionary Council. The leaders of the Nabat Confederation tried to unite different trends - anarchism-communism, anarchism-syndicatism and anarchism-individualism - on the basis of denying the transitional stage from capitalism to anarchist communism and demanded that their like-minded people lay the foundations of anarchy by creating economic, syndicalist organizations not controlled by the state. cooperatives, factory committees, communes for the gradual seizure of the means of production. They argued that in Ukraine, thanks to a wide insurrectionary movement, all the conditions were created for the first anarchist revolution, which would start a worldwide anarchist revolution. Since April 1919, the "Nabatists" refused all cooperation and "compromises" with the Soviet regime, gradually slipped into anti-Bolshevik positions and pushed the Makhnovists toward them.
The central bodies of Soviet power and the command received conflicting information about the state of affairs in the Makhnovist brigade, and the Gulyai-Polsky district. The Bureau of the Ukrainian Soviet Press reported about good discipline among the Makhnovists, that they noted the absence of banditry, unwillingness to retreat in front of volunteers and a "friendly attitude" towards the population. A politician and political instructor of the Zadneprovsk division, reporting on the state of the Makhnovist units, notes that political workers are accepted into the Makhnovist units and carry out work there, that the Makhnovists have "impulses to fight the enemy", good discipline and disposition towards Soviet power. They noted that, thanks to the authority of "Batka" Makhno, "whose popularity is incredible," his units are rapidly growing at the expense of volunteers.
However, along with positive reviews, there were many reports about anti-Bolshevik sentiments and "hooliganism" that reigned in the ranks of the Makhnovists. The Supreme Military Inspectorate of the Red Army, headed by its chairman N.I. Podvoisky was advised to reorganize the Makhnovist brigade, remove Makhno from office and hand him over and the commanders to the court. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council G.Ya. Sokolnikov in a telegram to V.I. Lenin and Kh.G. Rakovsky (Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR) reported that "... Makhno is waging a decisive, open struggle against the communists", robbing the population, and suggested, taking advantage of the military failures of the Makhnovists, "to remove Makhno." 7
It is difficult now to determine the accuracy of these or those statements, but there are facts indicating that in the spring of 1919 the Makhnovists were not going to raise a mutiny. Thus, neither in the Makhnovist newspapers, nor in the proclamations of the spring of 1919, there are calls for an immediate rebellion and an armed struggle against Soviet power; on the contrary, they assert the need for a military alliance of the "left forces". The relationship between Makhno and the center worsened due to the fact that in 1919-1920. in Ukraine, the question of the abuses of the Cheka was acute. In all the peasant revolts of that time, there was the slogan of the defeat of the Cheka. In June 1919 V.I. Lenin wrote to MI Latskis (chairman of the All-Ukrainian Cheka): “Kamenev says - and declares that several of the most prominent KGB officers confirm that the Cheka in Ukraine brought darkness of evil, being created too early and letting in a lot of those who had attached themselves. It is necessary to check the composition more strictly - I hope Dzerzhinsky will help you with this from here. It is necessary to pull up, by all means, the Chekists, and expel those who have applied. If you have a convenient opportunity, let me know in more detail about the cleaning of the Cheka in Ukraine, about the results of the work. " nine
In the Makhnovist press there were many statements against the emergency commissions in Ukraine and calls for their liquidation. The Makhnovists went from words to deeds. They abolished the Mariupol and Berdyansk district Cheka, a detachment of the Berdyansk Cheka was sent to the front. nine
In April 1919 A.E. Skachko (the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Red Army, which included the Makhnovist brigade), in a telegram to the commander of the Ukrainian Front, reported that "... the local Cheka are leading a reinforced campaign against the Makhnovists"; while the Makhnovists are fighting at the front, they are persecuted in the rear for one belonging to the Makhnovist movement. Skachko emphasized that "... with stupid, stupid antics, petty extraordinary affairs are definitely provoking the Makhnovist troops and the population to revolt against the Soviet regime." 10 The political commissar of the Zadneprovsk division also reported on unnecessary work in the "area of \u200b\u200bemergency situations". The Bolshevik newspaper "Zvezda" (Yekaterinoslav) in May 1919 pointed out that the local, southern Ukrainian Cheka "... are far from perfect and ideal" and "do not stand up to criticism from the point of view of revolutionary legal consciousness and socialism." The newspaper pointed to the "comprehensive competence" and "endless rights" of the Cheka, in particular the right of extrajudicial execution, and proposed to reorganize the Cheka and subordinate them to the revolutionary tribunals. eleven
From the end of April 1919, accusations against N.I. Makhno. An article was published in the newspaper Izvestia (Kharkov), which spoke about the anti-Soviet character of the Makhnovist movement and called on to put a limit on it. Similar articles have appeared in other publications. V.A. Antonov-Ovsienko, realizing that a confrontation with the Makhnovists can lead to grave consequences, in a telegram to the government of the Ukrainian SSR demands "... to immediately stop the provocative persecution of the Makhnovists in newspapers." 12
The tangle of contradictions that had accumulated by June 1919 threatened to turn into a tragedy. Makhno was charged with the fact that his detachments detained trains with coal and grain going from Donbass to the center of Russia. This was indeed the case. In May 1919, due to the aggravation of relations with the Makhnovists and the central military command, the Makhnovist brigade, after transferring it from subordination to the Ukrainian Front to subordination to the Southern Front, actually ceased to receive provisions, ammunition, and ammunition from the command. The supply sabotage put the Makhnovists in a very difficult position. Although, according to the military alliance between the Red Army and the Makhnovists, the command pledged to supply the Makhnovist brigade with everything necessary, this has not been done since May 1919. The Makhnovists tried to "knock out" ammunition and ammunition from the command by delaying certain echelons and demanding the establishment of trade.
However, the figures for the delay of the trains were sharply overestimated. It should also be noted that in February 1919 the Makhnovists donated 90 wagons of trophy flour to Moscow and Petrograd. Subsequently, many echelons freely passed to the center of Russia through the Makhnovsky region.
Later L.D. Trotsky, in his order to defeat the Makhnovists, motivating their treason, revealed the secrets of supplying the Makhnovist brigade. So, Trotsky accuses the Makhnovists of seizing "... food, uniforms, ammunition ... anywhere ...", completely forgetting that the command is responsible for supplying units of the Red Army. In the same order, Trotsky accuses the Makhnovists of the fact that they "... refuse to release coal and grain except in exchange for various supplies." 13 It follows from everything that the supply blockade of the Makhnovist brigade, which held an important sector of the front, undermined the combat capability of the Makhnovist units and created economic difficulties for the Soviet rear.
Trotsky, in a report dated May 22, 1919 to Moscow and Kharkov, proposed, with the help of a large detachment of Chekists, Baltic sailors and workers, to defeat the Makhnovists and take out grain and coal from the region, arguing that only after eliminating the Makhnovshchina, it is possible to carry out an offensive on Rostov, although the Makhnovist the brigade chained to itself significant forces of the White Guards, waging battles with them. IN AND. Lenin in a telegram to the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, warning of hasty and brutal measures against the Makhnovists, pointed out that relations with the Makhnovists regarding the export of coal and grain from Mariupol should be decided not by force, but by the establishment of trade.
The arrival of Antonov-Ovsienko and Kamenev in Gulyai Pole can be viewed as a thorough reconnaissance of the Bolsheviks before their attack on the area. At this time, several attempts were made to kill Makhno. In a word, every new day said that the Bolsheviks will decide not today - tomorrow with arms about the ideological influence in the Ukrainian revolution. Grigoriev's rebellion unexpectedly forced them outwardly and for some time to change their attitude towards the Makhnovshchina. fourteen
In early May 1919, the commander of the 6th Division of the 3rd Red Ukrainian Army N.A. Grigoriev launched an anti-Soviet rebellion. The suddenness of the performance allowed the rebels to seize Central Ukraine with the cities of Yekaterinoslav, Elisavetgrad, Cherkassy, \u200b\u200bKremenchug, Nikolaev, Kherson. In the Universal (Appeal) issued by the rebels, slogans of anti-Semitism and Ukrainian nationalism coexisted with demands for the abolition of food intelligence, the liquidation of collective farms, and free trade. The Grigorievites were supported by some other Soviet military units - the sailor's crew in Nikolaev, the Black Sea regiment in Yekaterinoslav.
During the Grigoriev rebellion, the Soviet command had concerns about the possibility of supporting the Grigorievites by the Makhnovists. On May 12, 1919, Makhno was presented with an ultimatum demanding to immediately issue an appeal against the rebels and inform the location of his units. Failure to comply with this order threatened Makhno to be outlawed. The Makhnovist headquarters fulfills these requirements and publishes a proclamation "Who is Grigoriev", which declares Ataman Grigoriev an enemy of the revolution. The proclamation spoke of the need to keep the front against the White Guards and that the rebels should not pay attention to "... the feud between Grigoriev and the Bolsheviks for political power." The Makhnovist Crimean regiment was later sent against the rebels.
Trotsky and his associates hastened to take advantage of the appropriate situation to accuse and defeat the Makhnovist movement. In a telegram to Rakovsky, Trotsky proposes "... after the crushing of the main Grigoriev forces" to liquidate the Makhnovist movement. “The task boils down to,” he argued, “to use the effect of Grigoriev's banditry, pulling in sufficiently reliable units to split Makhno. In order to remove the top, pull it up below. " 15 This task was to be performed by a group of troops under the command of K.E. Voroshilov.
Grigoriev is a former tsarist officer. On the eve of the overthrow of the hetman, he was in the ranks of the Petliurites. In the days of the disintegration of the Petliura army, Grigoriev, with all his units, went over to the side of the Bolsheviks. In the Kherson province, he played a significant role in the elimination of Petliura's power. He took Odessa. Then, until recently, he held the front in the direction of Bessarabia. In May 1919, Grigoriev opened the front. The Makhnovists had to take the most energetic measures to preserve the front. Grigoriev's gamble began to decline very quickly. Grigoriev remained with a detachment of several thousand people, consolidating himself in the Alexandria district of the Kherson province. As soon as the danger from Grigoriev was over, the previous Bolshevik agitation against the Makhnovshchina began. The delivery of ammunition and the necessary equipment, spent daily at the front, stopped altogether. And this at a time when the Denikinites were incredibly strengthened at the front with regiments of Kuban shepherds and Caucasian formations.
At a time when the insurgent troops were dying under the pressure of Cossack avalanches, the Bolsheviks invaded the insurgent villages in several regiments, seized and executed individual insurgent workers on the spot, and destroyed the district's communes or similar organizations. Trotsky played a decisive role in this campaign. He, who threatened all anarchism in Russia with an "iron broom", issued a number of orders directed against the Makhnovshchina. Trotsky's policy towards the Makhnovshchina was expressed by him in approximately the following form: it is better to give the whole of Ukraine to Denikin than to allow further development of the Makhnovshchina. The Bolsheviks withdrew several of their regiments from the Grishin sector of the front, thereby opening free passage for the Denikinites to the Gulyai Polsky region. Denikin's troops broke into the area not from the rebel front, but from the left flank, where the Red Army units were stationed. As a result, the Makhnovist army, which held the Mariupol-Kuteinikovo-Taganrog line, was bypassed by the Denikinites.
On June 6, the Denikinites occupied Gulyaypole, destroying the regiment formed by the peasants of the village. Makhno, with the army headquarters and a small detachment with one battery, retreated to the Gulyaypole railway station, knocked out the Denikinites from it and occupied the village. However, the approaching new forces of the Cossacks forced him to leave the village again.
The Bolsheviks, who issued a number of orders against the Makhnovists, were outwardly loyal to the Makhnovists for the first days. This was a tactic designed to capture the leaders of the Makhnovshchina. On June 7, they sent an armored train to Makhno's disposal. On June 8, several echelons of Red troops arrived at the Gyaychur station; the military commissar Mezhlauk, Voroshilov and others arrived. Contact was established between the red and the rebel command. Mezhlauk, Voroshilov were on the same armored train with Makhno, jointly leading the military operations. But at the same time, Voroshilov had an order from Trotsky to seize Makhno, all the responsible leaders of the Makhnovshchina, to disarm the insurgent units that were resisting to shoot. Makhno was warned in time and figured out what to do. He considered his departure from the post of commander of the rebel front the healthiest way out.
Meanwhile, the insurgent units behind Mariupol were retreating to Pologi and Aleksandrovsk. Makhno suddenly rushed to them, breaking free of the Bolshevik conspiracy. The chief of staff of the Makhnovist army, Ozerov, members of the staff Mikhalev-Pavlenko, Burobycha, and several people from the Soviet were subsequently captured and executed. The situation for Makhno was extremely difficult. He had to either completely withdraw from his units, or call them up to fight the Bolsheviks. But the latter, in view of Denikin's decisive offensive, seemed impossible to him. Makhno addressed the insurgent troops with a broad appeal, in which he highlighted the situation that had arisen, announced his resignation from the command post and asked the insurgents to keep the front against the Denikinites, despite the fact that they would temporarily be under the command of the Bolshevik headquarters. Makhno then fled with a small cavalry detachment. The insurgent regiments, renamed Red, under the command of their former commanders - Kalashnikov, Kurylenko, Klein, Dermendzhi and others - continued to fight the Denikinites, delaying their advance on Aleksandrovsk and Yekaterinoslav.
Yekaterinoslav fell at the end of June. Then Kharkov fell. The Bolsheviks did not engage in offensive or even defense, but exclusively in evacuation. And then, when it became clear everywhere that the Bolsheviks were abandoning Ukraine, trying only to take out of it as much of the male population and railway rolling stock as possible. Makhno considered the moment appropriate to take the initiative in the struggle against counter-revolution into his own hands. And to act as an independent revolutionary force both against Denikin and against the Bolsheviks. In the ranks of the rebels, who remained temporarily under the red command, the password was given to overthrow the red commanders and group under the general command of Makhno. The coup was organized by the Makhnovist commanders who were former in the ranks of the Red Army - Kalashnikov, Dermendzhi and Budapov. The connection took place behind the Pomoshchnaya station, in the town of Dobrovelichkov, Kherson province, in early August 1919. The area of \u200b\u200bPomoshchnaya, Elisavetrograd and Voznesensk was the first stronghold where Makhno stopped and began to put in order the combat units that had flown to him from different sides. There were formed four brigades of infantry and cavalry troops, a separate artillery division and a machine-gun regiment - a total of about 15,000 fighters. A separate horse hundred of 150-200 sabers, which was always with Makhno, was not included in this number of troops. With these forces, the Makhnovists launched an offensive against the Denikinites. The clash took on a fierce character. Several times the Denikinites were thrown 50-80 versts back to the east. In battles, they gave three armored trains to the Makhnovists, among which was a huge one - "Invincible". But reinforced with fresh forces, they again pushed the Makhnovists back to the west. On their side was a significant numerical superiority and superiority in weapons. Meanwhile, there were almost no cartridges in the Makhnovist army. Of the three attacks on Denikin, two had to be done solely with the aim of recapturing their cartridges. In addition, the Makhnovists had to act against the Bolshevik group retreating from Odessa to the North. Therefore, they had to abandon the Elisavetgrad-Pomoshchnaya-Voznesensk area and retreat further.
The retreat went on with continuous battles. The group of Denikinites who persecuted Makhno were distinguished by extreme stubbornness and persistence. It included officer regiments: First Simferopol and Second Labinsky. From mid-August 1919, this group began to strongly press Makhno, trying to embrace him from several sides. In the second half of August, a second group was added to this group of Denikinites, pushing Makhno from the east, coming from the direction of Odessa and Voznesensk. Then the insurgent army abandoned the railway area, having previously blown up all its armored trains. The retreat followed country roads. This is a retreat followed by daily battles. lasted more than a month, until the army of the Makhnovists approached the city of Uman, which was occupied by the troops of the Petliurites. At this time, the Makhnovist army had 8,000 wounded soldiers, which made up a huge baggage train, which slowed down its movement and military operations. After a thorough discussion of the issue, it was decided to offer the Petliurites military neutrality. Meanwhile, a delegation from Petliura arrived from Uman to the Makhnovist camp. The Petliurists, being in the war with Denikin, did not want to have a second front and wanted to avoid military clashes with the Makhnovists. Both sides pledged to maintain strict military neutrality towards each other, regardless of the political direction of each side. The Petliurites, in addition, undertook to receive and place all the wounded Makhnovists in hospitals.
Of course, both Makhno and everyone else in the army saw that neutrality was a fiction: that not today or tomorrow one could expect an alliance between the Petliurites and the Denikinites and their joint attack on the Makhnovists. But for Makhno it was important to gain one or two weeks of time. In fact, the attitude of the Makhnovists towards the Petliurites remained the same. sixteen
The suspicions of the Makhnovists were soon confirmed. By agreement with the Petliurites, the Makhnovist army could occupy an area of \u200b\u200b10 square miles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Tekuche, near Uman. From the north and west were the Petliurites; from the east and south there were Denikinites. A few days later, information was received about that. that the Petliurites are negotiating with the Denikin command about the conditions for encircling and defeating Makhno by joint forces. At the same time - September 24-25 - in the rear of the Makhnovists, on the western side, there were about 4-5 Denikin regiments. They could get there only by going through the area occupied by the Petliurists. On the evening of September 25, the Makhnovists were surrounded by Denikin's regiments from all sides. Uman was also busy with them. The fate of the entire army of Makhnovist rebels was decided.
From 25 to 26 September, the Makhnovist units, which had been keeping a course to the west all the time, suddenly turned all their forces to the east and went head-on to the main forces of the Denikin group. On September 25, in the evening, near the village of Krutenkoye, a battle of the first brigade of the Makhnovist army with units of Denikin took place. The latter retreated, trying to position themselves more firmly and lure the enemy, but the Makhnovists did not pursue them. This deceived the vigilance of the Denikinites. Meanwhile, at night, all the units of the Makhnovists who were stationed in several villages withdrew and moved eastward - against the enemy, who was stationed with the main forces near the village of Peregonovka, occupied by the Makhnovists.
Between three and four o'clock in the morning, a battle began. It went on continuously, developing and strengthening. By eight o'clock in the morning, it reached its highest tension. Makhno himself with his hundred went around the enemy. By nine o'clock in the morning, the Makhnovists began to retreat. The battle was already on the outskirts of the village. The Denikinites from various places pulled up the rest of their forces and pressed the Makhnovists. The members of the headquarters of the rebel army went to the chain. The critical moment came when it seemed that the battle was lost, which means everything was over. The outcome of the battle was decided by the sudden appearance of Makhno. Already at the moment when the Makhnovists began to retreat in a wave and the battle was on the outskirts of the village, Makhno with his hundred crashed into the rear of the enemy. A fierce hand-to-hand fight went on, and the First Officer Simferopol Regiment was not strong, but it was shot down and put to flight. Other regiments rushed after this regiment. And finally, all Denikin's units fled to the Sinyukha River, trying to cross it and gain a foothold on the other bank.
The pursuit lasted 12-15 versts. At the most important moment, when the Denikinites reached the river, the Makhnovist cavalry overtook them. Several hundred of them died in the river. Most of them managed to get across, but were intercepted by Makhno. The Denikin's headquarters and the reserve regiment, which stood on the other side of the river, were also captured. Of all the units, few managed to escape. The first officer's Simferopol regiment and other regiments were completely cut down. This event was only an inevitable consequence of the single combats between the Denikin army and the Makhnovists. Had the slightest blunder on the part of Makhno, the same fate would have befallen the revolutionary insurrectionary army.
The army's movement back to the Dnieper proceeded very quickly. The next day, after the defeat of the Denikinites, Makhno was at Peregonovka more than a hundred miles from the battlefield. And a day later the Makhnovists occupied Dolineka, Krivoy Rog and approached Nikopol. And on September 29, the Kichkassky bridge across the Dnieper was captured and the city of Aleksandrovsk was occupied. Alexandrovsky was followed by Pologi, Gulyai Pole, Berdyansk, Melitopol and Mariupol. In a week and a half, the entire south of Ukraine was cleared of Denikin's troops and authorities.
The liberation of the south of Ukraine by the Makhnovists, mainly the Azov region, endangered Denikin's entire company. The fact is that the main supply base of the Denikin army was located in the Mariupol-Volnovakha region. When Berdyansk and Mariupol were captured, there was a huge number of shells. There were whole tiers of shells in Volnovakha. And although it had not yet been taken, it could no longer serve the army of Denikin, since the railroad of the entire region was in the hands of the Makhnovists. The rear units serving the area were destroyed. Thus, this entire gigantic artillery base fell into the circle of the Makhnovists, and, from that time on, could no longer send a single shell either to the northern or to any other front. 17
The Denikinites hastily dispatched units that were in reserve near Taganrog against Makhno; but these parts were also broken. The Makhnovists rushed into the depths of the Donetsk basin, took Yekaterinoslav. Then the Denikinites realized that the center of the struggle from the north was shifted to the south, that the fate of their case would be decided in the south.
In connection with this state of affairs, the Denikinites removed their best cavalry units from the northern front - Mamontov and Shkuro. thanks to fresh forces and a multitude of armored vehicles, the Denikinites began to oust the Makhnovist units from certain places: Berdyansk, Mariupol and Gulyai Polya. But this only meant that Makhno occupied Sinelnikovo, Pavlograd, Yekaterinoslav and a number of other places. During October-November, the struggle again took on a fierce character, and in it Denikin's units again suffered several huge defeats. Most of all went to the Caucasian units. And at the end of November they willfully abandon Denikin's army and return to their Caucasus. So the general disintegration of Denikin's army began.
In the struggle against the Makhnovshchina in the south of Russia, the Denikinites suffered a complete defeat, and this predetermined the outcome of their entire campaign against the Russian revolution.
If it were not for the Uman breakthrough and the subsequent and subsequent defeat of the rear, the artillery base and all the equipment of the Denikinites, the latter would probably have entered Moscow around December 1919. The battle between the Reds and Denikin's troops near Orel was of little importance. Basically, the retreat of Denikin's troops to the south began earlier, precisely in connection with the defeat of the rear. All their subsequent military operations were intended to carry out, if possible, a painless retreat and take out the property.
The destruction of Denikin's counter-revolution in the fall of 1919 was one of the main tasks of the Makhnovshchina in the Russian revolution. The Makhnovists fulfilled this task in full. But this task did not exhaust the entire historical mission entrusted to the Makhnovists by the Russian revolution during this period. The country liberated from Denikin needed immediate protection throughout its territory. Without this protection, the country and the revolutionary opportunities that opened up before it with the destruction of Denikinism, could be crushed every day by the state armies of the Bolsheviks, who hastily rushed to Ukraine after the retreating Denikin.
The banners of the Makhnovshchina were raised throughout Ukraine. The necessary organizational steps were not enough to merge the entire numerous, dispersed in different parts of Ukraine, fighting force into one powerful revolutionary people's army. which would become a reliable guard on the approaches to the revolutionary territory.
However, the enthusiasm for victory and a share of carelessness prevented the Makhnovists from creating such a force in time. Therefore, from the very first days of the arrival of the Red Army in Ukraine, the Makhnovists were forced to concentrate in the cramped Gulyai-Polsky District.
In December, several divisions of Red troops came to the area of \u200b\u200bYekaterinoslav and Aleksandrovsk. A little later, an order from the Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Red Army came to the name of the commander of the Makhnovist army, ordering to send the insurgent army to the Polish front. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Makhnovist army replied that it found the order of the 14th Army inappropriate and provocative.
In mid-January 1920, Makhno and the soldiers of his army in the name of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee were again outlawed, as they refused to go to the Polish front. A fierce struggle broke out between the Makhnovists and the communist government. To avoid fraternization between the Red Army and the Makhnovists, they sent a Latvian rifle division and a group of Chinese against the Makhnovists - the units least versed in the Russian revolution and blindly obeying the authorities.
Despite the large number of Red troops, Makhno and his units were always out of reach. The actions of the Bolsheviks against the Makhnovists bore all the signs of terror. Mass executions of peasants proceeded unhindered.
During the spring and summer of 1920, the Makhnovists had to fight not with individual Red units, but, in fact, with the entire state apparatus of the Bolsheviks. For this reason, the army more than once had to evade the enemy, break away from its area and make thousand-verst raids. She was forced to retreat, then to the Donetsk region, then to the Kharkov and Poltava provinces. These raids were widely used for propaganda purposes.
During the summer of 1920, the Makhnovists began a campaign against Wrangel several times. Twice they fought with his units, but both times they were hit in the rear by the red troops. Throughout Ukraine, Soviet newspapers wrote about Makhno's alliance with Wrangel.
Wrangel did indeed send an envoy to Makhno, but he was publicly executed, and the incident itself was consecrated by the Makhnovists in their press. And at a meeting of the Council of Revolutionary Insurgents and the headquarters of the army, it was decided to propose to the communists, in order to jointly defeat Wrangel, to stop the mutual struggle. On behalf of the council of the insurgent army, in July and August 1920, telegrams of the corresponding content were sent to Kharkov and Moscow. There was no answer. The communists waged the previous war with the Makhnovists. But in September, when Yekaterinoslav was evacuated, when Wrangel occupied Berdyansk, Aleksandrovsk, Gulyai Pole, Sinelnikovo, a plenipotentiary delegation from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, headed by Ivanov, arrived in Starobelsk, where the Makhnovists were stationed, to negotiate joint actions against Wrangel. negotiations took place in the same place in Starobelsk, where the preliminary conditions for a military-political agreement with the Soviet government were selected.
For a long time, the Soviet government, under various pretexts, delayed the publication of this agreement. But the Makhnovists raised the issue sharply: until the agreement is published, the Makhnovist army cannot act on the basis of this agreement. It was only after such pressure from the Makhnovists that the Soviet government published the text of the agreement, but not all at once, but in parts: first, the second part, on a political issue. In this regard, the meaning of the agreement was obscured and understood correctly by very few. As for the fourth point of the political agreement, the Bolsheviks did not publish it, stating that it requires special discussion and consultation with Moscow.
After that, on October 15, the Makhnovist army went to Wrangel. Its combat participant was the area - Sinelnikovo, Aleksandrovsk, Pologi, Berdyansk, and the direction - Perekop. During the very first battles in the Pologa-Orekhov area, a large group of Wrangel soldiers was defeated, led by General Drozdov, and about 4 thousand Wrangel soldiers were taken prisoner. Three weeks later, the area was completely liberated from Wrangel's troops. In early November, the Makhnovists, together with the Red troops, were already at Perekop.
The role of the Makhnovists in cleansing the Crimea from the Wrangelites was as follows. At a time when red units were standing near Perekop, the Makhnovists, according to an operational order, took 25-30 versts to the left of Perekop and began to cross the Sivash. The first to go was the cavalry under the leadership of Marchenko - Gulyai Polish peasant - anarchist, then - the machine-gun regiment led by Kozhin. The crossing was under heavy fire from the enemy and cost a lot. Among many others, the commander Foma Kozhin was seriously wounded in the first battle. However, the perseverance and courage of the attackers turned the Wrangelites to flight. Then, Semyon Karetnik, commander of the Crimean army of the Makhnovists, sent all the units directly to Simferopol, which was taken by them. At the same time, Perekop was occupied by the red units. There is no doubt that the Makhnovists who entered through the Sivash into the depths of the Crimea contributed to his attack, forcing the Wrangelites to rush into the deep rear of the peninsula so as not to be squeezed from all sides in the Perekop gorges.
No one among the Makhnovists believed in the duration and strength of the agreement with the Bolsheviks. Based on the past, everyone expected that they would certainly come up with an excuse for a new campaign against the Makhnovshchina. But in view of the political situation, it was believed that this agreement would last three to four months. And this would be of greater importance for a wide propaganda work in the area.
In the defeat of Wrangel, the Makhnovists saw the beginning of the end of the agreement. On November 26, the Bolsheviks treacherously attacked the Makhnovist command and Makhnovist troops in Crimea, Gulyai Pole, captured the Makhnovist government in Kharkov, defeated and arrested all anarchists there, as well as anarchists and anarchist organizations throughout Ukraine.
The Soviet government was not slow to explain its actions: the Makhnovists and anarchists were allegedly preparing an uprising against Soviet power. The slogan of this uprising was supposed to be the fourth clause of the political agreement between the Soviet government and the Makhnovists, which looked like this: “... and political self-government, their autonomy and federal (contractual) relationship with the state bodies of the Soviet republics. " 18 Besides, Makhno was accused of a number of "counter-revolutionary" actions.
In Crimea, all members of the Makhnovist field headquarters and the commander of the Crimean Makhnovist army Semyon Karetnik were captured and killed. The cavalry commander Marchenko, who was surrounded by units of the 4th Red Army, made his way through a series of barriers and obstacles at the crossroads and by December 7, moving day and night, reached the Makhno group. But instead of the mighty cavalry of 1,500 men, a small detachment of 250 people returned, all that remained of the Makhnovist army in the Crimea. The connection took place in the Greek town of Kremenchik. And at that time Frunze was deploying units of three armies, including two cavalry, against Makhno. Almost the entire southern front fell on the rebels. But on the way, a small detachment of Makhnovists grew overgrown, partisan units that had lost contact with each other. The Red Army men of the units defeated by the Makhnovists also joined. At the beginning of December, Makhno already had 2,500 thousand fighters.
After several unsuccessful attempts to encircle Makhno, a huge mass of red armies pushed him to the end of the Azov coast in the Andreevka area. However, Frunze did not take into account the completely unique capabilities of the Makhnovist army. N. Efimov writes: “Makhnovist ... during the partisan struggle, and perhaps also due to his social conditions, has developed individual properties, Makhnovist, everywhere he feels himself independent. Even in battle, his favorite formation is lava, where the individual fighter is presented with maximum independence. The development in the Makhnovist of the properties of an individual soldier gives him the opportunity not to lose his head in dangerous moments ... ”19 Makhno, having explained the task, could disband his army in all four directions in full confidence that it would gather at the indicated point behind enemy lines and strike him. In addition, the Makhnovist army could move entirely on horses and carts, developing a speed of up to 80 versts a day.
All this helped the Makhnovists to get out of the trap prepared by Frunze: “Small groups of Makhnovists already at that time, during the battle, bypassed our units and slipped to the northeast ... and made them scatter. " 20
Having plunged into the carts, the Makhnovists went out into the operational space, smashing the oncoming red units, which could not imagine that the enemy would be able to escape. At the same time, the Red Army infantry fought reluctantly. The Makhnovist army grew again to 10-15 thousand people.
The inability to defeat the Makhnovists by military means pushed the Bolsheviks to build up terror. On December 5, the armies of the Southern Front were ordered to conduct general searches, shoot the peasants who did not surrender their weapons, impose indemnities on the villages, within the boundaries of which attacks on the red units were carried out. In order not to expose his fellow villagers to unnecessary danger, Makhno crosses the Dnieper in December and deepens into the right-bank Ukraine.
The transition to the right bank seriously weakened the Makhnovists - they were not known here, the area was unfamiliar, the sympathies of the peasantry leaned towards the side of the Petliuraites, with whom the Makhnovists had cool relations. At the same time, units of the cavalry divisions were advancing against the Makhnovists. Bloody battles began in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Gorny Tikich River. The Makhnovists moved so rapidly that they managed to catch the commander of one of the divisions L. Parkhomenko by surprise - he was killed on the spot. But the Makhnovists could not resist the onslaught of superior enemy forces on foreign territory. Suffering heavy losses at Gorny Tikich, the Makhnovists went north and crossed the Dnieper at Kanev. Then follows a raid through the Poltava Chernigov province and further to Belovodsk. In mid-February, Makhno turns to his native place. A new idea now possesses him - to spread the movement in breadth, gradually involving more and more new lands, creating support bases everywhere. This was the only way to break the ring of the red armies around his army on wheels. The first attempt to send detachments in different directions was unsuccessful. But in early March, Makhno sent columns to the Don, Voronezh, Kharkov. He himself, with a small mobile group, traveled around numerous centers of the uprising, appearing now in the Don, now in the Poltava region. The peasantry of a wider zone than the indigenous Makhnovsky region got used to the old man and supported him more and more.
It was at this time that the power of the Bolsheviks hung in the balance. Peasant uprisings swept the whole country, the workers of St. Petersburg went on strike, Kronstadt revolted. And everyone demanded the elimination of the regime, later known as "war communism", and the elimination, along with the one-party dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. Demands to stop food appropriation, freedom of trade, and liquidation of comps were deeply realistic, as the near future showed. In March 1921, the Bolsheviks made serious concessions to the peasantry for the sake of the main thing - to preserve their monopoly on power. The process of introducing a new expolitical policy lasted for the spring-summer of 1921. Considering all this, we can say that the Makhnovists and other peasant armies had chances of success at that time.
But it was at this moment that Makhno was unable to restructure his strategy. Having scattered forces to create new rebel zones, he was unable to concentrate large forces in time for a decisive offensive. The failure in the decisive clash on March 13, 1921 led to the fact that throughout April the Makhnovists fortified the insurgent centers in the north and east, but did not undertake a large-scale offensive. By May, Makhno went and concentrated about 2,000 soldiers in the Poltava region under the command of Kozhin and Kurylenko. It was decided to go to Kharkov. For this, such modest forces, of course, were not enough. The insurgent movement expanded its area of \u200b\u200boperations, but was unable to concentrate for decisive blows. The new partisan detachments of the Poltava and Chernigov regions were weakly connected with Makhno, although they rebelled under his slogans. They had not yet accepted the Makhnovist discipline and fully corresponded to the generally accepted idea that the peasant movement was amorphous. Only these 2,000 remained of the old Makhnovist cadres, most of whom were sent out to organize new centers.
Despite frequent successes in battles with the First Cavalry Army, the Makhnovists failed to break through to Kharkov. His strike group got stuck in the Poltava region. At this time, it became clear to the peasants that NEP is serious and for a long time. The ranks of the Makhnovist detachments were melting away. At the end of June, in the battles on Sula, Frunze inflicted a serious defeat on the Makhnovist strike group. By this time, almost three thousand Makhnovists had voluntarily surrendered to the Reds. The movement was melting before our eyes.
But Makhno was not going to surrender. With a small detachment of several dozen people, he breaks through the whole of Ukraine to the Romanian border. Several cavalry divisions are trying to find this detachment, but on August 28, 1921, it crossed the Dniester to Bessarabia. The civil war was over.
Thus, one of the forces that fought against both the Reds and the Whites was the revolutionary peasant movement led by Nestor Makhno, which he declared the third force of the civil war. The anarchist ideas promoted by Nestor Makhno and his like-minded people among the peasant masses fell on fertile soil and found a response among the peasantry. In this way, he managed to attract significant masses of the peasantry to his side and create a Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army.
The army of Nestor Makhno at the first stage entered into an alliance with the Bolsheviks. Together with the Red Army, she fought against Denikin's troops, liberated Ukraine from the Whites.
But the mistrust and negative attitude of the Bolsheviks to the ideological views of Makhno pushed him away from the red movement, he broke with the Bolsheviks and entered into confrontation with them on the fronts, civil war. Just as anarchism itself is contradictory, so was Nestor Makhno. Adhering to the Kropotkin idea that anarchist communism can be implemented immediately after the destruction of the old order, Makhno more than once took hasty, unbalanced and contradictory actions.
In August 1920, he again returned to the Bolsheviks, concluded an agreement with the command of the Red Army. With the Reds he crushed Wrangel's army. Helped the Red Army to liberate Crimea.
However, Nestor Makhno failed to play the role of a "buffer" between the red and white movements. He rolled in one direction or the other. The reason for this was his ideological views and fluctuations between the red and white middle peasants of the country. Nestor Makhno could not merge with the Bolsheviks, since they did not recognize the anarchist idea: without statehood, denial of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and as for the white movement, they generally did not recognize socialist ideas and such a choice of state structure.
In the Makhnovist anarcho-movement, he found the embodiment of the protest, the population of the regions gravitating to the west, against the cruel autocratic state, the attractiveness of Nestor Makhno's idea of \u200b\u200bfreedom, equality and brotherhood provided him with the support of the peasantry.
